 | ing to get the agreement of the Socialists to a more cooperative stance on central administrations. See also Young,
France,
101. Bidault nonetheless severely circumscribed Blum's freedom in the negotiations, denying him power to offer concessions on German policy in return for credits. See
Instructions à la délégation française,
from the Economic Office of the Quai d'Orsay, n.d., AN, F60, box 923. For Gouin's speech, see
Le Monde,
April 2 and April 3, 1946.
|
| 49. Caffery to Byrnes, April 4, 1946,
FRUS, 1946,
5: 42122; Clayton to Byrnes, February 22, 1946, ibid., 415; National Advisory Council minutes, May 6, 1946, ibid., 44046.
|
| 50. Chauvel recalled Bidault's insistence that the great desk of Louis XIV be used for the signing of the peace treaties, and that elaborate preparations be made for the entertainment of the visiting dignitaries (Chauvel,
Commentaire,
15051). After the elections of June, Bidault succeeded Gouin as president of the Provisional Republic, thus exacting a measure of revenge for Socialist criticism of his policies.
|
| 51. Bidault reiterated the French positions in a memorandum to the foreign ministers of the Council on April 25, 1946 (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents,
12528). See also
FRUS, 1946,
2: 187, on the preparations for the conference.
|
| 52. See Yergin's superb account of the evolution of American official attitudes toward the Soviets in 1946, in
Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State,
163256; and Leffler,
A Preponderance of Power,
100140.
|
| 53. Molotov's speech to the CFM, which criticized the Allies, is in Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents,
14447. Kennan's remark is in Kennan to State, March 6, 1946,
FRUS, 1946,
5: 519.
|
| 54.
Note
by Alphand, July 18, 1946, Bidault Papers, AN, 457 AP, box 60; instructions to Koenig, August 6, 1946, AN, 457 AP, box 61. Gillingham, in
Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe,
156, misreads Alphand's July 18 memo. Rather than suggesting an abandonment of French objectives, Alphand was arguing that France could get what it wanted only by using the politically neutral language of international control instead of that of dismemberment, and by staying
out
of the bizonal arrangement so as to augment the French bargaining position. A subtle change in tactics on Alphand's part in no way suggested that France's objective control of German industry had been altered. René Massigli, however, urged the Quai to accept Byrnes's proposal for merging the zones, and he would continue to advocate policies that were closer to and more cooperative with the U.S.-U.K. line on Germany (Young,
France,
118).
|
| 55. Byrnes's speech of September 6, 1946, in Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents,
15260. The French chargé in Washington, Armand Bérard, repeatedly noted that American policy boded ill for French designs in Germany (
Un ambassadeur se souvient,
7981, 1047, 11518).
|
| 56. See esp. Milward,
The Reconstruction of Western Europe,
155, and Hogan,
The Marshall Plan,
2835.
|
| 57. Wall,
The United States and the Making of Postwar France,
writes that at Moscow, "the French had altered their foreign policy to coincide with their financial needs" (67). Young,
France,
sees Moscow as "shifting France towards
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|
