Marcus Agrippa: Right-hand Man of Caesar Augustus (18 page)
Read Marcus Agrippa: Right-hand Man of Caesar Augustus Online
Authors: Lindsay Powell
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS002000, #HISTORY / Ancient / General / BIOGRAPHY & AUTOBIOGRAPHY / Military, #Bisac Code 2: BIO008000 Bisac Code 3: HIS027000
Caesar was not yet aware of Agrippa’s victory. Back at Tauromenium he had with him ‘3 legions, and 500 cavalry without horses, 1,000 light-armed, and 2,000 colonists serving as allies, but not enrolled, besides his fleet’.
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As his surveyors laid out his marching camp, he found himself suddenly surrounded on three sides by Sex. Pompeius – cavalry approached him on land and ships advanced from the sea. Caesar’s inexperience showed itself again when he hesitated to rally his men for battle. On their own initiative, his troops split into disparate groups, each fighting until onset of night when the enemy withdrew. Finally Caesar delegated command to Cornificius ‘and ordered him to drive back the enemy and do whatever the exigency required’.
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He boarded his flagship and sailed off to rally his fleet. Even as he was doing this Sextus’ own fleet appeared on the horizon. Caesar had been caught unprepared. His vessels were routed and he only managed to escape because he had taken the precaution of hiding the commander’s ensign so his ship could not be picked out. All at sea, Caesar’s boat drifted until it arrived at the harbour town of Abala. There he found men sympathetic to his cause and he was able to get a message to Cornificius and another to Agrippa that he was well. He urged Agrippa to send Laronius and troops to come to the aid of Cornificius. Caesar himself left with Messala to Stylis where three legions stood ready under Carinas’ command. Messala went on to Puteoli to fetch
Legio
I to his base at Vibo. He issued orders for Carinas to depart for Lipara.
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On the political front, he charged Maecenas to return to Rome again to deal with the ‘Revolutionists’ who were stirring up trouble for him in the city.
Cornificius put up a stout defence behind the stake-topped turf wall of his temporary camp. While Sextus hoped to defeat him by starving him into submission, Cornificius broke out and tried to engage him in set-piece battle. The Pompeian would not oblige, and Cornificius led his men instead in an attempt to escape along a road, while subjected to an enfilade of missiles hurled at them by Numidian auxilairies recruited by Sextus.
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Their escape proved a terrifying ordeal and Cornificius took many casualties.
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To his great relief Laronius arrived and Cornificius – and what remained of his army – finally made it to Mylae.
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Agrippa, meanwhile, was trying again to take and hold Tyndaris, which Appian describes as ‘a stronghold full of provisions and admirably situated for naval warfare’.
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The city, located some 58km (36 miles) from Messana, stood on a high hill projecting out as a promontory into the bay of the Tyrrhenian Sea bounded by the Punta di Milazzo on the east and the Capo Calavià on the west. It was regarded as strategically important by its Greek founders in the fourth century BCE and by both Carthaginians and Romans during the First Punic War. Following that brutal conflict it remained loyal to Rome, so much so that Cicero described it as
nobilissima civitas
, the ‘most noble community’.
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To capture the city became a strategic imperative for Agrippa. Nothing is recorded about the course of the siege save only that by the time Cornificius had escaped from his camp at the Shrine of the Archegetes it had already fallen to Agrippa.
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Now securely under Agrippa’s control, Caesar moved into Tyndaris with his troops and supplies, which were considerable: 21 legions (about 126,000 infantrymen assuming full strength), 20,000 cavalry and more than 5,000 lightly-armed skirmishing troops.
107
Sextus still controlled the coastline of the northeastern promontory of Sicily from Mylae to Pelorus (Punta del Faro). He deployed garrisons along it and fortified the inland mountain passes. ‘In fear of Agrippa’, writes Appian, ‘they kept fires burning continually, signifying that they would set fire to any ships that should sail against them.’
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For a while the ploy worked, but the menacing sight of Agrippa’s warships offshore troubled Sextus deeply. Finally, believing a report he received that Agrippa was advancing his fleet against him, he moved his position to Pelorus, abandoning Mylae and vicinity to Caesar.
