France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (44 page)

This aging process was also obvious with the generals. Contrary to popular belief, “political” appointments were rare. The vice president of the Superior War Council established an “aptitude list.” In three cases during the years Weygand was in charge (1931–1935), the minister appointed officers who were not on the list. Weygand felt that “Marshal Pétain was strangely reluctant to promoting elite officers to the higher ranks.”
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The struggle to bring younger men to the ranks of the army failed. In 1940 French colonels who were closer to 60 were facing German colonels of 40.

There is far more evidence in favor of the third part of my statement regarding the excellence of the younger officers. Many were the sons of middle-class families choosing a military career and being virtually the only ones to graduate from high school through the baccalauréat exam that opened the doors to higher education. The father’s example, a patriotic spirit, the deeper influence of the boy scouts, coupled with the economic crisis that plunged many families into a precarious life, encouraged several thousand youths to take the competitive exams for military school
and a career that could not provide wealth but did offer financial security and the magnet of adventure—the vast French Empire provided the attraction of the exotic. While the number of openings was reduced from 1,930 to 1,935, they increased sharply right after that date. For the army alone 1,093 new second lieutenants or equivalent rank were recruited in 1932 through competitive entrance exams (including the quartermaster and medical corps, etc.) and only 173 from the ranks. Even the École Polytechnique was basically a reservoir of officers. Out of 250 graduates per year on average, except for the “boot” that provided the engineers required by the state, all the others were sent to the artillery, the engineer corps and even the navy or the air force. Few of them were to choose civilian careers.

The competitive entry examinations were hard. The Écoles admitted one candidate out of five or six (Saint-Cyr) and one out of ten or twelve (Polytechnique, École Navale, École de l’Air created in 1935). The “spirit” of the École was already present in the preparatory schools known as “taupes” (or special math classes) for Polytechnique, and the “corniches” for Saint-Cyr. Public high schools were providing the greater number of candidates by far over the old Jesuit-run École des Postes (which became Sainte-Geneviève in Versailles) that still retained its top rank and prestige.

Most of those young officers undoubtedly belonged to the “right-wing” bourgeoisie but most of them subscribed to the principle that the army did not vote, being “the silent corps.”
*
They felt an emotional hostility to the Popular Front, but the army, after all, was no longer used to breaking up striking workers.

The French army could possible have become “political” enough to support the right wing, but France’s captains and lieutenants of the 1930s did not resemble the conspirational and warmongering Japanese officers of the same period. A career officer, Loustanau-Lacau, basically failed in 1938 when he tried to create anti-communist recruitment “cells” in the army called the “Corvignolles network.” According to the statements made by that strange character (who stood apart from the CSAR—also known as the “Cagoule,” the creation of an engineer Eugène Deloncle, because he refused to view the USSR as an enemy on the same level as Germany), the recruits were mostly reserve officers from his own age group (majors and colonels).

The valor of those young officers became apparent in 1940 and during the campaigns in Tunisia, Italy, southern France, and Alsace, or as leaders of many secret army “maquis” (later known as the ORA). Many of them were to die later in Indochina.

4.

T
HE
H
ERETICS

The benefit of hindsight makes it easy to criticize today French military doctrine in the 1930s. Those who were part of that tight pre-war hierarchy required visionary spirit and much courage to voice any kind of criticism, whether it be intellectually by rejecting the “authority principle” and taking a position against some very prestigious leaders, or, more practically, by rejecting the doctrine of the high-ranking officers they reported to. It was hard for any heretics to further their careers inside a Church that upheld infallibility.

