One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan (4 page)

What about democracy? A tribe is a “natural democracy.” In Afghan shuras and jirgas (tribal councils), every man’s voice has a chance to be heard. The fact that women and minority groups have no say in the process does not make it less effective nor less of a democracy to them. Asking them to change the way they have always conducted their business through their jirgas and shuras just does not make sense.

We need to integrate ourselves into the process as trusted “advisors” to the tribal leadership. They need to know that we have
their best interests in mind. The strengths that these tribal organizations show can be used eventually to establish cooperation and political integration with the central government (more than likely not our model, but a type). This would take time.

We must support the tribal system because it is the single, unchanging political, social and cultural reality in Afghan society and the one system that all Afghans understand, even if we don’t. We must also remember that the Pashtun tribes are fighting to preserve a centuries-old way of life.

Tribes offer their members security, safety, structure and significance. What other institutions do that right now in Afghanistan?

My entire premise is based on my experience with tribal engagement in Konar Province in 2003 with ODA 316, of which I was the team leader.

First, I hesitate to write this chapter for purely personal reasons. I have not acted alone. I had a great ODA with outstanding warriors and NCOs. This is not a story about the bravery, valor or camaraderie that we showed every single day—together. This is but one aspect of the overall mission we accomplished as a team. I will only
write from my own perspective and will not attempt to speak for any other team members.

Also, there are aspects of this portion of the mission that cannot be told in this forum for many reasons. I will leave it at that.

A few points before I describe the relationship my men and I built with the village of Mangwel in Konar Province.

First
, I am unable to tell the entire story for operational reasons that include some of the missions we did together (with the tribes) and some of the tactics, techniques and procedures involved in doing so. I am also concerned about the safety of the tribesmen who helped us so very much.

Second
, the trip to and from our MSS (Mission Support Site) or FB (Fire Base) in Asadabad to Mangwel was a life-threatening event. It was a combat patrol that, more often than not, encountered enemy contact somewhere along the way, and in several cases there were multiple contacts.

Third
, the tribe offered us outstanding intelligence that allowed us to target both insurgents and terrorists in the area. Their loyalty was with us. Not Afghan forces or US forces, but us.

Lastly
, I will only write about a few of the major events that took place. The entire story is a book. The primary point here is that I was able to have “influence without authority” in this area through the tribal leadership and its great leader, whom we came to call “Sitting Bull.”

ODA 316 deployed to Asadabad in Konar Province in April 2003. We got off a helicopter in the middle of the night having nothing but the broad mission statement of “kill and capture anti-coalition members.” I am not sure that there was an overall plan or strategy for Afghanistan at the time. We were making it up as we went along. The tactical reality was that we were fighting for our lives every single day.

We were safer in Mangwel than we were in our own firebase in Asadabad.

The immediate imperative was to get a feel for the area, to gather intelligence and to meet with as many village elders as possible. To accomplish this, I planned to conduct multiple Armed Reconnaissance patrols. Basically we were announcing our presence and inviting contact, friendly or hostile. On our second mission, we were attacked in a well-planned RPG ambush. We fought our way out and moved on to a small village in Khas Khonar, where we were told there was a “problem” in another village called Mangwel. We moved to Mangwel and we were met there by a man named Akhbar, the village doctor.

I got out my laptop and showed Malik Noor Afzhal video footage of the World Trade Center towers collapsing. He had never seen this and it made a deep impression.

After some negotiations, the doctor and some of the other elders said they would get their leader. Soon afterward, Malik (tribal leader) Noor Afzhal came into the compound. I was immediately aware of his presence and the respect that he carried with him. He invited several of my teammates and me in to sit down and drink some tea and talk. I made it a point to relax and put my weapon to the side.

Dr. Akhbar is the first person we met in Mangwel.

After introducing one another, he asked why we were there. Why had armed Americans come to his country? We spoke for some two hours. I got out my laptop and showed Malik Noor Afzhal video footage of the World Trade Center towers collapsing. He had never seen this and it made a deep impression. He had heard about 9/11 and now understood that we were there to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

He then asked me why other US forces had passed through his village but had never stopped to talk with him. I explained that I could not speak for other US soldiers, but only for me and my men.

