Read The Enigma of Japanese Power Online
Authors: Karel van Wolferen
Tags: #Japan - Economic Policy - 1945-1989, #Japan - Politics and Government - 1945, #Japan, #Political Culture - Japan, #Political Culture, #Business & Economics, #International, #General, #Political Science, #International Relations, #Public Policy, #Economic Policy, #Social Science, #Anthropology, #Cultural, #Political culture—Japan, #Japan—Politics and government—1945–, #Japan—Economic policy—1945–
The Enigma of Japanese Power (60 page)
The denial of the true mechanisms of Japanese power, the pervasive sense of being victimised, the sense of being at once unique and misunderstood, and the absence of leadership all combine to perpetuate Japanese isolation in the world. This isolation is further aggravated by the seemingly insurmountable difficulty of fitting Japan into a larger, ‘legal’ international framework.
The international world, especially the post-war trade system established under US auspices and sustained by such institutions as the GATT, the IMF and the OECD, operates on norms essentially different from those that make the Japanese System go round. GATT member countries do not usually arrange their relations with fellow members according to estimates of each other’s power. The United States has not been intimidating Japan into an awareness of its proper position in the scheme of things. Governments may lie to each other and to their own populations, but in international dealings among non-communist trading nations there is no gap between substantial reality and formal reality remotely comparable to the institutionalised gap found in Japan. To some extent reality may be managed, but at some point foreign journalists, scholarly commentators or exasperated governments will point out the discrepancies between appearance and reality if they think these have become too great.
The Japanese System and what is left of the international free-trade system are incompatible because the latter requires adherence to rules that the administrators cannot afford to accept lest they override their own informal relations. Generally applicable rules governing the opportunities of foreign participants in Japanese society and its market would undermine and ultimately destroy the System by undermining the complex webs of
jinmyaku
and informal procedures. Deals can be made with the System, but the introduction of universal rules within the System itself is not a possible subject for such deals.
The isolation of the System breeds popular attitudes that in turn intensify it and alienate the Japanese people even further from the rest of the world. Many foreign observers have seen persisting psychological insularity as one of the main factors in Japan’s international problems, and explain it with reference to cultural predilections. What tends to be overlooked here is that isolation is continuously encouraged by the way in which the Japanese are governed. Isolation follows from the way in which the emergence of a bourgeoisie has been halted; from the way in which the middle class has been incorporated into the hierarchy of business firms; from the way in which the school system, rather than educating citizens for Japan, produces administrators and salarymen for predetermined levels of the System’s hierarchies.
All this is most clearly demonstrated by the phenomenon of the so-called ‘returning youngsters’ (
kikoku shijo
) – Japanese children who have received an important part of their education abroad while their fathers were serving in overseas offices of their companies. Except for training in engineering and other technical fields, foreign education is generally a handicap for functioning in the System. Far from being appreciated for the scope and freshness of the learning and experience that they bring to Japanese high schools and universities on their return, the young returnees are actively discriminated against and are often the object of teasing and class bullying. They are invariably made to feel they are contaminated. The problem is so great that special schools have had to be established to remould them into acceptable Japanese. Their teachers complain that they ask too many questions. Their obvious dislike of proliferating school rules brands them as potential threats to Japanese social order. They are urged to mind their manner of walking and of laughing, since these may immediately mark them as outcasts in their homeland. Companies are not happy with job applicants who have lived abroad, worrying that their behaviour may upset the work community.
In cases where only a small number of Japanese representatives reside in a foreign city, they demonstrate that there is nothing insurmountable in their psychological make-up that prevents them from enjoying normal social relations with other peoples. It is when the expatriate Japanese community grows, and when a Japanese school is established, that their isolation becomes acute and they form exclusive Japanese clubs, or Japanese enclaves within existing local clubs. Subsequently, they tend, wherever possible, to move into the same town or locality. The extent to which this is done, and the extent of Japanese isolation from local society, is incomparably greater than in communities of Americans or Europeans abroad. From private conversations with Japanese businessmen in South-East Asia and Europe I have gathered that many feel that they cannot afford to awaken concern that they are picking up foreign ways, or suspicion that they prefer the company of foreigners to that of other Japanese. Thus the behaviour of Japanese abroad is a consequence of pressure on them by their companies, not of some vague cultural rule.
