Tank Tracks to Rangoon (23 page)

The arrival of Field’s tanks from round the back of Garrison Hill was greeted with cheers by the British infantry fighting for possession of DIS and FSD, some of whom were pinned down within fifteen yards of the Japanese bunkers. As the tanks opened a brisk and accurate fire, they were forced to lie flat as the shells cracked overhead into the fire slits. Not a single Japanese surrendered, so that by the end both features were littered with the bodies of those who had not been buried in their own bunkers.

8 Kohima : actions fought by 149 Regiment RAC

The same day a B Squadron tank commanded by Sergeant J. Waterhouse had reached the top of Summerhouse Hill by means of a road bulldozed by sappers, and stayed in position throughout the night ready to carry out shoots the following day in the area of the District Commissioner’s Bungalow and the Tennis Court, both of which had long been a thorn in the side of the infantry. The following is Sergeant Waterhouse’s report.

On the afternoon of 12th May I was ordered to proceed to HQ 6th Infantry Brigade … The plan was to attack and capture the Tennis Court and the surrounding (area) on the high ground south west of the DCs bungalow. Infantry reports suggested that the tennis court was fairly well defended and covered so well by enfilade and defilade fire that all previous attempts to take this position had failed with extensive casualties.

My orders were to get down to the tennis court from the top of Garrison Hill and if I could not do so owing to the ground, I was to approach as near as possible to the objective and dominate it by fire while the infantry went in.

The attack was set for 0900 hrs on the 13th, and as the forward platoon commander could give me no idea of the ground in front of his positions, I suggested we recce same just before last light on the 12th. This we did and were successful in finding a route to a position from which we could at least dominate.

The attack went in next day as planned except that zero hour was delayed an hour. A signal for the infantry to go in was my first round of 75-mm fire. I would like to mention here that the infantry gave me every assistance possible, and even put an officer in my tank who knew one or two enemy positions.

We started out well along the route previously arranged, and the next thing I remember was my driver shouting ‘’old on!’ and bump, we’re smack in the centre of the tennis court itself. We pulled to the right and found ourselves in front of a steel water tower very heavily sandbagged and small arms fire met us. My 75-mm gunner dealt with this position so effectively that the Nips started to leave in a hell of a hurry without even arms or equipment; they were met by infantry fire from both flanks and very few got away. We next paid our attention to a series of crawl trenches and MG posts all round the court, and had a hell of a party for the next twenty minutes or so. Finally, the infantry commander got me on i/c and told me all the positions had been captured in this area and quite a few Nips liquidated.

We next went on to the edge of the court which overlooks the DCs bungalow, and gave it quite a pasting (the bungalow). After
that everything in sight was well and truly plastered. The infantry again went in and took over without a casualty. I learned afterwards that as we came over the top onto the tennis court we crashed right on top of one of their main positions and buried at least a few of the enemy without ever having the privilege of killing them first.

The whole action lasted about forty minutes, and the infantry suffered one casualty only, and even he walked out. We stayed forward and gave covering fire until all the positions and the bungalow itself were consolidated, then we came out.

The infantry officer estimated that we ourselves had knocked out possibly forty of the enemy. I am not prepared to say that this was the full figure, but when we went down afterwards at the invitation of the infantry CO to view the shambles, as he called it, well, he was just about right.

Altogether, quite a useful shoot.

The effect of such a shoot on the respective morale of the British and Japanese can well be imagined, especially as during the same day Captain Field had smashed up further bunkers on Kuki Picquet. Desperate, Sato issued an order of the day, telling his men to fight to the death with their bodies, and to continue the fight afterwards with their spirits. Incredibly, starving and diseased though they were, they responded, and for another fortnight resisted fiercely on the hills flanking the road to Imphal. Then, finally, they broke, and began drifting away through the mountains, back towards the Chindwin, pursued by 7th Indian Division, whilst 2nd British Division, spearheaded by 149 Regiment, pressed on down the road to Imphal.

