Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (36 page)

The Attack by British Destroyers

Meanwhile, the 2nd British Destroyer Flotilla proceeded up Vestfjord at 20 knots. It was a nerve-wracking passage in the severely reduced visibility. There were several near misses, not only with the shoreline but also between the destroyers trying to keep within sight of each other in the heavy snow squalls. Skill and the quick reactions of the destroyer crews kept disasters from happening and the line of ships made the starboard turn into Ofotfjord at 0130 hours (GMT) without reducing speed and without being sighted by
U51
.
U25
also failed to see the British warships. Warburton-Lee reduced speed to 12 knots as he neared the narrow part of the fjord between Finnvika and Tjeldøy. Luck was again with the British. They were not sighted by
U46
, patrolling the narrows near Ramnes.

The Admiralty, in session throughout the operation, had time to consider the hazardous nature of Warburton-Lee’s undertaking and have second thoughts about its wisdom. However, they could not bring themselves to take the responsibility to call off the attack or delay it until the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla could be sufficiently reinforced. Instead, they sent a cautionary message to Warburton-Lee just as the British warships were entering Ofotfjord (0136 hours GMT):
¹⁰
“Norwegian defense ships
Eidsvold
and
Norge
may be in German hands. You alone can judge whether in these circumstances attack should be made. We shall support whatever decision you make.”

The Admiralty knew that there were six German destroyers in Narvik, along with one submarine. They suspected that the Norwegian shore batteries and the two coastal defense ships were in German hands. Finally, they were told that the fjord entrance might be mined. This intelligence about the situation in Narvik should have caused the Admiralty sufficient concern about sending five relatively small destroyers into what could be a hornet’s nest. Warburton-Lee was already in Ofotfjord when the Admiralty threw the ball back into his court. The cautionary message had no effect on his plans. The problem of looking too cautious was still there but the danger of being labeled foolhardy was removed by the last sentence in the Admiralty message.

The British destroyers were now approaching Narvik. Their navigational difficulties and near misses with the shoreline and each other resulted in the exchange of numerous radio signals between the destroyers as they proceeded into the fjord. The signals were sent in the clear. Navigational problems, as they were approaching their target, warranted taking this otherwise unacceptable risk. The British were again lucky. The German radio operators were obviously not searching various frequencies for enemy tactical information.

Diether von Roeder
headed for the entrance to Narvik harbor at 0330 hours (GMT), after only 30 minutes on patrol. Lieutenant Commander Holtorf calculated that this would bring him into the harbor at first light, about 0420 hours (GMT). Bonte’s journal notes that Gadow was to arrange for
Diether von Roeder
to remain on guard until relieved by
Hans Lüdemann
, Gadow’s flagship. It is obvious that there was some miscommunication, because it is difficult to understand why Holtorf left his post without notifying the flotilla commander. Holtorf could not help but notice that
Hans Lüdemann
was still alongside
Jan Wellem
when he entered the harbor and dropped anchor. The Germans claim that
Diether von Roeder
did not wait to be relieved due to a misunderstanding of orders.
¹¹

Diether von Roeder’s
navigation officer plotted the ship’s position and it happened to coincide exactly with a plot made by the navigation officer on the British destroyer
Hardy
at precisely the same time. The British navigation officer appears to have made a slight mistake in the ship’s dead-reckoning position, due perhaps to over-compensation for current and wind. However, the ships were probably not much over one mile apart. Captain Warburton-Lee signaled his ships at 0343 hours (GMT), “I am steering for the entrance of Narvik Harbour.”
¹²
The British destroyers headed for the harbor entrance at eight knots, on the same course as
Diether von Roeder
. Both sides were unaware that the enemy was so close to hand.

The first light of dawn was beginning to break when land appeared off the lead British destroyer’s port bow. It should have been the Framnes Peninsula if navigation had been on the mark. However, it turned out to be Emmenes, on the other side of the harbor entrance. This three kilometer mistake in navigation turned out to be very fortunate for the British, since it prevented them from running into
Diether von Roeder
and giving the German destroyers some warning of the impending attack.

