Terror in the Balkans (113 page)

subjected Serbia between 1916 and 1918, harsh and exploitative as it

was, was more lenient than it might have been. Yet it was not this legacy

that Boehme invoked in autumn 1941, but the more poisonous one that

preceded it. The majority of those Austrian-born offi cers receptive to

Boehme’s pitiless exhortations had not actually fought in Serbia during

the Great War. But this, apparently, mattered little; the toxic dissonance

of embittered collective memory could color their behavior anyway.

It is also distinctly possible, though the link is less clear, that the Aus-

trians’ contempt for what they perceived as brutish Serbian savagery

was part of a more general aversion to the “primitive” southern Slavs of

the Balkans. This was perhaps a distant echo of General Conrad’s con-

temptuous sentiments towards the Bosnian irregulars he encountered

between 1878 and 1882. This may well help explain why Austrian-born

offi cers, irrespective of the conditions their units faced or the duration

of their prior experience of the Yugoslav campaign, could also comport

256
terror in the balk ans

themselves with particular harshness in the NDH—perhaps especially

against its ethnic Serb inhabitants—as well as in Serbia.

The German army offi cers in this study belonged to an institution that

favored a terroristic doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare. During

World War II, German army units in Eastern and south-eastern Europe,

and their commanders, applied this doctrine extensively in response

to the resistance they faced. In time, some commanders acknowledged

the folly of pursuing it at the expense of a more measured, insightful

approach that appreciated the importance of winning hearts and minds.

But this dawning realization was never enough to overturn the basic

principles of Wehrmacht counterinsurgency warfare decisively—not

least because too many commanders continued subscribing to those

principles themselves.

But fi eld commanders did not just behave according to the collective

mind-set of their institution. Among other things, such was the nature of

the directives emanating down to them that they often enjoyed consider-

able freedom of action. The ruthless thrust of many of these directives

was unmistakable. But offi cers often chose to implement them with vary-

ing amounts of severity. The conditions in the fi eld they and their units

experienced could profoundly affect their conduct.

So too could the experiences offi cers had undergone earlier in their

lives. The years between 1914 and 1945 may not have been a second

Thirty Years’ War in every respect. But offi cers who were subjected to

the destructiveness of its earlier years could be enduringly affected by

the experience. It seems that the legacy of those years was still mark-

ing offi cers’ behavior, in sometimes immensely brutal ways, more than a

quarter of a century later. Investigating this phenomenon, through both

this study and others, is important for a fuller understanding of what

motivated the agents of the Third Reich.

Appendixes

Abbreviations

Notes

Acknowledgments

Index

a p p e n d i x a

Source References

for Featured Offi cers

The full set of offi cer sample data that was obtained from the sources that follow is accessible via http://www.gcu.ac.uk/gsbs/staff/drbenshepherd/.

y u g o s l av i a - b a s e d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s

Heinrich Borowski:
Militärishe Sammlungen, entry for Heinrich Borowski; United States War Department,
Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army

Which Participated in the War (1914–1918)
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, 1920), 33–35, 654–656.

Benignus Dippold:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Benignus Dippold; PERS 6, fi le on Benignus Dippold. United States War Department,
Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918)
, 101–103; Hans Jäger,
Das K. B. 19. Infanterie-Regiment König Viktor Emmanuel III. von Italien
(Munich; Schick, 1930),
passim.

Karl Eglseer:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Karl Eglseer; KA Vienna, Offi ziers-Belohnungsanträge. Karton 328, Nr. 249.501. Karl Eglseer; KA Vienna. Nachlaß, Karl Egl-

seer. Lebenslauf; Edmund Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg
, vols. 1–7 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1930–1938), order-of-battle entry for 87th Infantry Regiment, Vol. I, pp. 62–91; index entries for 87th Infantry Regiment and commanding formations, Vols. I and VII.

Johann Fortner:
BA-MA, MSg 9. File on Johann Fortner; United States War Department,
Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated
259

260
Appendix A

in the War (1914–1918)
, 101–103;
Das K.B. 5. Infanterie-Regiment Großherzog Ernst Ludwig
von Hessen
(Munich: Schick, 1929; no author details).

