France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (74 page)

In 1937 French factories delivered to the armed forces 146 fighter planes and 226 bombers; in 1938 131 fighters and 190 bombers; in 1939 (including the beginning of the war) 1,896 fighters and 215 bombers. Nevertheless, France had started very late and did not manufacture heavy bombers. The number of workers in the aeronautics industry increased from 38,495 in 1937 to 82,289 in 1939 (250,000 by June 1940; it would have been over 500,000 by 1941). We should note that in 1944 the British aeronautics industry employed 1,820,000 workers and that of the United States, 3 million.

A detailed study by Raymond Danel on “the French air force at the outbreak of war” provides the following numbers as of August 16, 1939.
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Both in metropolitan France and in the Empire the air force had 7,450 planes, including 3,959 war planes (the others were used for training,
liaison and health related missions, etc.). There were 353 additional naval airplanes.

The number of war planes (3,959) was very good, but first the very old models that dated from before Plan I of April 1, 1933 or some
1,264 planes
had to be deducted. Then came the “transitional” models from Plans I and II that were completely outclassed by most German planes; these numbered 1,617. There remained 1,078 modern planes. Considering the last two categories, out of the total number (2,881) the planes actually
operating
were:

But not all of these were immediately available.

These numbers are very interesting. They indicate that it took a long time from when new planes were received to the moment they were actually ready to be placed in service in the flight squadrons. In other words, the considerable progress made by French production in 1939 was only a beginning and the situation would really improve only in 1941. On the other hand they backed up the statement by the air force chief of staff that as of September 1, 1939, he could only count on 494 readied modern planes (as of August 16 they were 463) including 442 fighter planes (416 on August 16), 52 for reconnaissance (53 on August 16), and 0 bombers.
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However, 20 modern bombers had really already been completed, 704 single-seater fighters and 277 multiseater fighters for night and day
missions or a total of 981 fighters to be held against the 463 available planes.

What was the estimated strength of the German air force at that time? A report by Colonel de Geffrier, air attaché in Berlin, dated November 9, 1938, gave a summary of production. He estimated at 150,000 the workers in the avionics area and at 58,000 the workers in engine factories. Adding in weapons systems, the total was three times the French personnel of 1939. Furthermore, he wrote that “all the foreign technicians visiting Berlin…are amazed at the size of the industrial achievements of the Reich where aeronautics are concerned.” He estimated production at close to 600 military planes per month; production would soar to 1,000 in August and September. The pace was a ten-hour workday with two teams for twenty-four hours.
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A memo from Vuillemin to Guy La Chambre, dated August 26, 1939, gave the following estimate of the Luftwaffe’s plane strength:

He came up with the following chart as an estimate of the forces of both coalitions:

In a confrontation with the Luftwaffe, what kind of help could France expect from the Royal Air Force? It had started rearming much earlier, and for one or two months in 1939 its production would be greater than Germany’s. The British were producing many bombers and even heavy bombers. The
Deuxième Bureau
of the air force chief of staff estimated that in November 1938 in England proper there were 430 fighters, 820
bombers, 300 reconnaissance and support planes, or 1,550 planes with a general reserve of about 500. There were additionally 330 planes overseas and 250 on board navy ships.
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But not all this equipment was up to date.

