Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (63 page)

In other words, the “deep structure” of the Qur’an must be reconstructed from the surface structure, which was specific to seventh-century Arab culture. Subsequently, this deep structure must give rise to other surface structures, including contemporary ones, suitable to successive generations of Muslim society in various regions of the earth. This entails an interpretive diversity—clearly seen throughout Muslim history, particularly as practiced by Sufis, or Islamic mystics—without which the Message would “harden” and degenerate, and the Qur’an would become, as it is now, subject to political and other forms of self-interested manipulation exercised by so-called guardians of Islam.

The innovative approach to Qur’anic study that I have long proposed in my various writings on the process of modern Qur’anic interpretation entails the use of traditional exegetical methods
and
modern linguistic methodologies, in addition to the analysis of sociohistorical reality and culture.
³
By recognizing the difference between the original contextual “meaning,” which is virtually fixed because of its historicity, and the “significance” in a particular sociocultural context, which is changeable, and furthermore, by realizing that the significance must be strongly related and rationally connected to the meaning, we can produce more valid contemporary interpretations. Of course, any interpretations of the Qur’an produced using such a methodology are not exempt from the reality that
every
interpretation is historically and culturally constructed.

In early Islam, there emerged a debate between a rational school of theology known as the Mu’tazila that claimed that the Qur’an is “created” not eternal, and other theological schools of thought that held that the Qur’an is the “eternal” verbatim speech of God. In the Mu’tazilites’ view, an “uncreated” Qur’an is inconsistent with the concept of pure monotheism,
tawhid
, a pivotal concept in Islam. Sociohistorical analysis demonstrates that these schools did not hold their respective views in a vacuum; rather, they expressed in religious terminologies the different sociopolitical positions of their adherents. Eventually, the notion of an “eternal and uncreated” Qur’an became the dominant accepted dogma in Sunni Islam. Unfortunately, the history of this debate is either unknown or ignored by nearly all contemporary Sunni clerics and scholars. Instead, the doctrine of “eternity” is presented as the Truth, while the doctrine of “creation” is denounced as heresy.

As a result, the notion that religious texts, although Divine and revealed by God, are culturally constructed and historically determined is not only rejected by the Muslim establishment but also actively condemned as “apostasy.” There is frequently no clear distinction made among heresy, blasphemy, and apostasy within the Muslim world. Instead, Islamist radicals deliberately conflate these terms in order to attack any discourse that strays from the narrow bounds of their fundamentalist ideology. Having been at the receiving end of such allegations—and driven from my home in Egypt to exile in the Netherlands—I can state with conviction that charges of apostasy and blasphemy are key weapons in the fundamentalists’ arsenal, strategically employed to prevent reform of Muslim societies and instead confine the world’s Muslim population to a bleak, colorless prison of sociocultural and political conformity. There is little hope of escape from this imprisonment, as long as fundamentalists—and the opportunistic and/or authoritarian regimes that compete with them in a chase to the lowest common denominator of Islam—continue to serve as prison guards and wardens.

Laws penalizing blasphemy and apostasy exist in most Muslim-majority countries throughout the world and act as a severe constraint upon the use of reason to explore and understand the contemporary significance of the Qur’an’s profound message. By forcefully silencing critical inquiry, such laws play directly into the hands of Islamic radicals who seek to unify and politicize Muslim societies not only against the West but also against the very concept and principles of modern life, such as freedom, justice, human rights, and the dignity of man, which are themselves inseparable from the right to freedom of conscience and expression. Perhaps the greatest irony is that these core principles—which lie at the heart of any just and humane society—are deeply embedded in the message of the Qur’an itself and yet are ignored by Islam’s most fervent, and violent, “defenders.”

For although the Qur’an prescribes no earthly punishment for either blasphemy or apostasy, the historical development of Islamic law has widely, though not universally, prescribed the death penalty as punishment for both. A critical historical study of the Qur’an,
hadith
, and
shari’a
would reveal the human origin of these interpretations and hence their complete inappropriateness within a modern context.

This objective historical approach to studying the foundational elements of Islamic law is fiercely resisted by many clerics and mullahs. Yet it is absolutely vital, if we are to liberate the “deep substance” of the Holy Qur’an’s message, which proclaims the Prophet Muhammad (and hence, by implication, Islam itself) to be “a blessing for all creation.”

ABDULLAH SAEED

Some Muslims argue that the right to religious freedom as conceptualized in key international instruments is a product of the West and has no relevance for Muslims.
*
This argument emanates to a large extent from certain political and religious elites, who have an interest in keeping freedom of belief outside the Muslim domain and do so by relying on ideas, constructs and rulings developed in classical Islamic law. These groups tend to ignore the fact that human rights have growing political backing at the international level, with supporting conventions often enshrined in national legislation, even in Muslim-majority states. This means that the discourse on human rights has developed into a global debate in which Muslims are also participants. Thus religious freedom, as a fundamental human right under international law, has become one of the key rights upon which both Muslims and non-Muslims are increasingly focusing.

Freedom of belief for Muslims—particularly freedom to change religion—is one aspect of the right to religious freedom that is particularly targeted for criticism by many Muslims. They argue that this freedom, as conceptualized in international human rights instruments, is not in line with Islamic norms, values, and laws. According to proponents of this view, Muslims do not have the right to leave Islam and convert to another religion or to no religion at all. Under the classical Islamic law of apostasy, the penalty for leaving Islam is death. In the words of one Muslim religious leader: “The person who knows the truth [Islam] and believes in it, [but] then turns his back on it, does not deserve to live. The punishment for apostasy is prescribed for the protection of the religion and as a deterrent to anyone who is thinking of leaving Islam. There is no doubt that such a serious crime must be met with an equally weighty punishment.…”
¹

Nevertheless, classical Muslim apostasy laws, as well as other restrictions on religious freedom in the Muslim world, are increasingly being opposed by Muslims, as well as non-Muslims, at local, national, and international levels. There is growing pressure on Muslims to comply with international standards on
human rights from major international bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty International, as well as from influential powers such as the United States and the European Union.