Finally, the most important question: can the situation change? Theoretically, the answer is yes. As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this book, the System’s character is ultimately determined by political relationships. Nothing that is political is irreversible in the long run, especially if the political dimension is recognised for what it is. There is no good theoretical reason why the Japanese should for ever be held under political tutelage.
What might one do in an ideal situation? For a start, one would have to abolish Tokyo University. Other basic changes would have to take place in the legal and party systems. Law courses would have to be instituted in a large number of universities, and lawyers trained to give individual Japanese the means to protect themselves against the arbitrariness of the administrators. Control over the judiciary and over access to the bar would have to be taken away from the secretariat of the Supreme Court, and the artificial limitation on the number of law practitioners would have to be lifted. The schools and the media would have to work to foster individual political awareness and a sense of individual responsibility while de-emphasizing the importance of membership in companies and other organisations. All this would encourage the substitution of legal regulations for
jinmyaku
relationships, and of legally safeguarded processes for the System’s informality. Any essential change for the better would also require the emergence of political parties not dependent on the pork-barrel and intent on truly representing the interests of the middle class and factory workers. This would only be a beginning, but under such conditions Japan could conceivably begin gradually to function as the constitutionalist democracy it is supposed to be. And it would move towards a solution of the problem of who, or which institution, has the right to rule.
The activities and the insights of some Japanese groups, such as the activist groups of the federation of bar associations (Nichibenren) or the alternative education reform committee of ordinary citizens, are proof that what I suggest is not asking too much, since they indicate the ability of the Japanese to be genuine citizens and to see themselves as such. Unfortunately, experience so far gives no reason for optimism. If the System is guided by any overriding, sacrosanct aim, it is its own survival, which means the survival of the present constellation of administrators. This aim is mistakenly identified with the survival of Japan. The absence of political debate about national priorities, of parliamentary checks and balances and of a legal framework for solving conflict increases the ever-present risk of an intensification of Japanism. This, in turn, would be conducive to the re-emergence of extremist sentiments aimed at ‘saving the nation’, which, as in the past, would most likely lead the nation still deeper into trouble. The possibility must be considered that the Japanese System may yet go through another convulsion caused by an acute sense of confrontation with a hostile world. Such a spasm could conceivably bring a determined group to gather power to itself and plot a new course for the country, with a wholly unpredictable outcome.
The most likely possibility, perhaps, is that the System will muddle on, after having come to some
modus vivendi
with the Western world and the United States in particular. But this will require wise policies in the Western capitals.
The wonderful alternative of turning the System into a genuine modern constitutionalist state, and Japanese subjects into citizens, would require realignments of power akin to those of a genuine revolution.
- The Japan Problem
The distinction between ‘adversarial’ and ‘competitive’ trade was first introduced by Peter Drucker in the
Wall Street Journal
, 1 April 1986.
↩For an attempt to connect these and other recent developments within the perspective of the theories advanced in this book, see Chapter 15.
↩Umesao Tadao, ‘Escape from cultural isolation’, in Japan Center for International Exchange (eds.),
The Silent Power
, Simul Press, 1976.
↩Naohiro Amaya, ‘Japan’s Peter Pan syndrome’,
Asian Wall Street Journal
, 10 January 1986.
↩Chalmers Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley. See his
MITI and the Japanese Miracle
, Stanford University Press, 1982.
↩Among others, see F. A. Hayek,
Law, Legislation and Liberty
, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
↩Kim Jae Ik, who was the chief economic adviser of South Korean presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Do Hwan, told me once that Park Chung Hee had these Japanese experiences in mind when instructing the ‘architect’ of the South Korean economic miracle. Nam Duck Woo, to design the mechanism for rapid growth. Kim Jae Ik himself played a major role in shaping the South Korean ‘economic miracle’. He was murdered in the North Korean massacre of South Korean government leaders in Rangoon on 9 April 1983.