At Munich the (very pessimistic) assessments by the French military attaché reached the conclusion that the British would hold on to all their fighter planes to defend London and the cities but could send over a score of bomber squadrons or 120 planes.
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Since Chamberlain and Halifax were coming to France on November 24, 1938, the Air Force high command made some suggestions to Daladier as to what France should request as far as air force assistance was concerned. Unfortunately, their policy was becoming defensive. During his November 10 speech, Air Minister Sir Kingsley Wood announced the quadrupling of fighters in order to protect London, which was highly exposed. This was very dangerous for France.
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Since the war would probably be fought against Germany and Italy, it was necessary that as soon as the fighting began Great Britain would: 1) Send fighter squadrons in Lorraine and Champagne to improve the air cover of French forces; and 2) Lead the attack on Germany with its bomber squadrons. France would cover the Italian sector. The British “advanced air force” based on French territory was to include at least twenty squadrons.
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Buoyed by this information, Daladier began a very suggestive conversation with the British prime minister on November 24. “Mr. Daladier freely admitted, since he was talking to friends, that there had been a crisis in the French air force.” The industrial methods “had not been too felicitous” and remained those of small-scale shops: 800 million had been earmarked for the purchase of machinery. France could count on 2,600 planes in November (the number included many rickety old planes). It would have 4,000 in 1939. The pace of production was now 80 per month (the figure was totally false as we have mentioned; in October, November, and December France produced a total of 122 planes). “By the spring French factories will produce about 400 planes per month.” At this point the notes show that “Mr. Chamberlain was very much impressed.” In spite of enormous outlays, England was unable to reach that number. Nevertheless, Daladier went on. The appointment of an engineer, Caquot, to head all the aviation-manufacturing plants will allow improved coordination among the companies. If these numbers “prove to be too optimistic” he was ready to purchase 1,000 American planes by the spring. Chamberlain “wished to be forgiven if he still remained somewhat skeptical.”

On the other hand, while Daladier was discussing bombing Germany—by the British—Chamberlain kept insisting on defending London with fighter planes and anti-aircraft artillery. It was finally agreed that fighter planes and anti-aircraft artillery were both very useful and they left it at that.
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Italy was another potential enemy with an aircraft production of 160 planes per month in 1938.
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A memo from General Vuillemin to Guy La Chambre
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concluded that France’s fighter planes had the edge, while Italy was stronger in bombers whether they were heavy, midsize or light. France did have 48 heavy bombers and 588 (transitional) bombers with a speed under 400 km/hour. Italy, on the other hand, did have 360 midsize and 55 light bombers with a speed of over 400 km/hour. French bombers were slow and could attack the coastline at night less than 300 kilometers from the border, but could not venture into the Po Valley. By the spring of 1939, however, the French air force would cover the entire national territory and North Africa. He felt that by that date France would have some 530 with a speed over 400 km/hour and Italy would have 100.

One possible way to catch up was to purchase planes overseas. Daladier brought up the matter before becoming prime minister. He mentioned the United States and the USSR. There would even be an attempt at negotiation right after Munich to buy 300 engines from…Germany. Daladier discussed the issue with Charles Lindbergh, who was on his way to Germany. When he returned he met with Guy La Chambre who called deputy air attaché Captain Stehlin to Paris in January 1939. He asked him to hold a secret negotiation with General Udet to purchase Daimler-Benz 601 engines for the French Dewoitine 520. Göring, he said, was informed of the matter. Stehlin felt he should discuss the request with his boss General de Geffrier, the air attaché, who was amazed. A few aeronautics engineers went to Germany and some of Udet’s people traveled to Paris. The negotiations went on for a few months without Stehlin knowing anything about it.
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A few German planes used by nationalist Spain (in January) and one that crashed in the Jura region at the end of May provided intelligence “giving us one year’s advance in technical knowledge for our engine manufacturing.”
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It should be noted that Hitler approved the negotiations on the engines on condition that the deliveries would begin to be fulfilled at the end of 1939. The whole matter was kept strictly secret between Daladier and La Chambre since Daladier did not trust Bonnet’s discretion. Guy La Chambre consulted the United States through Ambassador
William Bullitt. Roosevelt sent his answer only on March 23 and it was negative.
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The March events put a stop to everything and also prevented France from receiving forty-five plane engines it had ordered from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia.

French negotiations to purchase modern American planes were studied in depth and quite remarkably by an American historian, John McVicar Haight, first in a series of articles and then in a book.
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We can only summarize his research here.
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It started in January 1938. Guy La Chambre sent Baron Amaury de La Grange, a senator, one of the authors of Plan V and an eminent aviation specialist, to study the possibility of purchasing 1,000 modern American planes. La Grange was a personal friend of President Roosevelt, who said he was very much in favor, but American industry was producing next to nothing. This came as an unpleasant surprise and, furthermore, there was opposition in France, namely within the Air Commission of the Chamber, which intended to “protect” French industry. He was only able to obtain an authorization, in spite of the American military, for the great pilot Michel Détroyat to secretly test the Curtiss P36, the only plane with a performance equal to the German Messerschmitt 109.