A careful examination of the debate reveals that current human rights discourse is not just a Western one. It is shared by a large number of Muslims as well. Muslim-majority states, as members of the United Nations, accept in principle the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and many have even ratified major human rights conventions. Constitutions in Muslim states often reflect the principles of the UDHR. Moreover, as a sign of participation in this global discourse, even some more traditionalist Muslims have developed what they consider to be “Muslim” human rights documents. These are generally modeled on the UDHR or similar human rights instruments but use Islamic ideas and terminology.

The political background of the prophetic and post-prophetic period against which the classical Islamic law of apostasy was formulated played a significant role in the development of this law and associated restrictions on freedom of religion. In the political context of the Prophet’s time, a person either belonged to the community of believers (Muslims), the unbelievers (non-Muslims) who were at peace with Muslims, or the unbelievers who were at war with Muslims. If one leaves Islam and the Muslims and their allies, there is no option but to join the opposition. An apostate, therefore, was perceived to have automatically joined the non-Muslim side, becoming part of the enemy ranks and using apostasy as a means to attack and inflict maximum harm on the Muslim community. Thus the question of apostasy in early Islamic history was closely associated with the safety and security of the Muslims. Apostates were deemed a serious social and political threat to the whole community.

The punishment for apostasy—based on texts such as the hadith, “If anyone changes his religion, kill him”
²
—came about within this sociopolitical context. The person referred to in the hadith was a
muharib
or someone who was in a state of war against Muslims. Under classical Islamic law anyone who was engaged in war against Muslims could be put to death.
³
Thus one could argue that in early Muslim reasoning, apostasy was more akin to treason, rather than a matter of simply changing one’s belief. The death sentence therefore was punishment for committing a serious political crime.

The years following the death of the Prophet Muhammad were also marked by a great deal of social and political tension in the body politic of the Muslim community. This also influenced early conceptions of apostasy and related offences, such as blasphemy and heresy. Problems developed among Muslims that were not simply about political leadership of the community but also about what and who represented religious authority. As the Muslim caliphate expanded and Muslims came into contact with customs, traditions, and practices from outside of Arabia, debates arose as to what was acceptable in Islam, who should be the legitimate political authority, and even who was a Muslim. Some Muslims
remained politically neutral in these disputes, while others were eager to take sides. It was in this context that several groups with specific theological or religio-political orientations began to emerge in Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. Such groups included the Kharijis, the Shia, the Qadaris (supporters of free will), and the Jabris (supporters of predestination). Their divisions continued to create tension and conflict within the body politic of the Muslim community.

State involvement in theological matters also began relatively early in Islam, particularly in the Abbasid period (750–1258 CE), which succeeded in wreaking further havoc within the Muslim community. Some rulers played a major role in reducing the scope available for discussion and debate on theological issues when certain views clashed with the state ideology. A good example of this is the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833). Freedom of belief for Muslims became severely curtailed when those who did not conform to state-adopted theological positions had to flee their towns, remain in hiding, or face torture and persecution, while being branded heretics or blasphemers.

It is important to note the high degree of fluidity and diversity in the understanding of what constitutes apostasy in the course of the development of apostasy laws. This state of affairs has been used by political and religious figures throughout history and up through the present day to control, oppress, persecute, and eliminate opponents. For this reason, the potential for misuse of apostasy laws has always been considerable.

How well the apostasy laws are supported by the Qur’an and the practice of Prophet Muhammad is also debatable. There are significant counterarguments to the view that the punishment of apostasy by death is based on clear Qur’anic or prophetic instructions. Critics argue there is nothing in the Qur’an to justify a temporal punishment, such as death, for apostasy, and little to justify many of the apostasy laws that one finds in classical Islamic legal texts. Many of these laws were developed on the basis of certain isolated (
ahad
) hadith or their interpretations or on the basis of analogy (
qiyas
) and
ijtihad
. For example, the hadith, “Whoever changes his religion, kill him,” could be understood to mean converting from any religion to another, and therefore could be taken as a prohibition against converting to any religion. Even if its interpretation was restricted to simply prohibiting conversion from Islam, there are other versions of the hadith that seem to imply a clear connection between the instruction to kill the apostate and rebellion against the Muslim community. In reading such hadith, classical Muslim jurists favored readings and interpretations that supported the death penalty at the expense of those readings that opposed such a penalty. Clear textual proofs that guarantee certainty of knowledge (
̀
ilm qat
́
i
) were lacking in this debate.

The point is that, because none of the textual proofs provided by Muslim jurists to support the death penalty for apostasy guarantees certainty of knowledge as understood in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (
usul al-fiqh
), Muslims now have the opportunity to go back and rethink the law. Moreover, if the law is no longer practicable or relevant for the majority of Muslims, there is strong
justification for reconsidering it. The argument that such laws have been traditionally backed by consensus (
ijma’
) should not be a deterrent. Numerous other laws in which there previously was a Muslim consensus have been subject to revision; some, as in the cases concerned with slavery and the caliphate, have been dropped altogether.