While the mission of the famous
École supérieure de guerre
, the traditional institution founded in 1876, was not to elaborate military doctrine, but in very practical terms to train well-rounded staff officers, military thinking only tended to exist within and around it.
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Many officers wrote about the school in their memoirs, from the odd account by Loustanau-Lacau,
⁵⁶
who was admitted in 1922 in the 44th class, the same one as Captain de Gaulle,
⁵⁷
to Colonel Schneider’s study,
L’École de guerre des années 30
,
⁵⁸
and General Renauld’s work on the 60th class graduating in 1938.
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The conclusion offered by the latter was, “despite the dedication and conscientiousness of the school as an institution…[it] had no influence over the evolution—which did not happen in any case—of French military thinking. On the contrary it was dominated by conformity and the influence of the teachings of 1914–1918.” General Beaufre, who was admitted to Saint-Cyr in 1921 and entered the
École de guerre
in 1930, also felt that “it was a good secondary staff school occasionally with a few outstanding courses…The emptiness of the school was due to the fact that a very narrow doctrine was taught where tactics…became something akin to an engineer’s blueprint…it was technical and comfortable, even reassuring, but fundamentally wrong.”
⁶⁰

Yet, despite the prestige of the top commander, many officers like Charles de Gaulle or Beaufre benefited from their dissatisfaction. When
he joined the army’s general staff, Beaufre reported to Captain Zeller, later to become a great resistance fighter and a governor of Paris, who told him, “There is something you must be aware of, my dear friend. Do you know General Gamelin?… Well, General Gamelin is an idiot.”
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And Beaufre found out that “[t]he thing that our commanders were most worried about was the presentation of the paperwork.” Depressed and exhausted by useless clashes with the finance ministry, the army high command “had…basically created a form of wisdom out of skepticism and determination… The only force left was inertia.”
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A few semi-heretics and some greater heretics faced up to that inertia. In the first category we shall place General Estienne, “the father of the tanks,” who described in 1921 the “huge strategic and tactical advantage represented by 100,000 men having the capability of covering eighty kilometers in one night fully loaded with weapons and supplies over the heavy armies of the past… They needed 8,000 tanks and 4,000 tracked tanks.”
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According to Ruhlmann,
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we can also quote General Hering, the sponsor of “the great spaces strategy,” and General Flavigny, “father of light mechanized divisions.” There was also Captain Mérat, who in 1920 produced a report entitled
Extrapolations
, that Mysyrowicz showed so admirably to be way ahead of its time as to the use of air forces and tanks.
⁶⁵

But let us now turn to the two greatest heretics: Charles de Gaulle and Admiral Castex.

De Gaulle had long been Pétain’s protégé—Admiral de Gaulle (his son) was named Philippe after the Marshal—but this did not prevent him from having a clear and creative mind. What the two men did have in common was a vast culture, a sense of style and even of majesty. But de Gaulle had read, among others, the British military writer Liddell-Hart and his concept of a “gold medal army” (a small, very powerful and mobile army replacing the large masses of infantry), Colonel Fuller and General Estienne. Pétain had objected to the poor graduating rank of Captain de Gaulle at the
École de Guerre
because of his unconventional ideas and perhaps also due to his arrogant personality. Pétain had compelled the
École de Guerre
to take de Gaulle as a lecturer (resulting in the book de Gaulle published in 1932, entitled
Le Fil de l’épeé
).
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In 1932 Pétain had de Gaulle appointed as secretary of the High Military Committee. For two years de Gaulle sat in on the discussions of the top military leaders—Pétain, Weygand, and Gamelin. During that time he wrote
Vers l’armée de métier
, published in 1934.
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It was the era of low military budgets and one-year conscription, when there was uncertainty about the “cover” and France was vulnerable. While the Maginot Line was a big help, it failed to cover the areas where the Germans were thinking of an attack on France: Belgium and the northern French plains where their armies “could easily pick the time and place.” Belgium could not be expected to sacrifice itself for France, which must defend herself. Using a defensive strategy? “The passive defender will be surprised, pinned down and turned.” If the defender is mobile and prepares for a war based on speed, as the Germans were clearly doing, “he can reach the necessary locations to forestall the unexpected and take the initiative…it is by maneuvering that France will be covered.”
⁶⁸

An elite unit was required for trhe complicated maneuvering and handling of rapid, powerful equipment; one-year conscription was not enough for training such units. A professional army was therefore required, which was a more reliable system than the massive mobilization of men with very little training. Such an army would number about 100,000, broken down into seven divisions (six heavy and one light) “entirely motorized, tracked and only partially armored.” It was therefore possible 1) to act alone in a limited operation consisting of taking territory as a guarantee; and 2) to have a spearhead for the national army that could then occupy the conquered territory. Tanks would open the path for the motorized infantry and mechanized artillery.

