France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (80 page)

All these setbacks did not stop Bonnet from phoning François-Poncet at 4:50 p.m., asking him to press Ciano. “It is agreed to hold a conference. If there are refusals we shall advise.”
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Had Daladier been kept informed after the 3 p.m. conversation? In any case he informed Ambassador Guariglia that he wished Mussolini would intervene with Hitler… to obtain a truce—which in itself was wishful thinking.
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While Bonnet’s maneuver regarding a possible conference on September 5 was underway, the British felt that another initiative was required to notify the German government that England and France would stand by their commitments if German troops did not evacuate Polish
territory. That decision had been taken late that morning by the British inner cabinet. Corbin was informed about the decision by phone on September 1 at 2:30 p.m. Then, following a meeting with Alexander Cadogan at 3:15 p.m., he said that the British government wanted the two ambassadors in Berlin to take identical steps.
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Bonnet immediately discussed the matter with Daladier. They could only accept. He phoned Coulondre at 4:55 p.m., instructing him to take part in that operation,
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and confirmed by cable at 5:55 p.m.
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An amusing detail was that Bonnet was so deeply involved in his Italian business that he could only instruct Coulondre to say exactly the same thing as Sir Nevile Henderson. “Well that makes my task so much more simple!” the French ambassador wrote ironically.
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The two diplomats went to the Wilhelmstrasse. At 10 p.m. Coulondre told Ribbentrop that unless the German government was “ready to promptly withdraw its forces from Polish territory the French government would unhesitatingly fulfill its obligations toward Poland.”
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France was therefore involved in two negotiations. As of the evening of September 1, the conflict between Bonnet and the British regarding Mussolini’s proposal was clear. We must quote the important telegram sent by Georges Bonnet to Corbin two hours later, at 6:15 p.m. “You have told me after chatting with the Foreign Office that the Secretary of State felt that at this time the project did not appear to be viable to him and that ‘it was like throwing holy water on a man with a rope around his neck.’ I would request that you say that I do not agree with that view. We certainly do have the firm intention of living up to our commitments. I have just given my approval to the draft of a note sent to me by the British government to order a joint initiative of our ambassadors in Berlin to so inform the government of the Reich. But I feel that the very firmness of our resolve compels us until the last minute not to neglect any effort in attempting to reestablish peace.”
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It should be noted that on September 1 the House of Commons had voted war funding of 500 million pounds sterling.

September 2 was even more dramatic and was to prove the energy of Georges Bonnet in fighting for his “cause,” which was to avoid or at least delay the reckoning.
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The day before he had offered the idea that France could not, according to the constitution, decide anything before Parliament assembled as planned during the afternoon of the 2nd. On the morning of the 2nd he felt that there had to be a forty-eight hour delay. Where did that idea originate? From Gamelin, who was haunted by his
general mobilization seeing that Polish mobilization, had been completely disrupted by the Luftwaffe? Or was it Italy? In any case, at 9 a.m. Ciano sent to Attolico, his ambassador to Berlin, a memorandum to inform Hitler that Italy “still could get France, England and Poland to accept a conference on the basis of the following:

1) Armistice holding the armies where they are at the moment;

2) Starting the conference in two to three days;

3) Resolving the Polish-German dispute in a manner that, given the situation, could only be to Germany’s advantage.”

And Ciano added: “The idea that had originated with the Duce was now being supported by France in particular.”
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At the same time, at 9 a.m. in Paris, Bonnet received Polish Ambassador Lukasziewicz and told him about the forty-eight hour delay. This would indicate that there had been an unofficial understanding between France and Italy on that issue. The unhappy Pole was so incensed that he wrote a vengeful letter to Daladier as soon as he left—and sent Bonnet a copy.
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He reminded the prime minister that assistance to Poland should be immediate and was extremely urgent from the strategic point of view. He demanded—unsuccessfully—that the delay be reduced from forty-eight to twenty-four hours.

On the same subject, Ambassador Phipps cabled his government at 9:55 a.m. that “every extra hour allowing the French mobilization to continue without hindrance was precious.”
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The Foreign Office got worried and asked that Phipps do everything he could to “inspire in Mr. Bonnet courage and determination.”
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Shortly after noon Ciano summoned François-Poncet and Percy Lorraine to tell them—as he had done with Attolico early that morning and using the same words—that Mussolini was maintaining the project of a conference under the conditions mentioned above. Hitler had been informed of his message. He was not opposed to the idea of a conference. However, he had received the French and British notes the evening before. Should these be viewed as ultimatums? Henderson had reassured him that they were not ultimatums. Germany could then examine the issue.
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After meeting with the two ambassadors, Ciano directly called first Bonnet and then Halifax. That chronological order is not unimportant. Bonnet was naturally delighted to see that Italy was taking his initiative and insisting on the forty-eight hour delay.
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Halifax, on the other hand, stated that it was too late unless Germany withdrew its troops. He would inform the Cabinet, about to meet, and would then
confirm that condition. “It seems to me that nothing else can be done,” wrote Ciano. “It is not my business to give Hitler such advice since he would firmly reject it, perhaps with contempt.”
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During the night Guariglia informed him of the new French position: partial withdrawal of German troops. Ciano took it upon himself to reject it immediately without even consulting Mussolini.
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But in the course of the afternoon and evening Bonnet would act as if he still considered the Italian offer as valid. The important event was the meeting of the French Parliament at 3 p.m. The House of Commons was to meet at 6 p.m. Sessions took place simultaneously at the Chamber and the Senate.
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At the Chamber, President Edouard Herriot spoke first.
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All the deputies rose—including the Communists—and cheered him after he expressed “the disapproval of any honest person” of the German-Soviet Pact. A number of pacifist deputies, from the USR (Marcel Déat, Frot) to Gaston Bergery and on the right (Scapini and Tixier-Vignancour), requested a secret session which was rejected by a show of hands. Daladier read the government’s message, inspired by that of Viviani in 1914. “But Viviani,” wrote Rossi-Landi, “used the word peace six times and the word war sixteen times; Daladier spoke of war only three times and of peace eleven times.”
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In the bill to authorize funding of 70 billion in additional expenses in order to “face up to the requirements of the international situation,” war was not mentioned. For some this was an issue. Did this vote allow the government to declare war since it implies tacitly that the Chamber accepted, or would a second specific vote be required?

