Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide (64 page)

The nature of today’s debate on apostasy and apostasy laws in Muslim states is also important to consider. Malaysia, for example, is a multireligious society in which apostasy laws have been long debated. In various states of Malaysia’s federation, apostasy laws, not necessarily with the death penalty, are in place and arguably violate constitutional guarantees of religious freedom by requiring Muslims who want to renounce Islam to repent or endure detention for the purpose of rehabilitation and education.

The apostasy debate in Malaysia is also linked to Malay identity and politics. Both main political parties—the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the opposition and more Islamist Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)—use the debate to score political points by demonstrating their commitment to Islam. PAS has supported introducing the death penalty to deter Muslims from renouncing Islam, so the more secularist UMNO has been trying to demonstrate its Islamic credentials. As part of this agenda, UMNO has supported the introduction of Islamic banking, insurance, and mortgages and the increase of Islamic programming on television and radio and in other government-controlled media; and it has given more coverage to Islamic festivals than in the past. Several UMNO-governed states within the federation also have introduced or are preparing to introduce legislation making it difficult for Muslims to renounce Islam. Thus support for apostasy laws, along with other features of Islamization, is among the tactics being used to garner political support.

A number of important issues emerge from the Qur’anic treatment of the subject of freedom of religion. It is clear that the Qur’an supports the notion of religious freedom, including religious faith as an individual choice. Religious freedom is presented in the Qur’an in a variety of contexts and ways. Under Muslim rule historically, non-Muslims were allowed to govern their lives under the rules and values of their religious traditions. Muslims were instructed not to abuse or slander adherents to other religions—including idolaters—even though their beliefs, values, and practices were not supported or respected by the Qur’an. The Qur’an also rejected forced conversions, as emphasized in the well-known verse, “There shall be no coercion in matters of faith …”
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The principle of personal responsibility that is a strong current through the Qur’an also emphasizes that each person is given the capacity to discern right from wrong, and it is a personal decision as to which belief system, if any, to follow. According to the Qur’an, God’s plan for humankind is not that everyone should follow the same path.
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The Prophet’s task was primarily to explain the difference between right and wrong. Individuals then had the choice of whether or not to follow God’s path. This principle applies equally to Muslims who choose to leave Islam. Every person will be
asked about his or her actions on the Day of Judgment and it will be the individual who will ultimately bear the responsibility for that choice in the afterlife.

Despite this, Muslim scholars of the classical period largely limited the scope of freedom available to a Muslim in choosing and adopting a religion or a belief system. They opted instead for a narrow definition of the right to religious freedom, confining it to the freedom given to non-Muslims either to remain under Islamic rule as “protected religious minorities” (
ahl al-dhimma
) or to convert to Islam. Conversion from Islam was banned absolutely. These scholars went against the general ethos of the Qur’an when they argued for state coercion to prevent Muslims from converting to other religions. The view of these early scholars is unsurprising as they functioned at a time when religious freedom and the concept of individual human dignity were not related in the way they are today. In the social and political environment of that earlier time, an individual generally became a “person” through association with a particular religion or tribe; and in the case of Islam, it was the religious tradition rather than the tribe that mattered most. In joining Islam, an individual automatically became part of the community of believers, which also functioned as a political unit, within the caliphate or emirate. Thus there was a conjunction between corporate religious identity rooted in the community and political identity. If someone rejected the community of believers, he or she was automatically excluded from the membership of the political community as well. This meant the complete loss of an individual’s basic rights, including the rights to life and to own property, which were conferred upon becoming a Muslim. Since an individual’s basic rights were dependent on being part of this community, the whole notion of apostasy and the punishment associated with it in the premodern period made sense.

In contrast, most Muslims today have moved away from this conjunction between religious community and political identity to a sort of separation between the two. Today, a political community in the sense of a nation-state does not have to be based on a religious community, and, in fact, most nation-states in the world are not based on this strict identification. As a rule, an individual can become a citizen of this political unit regardless of religious affiliation. This is true even in the majority of Muslim states, in which modern constitutions often guarantee religious freedom and equality before the law for all. Thus, in general, religious freedom has become a
prima facie
right in the modern period within the functioning of the nation-state. Notions of apostasy, driven by classical Islamic law that depended on the meshing of religious identity and political community, have therefore lost much of their political meaning.

With few exceptions, today’s societies are not “closed.” People move from one area to another and from country to country in an unprecedented manner. Migration, travel, and dual residence serve the purposes of education, business, recreation, and employment in a world driven by technologically advanced communication networks. Muslims migrate in large numbers to non-Muslim
countries and, to a lesser extent, vice versa. Consequently people of diverse religions may live in close proximity or even side by side in the same neighborhood.

This unprecedented interaction and pluralism places substantial pressure on all Islamic scholars to offer new ideas about religious freedom relevant to today’s multireligious and multicultural world. The reaffirmation of classical laws, developed for a different time, place, and circumstance, is not particularly practical. In any event, many Muslims have in practice abandoned key aspects of the apostasy laws, particularly punishment by death. It is only in a few Muslim states that the law is still in force. Despite this, the question of apostasy continues to be hotly debated among Muslims. It finds its way into contemporary Islamic legal texts and discourse, with many traditionalists continuing to argue for the implementation of these laws.