109
The report turned out to be false and Caesar was now able to ravage the region at will. By chance he found Lepidus when he was out foraging with his men near Mount Etna, and Caesar invited the triumvir to share his camp near Messana. Agrippa anchored his fleet nearby.
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Caesar decided the best strategy was to starve his opponent into submission and dispatched Taurus to capture the towns and hamlets which provided his supplies. Without provisions Sextus knew full well would soon fail. He still believed his strength was his nimble fleet. His best option now was to gamble everything on one last naval battle. He sent a message to Caesar inviting him to engage him in a naval battle to decide the war once and for all. Caesar accepted. A day was agreed and the place was the bay at Naulochus.
111
Neither the day – perhaps 3 September
– nor the exact location of Naulochus are known for certain, but the battle site lay somewhere east of Mylae where the coast sweeps into a great bay. On one side of it were arrayed 300 ships of Sex. Pompeius, Apollophanes (Papias), Demochares and Tisienus Gallus; on the other the assembled fleet of triumvir C. Iulius Caesar under the command of M. Agrippa.
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Along the shore, the infantrymen of both opponents stood and watched. Appian vividly describes the battle:
When the appointed day came the rival shouts of the oarsmen were first heard, accompanied by missiles thrown by machines and by hand, such as stones, firebrands, and arrows. Then the ships dashed against each other, some striking amidships, others on the prows, others on the beaks, where the blows are most effectual in discomposing the crew and rendering the vessel useless. Others broke the opposing line by sailing through it, at the same time discharging arrows and javelins; and the small boats picked up those who fell overboard. There was a struggle of soldiers while the sailors put forth their strength and the pilots their skill and their lung-power. The generals cheered their men, and all the machines were brought into requisition. The
harpago
achieved the greatest success. Thrown from a long distance upon the ships, as it could be by reason of its lightness, it clutched them, especially when the ropes pulled on it from behind. On account of the iron bands it could not be easily cut by the men whom it attacked, and those who tried to cut the ropes were prevented from reaching them by its length. As this apparatus had never been known before, the enemy had not provided themselves with scythe-mounted poles. One thing seemed advisable in this unexpected emergency, and that was to back water and draw the ship away; but as the enemy did the same the force exerted by the men was equal on both sides, and the
harpago
did its work.
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Accordingly, when the ships were drawn together, there was every kind of fighting, the men leaping upon each other’s decks. It was no longer easy to distinguish an enemy from a friend, as they used the same weapons for the most part, and nearly all spoke the Latin tongue, and the watchwords of each side were divulged to the other while they were mingled together. Hence arose many and diverse frauds and lack of confidence on both sides on the part of those using the same watchword. They failed to recognize each other completely, and meanwhile the fighting and the sea were a confused medley of corpses, clashing arms, and crashing ships. They left nothing untried except fire. This they abstained from, after their first onset, because they were locked together. The foot-soldiers of each army on the land beheld this sea-fight with apprehension and eagerness, believing that their own hope of safety was bound up in it. They could not distinguish anything, however sharply they might look, but merely a long-drawn-out line of 600 ships, and an alternation of cries and groans now on one side and now on the other.
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Judging from the colours of the towers, which constituted the only difference between them, Agrippa with difficulty made out that Pompeius’ ships had sustained the greater loss, and he cheered on those who were close to him
as though they were already victors. Then he drove at the enemy and pressed upon them without ceasing, until he overpowered those nearest him. They then lowered their towers and turned their ships in flight toward the straits. Seventeen of them, which were in advance, made their escape thither. The rest were cut off by Agrippa and some were pursued and driven aground. The pursuers ran aground with them in the rush, and either pulled off those that had come to a standstill or set fire to them. When the Pompeian ships that were still fighting saw what had befallen these, they surrendered to their enemies. Then the soldiers of Caesar who were in the ships raised a shout of victory and those on the land gave an answering shout. Those of Pompeius groaned. Pompeius himself, darting away from Naulochi, hastened to Messana, giving no orders to his infantry in his panic. Accordingly Caesar received the surrender of Tisienus on terms agreed upon, and of the cavalry besides, who were surrendered by their officers. Three of Caesar’s ships were sunk in the fight. Pompeius lost twenty-eight in this way, and the remainder were burned, or captured, or run aground, and stove in pieces, except the seventeen that escaped.