It had been agreed that no one would speak. Yet Gaston Bergery, an irregular of radicalism, went to the rostrum intending to say that the French Parliament had been “forced.” Herriot succeeded in talking him out of facing an “unruly” assembly. The entire text was approved with apparent unanimity; any opponents did not speak up. The session ended at 7:10 p.m.

In the Senate President Jeanneney did not speak. Chautemps read the government’s message. There was no request for a secret session; however, like Bergery at the Chamber, Laval went up to the rostrum. He was only able to say a few words recalling the Rome agreements of January 1935. No one understood how they related to the current situation. Later he explained that he wanted to ask Parliament for a vote on going to war.
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The Senate ended up voting unanimously in favor of the funding. The constitutional issue is not relevant for discussion here since it would mostly be used in future disputes.

Actually, if the word “war” had not been uttered in the text of the bill on military funding, it was probably because of the message from Ciano that Georges Bonnet continued to present as valid. It would be the same for the cabinet council meeting at 7:30 p.m. That council was rather interesting because Bonnet and Daladier agreed to use the Italian proposal and therefore wait at least until noon of the following day before taking action. Bonnet was hoping in that final delay to keep the peace. And what about Daladier? He said “he agreed. There was a military advantage in gaining twenty-four or forty-eight hours of mobilization time (which was what Gamelin said in the waiting-room to a few of us),” wrote Jean Zay.
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The entire Council agreed except for Mandel, Paul Reynaud and Campinchi. Reynaud asked the question, “What if Italy were only seeking to gain time for Germany? What if the latter, having reached its objectives tomorrow, offers to make peace? Will we not be in an awkward position to declare war?” The answer given to Reynaud was “in any event we will demand the evacuation of Poland.”
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De Monzie once again took the lead. France could not follow the British. “To require the withdrawal of German troops from Poland is an impossible demand.” He suggested a compromise, “a symbolic retreat, a withdrawal of a few kilometers.” That evening he had dinner at the residence of Ambassador Guariglia, along with Piétri and Mistler. The Italian ambassador was satisfied and de Monzie phoned Bonnet with advice to speak up to London.
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However, the British had to be taken into account. Already at the September 1 session the Commons had been surprised to hear that there was no decision to take action. “British public opinion was noticeably heating up.”
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On the evening of the 2nd Chamberlain and Halifax were terribly embarrassed. They did not dare act without France, which was delaying everything. Chamberlain’s embarrassed speech was viewed by many members of Parliament as an attempt to shirk the imperative obligations of the nation. Hence, the famous words, “Speak for England,” aimed at the liberal Arthur Greenwood. The result was “a feverish atmosphere that the prime minister’s statements did not manage to quiet.”
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The mention of the Italian project “gave rise to vehement protests from laborites and from many conservatives.” Chamberlain was compelled to promise a final declaration on the following day.

Sir Eric Phipps was instructed to tell the Quai d’Orsay that the decisive undertaking in Berlin must not be delayed beyond midnight.
However, the French Cabinet Council had decided to take no action before September 3 at noon on an ultimatum that would expire on the 4th at 5 a.m.
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Corbin went to 10 Downing Street where he met with Halifax and Chamberlain, who was worried. He “described the stormy meeting that had just ended at Westminster. The displeasure of the MPs was first directed against France, accused of shirking its duty. No one wanted to hear about the Italian offer—it was viewed as a trap to favor the German advance.” There was a lot of uneasiness.

“The Admiralty is also complaining that these delays are preventing certain defensive measures. The Germans are taking advantage of it to send submarines into the Atlantic and lay mines in the North Sea.” Corbin protested, expressing the opinion that French mobilization had to be pursued without enemy attacks—that was the position of Gamelin and Daladier.

Then for three-quarters of an hour Chamberlain and Halifax phoned Paris, the former speaking with Daladier and the latter with Bonnet. When Chamberlain suggested that he present the ultimatum the next morning, Daladier said he could not do it earlier “unless the British air force bombers can give us immediate assistance.” He added that there was a possibility, according to Ciano, for Germany to agree to withdraw its forces. Since Ciano had said exactly the opposite, the interpretation advanced by Parker of an intentional distortion of his words by Georges Bonnet is plausible if not proven.
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Halifax told Bonnet he saw only one solution which was that the ambassadors in Berlin act separately.
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The British cabinet then met from 10 p.m. to around midnight. Corbin has admirably described the split that existed at that juncture between the two governments. His report deserves to be quoted at length.

The British government, which had assembled its Parliament twenty-four hours ahead of us, was being accused in political circles of being slow, of hesitating, of being derelict of its duties in the face of aggression by the Reich. Many members of parliament, haunted by the memory of recent events, suspect that the Prime Minister, despite the firmness of his statements, to be involved in who knows what type of scheme. The Cabinet therefore felt compelled to reach a decision and let it become effective in the hours that followed. It should be noted that within its assessment of events the Italian offers carried very little weight…

The French government did not have the same haste in announcing its decision. Public opinion was very calm in the country and was satisfied for the moment with the statements made in Parliament. It had therefore complete discretion to choose its hour…