An important note here: I could feel that he and I were very comfortable with one another soon after we began talking. I spent a lot of time just listening. I spoke only when I thought I understood what had been said. My questions mostly pertained to things he had said, to ensure I had an understanding of what he was intending to say. I had a very good interpreter so this was made easier. The fact that my interpreter was middle-aged, well-educated and a Pashtun was invaluable.

The malik then asked us to stay for lunch, which I immediately agreed to.

After a great lunch, we began to speak again. The malik spoke about the problems
he was having in his village. The one that concerned him most was a bad situation within his own tribe. I will not get into the specifics of the different clans and sub-clans but there was a “highland” people and a “lowland” people.

Noor Afzhal’s tribe included people whose physical location is on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The highlands people had taken and were using some land that belonged to the lowland people. The malik told me the land had been given to his tribe by the “King of Afghanistan” many, many years ago and that he would show me the papers.

Dining with the tribe in Mangwel. I’m sitting second from the left next to my interpreter, across from Scott Gross’ nose and Tony Siriwardene to his right. Sitting Bull is standing in the background smiling.

Afghan food is delicious. For the first several months in Asadabad, the tribe fed us the only fresh vegetables we ever ate. We ate three meals a day with them and never was there a bad one. I was amazed because the people had so little, but they shared the best they had with us. Most often we ate lamb with a spicy pepper sauce, fresh tomatoes and onions. Bread and rice were the main staples. Each meal ended with some type of sweet made of nuts or fruit.

After the second time they fed us, I asked my interpreter if I could pay them for the meal. He told me I could not do that. I then began to understand melmastia, the tribal imperative of hospitality that is used by the Pashtuns. I quickly figured out other ways to “pay” them for their hospitality.

I told him he didn’t need to show me any papers. His word was enough.

He then told me he had given the highlanders ten days to comply with the request or he and his men would retake it by force. Here was the critical point for me and my relationship with Malik Noor Afzhal.

It is hard on paper to explain the seriousness of the situation and the complexity we both were facing. He had asked for help, a thing he later would tell me was hard for him to do (especially from an outsider) and I had many options. Could I afford to get involved in internal tribal warfare? What were the consequences if I did? With the tribe? With the other tribes in the area? With my own chain of command?

I made the decision to support him. “Malik, I am with you. My men and I will go with you and speak with the highlanders again.
If they do not turn the land back over to you, we will fight with you against them.” With that, a relationship was born. Malik Noor Afzhal then told me he had only eight warriors on duty at the current time. I told him, “No, you have sixteen.” (I had eight team members at the time).

We talked for hours, discussing what next steps to take. Then, out of the blue the malik leaned over and told my interpreter to tell me that he had not been completely honest, that he had not eight, but eighty warriors. I looked back at the malik, smiled and nodded my head in approval.

A lot more tea was drunk and a lot more information was exchanged, none of which I can talk about but all of which went toward deepening the bond between ODA 316 and the malik and his tribe. It was getting late. Noor Afzhal told my interpreter that he needed to speak with me alone, outside. He took my hand, looked
me in the eye and said, “Commander Jim, I have eight hundred warriors and they are at your disposal. You only need to ask and they will be yours.”

From eight to eighty to eight hundred. Without going into further detail, suffice it to say that the dispute with the highlanders was resolved. And we of ODA 316 had learned two lessons about Tribal
Engagement that, if anything, are more important today than they were then.

We saw firsthand the depth and power of the existing (though invisible to us) tribal defense system. And we grasped the absolute necessity of working with and bonding with the tribal leader—man to man, warrior to warrior.

Maybe a Special Forces ODA can understand an Afghan tribe because we ourselves are a tribe. And the Afghans recognize this. As time went by and we fought in many ambushes and engagements throughout the river valley and around other villages, the tribe came to believe that we were on their side and that we had come to help. With this, they began to open up to us. Here’s one example:

Our team was in Mangwel. Malik Noor Afzhal asked us to stay the night as we had many topics to discuss. Was this safe? I quickly counted over sixty armed warriors providing security. There were sentries high in the mountains (on the Pakistani side) that we were not meant to see, and three layers of security near the malik’s compound. We set up a hasty defensive perimeter (HDP) with our vehicles and got settled. The malik then approached me and said he wanted to take me somewhere very special.