Living Silence in Burma (30 page)

While the
tatmadaw
was respected as an honourable institution by many Burmese in the past, after the brutal killing of civilians in the cities in 1988, its reputation was severely tarnished. The military’s violent crackdown on monks in 2007 further tainted its image, affecting the morale of soldiers within the military as well. Enlisting ordinary soldiers has become much more difficult owing to low pay and poor treatment. Although there are still young men who join voluntarily because of family problems and a lack of other opportunities, the
tatmadaw
has had to resort to forced recruitment to fill its ranks. Nevertheless, ambitious young men are still attracted to joining the military at the officer level because of the material benefits and power that can be accrued.

The
tatmadaw
leaders indoctrinate new recruits to believe in the need for
tatmadaw
leadership in politics and the essential role of the
tatmadaw
in protecting the country, while also insisting on absolute obedience. Loyalty is valued far more than good behaviour, and the often inhuman treatment of villagers in conflict areas is broadly tolerated or promoted by higher-ranking officers. Similarly, corruption permeates all levels of the military, given the low salaries and a culture of impunity. Meanwhile, at the top level, concerns about internal coups and struggles for power lead higher-ranking generals to try to shore up their power bases even though such behaviour can raise suspicions about their motives and ultimately bring about their downfall.

From the regime’s perspective, expanding the
tatmadaw
is essential to maintaining its authority. According to one inside source, the SLORC calculated that since there were 50,000 insurgents, the
tatmadaw
should have ten times as many troops, 500,000, in order to have the upper hand in negotiations. In other words, might, rather than right, will be used to decide the political situation. Military analyst Andrew Selth has written that the regime wants to have a permanent military presence throughout the country so that if there is trouble anywhere, there are troops on hand to immediately take action.
¹
Professionalism is not as important as sheer
numbers, since the soldiers are primarily used to intimidate and terrorize the civilian population into submission.

Reasons for joining

In government textbooks and the popular media, the greatest heroes in Burma’s history are almost all military men. Most venerated are the imperialist kings who made Burmese kingdoms some of the most powerful in South-East Asia. In modern history, General Aung San and the Thirty Comrades are revered for their daring in slipping off to Japan for military training and then fighting for Burma’s independence. Young men from rural and urban areas alike are drawn to these images, particularly if they have not personally witnessed instances of
tatmadaw
brutality.

Foot soldiers generally join the
tatmadaw
because they have few other economic opportunities. Poorly educated, generally from impoverished rural families, and often escaping from problems at home, they see the army as their only refuge. Kyaw Win, who joined the army when he was fifteen, is typical. His parents had sent him to stay in town with his grandparents so he could attend school for a few years, but when they ordered him to return home to work on the farm, he ran away. He said, ‘I joined the army because I didn’t have a place to stay. There were forty people in my group. All of them had fought with their parents or fought with their brothers or sisters or uncles. I didn’t meet anyone who admired the army. Not in my group.’

In practical terms, it is much better to be a military man than a civilian. It is humiliating to have to live in silence and fear; by becoming soldiers, men can, to a certain extent, empower themselves. As one Burmese put it, ‘After training, they have a gun and they have some authority. They like that.’ Nevertheless, in recent years, bad conditions in the
tatmadaw
and the high demand for cheap labour in neighbouring countries have led many young men from farming families to seek their fortunes as migrant workers rather than soldiers. As a result, the
tatmadaw
has had difficulties recruiting and keeping soldiers. Migrant labourers who were arrested in Thailand and sent back to the Burma border in the late 1990s were sometimes held by Burmese authorities and told to choose between becoming a soldier or a porter. While both were potential death sentences, most decided that they were better off with a gun in their hands.

The
tatmadaw
has also resorted to not letting enlisted men resign and setting recruitment quotas for villages and army units. Human Rights Watch has documented how large numbers of young men and even children have been compelled to join against their will.
²

Orphaned boys are particularly desired by the
tatmadaw
, because they belong to no one and have no other allegiances.
³
The army is their only family and the barracks their only home. The military has set up special schools to train these children; once they are teenagers, they are sent into the army.

I met one such boy, only about six years old, on a train in Shan State in 1996. His parents had died and he was being taken by a group of soldiers back to their battalion headquarters. They had shaved his head and put him in an army uniform that was several sizes too big, but for the moment he was happy to be receiving so much attention.

Until at least 2000, boys from ethnic minority areas were also brought into the armed forces through
Ye Nyunt
(Greatest Bravery) schools, where children receive room and board and a free education. These junior high schools are usually located on battalion bases. The students do chores around the base, and are given basic military training as well as regular classes. Parents from mountain villages often do not realize that their sons will be expected to become soldiers afterwards, wanting only for them to have a chance to learn Burmese and obtain an education. After a couple of years of schooling, the students usually have little choice but to join the military.
⁴

It is easier to find recruits for officer training. Many parents view getting their children into the officer class as the best way for them to succeed and for the family to be protected. They believe that as long as the regime is in firm control, it is better to work with it than against it. Moreover, military officers are considered eligible marriage prospects, because, as one young man put it, ‘They can spend a lot of money. Their status is really different from ordinary people.’