Walter Hinghofer:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Walter Hinghofer; Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg,
order-of-battle entries for 11th Field Artillery Regiment: Vol. I, pp. 62–91, Vol. II, Beilage 14; order-of-battle entries for 11th Field Artillery Brigade: Vol. III, Beilage 2, Vol. IV, Beilage 2, Vol. V, Beilage 7, Vol. VII, Beilage 3; index entries for 11th Field Artillery Regiment and commanding formations, Vols. I and II; for 11th Field Artillery Brigade and commanding formations, Vols. III–VII. The brigade’s whereabouts during 1917 were traced via the documents contained in the KA Vienna, NFA,

Karton 3703. Feld-Artillerie Brigade 11. Brigadebefehle, 1916–1918.

Paul Hoffmann:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Paul Hoffmann; PERS 6, fi le on Paul Hoffmann. Personal-Nachweis; Hans Schöning,
Leib-Grenadier-Regiment König Friedrich Wilhelm III. (1. Brandenburgisches) Nr. 8 im Weltkrieg
(Oldenburg: Stalling, 1924), pp. 13–14,
passim
.

Fritz Neidholt:
RH7 Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Fritz Neidholt; PERS 6, fi le on Fritz Neidholt. Personal-Nachweis; United States War Department,
Histories of Two Hundred

and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army Which Participated in the War (1914–1918)
, 59–61, 592–594.

Friedrich Stahl:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Friedrich Stahl; PERS 6, fi le on Friedrich Stahl. Personal-Nachweis. Dienstlaufbahn
.

Emil Zellner:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Emil Zellner; AdR Vienna, Bundesheer-Akten. Personnel fi le on Emil Zellner. Volkswehr Bataillon Bruck a./d. Leitha. Vormerk-

blatt für die Qualifi kationsbeschreibung; Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns
letzter Krieg,
order-of-battle entries for 11th Field Gun Regiment: Vol. I, pp. 62–91, Vol. II, Beilage 14; index entries for 11th Field Gun Regiment and 16th Field Artillery Regiment, and commanding formations: Vols. I–VII.

y u g o s l av i a - b a s e d r e g i m e n ta l c o m m a n d e r s :

Nikolaus Boicetta:
PERS 6, fi le on Nikolaus Boicetta. Personal-Nachweis; AdR Vienna, Bundesheer-Akten. Personnel fi le on Nikolaus Boicetta. [Bundesheer offi cer personnel fi les are arranged alphabetically rather than under any numerical system.] Bericht zur Dienstbeschreibung et al.; Otto Tumliz,
Waffengänge des IR 6: Skizzen aus dem großen Kriege
(regimental press, published in the fi eld 1917); Glaise von Horstenau,
Österreich-Ungarns
letzter Krieg
, order-of-battle entries for 6th Infantry Regiment: Vol. I, pp. 62–91, Vol. II, Beilage 14; index entries for 6th Infantry Regiment, 6th Bosnian Rifl e Battalion, and commanding formations: Vols. I–IV.

Adalbert Lontschar:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Adalbert Lontschar; KA Vienna, Offi ziers-Belohnungsanträge. Karton 55, Nr. 63.331. Adalbert Lontschar; AdR Vienna,

Bundesheer-Akten. Personnel fi le on Adalbert Lontschar. Bericht zur Dienstbeschreibung;
Appendix A
261

Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg,
order-of-battle entries for 24th Infantry Regiment: Vol. I, pp. 62–91, Vol. II, Beilage 14; index entries for 24th Infantry Regiment and commanding formations: Vols. I–VII.

Alois Windisch:
RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Alois Windisch; KA Vienna, Nachlaß, Alois Windisch. Lebenslauf; AdR Vienna, Bundesheer-Akten. Personnel fi le on Alois

Windisch. Personalblatt; Maximilian Ehnl,
Das X. Bataillon des oberösterreichischen k.

u. k. Infanterie-Regimentes “Ernst Ludwig Großherzog von Hessen und bei Rhein” Nr. 14

im Weltkrieg
(Linz, 1932); Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg,
order-of-battle entries for 1st Infantry Regiment: Vol. I, pp. 62–91, Vol. II, Beilage 14; index entries for 14th Infantry Regiment and commanding formations: Vols. I–VII.

