Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (24 page)

The proposal was never formally accepted but the District Command, located in Harstad, was established in January 1940 and augmented so that it would be able to function in the manner envisioned in the 6th Division proposal. It was responsible for the administrative, logistical, and support functions within the 6th Division’s area of responsibility. Colonel Lars Mjelde, who reported to Fleischer, commanded this organization and had his own staff. Captain H. Løken was Colonel Mjelde’s chief of staff. Among others on his staff was the chief quartermaster, chief medical officer, commander of the Hålogaland Engineer Bn, the district engineer, and the chief of sea transport. General Fleischer effectively separated the administrative and operational elements of his staff through this organizational setup. While some higher authorities looked upon this unique arrangement with disapproval, it appears to have worked satisfactorily.

General Fleischer

Major General Carl Gustav Fleischer (1883-1942) is one of the two key individuals in the Narvik Campaign, the other being his opponent General Dietl. Neither officer survived the war. While Fleischer was a controversial officer, many consider him the most competent Norwegian general of World War 2. While he had excellent General Staff credentials, he lacked the combat experience and extensive troop duty that characterized Dietl’s career.

Fleischer is a well-known name in Norwegian society but Carl Gustav came from a modest and relatively unknown branch of that family. He was the son of a minister in the northern part of Trøndelag Province. His father was lost at sea when Carl Gustav was only two years old and his mother moved the family to Trondheim.

Carl Gustav grew up in a very religious home under tight economic conditions. The family moved from Trondheim to Oslo in 1899. Carl Gustav chose a military career despite opposition from his immediate family and he entered the military academy in 1902. This was a time when the Norwegian military was modernized and expanded in anticipation of a violent end to the country’s union with Sweden. Carl Gustav graduated in 1905 when war with Sweden appeared inevitable. War was averted at the last moment, but the perception of Sweden as a potential military threat lingered for many years.

General Torkel Hovland, in his biography of Fleischer, gives an extensive and excellent depiction of the general’s personality. It is important to keep these traits in mind since they assumed substantial importance during the Narvik Campaign. He appears to have been thoroughly honest and loyal to his followers. At times, he showed a reluctance to confront subordinates and superiors directly in disagreeable situations. Fleischer was a romantic, an ardent nationalist, had a feeling of destiny and a strong sense of duty and honor. He was stubborn, dogmatic, overly sensitive to actual or perceived affronts to his honor, and had a tendency to brood. The senior aristocratic British officers had little understanding for this unknown militia commander and his reaction to rather cavalier treatment by British military leaders affected the campaign. The Norwegian Government in exile shoved Fleischer aside and this serious affront to his sense of honor was undoubtedly a major factor in his suicide in Canada in 1942.

Fleischer spent many years on the General Staff but his command experience below regimental level was limited to a two-year tour in western Norway and three years with the Royal Guards. Fleischer was appointed Chief of Staff of the 6th Division in Harstad in 1919. He spent four years in this position and it was his first experience in the part of the country where he was to serve again 20 years later.

Fleischer was again posted to the General Staff in 1923 where he played an important role in the military reorganizations of the 1920s as Chief of the Mobilization and Readiness Division. The 1920s and 1930s were tough years for the Norwegian military. Pacifism, idealism, tough economic times, an anti-militaristic mood, and the lack of obvious threats combined to curtail severely the size and effectiveness of the military forces.

