Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (39 page)

The British account of
Rauenfels’
end has also found its way into some German sources. However, there are serious differences between that account and the events described in the Norwegian naval history. While
Rauenfels
was damaged severely, she did not explode. In fact, the German crew reboarded the ship after the British departed, managed to bring the fires under control, and beached their ship to keep it from sinking. The Norwegians captured the crew of 48 (one was killed in the encounter with the British). The Norwegians eventually salvaged most of the cargo but much was badly damaged by exposure to seawater.
¹⁸

With the departure of
Havock
from the vicinity of
Rauenfels
, the First Naval Battle of Narvik was over. In terms of damage and losses, it was a tossup. Each side lost two destroyers and all that participated, except three German ships, were damaged. The British had 147 dead and the Germans 176. From both a tactical and strategic view, the battle was a British victory. The Germans were surprised, their refueling operation was interrupted, they sustained heavy losses, six German iron ore ships were sunk (along with one British), and a supply ship was badly damaged and its salvageable cargo fell into Norwegian hands. While the British also sustained heavy losses and their ships barely escaped destruction, they could sustain naval losses to a much greater degree than their opponents.

In retrospect, both sides made serious mistakes. The Germans, in view of their own successful surprise operation 24 hours earlier, should have been more alert to a similar operation by their opponents, particularly since they were fully aware that large British naval forces were in the general area. It would have been wise for Captain Bonte to keep one or two of the three refueled destroyers,
Wilhelm Heidkamp
,
Georg Thiele
and
Bernd von Arnim
, on continuous patrol near the Ofotfjord entrance. Only those destroyers actually refueling should have remained in Narvik while the rest were moved to nearby bays and fjords to present a multi-directional threat to an attacker. The German reliance on submarines was misplaced, as they accomplished nothing.

Two events during the battle could have changed the outcome in German favor. An earlier warning to the outlaying destroyers could have trapped the British between the three surviving destroyers in Narvik and the five that were located outside the harbor. An earlier warning may have resulted in the destruction of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. Second, when the outlying destroyers were finally alerted, Commander Bey’s failure to close aggressively with his opponents may have saved the remaining British destroyers.

The British took a great risk in launching the operation without waiting for reinforcements. They were fully aware that they were going against superior enemy forces and that the suspected shore batteries could be in German hands, as could the two Norwegian coastal defense ships. This risk-taking is attributable to Admiralty interference in tactical operations. However, Admirals Forbes and Whitworth are not without blame.

The British had large naval forces in the area and more on their way. They could easily have bottled up the German ships at their only exit routes from Narvik, Vestfjord and Vågsfjord, and disposed of them at their leisure. However, even if the sense of urgency is accepted, the British could have added a cruiser and another destroyer flotilla to the attacking force. This may well have removed the necessity for a second battle. Warburton-Lee and his men fought the battle in the best tradition of the Royal Navy, assisted by what began to look like an unbelievable run of luck. The stage was now set for a final naval showdown.

C
ONFUSION AND
D
ISSARAY

“Against Whom?.”

K
ING
H
ÅKON
VII’
S REACTION WHEN AWAKENED BY HIS ADJUTANT AND TOLD NORWAY WAS AT WAR.

Myths of Treason and Sabotage

I have shown that Quisling and his party had little effect on German operational planning. The Germans used the organization as a source of information on political conditions in the country but Quisling was not informed about the forthcoming attack and his organization had no part in the operations. The Germans had come to realize that Quisling and his followers were not held in high regard in Norway.

Despite this fact, the writings during and immediately after the war accredited many of the German successes and Norwegian-Allied failures to treachery, sabotage, espionage, and fifth column operations. Politicians and historians alike, contributed to these myths. Even Winston Churchill added to these misconceptions. He writes in 1948:

While historians have now debunked most of the myths, there are people on both sides of the Atlantic who cling to the view that the Germans used deceit, espionage, and treachery in their attack on Norway and that Norwegians betrayed their own country. Many of the most outrageous claims came from British soldiers returning from their abortive efforts to stop the Germans.

In his excellent analysis of the Norwegian and Allied rationale for defeat, Richard Petrow writes that such stories served to make an otherwise incomprehensible defeat understandable.
²
He could have added that the stories also served as convenient shields for the mistakes by civilian and military officials in both Norway and Great Britain.

The facts are that the political and military leaders in Norway and Great Britain were asleep at the wheel and ignored the loud wake-up calls that came in for two weeks prior to the invasion. Most ignored clear indications that a military storm was gathering just over the horizon. That fantasy evaporated at 2315 hours on April 8 when foreign warships entered the restricted zone in Oslofjord. Thirty-five minutes later a short message from the 1st Naval District reported that the outer forts were engaging foreign warships. Norway’s 126 years of continuous peace had ended.

The Landings

The German pre-dawn attacks in southern and central Norway must be viewed as an unparalleled success. By the end of the day on April 9, all major Norwegian population centers and ports were in German hands. The success did not come without losses but these were judged acceptable by the Germans. About 1,500 men in the invasion force perished by April 10 and the material losses to the German Navy were considerable. These losses point to the high risks the Germans were willing to assume and to the fact that the invasion could have been a costly affair if the Norwegians had heeded the many warnings received during the week leading up to the attack.

