Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (35 page)

It appears likely that the Norwegians were trying to tell the British that two groups of German warships had passed, one consisting of five vessels and the other of four. This is logical since one German destroyer,
Erich Giese
, had fallen 50 miles behind the others. The remaining nine destroyers passed Tranøy around 0300 hours (local).
Erich Giese
passed several hours later and may not have been observed in the midst of heavy snow squalls.

The two British officers concluded from their conversation with the Norwegians that a submarine had also passed on its way to Narvik, that the Norwegians believed the Ofotfjord narrows were mined, that the German warships were much larger than the British ships that were now at Tranøy, and that strong German forces had occupied Narvik. Finally, the Norwegians warned them not to attack until they had twice as many warships.

Captain Warburton-Lee’s task was now altered drastically. He was no longer dealing with a lone German transport, but with six warships reported to be twice as large as his own as well as with at least one submarine. He could not ignore the possibility that the Germans had mined the narrows behind them and he still had to worry about the imaginary shore batteries. He had received a message from the Admiralty about 1300 hours (GMT) that read: “Battery at Narvik reported to consist of three 12 or 18 pounders mounted on Framnes and facing northwest [first mention of a shore battery in Narvik harbor]
.
Guns 4-inch or less may be in position on both sides of Ofotfjord near Ramnes.” Finally, he had to consider the possibility that the Norwegian coastal defense ships were in German hands.

Warburton-Lee was well aware that the odds against him were considerable and he spent some time pondering what to do. If he launched an attack in the knowledge that he was facing superior enemy forces and it led to failure or disaster, he would bear the responsibility and his superiors could determine his action foolhardy. Heavy reinforcements were available and could join him at the entrance to Ofotfjord before morning. The battle cruiser
Repulse
, the cruiser
Penelope
, and four destroyers had arrived at the entrance to Vestfjord as Warburton-Lee’s destroyers departed their patrol station. The
Renown
was also within striking distance, although it was doubtful that the Admiralty would risk either of the two battle cruisers in the restricted waters of Ofotfjord. Furthermore, two German battleships were still prowling the northern seas. On the other hand, Warburton-Lee may have feared that failure to proceed aggressively after receiving orders to attack from both the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty could be interpreted as timidity that would damage his ambitions.

Captain Warburton-Lee’s officers reported that he spent about 30 minutes by himself agonizing about the decision he had to make. In the end, he told his men that they would attack and sent a message to the Admiralty at 1751 hours (GMT) that read: “Norwegians report Germans holding Narvik in force, also six destroyers and one U-Boat are there and channel is possibly mined. Intend attacking at dawn high water.” It may be as Dickens writes that Warburton-Lee opted to follow the well-established naval custom of “Never ‘propose’ when you can ‘intend’, and never, never, ask for guidance.”
⁶
Tactically, it made sense to attack at dawn and at high tide. High tide might allow the British warships to pass safely over the reported minefield. Dawn was viewed as the most likely time to achieve surprise.

Most British accounts place emphasis on the famous last sentence of Warburton-Lee’s message and neglect to consider why the captain began his message with an alarming report of the obstacles in his way. It may well be that this young officer had found a way to avoid being labeled either timid or foolhardy. He may have hoped that on receipt of this new intelligence, either Whitworth, Forbes, or the Admiralty would intervene and tell him to wait for reinforcements. This would keep him from being considered too cautious. On the other hand, if they did not intervene and the attack was unsuccessful, his superiors would not be able to label him a dangerous risk-taker since their silence indicated their acquiescence.

Warburton-Lee’s message made Admiral Whitworth concerned about the wisdom of the planned attack. The five British destroyers were not only outnumbered but the German ships were much larger and better armed. The responsibility for the operation now underway would have been his had it not been for the Admiralty’s earlier intervention. He knew that every ship in his powerful force could reach Narvik before dawn but how would the Admiralty react to his entrance in what had now become their operation? He decided to intervene and sent the following visual signal to the ships in his vicinity at 1959 hours (GMT):

Before the message could be encoded and sent by radio, Whitworth changed his mind and at 2038 hours (GMT), he signaled his ships, “Cancel my 1959”
.
⁷
The assessment and decision reflected in Whitworth’s original message was obviously correct and it was unfortunate that he reconsidered and sent the second message. Whitworth, Forbes, and the Admiralty received Captain Warburton-Lee’s original message simultaneously at about 1830 hours (GMT). Admiral Whitworth had not ordered the Narvik attack. Admiral Forbes had ordered Warburton-Lee to proceed to Narvik almost nine hours earlier and about seven hours earlier, the Admiralty had ordered him to go on to Narvik and sink or capture the lone German transport they believed to be in that city. Both the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief left Whitworth out of the loop. Knowing that both Forbes and the Admiralty had received Warburton-Lee’s message giving the latest intelligence and intention, Whitworth no doubt expected them to amend their previous orders. This is probably the reason he waited one and a half hours before intervening.

If Whitworth had stuck with his original plan as reflected in his visual message, it may well have changed the outcome of the upcoming battle and perhaps alleviated the need for another attack three days later. In the 39 minutes that passed between his initial order and its cancellation, Admiral Whitworth may have decided that it was not his prerogative to amend or change the earlier orders of his superiors that they had left standing by their silence.

Whitworth did have the authority and prerogative to reinforce, from his own resources, a unit under his own command about to engage the enemy. It is possible that Admiral Whitworth simply decided not to run the risk of offending his superiors by interfering in actions they had commenced.

