Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (40 page)

Unlike the task forces destined for Oslo and Bergen, TF 2 approached the mouth of Trondheimfjord at high speed and in tight formation. The strong searchlights from the heavy cruiser
Admiral Hipper
blinded the Norwegian gunners and the ships were able to pass the forts without sustaining any damage. The city, army depots, and the naval headquarters were captured by the Germans without resistance. The forts were captured later in the day after some sharp fighting. Værnes Airfield, 22 miles east of Trondheim was captured without resistance on April 10. The loss of this important facility had a significant effect on subsequent Norwegian and Allied operations since its possession extended the reach of the Luftwaffe by several hundred miles.

Norwegian Reactions during the April 8–9 Crisis

The Germans placed great hopes in a quick capture of the Norwegian capital, since a success in Oslo could be expected to result in a peaceful occupation of Norway. The Germans hoped to capture the government, the royal family, the ministry of defense, and possibly both the army and navy staff. The Germans believed that with the royal family and government in their hands, the Norwegians would accept the German ultimatum.

The date and time of the German attack was revealed to the German naval and air attachés in Oslo four days before the attack. Both attachés were instructed not to reveal this information to the German Ambassador in Oslo, Dr. Bräuer. He was not informed until the evening of April 8 when he was given a note for delivery to the Norwegian Foreign Minister early in the morning of April 9. The ambitious German timetable was disrupted when TF 5 failed to reach the capital on April 9.

The Norwegian Government had grappled all the day of April 8 with massive Allied violations of Norwegian neutrality. There was a distinct possibility that Norway would soon find itself at war with Great Britain. At the same time, alarming reports were received about German naval movements through the Skagerrak and Kattegat. British violations of Norwegian waters, reports of German naval movements and even the sinking of
Rio de Janeiro
whose rescued German troops admitted they were on their way to Bergen, failed to alarm the government sufficiently to take prudent defensive measures.

The government met in continuing sessions in the evening of April 8 and throughout the night. A decision to mobilize was postponed until the following morning, but the sudden events of that day and the looming threat of attack from both the English and the Germans seem to have paralyzed the Norwegian Government.

The government assembled again in the Foreign Ministry at 0130 hours on April 9. This meeting followed an air raid alarm and blackout in Oslo at 0015 hours. The government had not requested that the two service chiefs attend their meeting and this had serious consequences. The cabinet ministers were told that something was happening in the Oslofjord but that the situation was unclear. All doubts were removed at 0150 hours when the 2nd Naval District reported that German warships had entered the restricted area around Bergen.

Prime Minister Nygaardsvold made a telephone call to the palace and talked to King Haakon VII. The king’s reaction to the news that the country was at war was, “Against whom?”, a fitting expression of the confusion and uncertainty that had prevailed for the past 24 hours. The Norwegians decided to ask Great Britain for assistance. Foreign Minister Koht made a wakeup call to the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Dormer. Koht met with Dormer at 0220 hours and Dormer sent a query to London at 0236 hours: “MOST IMMEDIATE. Norwegian Government stresses the need for strong and quick assistance before Germans establish firm footing on Norwegian soil. Please reply by 6 p.m. whether strong assistance can be (immediately) forthcoming.”
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The British answer, which promised their full assistance “forthwith,” was received at 1255 hours. This message gave the Norwegians, who did not know the confused state of affairs in Great Britain, unrealistically high expectations.

Irrational Mobilization Decision

The government finally decided to mobilize, and Defense Minister Ljungberg passed this order to General Kristian Laake. When questioned by Laake, Ljungberg confirmed that the order dealt with the forces that the military had recommended for mobilization on April 5: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Field Brigades. This decision would have serious consequences.

Ljungberg (1884–1967) was a career army officer who started his service in 1906. He was a colonel commanding an infantry regiment when he received his appointment as Defense Minister on December 22, 1939. He was not the government’s first choice. The prime minister favored General Fleischer but it was considered unwise to move him from his sensitive assignment in North Norway. Most of the cabinet favored Colonel Ruge but the defense minister he would replace, Fredrik Monsen, was adamantly opposed and threatened to withdraw his resignation. Ruge was viewed by some as stubborn and difficult to work with and many officers in the army had a negative view of him because of his involvement in the 1933 military reorganization.
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The army staff was confused about the orders received from Minister Ljungberg. The order called for only a partial mobilization of units in southern Norway. The order did not include the 5th Division in Trøndelag or the 6th Division in North Norway. Full mobilization called for the activation of 66 infantry battalions, at least on paper. The procedures for full mobilization called for notification by all available means, including radio. In a partial mobilization, on the other hand, the 18 infantry battalions (plus artillery, cavalry, engineers, and support units) in the four divisions in South Norway would be notified about the call-up by mail.

Those who wrote the procedures felt that a partial mobilization would be in response to a growing threat. Full mobilization, on the other hand, was a response to an immediate crisis or attack. The reserves, outside the six field brigades, were not trained and, in many cases, did not have the required equipment. All decision makers knew that this state of affairs would take several years to rectify. The distinction between full mobilization and the mobilization of only six field brigades had become blurred. Many, who felt that full mobilization, as originally envisioned, was impractical, viewed mobilization of six field brigades and supporting units as full mobilization.

General Laake decided to wait until Ljungberg determined the method of notification before sending out mobilization orders. Colonel Rasmus Hatledal, the chief of the general staff, protested to no avail. Valuable time was wasted in this absurd argument. Ljungberg eventually arrived at army headquarters and Hatledal pressed him for an order for full mobilization, but Ljungberg decided to leave the order for partial mobilization in force until he could discuss the issue with the cabinet.