People do not necessarily associate a military career with fully fledged support for the regime. The
tatmadaw
makes great efforts to indoctrinate officer trainees, however, because if the officers are not loyal they could organize a coup against the top leaders. Through their training, officer recruits largely come to believe in the need for continued military rule and their own important role in perpetuating it. Those who don’t agree or try to challenge what they are taught are expelled. All new recruits go through careful interviews and intensive background checks to ensure they have no connections to anti-government groups. Later on, officers who aren’t completely trusted – for instance, because they are ethnic minorities – are assigned to jobs where security is not at stake, such as accounting, administrative work, teaching or research.

Thiha, who later became an intelligence agent, explained how he
came to believe in the
tatmadaw
even though he had joined the Defence Services Academy only because his parents had pushed him to do so. He hated the first year because of the terrible hazing and bullying, but by the second year he had started thinking about staying so he could get revenge by doing the same to the younger students. By the third year, his military teachers’ indoctrination started taking effect. The students were repeatedly told that they were different from ordinary civilians, because they would be leading the country and, without them, the country could collapse. They were taught about the links between politics and the economy and the military’s role in nation-building. Thiha started feeling proud that he had acquired special knowledge which ordinary civilians didn’t have access to, and he believed he would be a leader in the future. The students were also repeatedly told how Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to divide the military, and that democracy would only lead to political chaos as it had in the past. By his final year, he said he had even more confidence in the
tatmadaw
, because he had been persuaded that, unlike the
tatmadaw
, the ethnic insurgents were only working for their own ethnic groups, not for the good of the whole country. Furthermore, he was told, they were funded by the West. He was convinced that only the
tatmadaw
could hold the country together.

Military officers tend to be more committed to continued military rule than ordinary soldiers. Having been encouraged to believe that they have a higher status than ordinary people, many come to see themselves as deserving the special treatment they receive. Military officers benefit from much-sought-after privileges such as free healthcare at military hospitals and access to various money-making opportunities, whether through side businesses or corruption. Moreover, the higher ranks are afforded opportunities to obtain or purchase imported cars and cell phones at a reduced price. This matters because the regime strictly limits the number that can be imported each year and registration can be difficult and costly. As a result, in 2008, cell phones were selling for as much as $2,500 and Japanese sports utility vehicles for $250,000.
⁵

Generals appear to be fully committed to continued military rule, if for no other reason than to preserve their privileges and to ensure they do not end up sentenced to prison or worse. According to one highly placed official, some of the higher-ranking officers realize that Burma’s military rulers made mistakes in the past, but believe the
tatmadaw
deserves a chance to correct those mistakes. There are also current and retired officers who believe that military rule should continue, but the particular individuals leading the regime should be changed. Because
of the generals’ generally low levels of education and lack of exposure to other systems and ideas, many have difficulties imagining a system other than that which they have known.

The wives and grown children of many senior generals tend to be strong supporters of continued military rule, because of the privileged lives they live. The wives rarely have to buy things, because they are showered with presents from people who seek their husbands’ favour. They keep the gifts they like and sell the rest. The wives of generals also expect the wives of lower-ranking officers to do their bidding, including accompanying them when they go out and assisting them at home. This happens not only in the capital but also on army bases.

A former military doctor related how a friend of his was the personal assistant to a regional commander. His wife worked as a schoolteacher, but when she came home at night, she had to go over to the regional commander’s house to grind
thanaka
(traditional facial powder) for his wife, as if she were her personal servant.

Corruption and poor treatment

After General Ne Win’s coup, many educated military men, particularly in the technical corps, retired or went abroad. As in the civilian sector, those who stayed were underpaid and saw their standard of living decline. Many increasingly resorted to theft and corruption. Usually this meant stealing military supplies and selling them outside the base. In other cases, it meant using soldiers for their own economic interests. Particularly in the rural areas, soldiers were forced to work on senior officers’ plantations and for their various commercial ventures, including logging, brick-making and other labour-intensive enterprises. After 1988, such abuses increased, with some officers even stealing the rations meant for front-line soldiers and selling them on the black market.
⁶
In the late 1990s, the battalions were told that the central command would no longer be providing rations for them, and they would have to support themselves. In many cases this meant confiscating villagers’ farmland or forcing villagers to bring them food.

Without sufficient rations or clothing, living conditions for ordinary soldiers stationed in the countryside are extremely difficult. Kyaw Win, who served in the Shan and Karen states from 1981 to 1989, recalled angrily:

    We were not fed well. If we got to eat
ngapi
[fish paste], it was rotten. There was sand in the rice. The officers told us to get along with the
villagers. But we had nothing to eat. And so we ate the vegetables that the villagers had planted. We didn’t have the money to buy them. So if they didn’t give them to us, we would go and steal them at night.

He also talked about how much the soldiers drank. Many were depressed and their salaries were insufficient to purchase anything of value, so they just bought alcohol. Members of soldiers’ families also had to find paying jobs. According to a long-time resident in the Chinese border town of Ruili, a significant percentage of the many sex workers operating there in the 1990s were from Burmese army families who couldn’t make ends meet.

Back at the battalion headquarters in town, the soldiers lived more comfortably, but they were often forced to work like servants for their officers’ families. Many resented having to clean their superiors’ houses, wash their clothes and do other chores, all of which were outside their official duties. Kyaw Win said some officers treated soldiers well at the front lines because they were scared, but back at the battalion headquarters they became arrogant and demanding.