Tank Tracks to Rangoon (22 page)

This action paved the way for a breakout designed to link up with the relief column fighting its way down the road from Kohima, and was almost the last tank action to be fought before the siege was finally broken.

The part played by 254 Tank Brigade at Imphal cannot be emphasized too much. Whilst the tank crews quite rightly point out that the major part of the day to day fighting was borne by the infantry and gunners, the presence of their vehicles, climbing impossible heights to provide support for the infantry, was a powerful moral force which affected both sides.

The British and Indian infantry knew that if a tank could be got into position, and most times it was, by hook or by crook, success was almost certain. They knew that the tanks would cover them whilst they consolidated their gains, and that they would take their wounded with them when they returned to harbour. They knew also that the tanks’ wireless net was superior to their own, and was an invaluable link with other troops who could reinforce them if necessary, and that the tanks often possessed the nearest first aid kit with which to treat a desperately wounded man. Most important of all, they knew that the tank crews were prepared to take the same risks as themselves, and that by attracting the enemy’s fire the tanks were saving them casualties, and that the tanks’ own fire was both accurate and effective. To tired, battle weary men, these things mean a lot.

To the Japanese foot soldier, waiting at his bunker fire slit to open up at his opposite number, the sound of Stuart or Lee engines thrashing their painful way up the slopes below him, was an invitation to him to make peace with himself before he joined his beloved ancestors, and often his last sight upon earth as the tanks crossed the crest was the black muzzle of a traversing 75- or 37-mm gun. In such circumstances his fire discipline frequently cracked, and instead of reserving his fire for the advancing infantry, he directed it at the tanks as soon as they appeared, to little effect. If his nerve broke and he ran, he would be lucky if the tanks’ machine guns or the infantry did not scythe him down; nor was he provided with sufficient anti-tank weapons to protect himself adequately. Too much of this sort of thing will affect the morale of any army, and the wonder is that the Japanese stood it so long and died so often at their posts. Where are our own tanks, they must have asked; why do they not fight in the mountains, like the British?

The answer was that the British armour had predicted its role well in advance, and had trained very hard with special emphasis on hill climbing; the Japanese armour had never imagined such
a method of employment, and was ill equipped both mentally and physically for such tasks.

During the siege, squadrons spent most of their time operating in two halves. This stretched the internal administrative arrangements of their parent regiments, and placed a heavy responsibility upon the half-squadron commanders. Whilst supplies did get through to the tanks, the siege situation did not always permit that every requirement could be met, and at one stage 7th Cavalry’s Jat squadron came close to starving, as the men would not depart from the strict diet ordered by their religion.

Again, the junior officers commanding half-squadrons were sometimes called upon to argue strenuously against misuse of their tanks in certain situations. It takes a certain amount of courage for a captain to argue the toss with a brigade or even divisional commander, but both Colonel Younger and Colonel Barlow were invariably able to prevent bullying, and it would have been a rash infantry commander who pushed the matter to a conclusion, since a complaint from Brigadier Scoones would have brought down the wrath of the Corps Commander himself, who was well aware of the good the tanks were doing.

On the hills surrounding the plain of Imphal two ideas were done to death for ever. One was that the Imperial Japanese Army was invincible, and the other was that tanks can not be used in mountainous jungle; amongst those remote and desolate summits can still be found the rusting remains of Lees and Stuarts, which bear silent witness to both.

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Pots-an-Pans to the troops.

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Throughout the Imphal battle, in attacks of this nature the tanks always carried coils of barbed wire and other consolidation stores for immediate use by the infantry once the position had been taken. They also carried away the infantry’s casualties when returning to leaguer.

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Major Cyril Morrison, later to command 11th Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry.

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SEAC
Newspaper.

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There is an interesting comparison to be made between Colonel Younger’s first method and the tactics of Brig. G. W. Richards’ 23rd Armoured Brigade, 8th Army’s infantry tank formation, at Second Alamein. Both methods provide maximum benefit to the infantry at minimum costs to the tanks. See the Author’s
Through Mud and Blood,
Robert Hale.

