France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (79 page)

Then Ciano suddenly summoned him once more. He had just seen Mussolini, who had thought up a “new event.” He was offering a conference with Germany on September 5 to France and England to examine “the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles that were the cause of the current problems.” Mussolini would only invite Hitler if the two democracies agreed to it. François-Poncet welcomed the offer with satisfaction and a bit of skepticism. He phoned Paris at 1:05 p.m.
³⁷
At 1:30 p.m. Corbin phoned from London. Lord Halifax and Chamberlain accepted with little enthusiasm but with one precondition, that the armies be demobilized.

Everything indicates that Mussolini was the originator of the idea. In the cited volume of
Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
,
³⁸
there are some 24 messages from Ambassador Sir Percy Lorraine to Ciano between August 24 to 31, but not once was the topic of a conference raised. Contrary to September 1938, England was not at all involved in the matter. But neither was France. François-Poncet did not discuss it during his August 24 meeting with Ciano nor in his dispatches to the department. On August 28 the Italian ambassador to Paris, Raffaele Guariglia, had long talks with Anatole de Monzie and Mistler. Both told him of the French will to resist and begged him to prevent Italy from entering the war. How could they keep the peace? They felt that a conference had become impossible and were only attempting to get a “mediation” by Mussolini.
³⁹
On the following day, August 29, Bonnet transmitted the report of his discussion with Guariglia to François-Poncet, “a long and cordial” conversation. Italian neutrality was discussed but absolutely not a conference.
⁴⁰
Guariglia liked Bonnet but not Daladier who was very close to his personal enemy, American Ambassador William Bullitt.
⁴¹

The 31st therefore came as a complete surprise. Bonnet, delighted, consulted with Daladier, who called a Council of Ministers meeting the same day, August 31, at 6 p.m. Monzie, who had lunch with Guariglia, was alerted by Bonnet and met with Queuille, Pomaret and Jean Zay, who said he would agree to accept “if this is not a new Munich.” Zay
then went to see Léon Blum, who was “very worried” and in favor of accepting conditional to “remaining in complete agreement with England.”
⁴²

The Council held a meeting. Bonnet said they had to accept. This would give France a few more days. But the unrealistic British condition on demobilization should be rejected, the presence of Poland should be required and the conference broadened to most of the problems regarding peace in the world.

Daladier began by stating his opposition. He “looked like a hedgehog with all his quills pricked up against someone or something that wasn’t clear. He turned his back on Bonnet from the very beginning. He was pouting with disgust and contempt.”
⁴³
When he spoke it was to say that France must refuse: it would be a new Munich. “Do we agree to go and chop up Poland and dishonor ourselves…then wind up with war in any case? The lesson of Munich is that Hitler’s signature isn’t worth anything.” As for demobilizing, Gamelin told him it would be “insanely imprudent.” He knew through Corbin that Chamberlain was opposed to a conference regarding the fate of Poland. The results of the direct contact between Poland and Germany had to come in first. In other words, Bonnet felt that Chamberlain would favor the Italian proposal and Daladier thought he was against it.
⁴⁴
Daladier knew that Alexis Léger viewed that initiative as a trap. During the cabinet meeting Daladier received a note from Corbin following a discussion with Halifax, stating that the Italian offer was a dangerous “maneuver.” At that point the famous letter from Coulondre was brought in by an officer of the military mission. Far from limiting it to Bonnet and Léger, Daladier read it to the Cabinet. How comforting! “The object was to bluff,” wrote de Monzie. “The one who bluffs last will have the upper hand… We must just be brazen. When the objective is to wait and be bold, enthusiasm and the easy way out go hand in hand. No more debates! Coulondre’s opinion shut up those who were recalcitrant.”
⁴⁵

After some statements with de Monzie, in favor of accepting, and Paul Reynaud, who was against it, the Council made no clear decision, to the point that two contradictory conclusions emerged. The minister of the interior, Albert Sarraut, gave the press a communiqué that appeared to reject all mediations. On the contrary, Bonnet and Monzie wrote a dispatch that seemed to imply acceptance. However, Bonnet did not send it on August 31.
⁴⁶

2.

