Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (3 page)

Intellectual and emotional efforts are mere preludes in the search for Truth. One’s goal as a Muslim should be to completely surrender oneself (
islâm
) to the absolute Truth and Reality of God rather than to mere intellectual or emotional concepts regarding the ultimate Truth. Without freedom, humans can only attain a self-satisfied and illusory grasp of the truth, rather than genuine Truth Itself (
haqq al-haqiqi
).

The spiritual aptitude of any given individual necessarily plays a key role in his or her ability to attain the Truth, while the particular expression of Truth apprehended by one person may differ from that of the next. Islam honors and values these differences, and religious freedom itself, recognizing that each human being comprehends God in accord with his or her own native abilities and propensities, as expressed in the
Hadith Qudsi
⁵
: “
Ana ‘inda zann ‘abdi bi
,” (“I am as my servant thinks I am”). Of course, one’s efforts to know God (
mujahadah
, from the same root as
jihad
) should be genuine and sincere (
ikhlas
), leading to a state of self-transcendence. In such a state, humans experience God’s ineffable Presence and their own annihilation. Muslim fundamentalists often reject this notion because of their shallow grasp of religion and lack of spiritual experience. For them, God must be understood as completely transcendent (
tanzih
) and far beyond the reach of humanity, with no hope for anyone to experience God’s Presence. Such views are mistaken, for as the Qur’an itself states: “Whichever way you turn, there is the face of God” (2:115).

Nothing can restrict the Absolute Truth. Sufism—whose purpose is to bring Muslims to the third stage of knowledge, that is, the truth and reality of certainty (
haqq al-yaqin
)—emphasizes the value of freedom and diversity, both as reflections of God’s will and purpose and to prevent the inadvertent or deliberate conflation of human understanding, which is inherently limited and subject to error, with the Divine. Faith (
îmân
) and surrender to God (
islâm
) on a purely intellectual level are not enough. Rather, a Muslim should continuously strive (
mujahadah
) to experience the actual Presence of God (
ihsan
). For without experiencing God’s Presence, a Muslim’s religious practice remains on a purely theoretical level;
islâm
has not yet become an experiential reality.

Sanctions against freedom of religious inquiry and expression act to stop the developmental process of religious understanding dead in its tracks. They conflate the sanctioning authority’s current, limited grasp of the truth with ultimate Truth itself, and thereby transform religion from a path to the Divine into a “divinized” goal, whose features and confines are generally dictated by those with an all-too-human agenda of earthly power and control.

We can see this process at work in attempts by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the United Nations General Assembly, and the UN Council on Human Rights to restrict freedom of expression and institute a legally binding global ban on any perceived criticism of Islam, to prevent so-called “defamation of religion.” Whether motivated by sincere concern for humanity or political calculation, such efforts are woefully misguided and play directly into the hands of fundamentalists, who wish to avoid all criticism of their attempts to narrow the scope of discourse regarding Islam, and to inter 1.3 billion Muslims in a narrow, suffocating chamber of dogmatism.

While hostility toward Islam and Muslims is a legitimate and vital concern, we must recognize that a major cause of such hostility is the behavior of certain Muslims themselves, who propagate a harsh, repressive, supremacist, and of tenviolent understanding of Islam, which tends to aggravate and confirm non-Muslims’ worst fears and prejudices about Islam and Muslims in general.

Rather than legally stifle criticism and debate—which will only encourage Muslim fundamentalists in their efforts to impose a spiritually void, harsh, and monolithic understanding of Islam upon all the world—Western authorities should instead firmly defend freedom of expression, not only in their own nations, but also globally, as enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
⁶

Those who are humble and strive to live in genuine submission to God (i.e.,
islâm
) do not claim to be perfect in their understanding of the Truth. Rather, they are content to live in peace with others, whose paths and views may differ.

Defending freedom of expression is by no means synonymous with
personally
countenancing or encouraging disrespect towards others’ religious beliefs, but it does imply greater faith in the judgment of God, than that of man. Beyond the daily headlines of chaos and violence, the vast majority of the world’s Muslims
continue to express their admiration of Muhammad by seeking to emulate the peaceful and tolerant example of his life, which they have been taught, without behaving violently in response to those who despise the Prophet or proclaim the supremacy of their own limited understanding of the Truth. Such Muslims live in accordance with the Qur’anic verse that states, “And the servants of (Allah) the Most Gracious are those who walk in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say ‘Peace’ ” (25:63).

On February 14, 1989, an elderly Iranian ayatollah pronounced a religious decree on blasphemy that targeted a novelist half a world away. His proclamation created a tremor whose strength has intensified so that it now threatens to fracture the very foundations of Western free society.

In his landmark edict, Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Khomeini called for “all zealous Muslims to execute quickly wherever they find them,” the British author Salman Rushdie and all others involved with his new book,
The Satanic Verses
. Khomeini was not deterred by the fact that Rushdie, born a Muslim in India and at that time living in London, had no connection to Iran. Khomeini had simply found the work offensive and wanted to ensure that “no one will dare to insult Islamic sanctity” ever again. As Iran’s highest official, he also needed to shore up his political legitimacy following the end of an inconclusive and devastating war with Iraq.

International headlines reported the many ensuing bounties put on Rushdie’s head, his hasty retreat to a safe house, and the murder of his Japanese translator and the assaults seriously injuring his Norwegian editor and his Italian translator. However, most Westerners gave the incident little thought. Those who did saw it as a quirk, a unique outburst by an insular and arcane ruler asserting a preposterous claim to direct the actions of Muslims worldwide. Rushdie himself, though perpetually under threat because the decree was never revoked, was feted by politicians and literary figures and remained a celebrity, and his books continued to sell well. At the time, the West was far from shaken.