The British made a course adjustment towards the harbor and despite an increase in speed to 12 knots, the fortuitous delay resulted in
Diether von Roeder
entering the harbor just moments before the British. It took the British six minutes to reach the harbor entrance. By this time, it was light enough to see a large number of ships anchored in the harbor, but the enemy destroyers were not yet detected.

Warburton-Lee dispatched the destroyers
Hotspur
and
Hostile
to the northeast to prevent any enemy ships that could be outside the harbor from interfering with the attack and to cover any possible shore batteries on Framnes. He entered the harbor alone with the
Hardy
, telling
Hunter
and
Havock
to await their turn to attack. The visibility had now improved to almost one mile, but the haze of the breaking dawn kept the British from immediately seeing the German destroyers. Two of these,
Hermann Künne
and
Hans Lüdemann
, were refueling on opposite sides of
Jan Wellem
.
Anton Schmitt
was behind the tanker, waiting its turn to refuel.
Diether von Roeder
had just dropped anchor west of the city pier, and the German flagship,
Wilhelm Heidkamp
, was further to the south.

Hardy
slid quietly by some of the merchant ships and sighted
Anton Schmitt
and
Wilhelm Heidkamp
through a gap between the merchant ships. Bonte’s ensign was observed flying from
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
mast.

The alarm had not sounded as the British broke out their battle flags. Warburton-Lee ordered the engine engaged slightly in order to maneuver into torpedo position. The two German ships were stationary and it was difficult to miss them at this short range. Torpedoes were launched and Warburton-Lee instinctively swung
Hardy
around and headed back for the harbor entrance at 20 knots. The time was 0430 hours (GMT). The first torpedo missed its target and hit a merchant ship. The second found its mark. The violent explosion detonated the aft magazine on the
Wilhelm Heidkamp
, blowing off the ship’s stern. The massive explosion tore off the three aft guns and munitions continued to explode for several minutes. Captain Bonte never knew what happened. He and 81 of his crew died instantly.
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
skipper, Lieutenant Commander Hans Erdmenger, miraculously escaped death and he managed to secure his wrecked ship to the Swedish transport
Oxelösund
in order to save the wounded and some of the valuable equipment.
Wilhelm Heidkamp
remained afloat until April 11.

Two additional German destroyers were sighted as
Hardy
exited the harbor at high speed, the
Hermann Künne
refueling alongside
Jan Wellem
, and
Diether von Roeder
.
Hardy
fired a salvo of three torpedoes at the German warships but they missed and detonated against the piers in the northeast corner of the harbor.

Hunter
now entered the harbor. Lieutenant Commander Lindsay de Villiers,
Hunter’s
skipper, was less discriminating in picking his targets. He fired the ship’s torpedoes into the crowded harbor at the same time as he opened up with his guns. The resulting chaos was indescribable.
Anton Schmitt’s
crew came on deck thinking they were under air attack. This thought was quickly dispelled when a shell hit the forward part of the ship. Lieutenant Commander Böhme was trying to leave his cabin when a torpedo from
Hunter
hit the ship’s forward turbine room. The explosion jammed the cabin door, trapping him inside. The German warships were now returning fire and
Hunter
laid smoke as she exited the harbor.
Havock
entered the harbor as
Hunter
exited. Her task was more difficult than that of her predecessors. The Germans were now aware that they were under a surface attack and the visibility that had been tolerable 15 minutes earlier was again very limited because of all the smoke from gunfire and burning ships.
Havock’s
skipper, Lieutenant Commander Rafe E. Courage, spotted
Hermann Künne
alongside
Jan Wellem
and opened fire on these two ships. No hits were scored.
Hermann Künne
had sufficient steam pressure to maneuver away from the tanker. This was done with a great sense of urgency and without taking time to detach the wires and hoses connecting it to
Jan Wellem
. Commander Courage now turned his attention to
Anton Schmitt
and gave that ship his full attention. A salvo of three torpedoes was fired at the German warship. The first two torpedoes hit two merchant ships. The third torpedo hit
Anton Schmitt
in the aft boiler room just after Böhme had managed to open the jammed door to his cabin and was on his way to the quarterdeck. Böhme was thrown overboard by the explosion. He was wearing a life jacket and this saved his life. German and Norwegian sources report that two torpedoes hit
Anton Schmitt
amidships and that the destroyer broke in two and sank almost immediately.