Whilst the road itself was good, there were long stretches where it was bounded on one side by a steep hill, and on the other by a precipitous drop, and had they been in a physical condition to do so, the Japanese could have delayed the advance indefinitely. As it was, they had to be winkled out of positions at Vizwema, Kuzama and Marama, but the checks imposed had only been short-lived, and by the evening of 21st June, 2nd Division’s leading troops had reached Milestone 103 on the road from Kohima; only eight miles separated them from 4 Corps’ perimeter.

At about 1030 the following morning, L/Corporal Canning of 123 Brigade’s Intelligence Section, climbed a tree and began to examine the ground to the north of 4 Corps’ most advanced outpost. He had not been looking for long when his binoculars picked up the shapes of a troop of Lees moving southwards down the road from Kohima with infantry riding on them, firing
their guns at several parties of the enemy retreating into the hills to the east. It was A Squadron 149 Regiment.

General Scoones had expected a junction to be effected that day, and had ordered a column to break out during the morning, and contact the leading troops of 33 Corps. Leading the column was the Carabiniers’ C Squadron under Major T. E. Dimsdale, with C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry not far behind.

The leading troop, Lt Rowe-Wilson’s, came across a road block in the form of a large tree felled across the road. This was not covered by the Japanese, and the tanks towed it off the road, and the advance continued until a further block was encountered at Milestone 107, this time built of loose stones. Rowe-Wilson told his leading tank to batter its way through. The vehicle gathered momentum for the impact, but suddenly ground to a halt only five yards from the obstruction. The tank commander, Sergeant Reed, had spotted something wedged between the stones, and his caution was entirely justified as the Japanese were found to have included in the wall some forty 37-mm shells with their noses pointing towards the tanks.

The Carabiniers withdrew a little way while the sappers dealt with this obstacle, and were on the point of moving on when the 7th Cavalry’s Stuarts, and some Bren carriers, came roaring past at speed, and disappeared into the distance.

The 7th, led by Lt John Moody’s troop, were now in ‘bandit’ country, but pressed on, nicely spaced, and rounded the last bend on to the long straight leading to the double bridge at Milestone 109. Here could be seen the Lees of 149 Regiment, which had already had some contact with 1/17th Dogras, and both units halted to exchange greetings, to shake hands, and to laugh and talk as though they were old friends.

The junction of the two Corps was symbolic of the total failure of Japanese arms, but was in itself almost a family affair. When the leading cars of PAVO arrived, Moody found that the troop leader was a friend to whom he had lent his poker dice months previously at Poona. To his surprise, the other officer bent down into his turret for a moment, and then handed them back. That night, 7th Cavalry and 3rd Carabiniers celebrated the relief as best they could within their modest means, and somehow plum pudding, rum and cigars were produced for the occasion. During the celebrations, the first lorried convoy from the north drove in, headlights blazing, ‘carrying beer,’ as one Carabinier hopeful announced.

However, the fighting was by no means over. It was true that the Japanese had been beaten, but they were continuing to attack in one or two places, and General Slim wanted them utterly routing. Although the monsoon had broken, they were to be pursued as they retreated back to the Chindwin, and were to be allowed no rest.

Along the Tiddim road, the crack Japanese 33rd Division, which had suffered nearly as much as the two others, but which had had the benefit of a better supply line, conducted a skilful withdrawal, harried by 5th Indian Division, which had as its spearhead half of the Carabiniers’ C Squadron.

‘The Tiddim road,’ wrote Major Dimsdale, ‘was an earth one, cut out of the wooded hillsides by bulldozers. It was rare for tanks to be able to get off the road. Map reading was a troop leader’s paradise: there were not only milestones but furlong posts as well. Each day we sent a troop with the leading company. Generally they would be held up by fire from some wooded spur. The tanks would reply and the infantry would try to work round. If it proved to be a big position, Hurri-bombers would be sent for and other companies hook deeper. Each time Brigadier Salamons would ask for a maximum strike, which was twenty-four planes. Each time, to his never-failing wrath, only twelve came. At the last moment the Japanese rear-guard would fade away. On we would go and repeat the business a few miles farther on.’