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Sextus escaped with his daughter and closest friends along with seventeen ships to Mytilene, Lesbos and sought asylum with M. Antonius.
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Caesar did not pursue his adversary, nor did he encourage others to do so on his behalf.
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Sextus had sought the protection of his colleague, and to encroach on his dominion might prove provocative, and, moreover, as he stated later, he was not one of his father’s murderers.
Although Sextus had fled, his deputy L. Plinius had remained in Sicily and occupied Messana. While Caesar stayed in Naulochus, he despatched Agrippa and Lepidus to deal with Plinius. Seeing Caesar’s deputies and their armies gathering outside the walls of the city, Plinius sued for peace terms. Agrippa preferred to wait until Caesar arrived, but Lepidus, impatient to see the Pompeian’s troops join his own, accepted his surrender and let his soldiers pillage the city. The addition of new men at arms grew Lepidus’ force to twenty-two legions, and a large contingent of cavalry.
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Emboldened by his military strength he actively sought to take the whole island for himself and ordered his men to secure the defiles around the city so Caesar could not enter it. It was a foolish and consequential move. Through mutual friends the two men communicated. Lepidus wanted a larger role in the Triumvirate, which Caesar refused to grant him. The two men argued, and a standoff ensued. Caesar managed to win over Lepidus’ troops and when he entered his camp, following a struggle, he was hailed
imperator
and the men deserted to him.
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Realizing the hopelessness of his situation Lepidus presented himself to Caesar and sought his mercy. Caesar showed clemency, but stripped him of his position as
triumvir
and military command, letting him keep only his office of
pontifex maximus
.
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So quickly had one of the three most powerful men had been reduced to little better than a private citizen. Through the defections, Caesar’s army now numbered 45 legions, 25,000 cavalry and 40,000 lightly-armed troops, as well as 600 warships.
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However, his own
troops, who had fought for him at Philippi and on other battlefields since now demanded their share of the rewards and to be allowed to retire. In the face of mutiny, Caesar remonstrated with his men, but it was an argument he could not win without greater loss to himself.
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Shrewdly, he recognized the contributions and sacrifices made by the troops and distributed awards for service and valour to all and prizes of victory to many, and in so doing secured their loyalty for a while longer.
When Caesar entered Rome victorious on 13 November 36 BCE he well knew that it was in large part due to his friend’s organization and military leadership skills that he did so. Agrippa’s loyalty too was rewarded. In two great sea battles in as many months, Agrippa had broken the military wing of Caesar’s political opposition. The position of the son of the Divine Iulius was now more secure, enabling him to stand up to his Pompeian adversaries in the Roman senatorial class. Agrippa had also eliminated the menace which the surviving son of Pompeius Magnus had inflicted upon the coastal regions of Italy and Africa. The grain could flow again unhindered from Africa and Sicily to the warehouses of Rome beside the Tiber, and the plebs could sleep at night knowing they would receive their daily bread. Agrippa’s vital contribution was rewarded with the gift of rich estates in Sicily, which had been confiscated from sympathizers of Sextus.
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The cash crops from these would generate enormous wealth for him in the years to come. Yet Agrippa merited a very special reward, one intended to be a very public recognition for his achievement. Caesar created a brilliant, one-ofa-kind military decoration for his loyal but modest friend.
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Variously known as the
corona classica
,
corona navalis
or
corona rostrata
(
plate 4
), it was a golden wreath surmounted with ships’
rostra
, which Vergil later described as,
A naval crown, that binds his manly brows,
The happy fortune of the fight foreshows.
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It was a conspicuous award and one intended to be seen. A law was passed permitting him to wear this naval crown in triumphal processions.
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Widely circulated silver coins were minted showing Agrippa wearing this distinctive military decoration.
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