After three years (1926-1929) with the Royal Guards, Fleischer returned to the General Staff and continued there until 1934. He was also an instructor in tactics at the Military Academy at the same time as Otto Ruge, the future Commander-in-Chief. The lack of an amicable relationship between these two officers assumed some importance during the Narvik Campaign. Their careers crossed at various times in the years leading up to World War 2 and it appears that they grew to dislike each other. Most writers attribute this bad chemistry to the fact that they were on opposite sides in the bitter dispute over the 1933 army reorganization. Hovland believes that the problems were deeper. Ruge was a pragmatist by nature. Fleischer, on the other hand, was an idealist who abhorred compromise when it came to national defense. He had little understanding for or patience with the give and take that characterize the budgetary process and allocation of resources in a democracy. Ruge’s view that military budget requests should be politically realistic and that the military should put the limited resources made available to the best use became the basis for the reorganization of 1933. Ruge made a distinction between what he called “peace defense,” such as a military neutrality watch, and the sort of situation that would arise if the country became involved in a European war because of its strategic position. To accomplish this dual mission, Ruge argued that the military should give up its wishes for a large establishment, which would only exist on paper because of limited resources. He wanted a small, modern, and well-trained army. Fleischer and many fellow officers opposed the reorganization that Ruge pushed through in 1933. They considered it unsuitable for the defense problems confronting Norway and a sell-out of national security. General Roscher-Nielsen described Fleischer as Ruge’s most incensed opponent.

Fleischer was promoted from major to colonel in 1934—skipping one rank—and assumed command of the 14th Inf Regt in Mosjøen. As commander of the 14th Inf, he was responsible for the defense of the area from Narvik to the Nord-Trøndelag provincial boundary. Fleischer was promoted to major general in January 1939, and given command of the 6th Division.

When the time came for the appointment of a new Minister of Defense in early 1940, Fleischer was one of three candidates under consideration. The other two were Colonels Ruge and Birger Ljungberg, the youngest of the three. Fleischer was not selected because it was judged unwise to make a command change in North Norway with hostilities just across the border in Finland. Ljungberg was eventually chosen because he was viewed as non-controversial and a person who could work well in a political setting.

The Town of Narvik

Narvik is located near the center of the area Fleischer and Hagerup were required to defend. At 68º 26’ 8’’ N, it is 220 kilometers north of the Arctic Circle, near the same latitude as Barrow, Alaska (71º 18’ 1” N). The distance from Narvik to Oslo is approximately 1,450 kilometers. Until 1902 Narvik was known as Victoriahavn. As late as 1883, it was an isolated community of a few farms, largely dependent on the Lofoten fisheries.

Narvik has an excellent ice–free harbor and this fact led to its selection as the western terminal of the Ofot Railway. Sweden and Norway had entered into a union in 1814 and the governments of the two countries decided, in the 1880s, to build a railroad to cross the 170km between the iron ore districts in Kiruna, Sweden and Narvik. The railroad would allow iron ore to be shipped during the winter months when the Gulf of Bothnia and parts of the Baltic froze. This immense, complicated construction project in a wild and inhospitable region took many years to complete, despite the involvement of thousands of laborers. The project included building harbor facilities to handle the iron ore and this caused a sharp increase in Narvik’s permanent population from 300 in 1898 to 4,500 in 1903, the year after the railroad was completed.

By 1940, Narvik’s population had grown to approximately 10,000 people, but the town remained very isolated. There were no road or railroad links to the southern areas of the country. A road or railroad through the mountainous wilderness between Narvik and Bodø was only in the planning stages. To reach Oslo or southern Norway from Narvik, a person had to take a coastal steamer to Trondheim or Bergen, and then catch a train for the remainder of the journey. An alternate route was by train from Narvik to Luleå, and on to Oslo via Stockholm. There was a road leading north from Øyjord, across the Ofotfjord from Narvik; however, it was difficult to keep this road open for traffic during the winter and it could become impassable during the spring thaw.

Prior to the construction of the Ofot Railway, North Norway was more or less a military no-man’s land. The railroad changed that and was the most important factor that caused the political and military leadership to plan a defense of the region. Russia was viewed as the main threat because of its well-known desire for ice-free harbors. A naval attack was viewed as the most likely form of Russian aggression and the plans to deal with this threat concentrated on naval and coastal artillery forces. Not much was accomplished, however, since in the period leading to the breakup of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905, the southern and eastern parts of the country were viewed as the priority from a military perspective.

After 1905, Russia was still viewed as the main threat, but the possibility of a Swedish attack to secure the railroad and the harbor at Narvik had to be considered. The nationalistic movement that led to Finnish independence at the end of World War 1 posed another possible threat because of large Finnish settlements in North Norway. An expansionist movement for creation of a “greater” Finland could result in demands for parts of the two northernmost provinces, Finnmark and Troms. German naval maneuvers in northern waters in 1911 added a new potential danger and the period prior to and during World War 1 saw considerable activity with respect to Narvik’s defenses.