↩Christie Kiefer, ‘The
danchi zoku
and the evolution of metropolitan mind’, in L. Austin (ed.),
Japan: The Paradox of Progress
, Yale University Press, 1976, p. 281.
↩Exceptions include Kurt Singer (
Mirror, Sword and Jewel
, Croom Helm, 1973), Ruth Benedict, Robert N. Bellah, Arthur Koestler and George De Vos.
↩Kato Tsugio,
Asahi Evening News
, 20 January 1983.
↩The same, except for the financial factor, can be said for China.
↩Lafcadio Heam,
Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation
, Turtle, 1959, p. 1.
↩Ruth Benedict,
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword
, Houghton Mifflin, 1946, p. 1.
↩Nakagawa and Ota,
The Japanese-Style Economic System
, Foreign Press Center, 1980.
↩Editorial in
Asian Wall Street Journal
, 10 April 1986.
↩Murakami Yasusuke, Kumon Shumpei and Sato Seizaburo,
Bunmei to shite no ie-shakai
[
Ie
Society as a Pattern of Civilisation], Chuo Koronsha, 1979; see also Murakami Yasusuke, ‘
Ie
society as a pattern of civilisation’,
Journal of Japanese Studies
, Summer 1984, pp. 281–363.
↩For these and many other continuous careers of social-control bureaucrats, see Chapter 14.
↩Reinhard Bendix,
Kings or People
, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 463–4.
↩Rollo May,
Power and Innocence
, Norton, 1972, p. 102.
↩‘Ought we to redefine it in a clear way, or ought we to banish it altogether? My initial reaction is that it should be banished altogether’ – Peter Nettle, ‘Power and the intellectuals’, in Conor Cruise O’Brien and William Dean Vanech (eds.),
Power and Consciousness
, New York University Press, 1969, p. 16, as quoted in May,
Power and Innocence
, op. cit., (n. 18).
↩Abraham Maslow, among other clinical psychologists, defines individual maturity as the integration of the cognitive, affective and conative aspects of the personality. In other words, the desires, emotions and reasoning of a mentally healthy, mature individual are in accord. Abraham Maslow,
Motivation and Personality
, Harper & Row, 1970.
↩Leszek Kolakowski, ‘Beyond empiricism: the need for a metaphysical foundation for freedom’, in John A. Howard (ed.).
On Freedom
, Devin-Adair, 1984.
↩
- The Elusive State
The pioneering work on instances of this in post-war Japan is Richard Halloran,
Japan – Images and Reality
, Knopf, 1969.
↩‘History of the kingdom of Wei (Wei Chi), c. AD 297’, in R. Tsunoda and L. C. Goodrich,
Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories
, Perkins Asiatic Monograph No. 2, South Pasadena, Calif.
↩‘Knowing the will of the gods’ was synonymous with ‘governing the country’ in the ancient Japanese term that was used. Ryosuke Ishii,
A History of Political Institutions in Japan
, University of Tokyo Press, 1980, pp. 5–7.
↩George B. Sansom,
Japan: A Short Cultural History
, Cresset Press, 1952, p. 300.
↩This is a singular case among the advanced non-communist countries. Sweden and Israel are examples of nations ruled for many decades by the same parties, but these were of the left and cannot be said to be in league with industry. The dominating ruling parties in other countries, such as Canada, Norway and Ireland, have occasionally had to make room for the competition for periods of a couple of years or more.
↩The LDP had 1.4 million members in 1978, 3.1 million in 1979 and 1.4 again in 1980. The sudden rise was to a large extent due to the ambitions of one contender for the prime ministership, Komoto Toshio, who paid the membership fee of close to a million members, hoping they would vote for him in newly introduced ‘primary elections’.
↩For a recent account of the relationship between central bureaucrats and local government officials, and the role played by the LDP politicians, see Tahara Soichiro, ‘Jichisho 2’ [Ministry of Home Affairs, part 2],
Shukan Bunshun
, 12 September 1985, pp. 46–51.
↩Masumi Junnosuke, ‘Gikaisei to atsuryoku dantai’ [The Diet system and pressure groups],
Chuo Koron
, January 1960, p. 46.