Derry and MacIntyre conclude that Admiral Whitworth decided not to reinforce the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla because such action could delay the attack and that the element of surprise would therefore be lost. Derry writes that the
Repulse
,
Penelope
, and the four destroyers had not joined Admiral Whitworth’s forces at the time when he contemplated reinforcing Warburton-Lee. This is not correct, as is demonstrated by the fact that Whitworth used visual signals to communicate his orders to
Penelope
. In fact, the
Hotspur
made visual contact with
Repulse
when it departed its patrol line to enter Vestfjord around 1300 hours (GMT).

Churchill takes note of Admiral Whitworth’s consideration to reinforce Captain Warburton-Lee and writes, “…but the time seemed too short and he felt that intervention by him at this stage might cause a delay. In fact, we in the Admiralty were not prepared to risk the
Renown
—one of our only two battle cruisers—in such an enterprise.”
⁸
This is misleading. Admiral Whitworth did not intend to use the
Renown
or
Repulse
to reinforce Warburton-Lee. Moreover, Whitworth and his staff had calculated that
Penelope
and the four destroyers could be at the pass through position southwest of Tranøy at 0100 hours (GMT) and the distance from there to the Ofotfjord entrance is about 30 miles. The fact that the
Penelope
and the four destroyers did not depart immediately upon receiving Admiral Whitworth’s first message indicates that they did not think that the time factor was critical. They were about 40 miles from the pass through position designated in Whitworth’s first message and they could reach that point at the designated time by leaving as late as 2300 hours (GMT). In fact, the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla was still to the south of Tranøy at midnight and the flotilla navigation officer sighted Tranøy Light at 0030 hours (GMT). Warburton-Lee’s destroyers entered Ofotfjord at 0130 hours and it is therefore true that
Penelope
and its escorts could not have made it from the designated pass-through position to the Ofotfjord entrance in time unless a more northerly pass-through position or an earlier pass-through time was designated. There are no obvious reasons why this could not have been done.

The silence from Admirals Whitworth and Forbes must have served as a reminder to the Admiralty that they had ordered the operation and that they should therefore reply to Captain Warburton-Lee. A message sent to the destroyer flotilla commander at 2100 hours (GMT) directed him to patrol east of Ramnes to keep the German warships from slipping out through channels leading to the north. MacIntyre concludes that the Admiralty worried that the Germans would escape to Vågsfjord through Tjelsund. It is more likely that they worried about escape through Ramsund since Tjelsund can be blocked without entering Ofotfjord.

Churchill and the Admiralty were obviously concerned that the German destroyers could slip out of Narvik during the night. This had in fact been the original plan but the loss of
Kattegat
made its implementation impossible. The Admiralty was not aware of Bonte’s problems and was determined not to allow him to add insult to injury by slipping past them twice.

The Admiralty message ended with, “Attack at dawn: all good luck”. This was the green light that Captain Warburton-Lee needed and must have come as a relief. He had reported what he believed he was up against and the Admiralty’s blessing on his intention to attack meant that he would not be responsible for a foolhardy action in case things went wrong.

The British chain of command above Warburton-Lee took a major and unwarranted risk in not providing reinforcements. This failure is not attributable solely to the lack of intelligence. A German force of one battleship, two cruisers and ten destroyers was sighted on a northbound course in the North Sea late on April 7, and a large part of this force was known to be north of Trondheim on April 8. The Admiralty, Admiral Forbes, and Admiral Whitworth should have asked themselves what happened to the ten destroyers. The
Renown
had encountered the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
without their destroyers on April 9. This, combined with the report received from the Norwegians at the Tranøy Pilot Station, should have led to the conclusion that the residue of the German force sighted in the North Sea on April 7 and 8 had in fact headed for Narvik.

German Fatigue and Complacency

Captain Bonte retired to his cabin on
Wilhelm Heidkamp
before midnight on April 9 after having made the earlier described deployment of his forces. The fact that the weather and visibility worsened dramatically during the evening undoubtedly gave the German captain a false sense of security. He should have remembered that the dismal weather had worked to his advantage in achieving surprise less than 24 hours earlier. The weather made it more difficult for the British to navigate the narrow fjord but it also made it more difficult for the German submarines to spot the British ships.

The 3rd Destroyer Flotilla was refueling and Commander Gadow, the flotilla commander, was responsible for securing the harbor entrance. He initiated the harbor patrol at 1900 hours with the destroyer
Hermann Künne
, one of the warships not yet refueled. The lack of fuel contributed to frequent relief of the patrolling destroyers.
Hermann Künne’s
skipper, Lieutenant Commander Friedrich Kothe, interpreted his order as allowing him to use his own initiative in cruising between Bogen Bay on the north side of Ofotfjord, directly opposite Ballangen Bay, and Ramnes. Lieutenant Commander F. Böhme took his ship,
Anton Schmitt
, out of the harbor to relieve
Hermann Künne
at midnight. Bitter cold and continuous snowstorms reduced the visibility to only a few hundred feet.

Fatigue on the part of the Germans may have helped the British achieve surprise at Narvik on April 10. Most of the German destroyer crews had been at their stations for 48 hours. Some were able to rest for a few hours in the afternoon of April 9, but the refueling operations kept most busy. Consideration for the exhaustion of his officers and men may have played a role in Bonte’s decision not to further disperse his destroyers, keeping more than he should in the harbor.

Anton Schmitt
was relieved of its patrol duty at 0400 hours (local) by
Diether von Roeder
. Lieutenant Commander Erich Holtorf, the
Dieter von Roeder’s
skipper, had received the following order from Commander Gadow via radio: “At 0400 [local] hours relieve ‘Anton Schmitt.’ Anti-submarine defense of harbor entrance until dawn.”
⁹
Anton Schmitt
anchored near
Jan Wellem
in anticipation of going alongside the latter to refuel. Lieutenant Commander Böhme retired to his cabin for a rest, but the fact that he remained fully clothed and kept his life jacket on are indications that he did not feel at ease with the situation.