France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (72 page)

Obviously, the Turks wanted to annex the territory, while the French and the British wanted an alliance with Turkey. The Turks cleverly used the idea of a political and military agreement in attempting to reach their objective.

On the French side negotiations were undertaken by two outstanding men who did not always agree, Gabriel Puaux, who had been appointed as High Commissioner to Syria where he arrived on January 7, 1939, and René Massigli, who was ambassador to Ankara since October 1938. Puaux, determined to enforce strongly the French mandate, was attempting to keep the Syrian nationalists at bay.
¹⁸⁸
He was at pains to accept what they were refusing, namely the loss of a province on the periphery.
¹⁸⁹
Massigli was much more sensitive about the necessary political imperatives. The Turks, on the other hand, were secretly satisfied
with France’s lack of vigor at Munich and were ready to give her a very hard time.
¹⁹⁰

On January 10 Massigli met with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Numan Menemencioglu, who, along with Prime Minister Saracoglu a few days later, did not hide the fact that they wanted to annex Hatay, at the most as an independent state under a Franco-Turkish guarantee. Massigli noted a “stiffening” and “impatience.” He offered three solutions: to hold strictly to the terms of the statute and the mandate; to let ourselves be “nibbled away” which meant losing face; to face the issue openly and allow for annexation if it was accepted by Damascus. He also complained of not having received instructions. It must be pointed out in this regard that Bonnet and Massigli were not on good terms, and that the ambassador never missed an opportunity to remind his own minister of his duty.
¹⁹¹
What was actually happening was the nibbling. The Hatay government, located in Antioch, was taking instructions from Ankara. The “Turkization” of the Sanjak was continuing. “Our authority is withering away.” Massigli, who returned to Paris at the beginning of February 1939, had strongly recommended ceding the territory on condition that there be compensations
for Syria
(who then made its peace with the outcome but was to blame France in the future); and its borders should be clearly determined, otherwise the Turks could pursue their claims all the way to Aleppo and beyond;
for France
, that its interests in the Sanjak should be recognized and that a Franco-Turkish mutual assistance pact be signed. As for the method, it could either be a series of compromises or a general settlement.
¹⁹²

Gabriel Puaux was opposed to Massigli’s plan. “To agree to Turkey’s annexation of Hatay at this time would be a gratuitous concession, bearing heavy consequences and dangerous to France’s prestige.” Puaux suggested that expressions of friendship toward Turkey be increased and wait until possible hostilities began in order to negotiate the alliance because he felt she would then be only too happy to sign it.
¹⁹³

What would Bonnet decide? He started by adopting Puaux’s point of view and rejecting any new demand coming from Ankara.
¹⁹⁴
The ambassador to Ankara, who had met with Saracoglu on February 17, answered him that to engage in the operation right away was less useful than to wait for the first emergency warning. The Turks, he said, “are convinced that time is on their side.”
¹⁹⁵
Things did not change for a few weeks.

Following the momentous events of March 1939, Bonnet began to change. He instructed Massigli to attempt a political type of negotiation.
¹⁹⁶
Was it because of the increasing danger or the unrest that began in February and mostly in early March in Syria (six dead on March 19)?
¹⁹⁷

There was the lingering fear that the Hatay government might suddenly proclaim the annexation of the Sanjak to Turkey. France would not accept it, as the minister wrote on April 4.
¹⁹⁸

The issue sharpened when England was ready to guarantee Greece and the
status quo
in the eastern Mediterranean, while France was attempting to convince her to issue a guarantee to Romania. The French minister thought this implied the approval of the British government. In any case, he noted, we set forth our “close and deep agreement with Great Britain.”
¹⁹⁹
On April 14 France and England agreed to extend their guarantee to Turkey.
²⁰⁰
Massigli once again complained about not being properly informed. “From the point of view of our authority here it is…generally preferable that instructions agreed to between Paris and London reach me at the same time as my British colleague.”
²⁰¹
He did not know what the intentions of the French government were regarding the revision of the Franco-Turkish commercial agreement that he felt was very important because it would be a way to reduce German penetration.
²⁰²

At the end of April Bonnet adopted Massigli’s position. He asked him to begin negotiations, using border modifications and protection for the Armenians. “I authorize you to inform the Turkish government that France, as far as she is concerned, would agree to ceding the Sanjak” and would gradually reduce its garrison to make it happen.
²⁰³
Massigli immediately replied that he would begin talks with Saracoglu very shortly.
²⁰⁴

The discussion dragged on. Saracoglu rejected the French conditions, saying that he was “deeply disappointed” that no date had been set for ceding the territory.
²⁰⁵
Bonnet was insisting on the independence of the “political agreement” and the accord on Hatay and reminded Massigli that if he was “resigned” to give away that area “it was only because of the general situation in Europe,” stating the serious repercussions this would have in Damascus, the bitterness of the Armenian population and the resistance at the Chamber of Deputies, etc.
²⁰⁶
In order to unravel the matter, Massigli suggested the visit of a top military leader to Turkey.
²⁰⁷
It so happened that General Weygand, who had served as French High Commissioner to the Levant, was going to represent France at the wedding of the crown prince of Iran and the sister of Egypt’s King Farouk (Herriot, who had wanted that mission of protocol, had finally withdrawn). On his way back he received a cable requesting that he go to Ankara.
²⁰⁸
He accepted because of his friendship toward Massigli. The
objective was to develop relations with Ismet Inonu, whom Weygand already knew, Saracoglu and Marshal Czakmak, chief of the general staff, and the former army commander in the First World War. He was, wrote Weygand in his report, “simple, direct and very understanding.” Weygand became convinced that it was urgently necessary “to put an end to the matter of the Sanjak of Alexandretta and…place what now appears to be essential ahead of what has become secondary,”
²⁰⁹
which he said did not please Daladier.
²¹⁰
Weygand spoke of a war where they could be blocked on French and German fortifications and with large forces landing at Dedeagach or Salonika. (Clearly there was no escaping the First World War.) It was agreed that 100 to 200 officers or noncommissioned officers would be trained at French schools. Beyond that the band played the
Marseillaise
. For von Papen, the new German ambassador who had arrived the day before, it was an unpleasant start.