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Piat. Short for Projector Infantry Anti-Tank. This cumbrous device threw a hollow-charge bomb by means of a heavy coiled spring mounted in a trough. It required considerable strength to compress the spring which could only be done by the gunner standing up and pressing with all his weight. The weapon was not accurate beyond thirty yards, but the bomb, like any hollow-charge ammunition, had tremendous penetrative power when it did connect. The American rocket-propelled bazooka was greatly superior and soon replaced the Piat.

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The FOO.

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Enemy – (Urdu).

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There is a story well known through the Army, which has its roots in the fighting around the Silchar track. Two wounded men making their way slowly down the track had paused to rest when a third, wearing a bandage round his left arm, caught them up.

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The establishment of 7th Light Cavalry provided for a 3 inch mortar troop.

Major-General Sato’s 31st Division advanced from the Chindwin in four columns, and behind it was driven an enormous herd of cattle, sufficient to feed the men for the period they thought they would need to capture Kohima and hold it until Mutaguchi had wiped out the Imphal garrison and could come up the road with fresh supplies. Apart from the cattle, and what the men possessed by way of marching rations, 31st Division brought little save guns and ammunition.

During the early hours of 5th April 1944, Sato’s leading regiment, the 58th, succeeded in isolating the little hill town of Kohima, held by a tiny garrison of which the 4th Battalion The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment formed the major part.

The West Kents came from 161 Indian Infantry Brigade, which had recently arrived in the area direct from the Arakan. The two other battalions, 1/1st Punjabis and 4/7th Rajputs, occupied a defensive box, along with a few mountain guns, at Jotsoma, two miles along the Dimapur road, and this box was, in its turn, isolated by the Japanese on 7th April.

What followed has become known as one of the most savage and vindictive infantry battles in the combined histories of the British, Indian and Japanese armies. For thirteen days, the Kohima garrison beat off incessant fanatical attacks by an enemy many times their number. Within the contracting perimeter, the bodies of friend and foe remained unburied, and in many trenches the only occupants were the dead. Men fought hand to hand on the surface, whilst below ground others grunted and struggled in stifling darkness as Japanese attempts to tunnel their way in were met by counter mines. The battlefield reminded one officer of a particularly nasty corner of the Somme, which says a great deal. On 14th April, Brigadier Warren’s box at Jotsoma was relieved by 5th Brigade from 2nd British Division,
and on the 18th the same brigade broke through to Kohima, not a moment too soon, as the garrison was almost spent and could not have resisted many more determined assaults.

Sato, confronted with the steady build-up of Lt-General Montagu Stopford’s 33 Corps to his front, now went over to the defensive. In this he might have succeeded indefinitely, as he held most commanding positions in the hills, and if he lost one he could simply retire to the next.

However, at this stage, things began to go wrong for him. His supplies, both of food and ammunition, began to run down, and his superior, Mutaguchi, turned a deaf ear to his repeated requests for replenishment. His men fought on, throwing back repeated British attacks, but their health began to deteriorate. Relations between the two generals began to sour. Mutaguchi ordered Sato to send about one third of his force to Imphal, but Sato disobeyed as his own losses had been disastrous. Sato made one final request for food and ammunition to be flown up to him, which was ignored, so on 30th May he signalled Mutaguchi to the effect that he was going to withdraw. The latter responded with a promise to court martial him if he did so, to which Sato insolently replied that he would bring him down as well. He then went right over Mutaguchi’s head, and informed Burma Area Army HQ that in his opinion the ability of Mutaguchi’s staff fell short of that of cadets. In the aftermath of the
U-Go
débâcle, Sato escaped a court martial simply because the washing of so much dirty linen in public was considered to be against the national interest, but both he and Mutaguchi were sacked, and thereafter held only administrative appointments. Many Japanese blame Sato for the failure of
U-Go
, but he had in fact accomplished rather more than his fellow divisional commanders, and had Mutaguchi given him the support he gave to Tanaka he could have done a great deal more.
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Sato’s opening moves had, in fact, caught the British commanders on the wrong foot, and 33 Corps was slow in putting its counter measures into effect. The Corps consisted of 2nd British Division, a formation containing a high proportion of regular battalions, 7th Indian Division, recently arrived from the Arakan, and one brigade from 5th Indian Division, which has already been mentioned. The Corps’ armour, in the opening stages of the battle, consisted only of five Lees of C Squadron
150 Regiment RAC, commanded by Lt R. H. K. Wait, manned by scratch crews, which included artillerymen and infantry, as the regular crews were already manning the Carabiniers’ reserve tanks at Imphal under the title of YL Squadron. The position improved radically with the arrival of 149 Regiment RAC, commanded by an RTR officer, Lt-Colonel F. W. B. Good, which had been raised from a battalion of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and upon this regiment’s Lees fell most of the tank work at Kohima. A newly raised Indian regiment, 45th Cavalry, equipped with Stuarts, was employed mainly in patrolling the Corps’ line of communication, a task considered to be of prime importance since the Japanese were expected to make a flank move through the hills on Dimapur, and also carried supplies up to the forward troops and provided local protection for the Zubza box. Later, a third regiment, 11th Prince Albert Victor’s Own Cavalry,
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arrived with its Daimler armoured cars, and took over some of these duties.