↩For the background of the founders and leaders of these federations, see Chapter 14.
↩Mary Elizabeth Berry,
Hideyoshi
, Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 4.
↩Herman Ooms,
Tokugawa Ideology
, Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 26–8.
↩The Imperial Decree accompanying the abolition of the domains, as quoted in Delmer Brown,
Nationalism in Japan
, University of California Press, 1955, p. 96.
↩Neither ‘Ministry of the Interior’ nor ‘Home Ministry’, which are the common English translations of Naimusho, convey the jurisdiction and might of this at times most powerful component of Japan’s pre-war System.
↩The only power that parliament was given was to refuse to pass the budget, thus forcing the government to try to make ends meet with a budget equal in size to that of the previous year.
↩Nezu Masashi,
Dainippon teikoku no hokai: Tenno showaki
[The Collapse of Imperial Japan: Record on the Emperor in Showa], vol. 1, Shiseido, 1961, pp. 128–9. I am indebted to David Titus,
Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan
, Columbia University Press, 1974, for drawing my attention to this case.
↩James B. Crowley, ‘Japanese army factionalism in the early 1930s’,
Journal of Asian Studies
, May 1962, pp. 309–26.
↩Asada Sadao, ‘The Japanese navy and the United States’, in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.),
Pearl Harbor as History
, Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 258–9. See also Fujiwara Akira, ‘The role of the Japanese army’, ibid., p. 195.
↩Ben-Ami Shillony,
Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan
, Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 29.
↩Ibid., p. 83.
↩Chalmers Johnson,
Japan s Public Policy Companies
, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.
↩Okumura Hiroshi,
Shin: Nihon no rokudai kigyo shudan
[Six Big Corporate Groups in Japan], Daiamondosha, 1983, p. 25.
↩Kosai Yutaka,
The Era of High-Speed Growth
, University of Tokyo Press, 1986, pp. 26–7.
↩
- An Inescapable Embrace
Kiyomi Morioka,
Religion in Changing Japanese Society
, University of Tokyo Press, 1975, p. 7.
↩The Philippine Catholic Church played a decisive role in the events leading up to Marcos’s flight from his palace. See the various statements of the bishops’ conference and of the cardinal made in February 1986.
↩Frederick B. Katz,
The Mind of the Middle Ages
, University of Chicago Press, 1953, chapter 4.
↩Nakayama Committee for the Keizai Chosa Kyogikai (Japan Economic Research Conference),
Chosa hokoku 74-7 jumin undo to shohisha uruio: sono gendai ni okeru igi to mondaiten
[Research Report 74-7: Citizen and Consumer Movements, their Meaning and Problems in the Contemporary Age], Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai, March 1975. For an attack on this report by the citizens’ movement, see Jishukoza Henshu Iinkai, ‘Kan, san, gakkai no jumin undo taisaku o hyosu’ [Evaluation of the measures against citizens’ movements by the bureaucracy, business and academic world],
Gekkan Jishukoza
, vol. 49, 10 April 1975, pp. 1–7.
↩Taguchi Fukuji and Toshinai Yoshinori, ‘Atsuryoku dantai to shite no ishikai’ [JMA as a pressure group],
Chuo Koron
, April 1959, p. 263.
↩Non-government estimates of the total number of abortions (of which the clinics register only a fraction for tax reasons) range between one and two million a year. See also Chapter 14.
↩A recent example is the proposed AIDS control law, which places the doctors under no compulsion whatsoever. For an account of the strong influence of the relevant LDP politicians over the ministry, see Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki,
‘Zoku giin’ no kenkyu
[A Study of ‘
Zoku
Diet Members’], Nihon Keizaishimbun, 1987, pp. 194–8.
↩Tsuji Kiyoaki, ‘Atsuryoku dantai’ [Pressure groups], in Arisawa Hiromi et al. (eds),
Keizai shutaisei koza shakai II
, vol. 4, Chuo Koronsha, 1960, p. 232. See Chapter 15 for an account of the important role this group played for the System.
↩Kimura Kihachiro, ‘33 nendo yosan o meguru atsuryoku’ [Pressure on the budget of fiscal 1958],
Chuo Koron
, May 1958, pp. 124–31.