The Germans were correct in their assumption that the Norwegian Navy posed no serious obstacle, even to the lighter units of the invasion force. They also assumed that the coastal fortresses were no serious obstacles because they had only a caretaker, or small complement, present for duty. This underestimation caused considerable losses to the ships in the task forces.

The manning of the coastal forts was inadequate and the minefields covering the approaches to the main harbors were not laid. Only about 30% of authorized strength was present for duty and some of the personnel had not served since 1918. A number of gun batteries were therefore not manned and some guns had not fired a live round since the 1890s. The failure to provide infantry protection led to the quick capture of the forts and the Germans hastily prepared them to contest expected British attacks. While a full discussion of the landings is outside the scope of this book, a short summary of the landing operations is in order.

Task Force 5 entered Oslofjord shortly before midnight on April 8. The Germans were able to pass the outer line of forts without sustaining damage because of heavy fog and Norwegian adherence to neutrality procedures, which called for firing warning shots. The TF approached the inner line of forts (Oscarborg) at slow speed (12 knots) with the flagship, the heavy cruiser
Blücher
, in the lead, followed by the heavy cruiser
Lützow
and the light cruiser
Emden
. The Germans hoped to pass the fort without receiving fire and to capture the capital and the Norwegian Government by surprise.

With Colonel Birger Eriksen in command, the Norwegian fort opened a devastating fire on
Blücher
at a range of only 1,800 meters as dawn was breaking.
Blücher
, which had been commissioned only seven months earlier and was the most modern of the large units in the German Navy, sustained numerous hits from heavy caliber shells and torpedoes. Within a short time, the ship capsized and sank with the loss of about 1,000 soldiers and sailors. The German naval and land component commanders passed temporarily into Norwegian captivity. The shore batteries then shifted their fires to the other major German units, and the heavy cruiser
Lützow
sustained substantial damage before the task force withdrew. This action disrupted the German timetable and allowed the Norwegian government and royal family to leave the capital. After withdrawing outside the range of the Norwegian guns, the Germans landed troops on the east side of the fjord, and the unprotected Oscarborg surrendered at 0900 hours on April 10.

German plans called for the capture of Fornebu Airport outside Oslo by parachute troops followed by air-landing two infantry battalions. The parachute drop was aborted due to heavy fog. The seven operational Norwegian Gladiators took to the air and engaged the German aircraft in a spirited fight. They were able to destroy five German aircraft before they exhausted their fuel and ammunition. Three of the Norwegian aircraft were destroyed while the remaining four landed on lakes in the country’s interior. The German fighters that were to provide cover for the parachute operation ran out of fuel and had to land at Fornebu despite the fact that the airfield had not been secured. The transport aircraft, which had now arrived on the scene, saw the fighters land and followed suit. Two German aircraft were destroyed and five severely damaged by fire from the three Norwegian machinegun positions on the airfield. Despite losses, the Germans quickly overcame the defenders. The transports brought in about 900 troops and these were dispatched towards Oslo. The virtually defenseless capital was surrendered at 1400 hours.

Task Force 5 also had the mission of capturing the main Norwegian naval base at the nearby town of Horten. There were only two operational Norwegian warships, one minelayer and one minesweeper, in the harbor and 40% of their crews were on shore leave. These two ships put up a determined fight, sinking one German minesweeper and damaging a torpedo boat. Another minesweeper sank later because of damage it sustained. In a daring operation, a force of about 50 Germans managed to capture the naval district headquarters and this led to the surrender of Horten and the ships in its harbor. Over the next week, the outer forts, which were increasingly cut off from friendly forces as the Germans advanced along both sides of the fjord, were captured or surrendered. In the process, the Germans lost one torpedo boat.

Lützow
was the only ship in TF 5 that returned to Germany immediately after the landing. She was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine
Spearfish
while in international waters, and towed home for repair. She was out of commission for about a year.

The towns of Arendal and Egersund, both terminals for overseas cables were captured without resistance by company-size German forces. The attack on the city of Kristiansand was repelled twice by its forts despite heavy shelling and air bombardment. The Norwegians believed that Allied assistance was on its way and a German signal flag was misread as the French tricolor during the third attack. The Germans were able to slip into the harbor and they quickly captured the city, forts, and naval units. The German light cruiser
Karlsruhe
was sunk by a British submarine on its return to Germany during the night of April 9-10.

The city of Stavanger, with its important airfield at Sola, was to be captured by parachute troops. Only two platoons of Norwegian troops were on the airfield at the time of the attack and it was captured quickly, although the paratroopers suffered a number of killed and wounded. Two battalions of German infantry arrived in transports in the course of the day. A Norwegian destroyer was able to sink one of the German supply ships before it was itself destroyed by German aircraft. Another Norwegian destroyer captured a second German supply ship but it was scuttled by its crew as the Norwegian warship tried to bring it to England. A large number of German bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft had arrived at Sola already by April 9. Their presence became a decisive factor in British naval operations off the Norwegian coast. The Norwegian forces abandoned the city of Stavanger and withdrew into the interior to complete their mobilization.

Bergen, Norway’s second largest city, was securely in German hands by the end of April 9 but not without losses. The Norwegian torpedo battery was not activated but the guns at the two inner forts caused considerable damage to the German artillery training ship
Bremse
. The light cruiser
Königsberg
was so severely damaged that it was not seaworthy. Fifteen British aircraft attacked Bergen after dawn on April 10 and two bombs hit
Köningsberg
, which was abandoned.