On May 12 Massigli was convinced he would sign the political agreement before the negotiations on Hatay ended and sent the text to Paris.
²¹¹
Alas! Menemencioglu injected a last minute maneuver. Nothing was signed.
²¹²
The Turks were too cunning to forget their friendly blackmail weapon. On May 19 they signed with England alone, while announcing a similar agreement with France. This, wrote Massigli, “forces me to return to that sorry matter of the Sanjak that overshadows all our negotiations for so long, depriving us of any freedom of action.” In the eyes of the Turks it was quite simply “blackmail.” Massigli used the word. But “I don’t think we have anything to gain by remaining in the somewhat ambiguous situation we are in right now.”
²¹³

On June 23 the Sanjak agreement was finally signed. The government, wrote Massigli, decided to take the wise decision that was called for. But everything was given away. Nothing guaranteed French interests whether cultural or economic (the
Société d’électricité d’Antioche
and the
Société du port d’Alexandrette
requested to leave the territory).
²¹⁴
The two countries were committed to mutual assistance
²¹⁵
pending the signing of the Franco-Anglo-Turkish alliance treaty that was to take place only on October 19, 1939, and having no effect whatsoever. General Huntziger paid a formal visit to Turkey. It was agreed that the 2,500 French soldiers would leave the territory by July 23. The French flag would continue to fly…over the Alexandrette military cemetery.

Chapter XIV

F
INAL
P
REPARATIONS

1.

E
CONOMIC
R
EADINESS

S
ince war was possible and even probable, how could the economy be prepared for that event? It became obviously necessary to enhance armaments production and create large supplies of petroleum products and raw materials. The financing of the military and war budgets also had to be addressed. Therefore, the idea of preventing the expatriation of funds and even compelling the return of those that had fled became the obsession of the politicians of the time. The increase in the gold reserves of the Bank of France provided a test of sorts.

October and November 1938 were the crucially important months concerning all these issues. The main debate centered on the forty-hour week. Socially it had a symbolic value, but created two serious problems, one economic and the other tied to national defense. Between 1936 and 1938 unfilled employment applications were reduced from 468,000 to 424,000. Partial unemployment (under forty working hours) was 20.4% in April. An arithmetic calculation led to the belief that if the weekly
working hours increased, then the number of unemployed workers would also increase.
¹

Alfred Sauvy was able to prove the uselessness of that kind of thinking. Most of industry was working fully within the rigorous limits of the forty hours. There was no other way to increase production than to allow greater flexibility and authorize overtime. By itself increased production would reduce unemployment.

Daladier faced the issue as soon as he came to power. In his government policy statement of April 12, 1938,
²
he declared, “All financial, economic, social and political issues are closely tied to that of our security.” In the aftermath of a strike, aviation industry workers had agreed to work five hours more. The problem also involved metal workers who were also on strike. The Metals Federation agreed to five hours overtime but management opposed it because the agreement rested on a fundamental salary increase. On August 21 Daladier gave a speech on radio where he expressed his intent to “get France back to work.” His conclusion was, “As long as the international situation is this sensitive we must be able to work more than forty hours and up to forty-eight hours in national defense-based industries. Faced with totalitarian states that are rearming without any regard for the work time involved, will France waste its time in disputes?”
³
The speech led to the resignation of two cabinet ministers, Ramadier, an independent socialist at Labor who was replaced with Pomaret, and Frossard at Public Works, replaced with de Monzie. A law decree dated August 31 gave the government the freedom to authorize overtime in defense-related industry.

On October 4, immediately following Munich, the Daladier government was granted full power until November 15 by a vote of 331 to 78 (basically the communists) and 203 abstentions (many socialists and part of the right).
⁴

Full power was to last until November 15. It therefore seemed clear that it would not be renewed. It became necessary to take action prior to that date. Finance minister Marchandeau was an advocate of a planned economy. He agreed to suspend the forty hour law, but above all he wanted to set up foreign exchange controls to stop the exit of capital funds and the drop in the price of gold. Daladier showed no enthusiasm for this plan. In his October 28 speech to the Radical Party convention in Marseille he had violently severed relations with the communists who were strong backers of foreign exchange controls. During the entire month of October he received negative opinions regarding the Marchandeau plan. On
October 30 and 31 and on November 1 there were meetings of the Cabinet Council where Paul Reynaud vigorously attacked the program. On October 31 Daladier called Reynaud and Marchandeau to his office and asked that they switch positions as of November 1. Marchandeau agreed not to resign to avoid endangering the government. There was immediately “a complete change of atmosphere. The will to win replaced resignation and the desire for rapid and efficient reforms overcame passivity.”
⁵

Paul Reynaud assembled a brilliant team. Gaston Palewski was his cabinet director; D. Leca was the head of the cabinet, which also included Michel Debré. He benefited from the active collaboration of the general secretary of the finance ministry, Yves Bouthiller, the director of the
Mouvement général des fonds
, Jacques Rueff, and his deputy Maurice Couve de Murville. Finally, he consulted with Alfred Sauvy, a specialist in economic statistics. Everyone worked very hard at preparing the law decrees. It was what Alfred Sauvy called the “crazy week.”