The weather was vile, the continuous rain turning the ground into a morass, and in places the engineers were forced to cover the hillsides above the road with enormous stretches of tarpaulin to prevent them being washed away. At one point, the road collapsed under a tank, which slid over the edge and crashed down the slope for 1,000 feet; one man who jumped was crushed beneath the vehicle, but the remainder survived, badly battered by the 75-mm ammunition which had broken loose inside.

All the way down the Tiddim road was the evidence of the Japanese defeat. Abandoned equipment, arms, ammunition, countless bodies, and even a few prisoners. In its retreat, the Japanese 14th Tank Regiment left some thirty tanks littering the roadside, some still manned by the corpses of their disease ridden crews. Amongst the Type 95s and Type 97s were a few Stuarts, probably the last of those captured from 7th Armoured Brigade during the early days of the war in Burma.

During the manoeuvres to capture Tiddim, one of C Squadron’s tanks scaled Kennedy Peak, 8,900 feet above sea level, setting a new altitude record for armoured warfare, which was broken some years later by their old friends 7th Light Cavalry at the battle of Zotila, fought out in a sub-zero climate at a height of 12,000 feet.

Back at Imphal, the Japanese at the Shenam saddle were still attacking vigorously when their forces elsewhere began to withdraw, and even mounted a daring raid behind the British lines which resulted in the destruction of several aircraft on Palel airfield. To assist in the ejection of these tough customers B Squadron 149 Regiment, under Major Ezra Rhodes, was sent up to the saddle.

‘The squadron was dispersed over several ridges, with its first role fire support on to the known Japanese positions. Owing to weather conditions (the monsoon had broken) the tanks were unable to do more than provide a threat, and did not actually have an opportunity of action. During this time we were immersed in rain and cloud at an altitude of about 4,000 feet for three weeks without once seeing the sun, or much farther than 100 yards.’

Eventually, the infantry drove the Japanese out of their positions, and the road was open into the Kabaw valley. Two troops of B Squadron accompanied the advance as far as Tamu.

The advance down the Kabaw was made by the 11th (East African) Division, joined in late October by C Squadron 7th Light Cavalry, and the pattern of the advance was very similar to that on the Tiddim axis.

‘Tanks were on call with a tank officer at the leading company HQ until opposition was bumped. Then the tanks came up—usually only a troop—and did what they could, often firing blind into the jungle, as generally it was impossible to spot targets. If this failed to drive back the Japs, they were pulled back and harboured and a full scale attack arranged with air strikes, the divisional artillery and tank support. By that time the Japs had often flitted and the position attacked was empty.’

The 11th Division’s objective was the town of Kalewa on the Chindwin, a major Japanese evacuation point, and the road passed through the formidable Myittha gorge, where the enemy conducted a stubborn and skilful defence, slowing down the advance so that it took twelve days to cover twenty miles. The heaviest fighting took place in an area known as Windy Corner,
where the road went round an exposed bluff into a re-entrant, then swung out round a second bluff and down to Chaunggyin.

The next morning 1 Troop under Risaldar Hazara Singh with a platoon of Bombay Grenadiers moved on down to Chaunggyin where they came under heavy machine gun fire. The enemy left their position to attack the tanks and there was some close quarter fighting.

Meanwhile, SHQ had been watching the battle from Windy Corner. Their peace was disturbed when a Jap 75 dropped two shells short of Major Campbell’s tank. The tanks backed into the re-entrant and on going round the second corner David Harrison’s tank got too near the edge of the road and halted with one track hanging over the cliff. Alister tried to tow him back on to the road, but the tank fell over the cliff almost dragging Alister’s with it. No one was hurt in spite of the 75 being active throughout …

No 1 Troop pulled out that evening with the infantry, and Risaldar Hazara Singh was awarded an immediate MC for his part in the battle. He had held his ground unsupported against heavy fire, and beaten off several attacks, and had brought back information as to the position and strength of the Japs.