T
HE
L
AST
T
HREE
D
AYS
(September 1–3, 1939)

The German attack on Poland on its northern, western and southern borders took place on September 1, 1939 at 4:45 a.m. The French government found out through two cables from Léon Noël received at 8:20 and 8:30 a.m.
⁴⁷
France had been allied to Poland since 1921
⁴⁸
and would go to war only on September 3 at 5 p.m., or six hours after Great Britain. That time lag, which surprised public opinion and brought about energetic protests by the Polish ambassador, Lukasziewicz, has been the object of a number of more or less serious explanations. Some people attributed it to the British leadership. As British historian A.J.P. Taylor supported the thesis that up to the end Chamberlain had attempted to avoid war and that he had been compelled to give in by pressure from of the members of Parliament at the House of Commons and in particular the “backbenchers”—the bulk of ordinary members of Parliament.
⁴⁹
That view has been strongly criticized by another British historian, R.A.C. Parker,
⁵⁰
who we believe clearly demonstrates that Chamberlain at that time did not attempt to return to the policy of
appeasement
and that the delay was due to French authorities. Parker had been unable to consult the archives at the Quai d’Orsay that confirm his views most emphatically.

Who wanted such a delay in France? The military leaders for one. Gamelin feared that the general mobilization operations, decided by the Council as of the morning of September 1, could be disrupted by bombing. But Gamelin’s role appears to be secondary compared to that of Georges Bonnet. He was the one, contrary to the British, who continued the
appeasement
policy and wanted a new Munich; he was the one who was determined to delay the outbreak of the tragedy in the hope of preventing it even if it may mean breaking France’s commitments once more. He did this so cleverly that Mandel said that he was working “for the
Livre Jaune
.” Daladier, who was much more inclined than Bonnet to honor France’s commitments, showed some hesitation. But between Bonnet’s maneuvering and the haste of the British he practically severed his relations with his minister in the end.

What makes the negotiations of September 1 and 2 appear obscure up to the night of September 2–3 when everything becomes clear, was
the existence of two attitudes and, therefore, of two diplomatic activities. On one hand the British, no longer feeling that it was possible to avoid war, were determined to serve Hitler with an ultimatum and were increasingly in a hurry to do so. Georges Bonnet, on the other, with the “objective” support of Daladier and Gamelin, wanted to delay such an ultimatum as long as possible. His leverage was the Italian conference project.

But in these two debates the British needed the French as much as the French needed the British. Each side was forced to make some concessions, at least until the final clarification. To understand all this the facts must be examined, at times on an hourly basis. There should, however, be no mistake; this was not a “superstructure” as some would call it. It was the clash between two deeply rooted ways of thinking. The British Tories, who remained blind and deaf for a long time, were still fortified by a solid principle: one must give one’s word sparingly, but once it was given it must be kept. Munich was legitimate since the British had never promised the Czechs anything.
A new Munich would go against honor and therefore against Great Britain’s interests
.

The French leaders facing them belonged to a different social class for the most part, and twenty years of “pact-making” had effectively adulterated their instincts. In the cunning of some radicals like Bonnet (not of all of them, obviously!) was the almost subconscious idea that a treaty was only worth its escape clauses. On that point he was like Léger and the entire Briand tradition. As a Polish diplomat told Hervé Alphand, Léger “introduced ambiguity into French policy. In the past alliance treaties were simple and clear…The treaties Briand made did not use that honest approach.”
⁵¹

The relationship between those two attitudes and the British and French regimes of the time deserves some thought. From September 1–3 the House of Commons met three times and held wide open debates. The French Parliament met only once in the afternoon of September 2. It was understood that no one would speak following the government’s statement. The stability of the British system during those days of anguish allowed for broad consultations among the people’s representatives. The unstable regime of the Third Republic during its final moments (no one knew that it was near death at the time) forced the executive branch to take multiple precautions and leading it to trickery toward the members of Parliament, just as it had done with foreign countries.