Few foresaw that Khomeini was, in fact, spearheading a religious trend with political undertones, propelled by a zeal not seen in the West for several centuries. His edict signaled a new worldwide movement to curb freedoms of religion and speech through the export and enforcement of Muslim blasphemy rules that were already suppressing minorities and dissenters in Muslim-majority countries. All this took place in the context of a revival of reactionary forms of Islam, supported heavily by the political rulers and spiritual authorities of both Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, who fiercely compete for power in the Muslim world.

Sunni authorities soon outdistanced Shia Iran’s lead, generating a proliferation of fatwas and demands to stop purported Western blasphemy and related sins of apostasy, heresy, and “insulting Islam.”
¹
Over the ensuing years, Western film-makers, legislators, writers, journalists, political analysts, social activists, religious dissidents, and cartoonists have been targeted. As this book describes, this intimidation and violence has been not intended ostensibly only to protect Islam from criticism and rejection. It also serves the narrower political purpose of shielding from criticism those who claim the right to rule in the name of Islam.

This trend intensified after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, as Islam and Muslim governments were publicly scrutinized, criticized, and sometimes ridiculed in the West to an extent never seen or permitted in Muslim lands. Whether Shia or Sunni, Muslim authorities feared that Western critiques could weaken their religious claims and their rule. The response of many Muslim-majority states, including those that describe themselves as “secular,” has been to demand that Western governments punish all those within their borders who have purportedly insulted Islam. In so doing, they, like Khomeini, have departed from a long tradition, based on the opinion of Islamic legal scholars, that offenses committed by non-Muslims in non-Muslim countries are no concern of Islamic law.

These events played out against the backdrop of Islamist terror in the United States, Bali, Madrid, London, and elsewhere. That violence, while carried out for different reasons and involving other actors, amplified a sense of intimidation accompanying the Muslim antiblasphemy movement in the West. The movement itself, however, was never simply the demand of an apparent extremist fringe that could be marginalized; its strength was further demonstrated when the cause was taken up and mainstreamed by governments in the Muslim world—secular and religious—united within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The Saudi-based OIC and its fifty-seven members gave the antiblasphemy movement weight and traction. While the West largely understood religious freedom as a right of an individual, the OIC reinterpreted it to mean respect for religion itself, specifically Islam and everything Islamic. The OIC and its members were responsible for placing “defamation against religions”—in practice, a code term for Islamic blasphemy restrictions—onto the human rights agenda of the United Nations. This was done in an attempt to shape a new international human rights regime that would supplant existing laws that protect individual freedoms; the new laws would instead protect religions, particularly Islam. In the best-known international blasphemy episode, usually known as the Danish cartoons crisis, it was the OIC that amplified the event and gave global momentum to the backlash that made it so traumatic. There were certainly a multiplicity of actors, motives, and agendas in scores of countries. The overall trajectory, however, was to give heft to a decades-long, multiparty campaign, combining international lobbying, lawsuits, threats, and violence. The intention was to export restrictions on “insulting Islam” and blasphemy to the rest of the world.

Today, OIC countries are demanding that the West curb the intertwined individual freedoms of religion and expression—rights that have been enshrined in some constitutions for two hundred years, as well as recognized, since the founding of the United Nations, as universal fundamental human rights under international law. Nevertheless, the Western world has often been dilatory and confused in its response to the OIC’s demands, not least because its lacks clarity about what dangers they entail and what lies behind them. Most of the discussion about “insulting Islam,” doubtless shaped about memories of the Rushdie affair and Danish cartoons, has focused naively on questions of trying to curb “hate speech,” and what are more generally thought to be insults, and of how to accommodate such demands within free societies.

Later in this book, we will examine how Western countries are faring in their undertaking to balance Muslim demands and fundamental rights and freedoms. But, before analyzing this, we must take a step back to examine whether such accommodation is desirable or even possible. We argue that the current imposition of curbs on perceived anti-Islamic speech—whether called blasphemy, defamation of Islam, insulting Islam, or anti-Islamic hate speech—is incompatible with the freedoms that define democracy and individual human rights.

The heart of the problem lies in determining precisely what specific forms of expression the OIC countries seek to limit in the West. There are no clear definitions of religious defamation or religious hate speech. Similarly, no common practice regarding blasphemy crimes exists within the OIC membership. Many Muslim expectations are based on amorphous rules expressed in practices that vary from country to country and evolve and expand over time. Within countries that have such restrictions, definitions are generally left to case law, commonly unwritten, and often determined by the subjective and sometimes self-serving opinions of local authorities. The nature of what is being asked of the non-Muslim world is, therefore, obscure.

Also, within most Western countries, discrimination and incitement to violence against Muslims and others are already understood to be crimes, which implies that speech crimes against Islam must include something far wider. As our survey reveals, the freedom to debate, to reject, to refuse to respect, to criticize religious ideas, and to worship according to one’s conscience are essential to religious freedom. Blasphemy restrictions coerce religious conformity and forcibly silence criticism of dominant religious ideas, especially when those ideas support, and are supported by, political power. When politics and religion are intertwined, there can be no free political debate if there is no free religious debate.

In contrast to the West, many OIC countries have their own limits on speech regarding Islam, which control not only ridicule and mocking language, but also what can be expressed, analyzed, and argued in the political, cultural, social, economic, and religious realms; in fact, these limits are major means of social and political control. To give a clearer understanding of what leading OIC governments
mean when they call for the internationalization of legal bans on blasphemy and insults to Islam, we first examine the contemporary situation within those countries.