Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader (90 page)

Read Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader Online

Authors: Geremie Barme

Tags: #History, #Asia, #China, #Literary Criticism, #Asian, #Chinese, #Political Science, #Political Ideologies, #Communism; Post-Communism & Socialism, #World, #General, #test

BOOK: Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader
3.04Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub

 

Page 277
masses use to express their frustrations. It would appear that apart from the present policies pursued by the Mainland government there are no alternative, viable political resources for people to rely on apart from the heritage of Mao Zedong. This has been particularly evident since the Massacre of 4 June [1989]. Now most people feel that Western political models are, in the case of China, both impractical and dangerous. What we are presently seeing is the combination of nationalist currents of thought with a nostalgia for the Maoist past. We are being drawn back to the age of Mao Zedong.
Certainly, the Open Door and Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping took as their starting point a complete negation of the Cultural Revolution and a betrayal of the Maoist line. In the last decade or so China has experienced massive changes and the country's fast-track economic development has astounded the world. Consumerism and hedonism have made people feel richer. It seems as though nothing can stop the "peaceful evolution"
3
that is going on in China. But nobody can afford to forget the following facts: our economic takeoff has not changed the one-party dictatorship created by Mao Zedong; the improvement in the standard of living has not led to increased human rights; the market economy is not predicated on a legal structure based on private property; every political movement strikes terror in the hearts of the new rich; the popularity of karaoke bars and the flood of violent and pornographic literature has not enhanced the status of freedom of speech; industrial reform that has led to the separation of Party and industrial management and the conversion of state industries into companies has not given the masses any greater opportunities or rights to participate in the political life of the nation. . . . This is the true legacy of Mao Zedong.
Rapid economic development has exacerbated various social antagonisms and brought them to the fore. It has also led to greatly increased public dissatisfaction and frustration. Once Deng Xiaoping effectively blocked any attempts at democratic political reform people increasingly turned to nostalgia as a means of expressing their unhappiness with the state of affairs. People outraged by overt corruption and the activities of official speculators who have become wealthy overnight only too readily think of how Mao Zedong overthrew Capitalist Roaders in the Party and warned of the need to purge bureaucrats from the government. They recall fondly the incorruptible Party of the Maoist past. The people who have been cast to the bottom rung of the economic ladder as disparities in income increase, as well as those who have not benefited from the redistribution of wealth that has taken place, recall with longing the egalitarianism and social justice of the past. Although poverty was the hallmark of that age, at least everyone was equally impoverished. People did not feel as lost and disenfranchised

 

Page 278
then as they do today. Nor did they feel they were the victims of such social injustice. Unemployed or semi-employed people as well as workers in state enterprises who are no longer being paid will recall their former exalted position under Mao as the masters of society. They remember the iron ricebowl that assured them an income for life and the Party organization that took care of them from cradle to crypt. The people who witness in terror and disgust the flood of itinerant workers swelling the population of the cities will recall that under Mao there was a strict household registration system that kept the peasants bound to the land. As for the peasants who have been forced to abandon the land they look forward to another peasant leader like Mao Zedong who will lead them to overthrow the landlords and divide up their property just as Mao did. The former powerholders, from high to low, who have retired or who have been forced aside will remember how, under Mao, they were assured power for life. People dissatisfied with the increase in crime, the spread of pornography and prostitution and the production of shoddy and bogus goods think of the innocent and pure days of Mao. . . . In comparison to these very practical and utilitarian views, the dissidents who were purged after 4 June and who still oppose the government have little to offer the masses. Their manifestoes and petitions have little impact on the powerholders especially in comparison to workers' strikes, peasant riots, fluctuations in the stock market and violent crime. At the slightest hint of activity the organs of the proletarian dictatorship go into operation and crush all opposition. The dissidents have absolutely no impact on the society as a whole.
We are faced with an absurd social tableau: the poverty of the Mao age was emotionally satisfying and exciting, it made people sing with joy although the social ambience was stultifyingly pure. The wealth generated in the age of Deng, however, has made the Chinese feel impotent and disgruntled. The social scene is chaotic to the point of complete degradation. On one hand, we have a peasant leader who murdered tens of millions of people and turned hundreds of millions into pliant slaves, but he is still deeply missed. On the other, is the second generation leadership [Deng, et al.] which rehabilitated countless numbers of unjustly condemned people and which has given the Chinese unprecedented wealth. Yet these people are the object of mass discontent. In my opinion, the person chiefly responsible for this ridiculous situation is not Mao Zedong, nor even the Chinese, but none other than Deng Xiaoping himself.
Since coming to power Deng has been caught in a bind. The Maoists within the Party as well as the malcontents outside it have criticized him for taking the Capitalist Road. The Reformers in the Party (including people who called for political reform like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang) as well as

