Liars and Outliers (38 page)

(4)
There's a reasonable argument that
no money would
be necessary, either. Reciprocal altruism would be enough for angels. Money is only required when debt becomes formal.

(5)
This is named after anthropologist
Terrence Deacon
, who first described it.

(6)
Conservative estimates are that between 20% and 25% of all Americans have had sex with someone who is not their spouse while they are married.

(7)
A gaggle of recent animal studies across a variety of species demonstrate that there's
far more philandering
going on in the animal world than we previously thought. Of about 4,000 mammalian species, only a few are monogamous. Even birds, once regarded as the poster children of monogamy, aren't all that faithful to their mates. Once DNA fingerprinting became cheap in the 1990s, study after study showed that anything from 10% to 40% of chicks are not raised by their biological father.

(8)
There's a balance
here. Archaeological evidence indicates that Neanderthals, while violent like any other primate, were more compassionate than early humans. Yet they died out while our ancestors survived. There is
preliminary evidence
that Neanderthals engaged in cannibalism.

(9)
These numbers are reflected in
military organization
throughout history: squads of 10 to 15, organized into platoons of three to four squads, organized into companies of three to four platoons, organized into battalions of three to four companies, organized into regiments of three to four battalions, organized into divisions of two to three regiments, and organized into corps of two to three divisions.

(10)
There are several theories on the evolutionary
origins of religion
. While all talk about the ways it induces societal cohesion, they differ as to whether that's an essential aspect of religion or just a side effect.

(11)
The combination of these three are what sociologists call
social controls
. I am
not using that term
because 1) it traditionally does not include coercive measures, and I need a term that encompasses both coercive and non-coercive measures, and 2) its definition has changed over the years and now is limited to crime and deviance. Also, the sociological term has never included physical security measures. Finally, I am avoiding it for the same reason I am avoiding the game-theoretic term “social dilemmas”; I want to emphasize the societal aspect of these systems.

(12)
The research is by no means conclusive, but data from Facebook, Twitter, and elsewhere indicates that Dunbar's numbers are
not growing
due to information technology. Facebook claims the average user has 130 friends; if you ignore people who don't actually use their accounts, my guess is that the median is around 150. (
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
.) There's even evidence that links the number of Facebook friends to the size of
certain brain regions
. Such social networks are changing the definition of “friend.” How else can you explain that so many of our Facebook pages include people we would never have even considered talking to in high school, and yet we help water their imaginary plants?

Chapter 5

(1)
The
Prisoner's Dilemma
was originally framed in the 1950s by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher at the RAND Corporation, and was named several years later by Albert Tucker.
Many researchers
have informed and analyzed this game, most famously John Nash and then Robert Axelrod, who used it to help explain the evolution of cooperation.

(2)
I should probably explain about Alice and Bob. Cryptographers—and I started as a cryptographer—name the two actors in any security discussion Alice and Bob. To us, anyone we don't know is either Alice or Bob. If you meet me, don't be surprised if I call you Alice or Bob.

(3)
As stylized as the story is, this sort of thing is not uncommon. It's basic plea bargaining.

(4)
I heard the story of someone who never stops at four-way stop signs, because he figures that the other person will stop. This hawkish strategy works great, as long as he only meets doves at intersections.

(5)
One database search yielded 73,000 academic papers with the phrase “Prisoner's Dilemma” in the title.

(6)
Hardin used an
open grazing pasture
as an example. From the paper:

Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.

As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one positive component.

Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another…. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.

(7)
Normal games are zero-sum: someone wins, and someone else loses. The sum of the win (+1) and the loss (-1) totals zero.

(8)
Yes, these rules are sometimes made by autocratic rulers for their own benefit. We'll talk about this in Chapter 11.

Chapter 6

(1)
One way to think about defectors is that they are less risk-averse than cooperators. As a result, the cooperators tend to obtain moderate benefits with few severe costs, whereas defectors might get much larger benefits, but in the long run tend to pay more severe costs.

(2)
Dan Ariely's term, “
predictably irrational
,” describes us pretty well.

(3)
The name comes from the movie
Rebel Without a Cause
, in which the antihero, Jim Stark, and the local bully race stolen cars toward a cliff; the first to jump out earns the shame of being called “chicken.” Of course, if no one defects, both cars fly over the edge and both players die. (If you don't have a convenient cliff, you can play the game by racing two cars directly at each other; the first person to swerve to avoid the oncoming car is the chicken.) In this game, cooperate–cooperate is the best solution, but cooperate–defect or defect–cooperate is much better than defect–defect. In foreign policy, this is known as brinkmanship, a strategy that almost led to disastrous consequences during the
Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962. There have been some fascinating experiments with Chicken that really seem to have brought out the
worst in people
.

