Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (23 page)

Army Forces

Major General Carl Gustav Fleischer, the commander of the 6th Division, commanded all army forces in North Norway. His geographic area of responsibility coincided with that of the 3rd Naval District. The country’s three northern provinces were sparsely populated and mobilization called for the introduction of forces from other areas of the country. Fleischer was designated as wartime commander of all forces in North Norway, army as well as navy. When war broke out in Europe in September 1939, a so-called neutrality watch, which was a very limited mobilization, was organized throughout the country. Since the Soviet Union was not a belligerent, the neutrality watch in North Norway was limited to two infantry battalions and a garrison company. One line battalion and the garrison company were located in East Finnmark and the other battalion in the Narvik area.

The looming crisis between the Soviet Union and Finland in October 1939 resulted in a further buildup of forces in North Norway. The Alta Battalion was mobilized and the forces in East Finnmark were strengthened by the addition of engineers and artillery. When war broke out in Finland, the Alta Bn and the 1st Bn, 15th Inf Regt at Elvegårdsmoen were sent to East Finnmark. In addition, the 1st Bn, 14th Inf Regt was mobilized in December and sent to East Finnmark. The 1st Bn, 16th Inf Regt was also mobilized but remained at Setermoen in Troms Province. Since the buildup in East Finnmark exceeded three line battalions, Colonel W. Faye, who commanded the 6th Field Brigade, was designated as the overall commander in that area and given a special staff. Colonel Kristian R. Løken took over as commander of the 6th Field Brigade and the Troms area.

The Norwegian Government viewed the situation in Finland with alarm and the 6th Division was ordered partially mobilized in January 1940. In addition to various staff elements, support and service support units, two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion were mobilized. The Varanger Battalion was stationed at Nyborgsmoen in East Finnmark. The 2nd Bn, 15th Inf Regt and the 3rd Mountain Artillery Bn remained at Setermoen. At the same time, a redeployment of forces took place. The Alta Bn was demobilized. The 1st Bn, 15th Inf Regt returned to Elvegårdsmoen where it was demobilized and replaced by a battalion from Trøndelag, the 1st Bn, 13th Inf Regt. Another battalion from Trøndelag, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf Regt was moved to East Finnmark. The final major change in the disposition of forces in North Norway took place on March 15, 1940 when the 1st Bn, 14th Inf Regt in East Finnmark was replaced by the 2nd Bn from the same regiment and the 1st Bn, 16th Inf Regt at Setermoen was demobilized.

Thus, while each of the other divisional areas in the country had only one infantry battalion on active duty at the time of the German attack, the 6th Division in North Norway had five battalions assigned. The units in North Norway were better equipped than the units in other areas of the country. All field units were outfitted with skis and winter gear. What was lacking was procured or produced by civilian industry within the divisional area. Various women’s organizations provided a valuable service by making winter clothing, including white winter camouflage materials for covering regular uniforms.

The three northern provinces were well stocked with food and fuel. For most foodstuffs there were sufficient quantities on hand to last up to nine months in case the area became isolated from the rest of the country. A concerted effort was made in early 1940 to distribute these vast stores to smaller warehouses throughout the countryside. This distribution served a dual purpose. First, it increased the security of the stores by making their capture or destruction more difficult. Second, the wide distribution made access easier for both the military and the population at large, particularly in areas that could become isolated either through enemy action or because of the severe winter weather.

The units mobilized for the neutrality watch were expected to conduct such training and exercises as would improve their ability to operate in war. There was an acute shortage of both junior officers and NCOs despite efforts to bring some in from other parts of the country. Many of the enlisted and lower ranking NCOs in the units that were mobilized came from older age groups and the recruit training period for some had been as short as 48 days. Since a number of years had passed since these enlisted men were trained or on active duty, it became necessary to restart their training. Officers and senior NCOs were much older than their counterparts in the German Army, well past their prime for the physical demands likely to be faced by company grade officers in combat. Furthermore, they did not have experience to fall back on since they had seen little service and few had the opportunity in the 1920s and 1930s to attend refresher courses, or to become familiar with new weapons and equipment.

A look at the ages of the officers in the 1/13th Inf Regt, which had the mission of defending the Narvik area, illustrates this problem. This unit was activated in Nord-Trøndelag Province on January 5, 1940 and arrived in Narvik on January 13. The battalion commander was 58 years old. The ages of the five captains ranged from over 40 to 62 years of age. The situation was similar among the 26 lieutenants assigned to the battalion. Their average age was 37.5 years, with the two youngest being 25 and the two oldest 56. The lack of combat experience, inadequate training, limited periods of active duty and age are the major factors that determined the performance of this battalion in the campaign.