Defense Plans for Narvik

Narvik is located on terrain that is not a very defensible. The military authorities demanded and received promises from the politicians that coastal fortresses would be constructed in the Narvik approaches as a condition for their blessing of the Ofot Railway project. The promise was only partially fulfilled, and after World War 1, it was ignored.

The early defense plans for Narvik focused primarily on a series of coastal artillery batteries supplemented by submarines and torpedo boats. Plans were set in motion to establish a naval base at Ramsund near the Ofotfjord entrance and for the construction of coastal artillery battery positions covering the fjord entrance from the north and west. A battery of 105mm guns was established at Forholten covering the northern entrances to Ramsund, which was dredged, and Tjeldsund. This battery was operational in 1916 but not activated in 1940. The battery at Ramnes, at the junction of Ramsund and Ofotfjord, was never completed. The three 6-inch guns for this battery were kept in storage for many years and in March 1940, they were sent to Bergen to be used in a planned gun battery on that city’s northern approach. They were at the naval depot in Bergen on April 9 and were captured by the Germans.

The elaborate plans for a strong naval base at Ramsund never came to fruition and they were shelved in 1925 when Ramsund was designated as a naval depot rather than a naval base. The severe reduction in defense expenditures after World War I and the lack of any immediate threats were the primary reasons for the abandonment of these sensible plans. The navy did not resist the changed status for Ramsund and it did not see the same need as the army for a coastal battery at Ramnes. The navy viewed the battery as being part of the framework of the naval base, while the army viewed it as an important factor in the defense of Narvik and the Ofot Railway. After the 1933 defense reorganization, the coastal artillery came under the navy’s jurisdiction.

Both General Fleischer and his predecessor requested repeatedly that the planned coastal fortifications at the Ofotfjord entrance be completed but they were turned down. Fleischer sought a promise from the navy for a three-hour early warning of an enemy attack on Narvik. The navy refused—with good reasons—to commit to such a promise.

Before and during World War 1, army plans for the defense of the railroad leading to the Swedish border were given a lower priority since the establishment of coastal artillery batteries and use of navy assets were viewed as the primary means of defense. However, since the defenses in the outer part of Ofotfjord were never completed, the army plans for the defense of the Ofot Railway took on added significance even during World War I.

Army plans called for the establishment of a blocking position in the Sildvik area, about 20 kilometers east of Narvik, and preparations for the destruction of the railroad if the defensive positions could not be held. The defenses in this blocking position consisted of bunkers for machineguns and artillery, and an armored railroad car with a 75mm gun. Searchlights, magazines, sidings, etc. to support the blocking position were installed. These projects were completed during World War I.

A reinforced company-size task force was initially designated to occupy these positions, and it was referred to as the “Narvik Detachment.” The planners anticipated the need for a quick occupation of the defensive line and the troops were therefore located in Narvik where adequate quarters were available. From there, they would be able to occupy the defensive positions on short notice, something that would not be possible from the regimental base at Elvegårdsmoen.
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The “Narvik Detachment” was a rapid reaction force, to be augmented as the situation dictated. It was not a force designed to defend the town of Narvik.

The plans for the defense of the railroad line to Sweden were rational. They recognized that the primary objective of any seaward attacker was Narvik
and
the railroad to the Swedish border. The capture of Narvik without also seizing the railroad would be meaningless, since the flow of Swedish iron ore would cease. The planners assumed that the attacker would have naval dominance before landing troops. A force defending Narvik would therefore be exposed to heavy naval gunfire and it could be cut off from a retreat along the railroad by an enemy landing at any point along the southern shore of Rombakfjord, possibly at Djupvik or Straumsnes. The plan to occupy a defensive line in the Sildvik area was therefore a sound solution. The positions would be less exposed to naval gunfire and more difficult to envelop.