(4)
For many interactions, the Snowdrift Dilemma is a
better model
of the real world than the Prisoner's Dilemma.

(5)
There's also the unfortunately named Battle of the Sexes. He wants to do a stereotypically male thing on Saturday night. She wants to do a stereotypically female thing. The dilemma comes from the fact that each would rather do either of the two things with the other than do the stereotypical thing alone.

(6)
In behavioral economics,
Prospect Theory
has tried to capture these complexities. Daniel Kahneman is the only psychologist to ever win a Nobel Prize, and he won it in economics.

(7)
Many of the criticisms of Hardin's original paper on the Tragedy of the Commons pointed out that, in the real world,
systems of regulation
were commonly established by users of commons.

(8)
Douglas Hofstadter calls this “
superrationality
.” He assumes that smart people will behave this way, regardless of culture. In his construction, a superrational player assumes he is playing against another superrational player, someone who will think like he does and make the same decisions he does. By that analysis, cooperate– cooperate is much better than defect–defect. In so doing, players are being
collectively rational
, rather than individually rational. Collectively, cooperating is better.

(9)
In societies that prescribed a particular hand for eating and the other hand for wiping, this also made it impossible for the thief to eat in public without shaming himself.

(10)
Law professor Lawrence Lessig proposed a theory of regulation that identified
four different modalities
by which society can modify individual behavior: norms, markets, laws, and architecture. To use one of his examples, society could reduce smoking through a public ad campaign, a tax, smoking bans, or regulations on what quantity of addictive chemicals cigarettes can contain. According to Lessig, a smart regulator uses them all—or, at least, is aware of them all.

My model is similar. I've broken Lessig's “norms” into moral and reputational because, from the point of view of societal pressure, they're very different. Lessig's “markets” can either be informal or formal; in my model, that corresponds to reputational and institutional. And I've combined institutional markets with laws because, from a security perspective, they're similar enough to be treated together. My security is roughly analogous to Lessig's “architecture.”

In
Freakonomics
, Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner write that “there are
three basic flavors
of incentive: economic, social, and moral.” These correspond to my institutional, reputational, and moral pressures.

Chapter 7

(1)
Voting by mail is much easier, which is why it is becoming increasingly common in jurisdictions that offer the option to everyone.

(2)
Unfortunately,
the same analysis
shows that it's not worth people's trouble to be informed voters; their most logical course of action is to vote but remain politically ignorant.

(3)
It's
related to other
, more general, moral rules. For example, altruism is a major factor in predicting whether someone will vote or not.

(4)
I am
not distinguishing
between the terms “morals” and “ethics.” Although many philosophers make distinctions between the two concepts, a debate about moral theory is far beyond the scope of this book. And my definition of “morals” is pretty inclusive.

(5)
“
National Voter Turnout
in Federal Elections 1960–2008,”
Infoplease.com
, 2008. Note that this isn't the same as registered voters. In the U.S., voting is generally a two-step process. First you have to register. Then you have to vote. In most states, you can't even do both on the same day.

(6)
Here is how it's expressed in a variety of religions:

Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow man. This is the entire Law; all the rest is commentary.” —Talmud, Shabbat 3id.

Christianity: “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.” —Matthew 7:12. Also “Do to others as you would have them do to you.” —Luke 6:31.

Islam: “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself.” —Forty Hadith of an-Nawawi 13.

Hinduism: “This is the sum of duty; do naught onto others what you would not have them do unto you.” —Mahabharata 5,1517.

Confucianism: “Do not do to others what you would not like yourself. Then there will be no resentment against you, either in the family or in the state.” — Analects 12:2.

Buddhism: “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.” —Udana-Varga 5,1.

Taoism: “Regard your neighbor's gain as your gain, and your neighbor's loss as your own loss.” —Tai Shang Kan Yin P'ien, Chapter 49.

Jainism: “A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated.” —Sutrakritanga 1.11.33.

Zoroastrianism: “That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is not good for itself.” —Dadisten-I-dinik, 94,5.

Bahá'í: “And if thine eyes be turned towards justice, choose thou for thy neighbour that which thou choosest for thyself.” —Epistle to the Son of the Wolf, 30.

Philosophers and theologians see a
significant difference
in the positive and negative phrasing of this rule—“do unto others what you want…” versus “don't do unto others what you don't want…”—but that's too far into the details for our purposes. As a societal pressure system, the altruistic and reciprocal nature of the rule is enough. Treat others well, because we will all be better off if everyone does the same.

(7)
Here's a random sampling:

From the
Chácobo of Bolivia
: “If you are a human being, then you will share what you have with those who are in need.”

From the
Maori of New Zealand
: “By many, by thousands is the object attained.”