Lack of quarters resulted in units being spread out over relatively large areas. Combined with the severe winter weather and the lack of daylight during the winter months, the dispersion of the units made training very difficult.

The units in East Finnmark were required to patrol and outpost long stretches of the border with the Soviet Union and Finland. This mission made unit training and exercise at company and battalion level impossible for them.

The situation was better in Troms and Ofoten. Here it was possible to conduct maneuvers at battalion and brigade level. Two such maneuvers were conducted in February and March. The first was a defensive exercise, while the second involved movement to contact and attacks against prepared defensive positions. A maneuver by the 1/13th Inf, scheduled to begin on March 8, was cancelled due to continual snowstorms. A report by the 6th Division on December 18, 1939 summarizes the combat readiness of its battalions and the statements are equally applicable to the units in its command in April 1940:
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Despite all shortcomings, there is no doubt that the battalions involved in the neutrality watch in North Norway benefited from that experience in both operational readiness and morale. It is to General Fleischer’s credit that he managed, despite serious obstacles, to bring the 6th Division to a state of readiness that permitted the start of offensive operations within a relatively short time after absorbing the first shocks of war. Fleischer wrote, “The units suffered much hardship but developed toughness, became skilled at operating together, and learned to manage on their own. They became units that could be used in war.”
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For these reasons, the campaign in North Norway started out with advantages that were not present in other areas of the country. General Fleischer was able to begin operations almost immediately with mobilized units and fully functional and provisioned supply and support organizations. Except for the units that lost their supplies and equipment when the Germans captured Elvegårdsmoen, the 6th Division was able to mobilize according to plans without any serious enemy interference.
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The units in southern and central Norway had their mobilization disrupted by the immediate loss of depots and population centers. In addition, they had to cope with enemy air supremacy and a rapid build-up of his forces.

General Fleischer had his headquarters in Harstad, but he and his chief of staff had departed for an inspection of the forces in East Finnmark on April 3, 1940. They were at Nybergsmoen near Kirkenes on April 8 to observe an exercise by the Varanger Battalion. Colonel Lars Mjelde, the 6th District Commander, supervised the division staff during Fleischer’s absence.

North Norway was divided into five sectors, but battalion-size or larger formations were located in only three area commands on April 8, 1940:

A functional radio net was established shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939 and it was in operation until October 10, 1939. It provided radio communication between the District Command in Harstad, Colonel Sundlo’s headquarters in Narvik, and Colonel Løken’s headquarters in Troms. Telephone was the only means of communication between the three major subordinate commands, the District Command, and General Fleischer’s headquarters after October 10, 1939. There were no direct communication links between navy and army commands in the Narvik area, although there was frequent personal and telephone contact between Colonel Sundlo and Captain Askim. The failure to provide the army headquarters in Narvik with a radio link to the Ofot Division caused serious problems. While the Ofot Division had radio communications with the 3rd Naval District, that organization relied on telephone to communicate with army headquarters in Harstad.

The Hålogaland Air Group, established in January 1938, came under General Fleischer’s direct command. This unit had its headquarters at Bardufoss Airfield and it had six Fokker CVE aircraft (Dutch built light bomber-reconnaissance aircraft), one transport, and three Tiger Moth aircraft assigned. Three Fokker aircraft, the transport, and one Tiger Moth were stationed in Seida in East Finnmark. The rest were at Banak in West Finnmark. There were two antiaircraft platoons at Seida and one at Banak. Each platoon had three Colt machineguns. The aircraft were outfitted with skis and were therefore not completely dependent on airfields. They were, for example, capable of operating from frozen lakes.

In the mobilization plans, it was assumed that the 6th Division’s staff would split, with one part becoming the staff of the 6th Field Brigade and the other part the 6th District Command. The idea was that General Fleischer would take over as commander of the 6th Field Brigade and at the same time assume the role as overall commander in the war zone while the administrative functions outside the war zone would be the responsibility of 6th District Command.

The 6th Division regarded this as an unsuitable solution for North Norway. The reasons were that it was difficult to know in advance what would be a war zone, and because the 6th Field Brigade was viewed as a strategic reserve. In April 1937, the 6th Division proposed that the 6th District Command assume responsibility for the administrative functions in all of North Norway and that the division commander not be tied to any specific unit, such as the 6th Field Brigade.
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This would facilitate his role as commander-in-chief in North Norway after the outbreak of war.