↩See, for instance,
Asahi Shimbun
, editorial, 16 March 1957.
↩The photographer Eugene Smith, who helped draw the world’s attention to Minamata with his photo books, suffered a permanent eye injury at the hands of these gangsters.
↩Jiyuminshu Henshubu, ‘1985 nen taisei e no tembo’ [Perspectives for the 1985 system],
Jiyuminshu
, January 1982, p. 224.
↩Asahi Shimbun
, 8 April 1988.
↩These are the Nihon Izokukai, the Gun On Ren, the Nihon Shoi Gunjinkai and the Goyu Remmei. They want revision of the ‘peace’ constitution and formal reinstitution of Yasukuni shrine, a pilgrimage centre of the abolished state Shinto (see Chapter 13). They sponsor monuments to soldiers, including executed war criminals.
↩Ishida Takeshi, ‘Pressure groups in Japan’,
Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan
, December 1964.
↩Ibid., p. 335.
↩Takeshi Ishida, ‘The development of interest groups and the pattern of political modernisation in Japan’, in R. E. Ward (ed.),
Political Development in Modern Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 333–4.
↩Tsuji, ‘Atsuryoku dantai’, op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 246–7.
↩‘Yosan to atsuryoku’ [Budget and pressures], part 12,
Yomiuri Shinbun
, 17 December 1965.
↩Yomiuri Shinbun
, editorial, 13 August 1986.
↩An abbreviation of
nogyo kyodo kumiai
(‘agricultural co-operative union’).
↩According to statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, as of February 1985, the total population in Japan’s 4,376,000 farming households was 19,839,000 (9,662,000 males and 10,177,000 females); 6,363,000 out of this total were engaged in part-time or full-time farming.
↩Ishikawa Hideo, ‘Taiseinai no atsuryoku dantai: Zenkoku Nokyo Chuokai’ [A pressure group in the establishment: Zenchu],
Asahi Jaanaru
, 30 May 1965, p. 39.
↩Matsumoto Seicho, ‘Kensetsu kanryoron’ [On construction bureaucrats],
Bungei Shunju
, February 1964, p. 136.
↩T. J. Pempel, Policy and Politics in Japan, Temple University Press, 1982, p. 30.
↩Ishikawa, ‘Taiseinai’, op. cit. (n. 23), p. 38.
↩Tahara Soichiro, ‘nokyo gaiko o tenkai suru Fujita Saburo Zenchu kaicho’ [Fujita Saburo, Zenchu president who promotes
nokyo
’s diplomacy],
Chuo Koron
, March 1980, p. 284.
↩Ishikawa, ‘Taiseinai’, op. cit. (n. 23), pp. 36–7.
↩Tachibana Takashi,
nokyo
, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1984. The following information about Miyazaki prefecture is culled from this book.
↩Ibid., p. 343.
↩With the Maintenance of Public Peace Law of 1900, which denied workers the right to organise.
↩Ikeda Makoto, ‘Roshi kyocho seisaku no keisei: Naimusho shakaikyoku setchi no igi ni tsuite’ [Formation of policy for co-operation between management and labour: the significance of Naimusho’s social bureau],
Nihon rodo kyokai zasshi
, no. 226, 1978, pp. 14–23; and Sheldon M. Garon, ‘The imperial bureaucracy and labor policy in postwar Japan’,
Journal of Asian Studies
, May 1984.
↩The highest organisation rate was 7.9 per cent in 1931 with a total of 368,975. The largest number of union members in pre-war Japan was reached in 1936 with an organisation rate of 6.9 per cent.
↩Sheldon M. Garon,
The State and Labor in Modern Japan
, University of California Press, 1987, pp. 220 ff.
↩Thomas R. H. Havens,
Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two
, Norton, 1978, pp. 43–6.
↩For the most complete account of this reorganisation of the Japanese labour movement along lines inspired by Nazi Germany and Italian fascism, see Garon,
State and Labor
, op. cit. (n. 34), chapter 6.
↩Takafusa Nakamura,
The Postwar Japanese Economy
, University of Tokyo Press, 1981, p. 18.