Joachim Wüst:
Lebenslauf. PERS 6, fi le on Joachim Wüst. Lebenslauf.

Rudolf Wutte:
AdR Vienna, Bundesheer-Akten. Personnel fi le on Rudolf Wutte. Bericht zur Dienstbeschreibung; Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg
, index entries for SMS Novara: Vol. III.

s o v i e t u n i o n - b a s e d d i v i s i o n a l c o m m a n d e r s :

Gottfried Barton:
BA-MA, MSg 9. File on Gottfried Barton; Glaise von Horstenau et al.,
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg,
vols. 1–7 (Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1930–1938), order-of-battle entries for 6th Lancer Regiment: Vol. I, pp.

62–91; for 8th Cavalry Division: Vol. II, Beilage 14, Vol. III, Beilage 2, Vol. IV, Beilage 2. Index entries for 6th Lancer Regiment, 8th Cavalry Division, and commanding formations: Vols. I–IV.

Hubert Lendle:
BA-MA RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Hubert Lendle; BA-MA Pers 6.

Personnel fi le on Hubert Lendle. Personal-Nachweis.

Johann Pfl ugbeil,
BA-MA RH7, Heeresgeneralkartei. File on Johann Pfl ugbeil; BA-MA, Pers 6. File on Johann Pfl ugbeil. Personal-Nachweis, Lebenslauf.

a p p e n d i x b

Note on the Primary Sources

Except where stated, the primary source material presented in this study is housed in

the Federal Military Archive (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv or BA-MA) in Freiburg-

im-Breisgau. Endnote primary material belonging to the groupings RH, RW, or MSg was

accessed in the form of original documents. Most of the primary material was, however,

obtained from microfi lmed copies belonging to the archive’s MFB4 series. As BA-MA

researchers usually work with original documents, the author has produced a conversion

chart listing the MFB4 fi les against their designations as original document fi les. The chart is accessible via http://www.gcu.ac.uk/gsbs/staff/drbenshepherd/. MFB4 references are

presented in the endnotes in the following order: fi lm number, fi le number, frame number.

For example: MFB4/56159 (fi lm), 28326/16 (fi le), 442–443 (frame).

The study originally set out to examine what motivated German army offi cers serving in

Yugoslavia at divisional and regimental levels, including how offi cers’ behavior was shaped by infl uences and experiences earlier in their lives. Investigating this question involved examining both personal-level data and unit-level data.

Initially, personal-level data were collected for approximately forty offi cers, predominantly from various types of offi cer personnel fi le. Based on the author’s previous research experience, it was anticipated at the study’s outset that the main source types available—

personal-level sources on particular offi cers, and unit-level sources generated by divisions, regiments, and other formations—would be unlikely to state offi cers’ motivations explicitly.

It would therefore be necessary in most cases to infer individual motivations by examining biographical details alongside the way in which a particular offi cer subsequently behaved.

This approach distinguishes a divisional- or regimental-level study from studies focusing upon higher command levels, such as Johannes Hürter’s
Hitlers Heerführer
, which, thanks to the available sources, are much better placed to utilize material such as private letters
263

264
Appendix B

and diaries to provide a more explicit picture of the motivations of army-level and army group–level generals. Nevertheless, this author’s previous monograph,
War in the Wild
East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans
, had demonstrated the potential of a more inferential approach to studying offi cers at divisional and regimental levels. It was therefore anticipated that such an approach would be even more effective when applied to an offi cer sample considerably larger than that available for
War in the Wild East
.

In the event, the group of offi cers for whom data could be utilized meaningfully to

illustrate personal motivations proved considerably smaller than had been anticipated.

The main reason for this concerned the
quantity
and
quality
of divisional and regimental sources. The
quantity
of information will be compromised by a failure of any group to keep records or a willful destruction of those records by the group, enemy action, or other factors such as records being mislaid or lost. The
quality
of information is infl uenced by the extent to which offi cers were diligent, effective, and/or honest in recording their actions.

Quality can vary with regard to how offi cers were instructed to record information and the circumstances in which they produced records.