The book—which made no mention of the air force—was not intended to be technical. What de Gaulle wanted to provide was “a summation for an action program.” was a major in 1927, lieutenant colonel in 1932 and a full colonel in 1938; at the time he was probably not planning to engage in a political career. If he failed to prevail with the military, he could try getting his ideas adopted by the politicians. Most of them backed the Maginot Line and some, like Léon Blum and the majority of the left, viewed the title of the book as a threat to democracy. The fear of fascism increased after February 6, 1934, and political debate was very much involved with the issue of the “Leagues.” Was de Gaulle trying to provide a “praetorian guard” to the right-wing agitators?
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The national union government of Doumergue included Marshal Pétain as minister of war, by now extremely irritated at his former protégé. General Maurin admired and followed Pétain’s course as did Fabry, the minister of win the Laval cabinet. When they even had any clue regarding de Gaulle’s thinking, the moderates governing France were, for various reasons, just as hostile to
the heretic as the left. The openness to his ideas was therefore extremely narrow.

As secretary of the Military High Committee, de Gaulle met Paul-Boncour and had some involvement in the French build-up plan of 1932. Paul-Boncour held him in high esteem but supported collective security and greatly admired the Maginot Line. In the end, de Gaulle decided to approach Paul Reynaud, who had a political future and was himself a heretic since he opposed the politics of deflation and favored devaluation in 1934. He was no doubt a very intelligent man, troubled by the contradiction between diplomacy and strategic doctrine. Doctor Auburtin, a friend of both men, introduced de Gaulle to Reynaud in December 1934.
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It was the time when the debate regarding the reestablishment of two-year conscription was getting underway. Paul Reynaud, in a speech on March 15, 1935, was critical of the defensive strategy. This led Prime Minister Flandin to call him an “idiot”
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and elicited a vigorous answer from General Maurin, who also favored a defensive policy but pointed out—it was Weygand’s position as well—that circumstances did not favor an overhaul of France’s military system.

Paul Reynaud went much further. On March 28, 1935, he introduced a bill “for which General [
sic
] de Gaulle deserves all the credit,” he said,
⁷²
in an attempt to create “an armored corps.” He returned to the idea of the 6 armored divisions de Gaulle had planned, including 500 tanks each added to the light mechanized division that was already operational. Pétain, Weygand and Debeney were extremely critical even before the debate got underway. Debeney was in favor of the offensive but with powerful waves of infantry and felt the tanks were too vulnerable. The Chamber rejected the project after a lively debate on December 26, 1935. Paul Reynaud continued to fight, publishing a book entitled
Le problème militaire français
where he spelled out Colonel de Gaulle’s ideas.

It was all to be a useless exercise. In 1937 de Gaulle was sent to Metz to take over the command of a tank regiment. His books had been moderately successful. The backers of the defensive strategy, as well as those who favored the classic type of offensive, were against him. Weygand was undoubtedly the closest to his views. On March 1, 1935, Pétain published a widely discussed article in the
Revue des deux mondes
entitled “France’s security in the low birth-rate years.”
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“Our national defense must be based on the principle of the nation at arms.” The system should not be changed and, in any case, it would be impossible to bring about without enough volunteers to create a professional army. Later on the rift between
Pétain and de Gaulle became irreparable. In 1938 de Gaulle published a book that Pétain had asked him to ghost-write in 1922 to be published under his name, entitled
La France et son armée
. dedicated the book to the aging Marshal, who was deeply irritated, and attempted to pressure the publisher, Plon not to sell it.
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