 

Page 279
the dissidents in the society at large have attacked him for upholding authoritarian rule and for being a dictator. Caught in a tussle between these two forces Deng has been powerless to respond to the attacks of the Maoists. He has constantly compromised with them and been forced to do so because his Four Basic Principles are used by the Maoists to bolster and protect themselves. No matter how outrageous they become they have never been treated like the dissidents. On the contrary, there has been an escalation of the pressure Deng has brought to bear on radical reformists. First, they were named in the media and criticized, then came expulsions from the Party and dismissal from office. Finally, he resorted to using tanks and mass jailings to silence them. As Deng upped the ante in regard to the Reformers, the Maoists took advantage of the situation to increase pressure on Deng.
The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1984 and the Anti-Liberalisation Campaign of 1987 resulted in the fall of [Party General Secretary] Hu Yaobang from power and the purging of a large part of the reformist élite.
4
Those purges were, for the Maoists, relatively moderate. The bloody massacre of 4 June sealed the fate of Zhao Ziyang and his plans for political reform as well as leading to the ouster of large numbers of élite intellectuals, not to mention the murder of pro-Reform citizens. What followed was a massive Maoist purge in all realmspolitical, economic, and ideological. People had to make self-criticisms before they could be let off the hook. China now pursued a policy of ''preventing peaceful evolution" and propaganda about foreign imperialists plotting to overthrow the Party not heard for many years was trotted out once more.
5
A "neo-conservatism" led by He Xin spread throughout the nation. He Xin's sophistry even managed to fool many university students who had experienced 4 June.
6
The high-level Maoists within the Party now blamed 4 June on Deng's capitalist policies and said they had encouraged bourgeois liberal elements within the society.
Meanwhile, among the masses, Mao badges reappeared everywhere. Old songs in praise of Mao reverberated throughout the land and books, films and teleseries related to Mao became all the rage. . . . Suddenly the whole nation seemed to be possessed by a desire to return to the Maoist past. Deng's prestige was clearly under threat.
In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping responded to all of these pressures by going on his "tour of the south,"
7
reaffirming his policy that the Reform policies must continue for another century. This led to a new high tide of Reform. Although the Maoists were forced into retreat they kept up the pressure in both the political and ideological arenas. While consumerism and money making swept the nation, the Maoists still issued warnings against peaceful evolution. Although the authorities published the third volume of
Deng Xiaoping's Selected Works
at the time of the Mao centenary in

 