At Kohima, there was less scope for the use of tanks than there was at Imphal, as the country was close and mountainous, and most of the fighting took place along the axis of the road. Nonetheless, the Japanese were well aware of the power of the tank, and decided that they would eliminate Wait and his scratch force before they could do any damage. Twice during the early hours of 14th April they tried to break into his harbour, carrying magnetic mines, and twice they were driven off with severe loss. Later the same day, they had cause to rue their failure, for the five tanks smashed in their bunkers on the feature known as Cameron Picquet, which was then stormed by 1st Cameron Highlanders, opening the way for the relief of Jotsoma. For this, Wait and his men received the personal thanks of Major-General J. M. L. Grover, 2nd Division’s commander, who told them that they had been largely instrumental in getting his troops through to Kohima in time.

By 17th April 149 Regiment was beginning to arrive in the area, and half A Squadron, under Major Matthews, assisted the Royal Berkshire Regiment in their relief of the West Kents at Kohima town. They found that with the exception of Garrison Hill, most of the town was held by the Japanese, including the Naga village, a large native village which stood on higher ground, and most of the surrounding high ground as well. For the remainder of April and for the first three weeks of May, 33 Corps strove to force a way through this mountain wall, and the tanks were in action daily. ‘It was,’ as Colonel Good remarked, ‘A troop leader’s battle from the word go.’ It was also a battle of attrition in the most literal sense, in which the tanks eroded the enemy’s will to fight just as they eroded his dwindling manpower resources. When the Japanese finally broke, one optimist scrawled a message on a wall for the victors to read:

‘British—too many guns, tanks and troops. Japanese going. Back in six months.’

As at Imphal, the main roles for the tanks were destroying bunkers and strong positions, dominating high features and denying high ground to the enemy, evacuating wounded and taking stores, wire, food and water to isolated positions. For their part, the Japanese were quick to appreciate that the tanks were largely confined to the road and to a few tracks, and built formidable road blocks from burned out vehicles, which together with the approaches, were mined. These obstacles were covered by automatic and mortar fire and by anti-tank and 75-mm guns.

Tank operations reached a climax during
Operation Thunderbolt
, which, between 11th and 14th May, succeeded in smashing a hole through the Japanese centre. Extracts from 149’s War Diary describe the fighting.
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11th May 44.
The two tanks from FSD in attempting to help infantry onto DIS were disabled—one by an anti-tank mine and the other by sliding over the side owing to the greasy surface and the narrowness of the track. Lt P. M. Wood killed by the explosion of an anti-tank mine whilst attempting to guide the tank onto the track again. All the rest of crews evacuated safely.

Leading tanks on the way round held up by partial road blocks consisting of a number of disabled armoured vehicles, which were difficult to negotiate. On attempting to pass through, the leading
tank blew a track, caused by an anti-tank mine; another tank tried to get round and also blew its track, preventing the passage of further tanks. The column was withdrawn as work could not be carried on owing to heavy mg fire.

12th May 44.
Captain P. S. Field in command of two troops of A Squadron (Lts A. B. K. Mitchell and A. Testemale) succeeded in reaching the Pimple and DIS after overcoming three road blocks with the aid of the sappers. Targets were shot up on FSD, DIS and Jail Hill. Estimated number of bunkers knocked out—12. Tanks harboured for the night in own perimeter—2 on FSD, 2 on DIS and one troop at the Pimple.