The delivery of the German ultimatum delayed this discussion. There are those who claim that Ljungberg assumed that the mobilization of the four field brigades would be handled as an immediate action and others claim that he was the victim of the government’s failure to pay attention to the many military warnings about the possibility of a surprise attack.
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His decision is not justified by either of these two explanations and it is hard to believe that Ljungberg, having just come from the command of a regiment, did not know the difference in procedures for partial and full mobilization. The decision was made to mobilize by mail, giving a date of April 12.

Hatledal protested and pointed out that mobilization had to be announced over the radio since it was too late to mobilize via the postal system. Laake, who apparently still did not believe that an invasion was in progress, did not support him. The order for mobilization by letter remained in force.

Colonel Hatledal, on his own responsibility, moved the first day of mobilization from 12 to 11 April, increased the number of troops called to the colors from 24,000 to 38,000, and included the 5th Division in Trøndelag. There were also many units in North Norway that required mobilization despite the fact that the 6th Division was on a partial war footing. Hatledal did not dare take the final and most important step, sending the mobilization order by radio. Such action would probably result in his relief and a countermand of his order, resulting in even more confusion.

It is certainly true that full mobilization included individuals who were not trained and who lacked some of the required equipment. However, to justify the decision to mobilize by mail by claiming that full mobilization was an unrealistic option that would lead to more chaos demonstrates the rigidity that characterized the Norwegian military and civilian leadership in 1940. Hatledal was not arguing for full mobilization, only that the notification by radio and telegram applicable to full mobilization should be used in the current situation. Whatever additional chaos may have resulted was certainly preferable to giving the Germans three days to consolidate their bridgeheads.

The German Ultimatum and Negotiations

Minister Bräuer’s instructions called for the presentation of the German note to the Norwegian Foreign Minister between 0400 and 0500 hours on April 9. The Germans believed that if the ultimatum was delivered to the Norwegian Government before the start of hostilities, there was a good chance that the Norwegians would accept the German demands. They assumed that German attack groups would not meet any resistance before 0400 hours at the earliest. This assumption was unrealistic since hostilities had started as early as 2300 hours on April 8. By 0400 hours, the Norwegians were aware that there were German attacks taking place against Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim. At 0414 hours, the naval headquarters in Oslo also learned that an attack was in progress against Narvik and at 0500 hours that Kristiansand was under attack.

Curt Bräuer met with Mr. Koht in the Foreign Ministry library at 0430, while the second air raid alarm of the night took place. Bräuer presented the German note immediately. It announced that Germany had found it necessary to occupy parts of Norway as a preemptive operation to forestall British plans against Norway. Norwegian unwillingness or inability to defend its neutrality against British violations also necessitated the German operation. The note stated that the German occupation would only be for the duration of the war, and that the integrity and sovereignty of Norway would be respected. If the Norwegians resisted, the resistance would be broken with all means at Germany’s disposal. To prevent unnecessary bloodshed, the Norwegian Government should take the necessary political and military steps to cooperate with the German authorities. The note had an enclosure detailing the steps that were necessary. These included a demand for the Norwegian Government to announce to the Norwegian people that all resistance should cease. All military installations were to be turned over to the Germans. The Germans were to take control of all communication facilities, the press, radio, and postal system. Norwegian military units should be ordered to contact and cooperate with the German armed forces.

Koht listened silently as Bräuer read the German ultimatum. When the German had finished, Koht stated that he needed to consult the cabinet. Bräuer insisted on an immediate answer. Koht replied that the cabinet was in the next room and a quick answer should therefore not be a problem. It took the government only a couple of minutes to decide unanimously to reject the German ultimatum. Koht returned to the library and informed Bräuer that Norway would not submit to the German demands. Bräuer stated that this meant war and that nothing could save Norway. Koht replied that the war had already started. Bräuer reported the Norwegian reply in a telegram to General von Falkenhorst at 0618 hours.

The Norwegian Government and the royal family left Oslo for Hamar by a special train at 0723 hours. Koht had an interview with the Norwegian Broadcasting System at the railway station in Oslo and reported what had transpired and that general mobilization had been ordered. While this was not exactly what had been decided, it is how news about mobilization first reached thousands of Norwegians and they began showing up at mobilization centers all over the country.

The Norwegian Parliament was able to convene in the afternoon of April 9 at Hamar, a town located 76 miles north of Oslo. Despite the confusion that reigned that day, only five of the 150 members were absent. The members of the government, with the exception of Defense Minister Ljungberg, were all from the Labor Party. Prime Minister Nygaardsvold offered the government’s resignation in order that a new government, with all parties represented, could be formed. However, at the urging of Hambro, the leader of the conservatives, it was agreed unanimously that the government should remain in power and that three members from the opposition parties be added as ministers without portfolio.

The government also received a request from Ambassador Bräuer for negotiations and a meeting with the Norwegian Government and King. While most of those present felt that to negotiate with the Germans was meaningless, Foreign Minister Koht, who was skeptical about the extent and timeliness of Allied assistance, convinced them that they should at least listen to their proposal. A message sent to the Germans stated that the proposal would be submitted to the Parliament provided the Germans did not make any offensive military moves. The parliamentary session adjourned at 1930 hours when it was learned that a German force was approaching Hamar. For the second time in a day, the government was forced to move. Their new destination was the town of Elverum, about 20 miles from Hamar and 50 miles from the Swedish border.

The government meeting in Hamar, as the ones on the previous day, is hard to understand. It was time for action, not for discussions, and particularly not for discussions involving the Parliament. Odd-Bjørn Fure writes, “In a situation that demanded observations, analysis, and action, the government became tied up in an endless and purposeless debate in the Parliament.”
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The fact that the military chiefs were not represented at the most important meetings on April 9 was a major blunder. The cabinet ministers had little understanding of the military issues involved as the country went from peace to war. They did not understand how the war would be fought and therefore they made decisions without appreciating their military consequences.