Page 280
an attempt to divert interest in Mao,
8
in the hearts and minds of the masses Mao remains the greatest modern leader of China.
In 1994 the various social tensions in China became more evident and violent. Party Central took measures to strengthen its power and control over local Party organizations. About this time the book
China Through the Third Eye
was published and in July a conference, "Socialism and the Modern World," was held in Beijing.
9
Both were highly critical of Deng's policies and expressed nostalgia for the Mao years. The popular impact of these two events goes without saying; but it is interesting to note that the authorities took them seriously as well. This is an indication that the types of views expressed [in both the book and at the conference] have a widespread appeal.
Deng's greatest achievement may well have been that he was able to break free of the Mao era and abandon "class struggle" in favour of economic development. But Deng's greatest dilemma has resulted from the fact that he persevered with Mao's political system and was unable to change fundamentally the nature of authoritarian rule in China. Nor could he expose the disasters that Mao's rule created. On the contrary, by pursuing his Four Basic Principles, Deng maintained Mao as the ruling icon of the Party and the nation. Particularly, in his autumn years, Deng has re-enacted the tragedy of Mao himself.
It may well be that as a Party member who worked under Mao for decades Deng was congenitally incapable of cutting the umbilical cord to the Chairman. Despite his own suffering under Mao and the horrors wrought on the Chinese people by him Deng could not bring himself to betray him entirely. Deng's greatest tragedy has been his inability and unwillingness to develop a Reform strategy that could supersede Mao Zedong.
China has lived under Reform for sixteen years now; still the specter of Mao haunts the land. Those who are disgruntled with the present state of affairs find resources of confidence and strength in the legacy of Mao. Every time Reform suffers a setback, whenever social tensions are exacerbated people from the highest echelons of the Party to the broad masses pay homage once more at the altar of Mao Zedong and seek to negate the policies of Deng Xiaoping. People ignore the fact that the social problems of today are, in essence, remnants of Mao's rule. They are oblivious to the fact that any sustainable effort to transform China must negate Mao's legacy. And still they worship him.
In reality, the reason that leftist thinking repeatedly resurfaces in China and finds support is that Deng Xiaoping has allowed it to do so. The Maoist system that he has continued to promote is the greatest enemy of the Re-

 

Page 281
forms on which he embarked. The 4 June Massacre served only to entrench the contradiction between the Four Basic Principles and the Reform policies.
After Deng, it will be the banner of Mao Zedong that may be unfurled once more to stabilize China. Maoist socialist egalitarianism may well be used to pursue policies of social equality and clean government. For in these policies the authorities may find a way of dealing equitably with mass disaffection. But that will mean that China will fall back into the vicious cycle of history.
November 1994, Beijing
Notes
1. Liu Xiaobo, "Hunshi mowang Mao Zedong."
2.
Maopai
in Chinese. This is the common Hong Kong term for ideological conservatives in favor of monolithic Party power, the planned economy and limited reform.
3. See "A Place in the Pantheon" note 2.
4. The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign was a short-lived cultural purge that began in late 1983. The Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation Campaign of early 1987 was only marginally more effective, although it did result in the resignation of Hu Yaobang. For details, see Barmé and Minford, eds.,
Seeds of Fire,
pp. 342-53.
5. Deng Xiaoping claimed that the activists who were supposedly behind the student demonstrations of 1989 were agents of enemy powers (that is, the U.S.) who were hoping to turn China into a bourgeois republic that would be a vassal state of the West.
6. He Xin was active in the first few years after 4 June and he reportedly impressed many university students when he spoke at campuses in Beijing presenting his avowedly conservative view of contemporary events. He Xin and Liu Xiaobo have been public enemies since the late 1980s. He Xin cannot be single-handedly held responsible for the neo-conservative wave of the early 1990s.
7. See "A Place in the Pantheon" note 15.
8. The third volume of Deng's works (
Dengxuan sanjuan
as it was called in Chinese) was published in 1993 in an obvious attempt to focus people's attention on Deng and his policies. The propaganda authorities directed that the book be used in obligatory political study sessions and as a result it was soon on the official best-seller list.
9. See Wang Shan (alias Luoyiningge'er),
Disan zhi yanjing kan Zhongguo.
This book created a sensation when it was published in the spring of 1994 and although it was eventually banned it was widely discussed. The conference,
Shehuizhuyi yu dangdai shijie,
was organized by Wu Qin (see "Mao More Than Ever") with the support of the Beijing Capital Steel Corporation. See Shao Yanfeng, "Shehuizhuyi shi guoqu geng shi weilai, shoudu xuezhe yantao `shehuizhuyi zai dangdai shijie.'"

Other books

Keith Haring Journals by Keith Haring
The Pause by John Larkin
Tall Cool One by Zoey Dean
The Burning City by Megan Morgan
CURSE THE MOON by Lee Jackson