↩Garon,
State and Labor
, op. cit. (n. 34), p. 213. The proposal was by Minami Iwao, who had studied Hitler’s labour policies and the German Labour Front.
↩A revised National Public Service Law took away the right of public service employees to strike and bargain collectively. Workers in government enterprises, to whom a different law applied, could still bargain collectively, but were also deprived of the right to strike.
↩Sumiya Mikio, ‘Nihonteki roshi kankeiron no saikochiku’ [Reconstruction of the theory on Japanese labour relations],
Nihon rodo kyokai zasshi
, vol. 262, January 1981, p. 2. Sumiya makes the interesting point that labour relations in small and medium-sized companies, and those affecting women, are not being studied.
↩Stephen S. Large, ‘The patterns of Taisho democracy’, in H. Wray and H. Conroy (eds.),
Japan Examined
, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p. 177.
↩Rengo started on 20 November 1987 with sixty-two labour organisations, whose membership totalled 5.55 million members. This covered some 70 per cent of the private unions.
↩Chamoto Shigemasa, ‘Zenmin Roren no hossoku to Zendentsu’ [The organisation of Zenmin Roren and Zendentsu],
Sekai
, December 1987, p. 281.
↩Ibid., pp. 283–4.
↩Ibid., pp. 283–4.
↩See Chapters 12 and 14 for the intricate background of these long-term plans of the LDP.
↩Masumi Junnosuke, ‘Gikaisei to atsuryoku dantai’ [The Diet system and pressure groups],
Chuo Koron
, January 1960, p. 46.
↩An excellent summary and assessment of the motives of the government, the BLL and the JCP in connection with litigation and denunciation practices connected with the
burakumin
can be found in Frank K. Upham,
Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan
, Harvard University Press, 1977, chapter 3, esp. pp. 116–17, 123.
↩Burakumin
are three and a half times more likely than non-
burakumin
Japanese to suffer from a physical disorder, according to calculations by a BLL-affiliated research institute. See Murakoshi Sueo and Miwa Yoshio (eds),
Konnichi no buraku sabetsu
[Buraku Discrimination Today], Buraku Kaiho Kenkyujo, 1986.
↩Benjamin C. Duke,
Japan’s Militant Teachers
, University of Hawaii Press, 1973, p. 35.
↩Ibid., pp. 107–8; and Donald R. Thurston,
Teachers and Politics in Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 15.
↩Yung Park, ‘Big business and education policy in Japan’, unpublished paper, Humboldt State University.
↩Totsuka Ichiro and Kiya Toshikazu (eds.),
Mombusho
[The Ministry of Education], Hobunsha, 1956, pp. 98–101; and Duke,
Japan’s Militant
, op. cit. (n. 50), pp. 124–5.
↩Nippon Times
, 27 March and 8 April 1956, as cited in Duke,
Japan’s Militant
, op. cit. (n. 50), p. 132.
↩Duke,
Japan’s Militant
, op. cit. (n. 50), p. 116.
↩See Yung H. Park,
Bureaucrats and Ministers in Contemporary Japanese Government
, Institute of Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986, pp. 24–5.
↩Thurston,
Teachers
, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 193.
↩Duke,
Japan’s Militant
, op. cit. (n. 50), pp. 153–4.
↩Thomas Rohlen,
Japan’s High Schools
, University of California Press, 1983, p. 222; Duke,
Japan’s Militant
, op. cit. (n. 50), p. 202; Thurston,
Teachers
, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 83.
↩The
Grus japanensis
.
↩Thurston,
Teachers
, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 132.
↩See Chapters 6 and 7.
↩See Chapters 9 and 10.
↩Justin Williams,
Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur
, University of Tokyo Press, 1979, p. 258.
↩See, for example, Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Kraus, ‘The conservative policy line and the development of patterned pluralism’, in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds.),
The Political Economy of Japan
, vol. 1, Stanford University Press, 1987, pp. 537 ff.
↩See, for example, Pempel,
Policy and Politics
, op. cit. (n. 25). Pempel is one of the very few scholars who have contributed serious analysis to the study of Japanese politics.
↩