On China (76 page)

9
“Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly: April 10, 1974” (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974).

10
Ibid., 5.

11
Ibid., 6.

12
Ibid., 8.

13
“Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,”
FRUS
18, 788–89.

14
Ibid., 788.

15
George H. W. Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing; Winston Lord, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff; and myself.

16
“Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,”
FRUS
18, 789–90.

17
Ibid., 789.

18
Ibid., 793.

19
Ibid. In 1940, Britain withdrew its expeditionary force after the Battle of France.

20
Ibid., 794.

21
Ibid.

22
Ibid., 791.

23
Ibid., 792.

24
Ibid.

25
Ibid., 790.

26
Ibid., 791.

27
Ibid.

28
“Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 25, 1975, 9:30 a.m.,”
FRUS
18, 832.

29
Ibid.

30
“Paper Prepared by the Director of Policy Planning Staff (Lord), Washington, undated,”
FRUS
18, 831.

31
“Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,”
FRUS
18, 858.

32
Ibid., 859.

33
A companion of Mao’s in Yan’an during the civil war; a former general, now ambassador in Washington.

34
Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang.

35
Qiao Guanhua, Foreign Minister.

36
“Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,”
FRUS
18, 859.

37
Ibid., 867.

38
Some of the texts leveled harsh criticism against the excesses of Qin Shihuang and the Tang Dynasty Empress Wu Zetian, rhetorical stand-ins for Mao and Jiang Qing respectively.

39
See Henry Kissinger,
Years of Renewal
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 897.

1
Richard Evans,
Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China
(New York: Viking, 1993), 186–87.

2
See, for example, “The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,”
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: 1975–1982,
vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 11–13; and “Some Problems Outstanding in the Iron and Steel Industry: May 29, 1975,” in ibid., 18–22.

3
“The Whole Party Should Take the Overall Interest into Account and Push the Economy Forward: March 5, 1975,” in ibid., 14–17.

4
“Priority Should Be Given to Scientific Research: September 26, 1975,”
http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol2/text/b1080.html
.

5
“The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
13.

6
“Things Must Be Put in Order in All Fields: September 27 and October 4, 1975,” in ibid., 47.

7
Deng Xiaoping, “Memorial Speech,” as reproduced in
China Quarterly
65 (March 1976): 423.

8
“The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. 2, 51, note 1 (quoting February 1977 editorial advancing the principle); see also Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed.,
The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 312–13.

9
MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in MacFarquhar, ed.,
The Politics of China,
312.

10
“Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work: June 2, 1978,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. 2, 132.

11
“The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 51.

12
“Respect Knowledge, Respect Trained Personnel: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 53.

13
Stanley Karnow, “Our Next Move on China,”
New York Times
(August 14, 1977); Jonathan Spence,
The Search for Modern China
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 632.

14
See Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture,” in David Shambaugh, ed.,
Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).

15
“Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite As One in Looking into the Future: December 13, 1978,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. 2, 152.

16
Ibid., 154.

17
Ibid.

18
“Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles: March 30, 1979,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. 2, 181.

19
Ibid., 181.

20
Ibid., 182–83.

21
Until 1983, Deng was Vice Premier and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. From 1981 to 1989, he was Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the Advisory Commission.

22
Evans,
Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China,
256.

1
“Touch the tiger’s buttocks” is a Chinese idiom popularized by Mao, meaning to do something daring or dangerous. The occasion of this remark was my meeting with Hua Guofeng in Beijing in April 1979.

2
During the Cultural Revolution, then Defense Minister Lin Biao abolished all ranks and insignia and ordered extensive ideological training for Chinese troops using the “Little Red Book” of Mao’s aphorisms. The PLA was called on to play social and ideological roles far outside the mission of an ordinary military. A penetrating account of the toll these developments took on the PLA during the conflict with Vietnam may be found in Edward O’Dowd,
Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War
(New York: Routledge, 2007).

3
“Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Pham Van Dong: Beijing, 29 April 1968,” in Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International History Project, May 1998), 127–28. (Brackets in original.)

4
See Chapter 8, “The Road to Reconciliation,” page 205.

5
I have always believed that having been willing to force the—to Mao—ideologically correct Khmer Rouge into a compromise, unnecessarily as it turned out, contributed to Zhou’s fall. See also Kissinger,
Years of Upheaval
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1982)
,
368.