* * * *

On September 1, following Hitler’s aggression, the Council of Ministers was summoned to a meeting at 10 a.m. The business at hand was dealt with quickly and only two important decisions were reached: the general mobilization orders were issued—September 2 being the first day of the mobilization—and Parliament was called to meet on the afternoon of the 2nd. The cabinet set additional military funding at 75 billion to be submitted for approval.
⁵²

At the close of the meeting Georges Bonnet began his maneuver. At 11:45 a.m. he sent his version of the decisions made by the cabinet on August 31 to Rome.

France would agree to the Italian conference proposal on condition that the Poles be invited and that its objective be a general discussion regarding peace. In other words, Bonnet on his own authority: 1. Felt that the cabinet meeting of August 31 had given him a free hand; 2. Totally ignored the condition set by the British on the 31st, namely to only accept if there were a prior demobilization; 3.
Failed to take into consideration that between the vague position taken on August 31 and his cable of September 1, Hitler had invaded Poland
.

It was necessary, however, that the slight incident during the night did not alter the views held by Italy and Great Britain and that an invaded Poland would accept. Bonnet spent part of his day on the matter.

On the Italian side, Ambassador Guariglia in Paris received a phone call around 9 a.m. from a French cousin of his, Count de Ronceray, who had probably been pressured by de Monzie or Piétri, announcing that the French Council of Ministers had accepted the Italian proposal the ambassador knew nothing about, and also insisted that the events which he called “a mishap” notwithstanding, Rome should stand by its proposals. He paid him a visit, then went to see Piétri. Bonnet phoned Guariglia just before 10 a.m. Guariglia went to the Quai d’Orsay where he had meetings with Mistler, Bérenger and Piétri, who also reiterated the same positions. Then he met with a newsman who was an emissary of Guy La Chambre and who gave him a statement from Daladier to “restore Franco-Italian friendship.” Guariglia sent a cable to Ciano at 11 a.m.
⁵³

At the same time François-Poncet was getting ready to meet with Ciano at 12:15 p.m. and handed him the text of Bonnet’s message.
⁵⁴
Ciano was both satisfied and skeptical. “He…added that he was unable to tell me whether the Italian proposal still had any justification.”
⁵⁵
If,
on the 31st, Mussolini could still hope to do Hitler a good turn by allowing him to obtain what he wanted without war, by the 1st his initiative could be taken as a scheme to break his thrust.
⁵⁶
Nevertheless, after meeting with Daladier at 3 p.m., Bonnet phoned Corbin at 3:40 p.m. “He informed him about the phone call he received from Mr. François-Poncet. The Italian government believes it is possible if the agreement of France and England is secured, to offer the proposal made yesterday once more; it feels that Poland must be present at the conference.” Bonnet demanded that Corbin find out the exact answer that the British had given to Mussolini.
⁵⁷

The English answer, coming as a verbal communication from Percy Lorraine, stated exactly the following: “It appears that, according to the information received, the action of the German government now makes it unfortunately impossible to follow this path.”
⁵⁸
While Corbin investigated, Bonnet called British Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps at 3:48 p.m. He gathered the impression that the British government “thought that it would not be useful to call for such a conference given the circumstances.” Corbin’s report given by phone at 4:10 p.m. was even more specifically negative. “Sir Percy Lorraine answered that England would have been favorable had Hitler not started the hostilities.” It would be, said the British government “like throwing holy water to a man with a rope around his neck.”
⁵⁹

Léon Noël could not be reached by phone even when attempting to place the call through Bucharest. It was only at 6:25 p.m. that Bonnet was able to ask the ambassador to probe the Poles regarding such a conference. Beck answered that—obviously—“the question at hand is not about a conference but rather about the joint action that must be taken by the allies.”
⁶⁰
The Polish ambassador to Paris, Lukasziewicz, was indignant to see no action being taken on the French side.
⁶¹