On the practical problems posed by apostasy laws, one may argue that these laws have a great potential for abuse. There is a high degree of diversity in Muslim theological, legal, and religio-political positions and thought, and it is difficult to devise a creed that is applicable to and accepted by all Muslims. In addition to premodern divisions, new divisions have emerged among Muslims today, and Muslims from one group still often accuse their opponents of apostasy, heresy, and unbelief. Similarly, in a number of Muslim countries, the government assumes the responsibility of “protecting” local orthodoxies. Those who do not adhere to the government-sanctioned orthodoxy can be branded as deviants, heretics, or apostates. The potential for abuse is all the more real because governments in a number of Muslim countries are either semi-authoritarian or fully authoritarian; thus civil, political, and religious rights remain severely curtailed there. Moreover, religion and religious institutions in these countries are subordinated to the government, which can use its authority to persuade or, if necessary, force religious officials and institutions to question the religious beliefs of political opponents and dissidents. The authoritarian tendencies inherent in these countries also mean that there are very few, if any, institutional safeguards to check abuses, safeguards such as elected representatives of Parliament, independent courts, or a free civic society and media.

For these reasons, it is essential to formulate a concept of religious freedom that is in harmony with our current realities, taking into account both Islamic belief and religious diversity within nation-states. It is premature to believe that nation-states in the Muslim world are going to disappear or that, somehow, a new single Muslim state will emerge with a caliphal system in which one caliph leads the faithful. This idea, modeled on the premodern “caliph,” can only be described today as utopian, unrealistic, and impractical. Even a cursory look at the map of the Muslim world—with all its political, theological, economic, and cultural differences—reveals that there are considerable divisions and differences among Muslims that would prevent the realization of such an idea. It is inconceivable that these Muslim states could be politically united under one umbrella, as some Muslims seem to believe, or that all Muslims will one day be
residing in a
dar al-islam
(abode of Islam) that accommodates only Muslims as full citizens.

If we are right about world trends, we will see less, not more, compartmentalization of the world into religious blocs. On the contrary, globalization will bring far more linkages and mixes of people from a variety of religious backgrounds into the same space. With the increasing intensity of globalization, interaction, and multiculturalism, many of the classical ideas that Muslims inherited from the past are now impractical and unrealistic. Recognizing these new realities, many Muslim social and political systems have adopted modern ideas associated with religious freedom.

Two important but rarely discussed challenges to laws on apostasy are the increasing religious diversity in the world and the issue of “silent apostasy.” Today, nearly all Muslim countries are multireligious societies, and among a nation’s Muslim population are people with different legal, theological, or mystical traditions. Even in Saudi Arabia, where all citizens are required by law to be Muslims, there is a significant Shia minority population, in addition to the Sunni majority. Several million Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists also live there as long-term guest workers.

The number of Muslims living as minorities throughout the world is also increasing. Several million Muslims live in the United States and Europe as minorities. There are approximately 50 million Muslims in China and 150 million in India. In those places, apostasy laws have no legal consequences. Muslims are free to convert, apostatize, or simply not follow any religion at all, without any detriment to their basic rights. Today, the classical Islamic law categories of the “abode of Islam” (
dar al-islam
) and “the abode of war” (
dar al-harb
) are not useful to determine where Muslims are located. Given globalization and increasing fluidity and mobility, it is common for people of various faiths to live side by side. In a world of information exchange in which proselytizing is widely practiced, religious conversions will undoubtedly occur and religious boundaries will break down.

Complicating this further is the fact that in all Muslim communities there are both practicing and non-practicing or nominal Muslims. Practicing Muslims themselves vary in their commitment to Islamic rituals, commandments, and prohibitions. Some may be totally committed and devoted to both the fundamentals and non-fundamentals of the religion. Others may adhere only to the fundamentals such as the five daily prayers, fasting,
zakat
, and pilgrimage. Some believers may practice some, or even most, fundamentals but ignore others and be irregular in their practice.

The merely nominal or “cultural” Muslims are those who happen to have been born into a Muslim family and have only minimal affiliation with Islam. Cultural Muslims may carry a Muslim name, live in a Muslim community, and identify with Islam when asked about their religious affiliation. They may also have a superficial, distorted or vague familiarity with what Muslims “do.” Cultural Muslims are not usually interested in observing religious practices apart from
occasional attendance at
Eid
prayer or participation in community religio-cultural activities. They have little commitment to Islam and do not abide by its commandments or prohibitions. In all Muslim communities there are large numbers of cultural or nominal Muslims, though there are no reliable studies in this area. Conservative estimates of a quarter of the Muslim population being nominal Muslims would mean that at least 300 million Muslims fall into this category.

Nominal Muslims present a major challenge to the law on apostasy. Under classical Islamic law, such people should be considered apostates. They profess Islam outwardly and perhaps incidentally but have no commitment to it or its practices. A number of classical Muslim scholars held that anyone who did not, for instance, perform the obligatory requirements of the five daily prayers would fall into the category of an apostate. The question then becomes whether they should be put to death as a result. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the Muslim who does not pray the five daily prayers must be ordered to do so; if he refuses, he must be put to death as a
kafir
(unbeliever). He will not be washed before burial, no prayer will be performed for him, and he will not be buried in a Muslim cemetery.
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Ibn Taymiyya’s view is not isolated; as far as fundamental religious obligations are concerned, many
ulama
would concur with him. In fact, many view the first caliph Abu Bakr’s engagement in the so-called wars of apostasy as fighting apostates whose crime was the refusal to pay
zakat
, a fundamental obligation of Islam.

If apostasy laws, as understood in classical Islamic law, were rigorously applied, of the 1.2 billion or more Muslims in the world today, it is likely that at least 300 million nominal Muslims would be condemned to death. Those Muslims today who argue for the imposition of the death penalty for apostasy appear to ignore the practical implications of their views, which puts them in an increasingly untenable position. The idea of putting to death hundreds of millions of Muslims is obviously absurd. Perhaps that is why “silent” apostasy is for all practical purposes ignored in the current debate.