6
Robert S. Ross,
The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 74, quoting Xinhua news report (August 15, 1975), as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, People’s Republic of China (August 18, 1975), A7.

7
Ibid.

8
Ibid., 98, quoting Xinhua news report (March 15, 1976), as translated in FBIS Daily Report, People’s Republic of China (March 16, 1976), A13.

9
In April 1978, the Afghan President was assassinated and his government was replaced; on December 5, 1978, the Soviet Union and the new government of Afghanistan entered into a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation; and on February 19, 1979, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan was assassinated.

10
Cyrus Vance,
Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 79.

11
“President Carter’s Instructions to Zbigniew Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985), Annex I, 2.

12
The five principles were: affirmation of a one China policy; a commitment not to offer American support to Taiwan independence movements; American discouragement of a hypothetical Japanese deployment into Taiwan; support for any peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taipei; and a commitment to continued normalization. See Chapter 9, “Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou,” page 271.

13
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s Meeting with the People’s Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January, 29th 1979, 3:35–4:59 p.m.,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Vertical File—China, item no. 270, 10–11.

14
“Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232, 3.

15
Ibid., 6–7.

16
Ibid. Sadat served as President of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981. The “bold action” referred to included Sadat’s expulsion of over twenty thousand Soviet military advisors from Egypt in 1972, the launching of the October 1973 War, and the subsequent entry into a peace process with Israel.

17
Ibid., 4.

18
Ibid., 10–11.

19
“Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 16.

20
Ibid., 5–6.

21
“Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng: Beijing, May 22nd, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 233c, 4–5.

22
“Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President’s Meeting with Ambassador Ch’ai Tse-min: Washington, September 19, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 250b, 3.

23
“Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P’ing: Beijing, May 21st 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 6.

24
In recent years, Chinese leaders and policy analysts have introduced the phrase “peaceful rise” to describe China’s foreign policy aspiration to achieve major-power status within the framework of the existing international system. In a thoughtful article synthesizing both Chinese and Western scholarship on the concept, the scholar Barry Buzan raises the prospect that China’s “peaceful rise” began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Deng increasingly aligned China’s domestic development and foreign policy to the nonrevolutionary world and sought out common interests with the West. Deng’s trips abroad offered dramatic proof of this realignment. See Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?”
The Chinese Journal of International Politics
3 (2010): 12–13.

25
“An Interview with Teng Hsiao P’ing,”
Time
(February 5, 1979),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,946204,00.html
.

26
“China and Japan Hug and Make Up,”
Time
(November 6, 1978),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948275-1,00.html
.

27
Henry Kamm, “Teng Begins Southeast Asian Tour to Counter Rising Soviet Influence,”
New York Times
(November 6, 1978), A1.

28
Henry Kamm, “Teng Tells the Thais Moscow-Hanoi Treaty Perils World’s Peace,”
New York Times
(November 9, 1978), A9.

29
“Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18–February 21, 1992,” in
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,
vol. 3, trans., The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 366.

30
Lee Kuan Yew,
From Third World to First: The Singapore Story—1965–2000
(New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 597.

31
Ibid., 598–99.

32
Fox Butterfield, “Differences Fade as Rivals Mingle to Honor Teng,”
New York Times
(January 30, 1979), A1.

33
Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut’ Teng Gets New View of World in Houston,”
New York Times
(February 3, 1979), A1.

34
Fox Butterfield, “Teng Again Says Chinese May Move Against Vietnam,”
New York Times
(February 1, 1979), A16.

35
Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut’ Teng Gets New View of World in Houston,” A1. For consistency with the main text of the present volume, the quoted passage’s original spelling “Teng Hsiao-p’ing” has been rendered as “Deng Xiaoping.”

36
Twenty-two years represented the interval between the two world wars. Since more than twenty-two years had elapsed since the end of the Second World War, Chinese leaders were nervous that a certain historical rhythm was moving events. Mao had made the same point to the Australian Communist leader E. F. Hill a decade earlier. See also Chapter 8, “The Road to Reconciliation,” page 207; and Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,”
Cold War International History Project Bulletin
11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.