Hermann Künne
had managed to back away from
Jan Wellem
and it was located less than 50 meters from
Anton Schmitt
when the latter received the second torpedo hit. The tremendous explosion sent shock waves through
Hermann Künne
and temporarily made its engines inoperable. As the forward part of
Anton Schmitt
rolled over, her mast settled on
Hermann Künne’s
deck and the two ships became entangled and remained immobilized for the next 40 minutes.

There is some dispute as to what happened during this first phase of the attack and that is understandable in such a violent and sudden encounter. Captain MacIntyre writes that torpedoes from
Hardy
caused the destruction of both
Wilhelm Heidkamp
and
Anton Schmitt
and that while both
Hunter
and
Havock
fired torpedoes, these appeared to have missed. Moulton appears to accept the same reasoning but this may be because he seems to have relied heavily on what Captain MacIntyre wrote about this event. Dickens and Harvey, however, maintain that torpedoes fired by
Havock
sank
Anton Schmitt
. German sources and the sequence of events leading to Commander Böhme reaching the quarterdeck at the same time as the torpedo struck the ship, support Dickens and Harvey’s version.

The German gunfire became increasingly effective as the men began to recover from their surprise, and Courage decided to break off his attack.
Havock
received fire from
Hans Lüdemann
, which was now loose from
Jan Wellem
, and
Diether von Roeder
as she exited the harbor.
Havock
was not hit, but
Hans Lüdemann
sustained two damaging hits. One shell put one of her forward guns out of action while a second shell started a fire in the aft part of the ship, making it necessary to flood the rear magazine to keep it from exploding.
Havock
was also subjected to a hail of rifle and machinegun fire from German troops on shore. The battle had lasted 30 minutes and the crowded harbor was a terrible scene of destruction.

Hotspur
, skippered by Commander Herbert F. N. Layman, and
Hostile
, skippered by Commander J. P. Wright now joined the battle, as they had returned from their mission to check any shore batteries at Framnes.
Hostile
became engaged in a gun battle with
Diether von Roeder
, still at anchor and immobile. The battle was intense but the visibility was so reduced by smoke that the gunnery was not very effective.
Hostile
took no hits, but
Diether von Roeder
sustained two damaging hits.
Hunter
fired four torpedoes into the harbor and hit two merchant ships, one being the British
Blythmoor
. The British had fired 22 torpedoes into the harbor. All five British destroyers were now steaming in a rough counter-clockwise formation outside the harbor, engaging targets as they came abreast of the entrance.

Due to the reduced visibility caused by the smoke from the fires and guns, the three surviving German destroyers and their five opponents were aiming their fire at observed gun flashes. Commander Wright was trying to get into a position to launch a torpedo attack against
Diether von Roeder
, but Commander Holtorf beat him to the draw.
Diether von Roeder
had taken a punishing pounding from the British fire. Two shells from
Hostile
penetrated her port side below the bridge, rupturing a fuel tank, and damaging the steering controls. The fire from the broken fuel tank set the aft boiler room ablaze. The ship was still immobile but Holtorf feared that the spreading fire would reach the magazines and he decided to launch his torpedoes before it was too late. He sent a spread of eight torpedoes between the merchant ships towards the harbor entrance.
Hans Lüdemann
and
Hermann Künne
also sent torpedo salvos towards the entrance.