The essential writings of Machiavelli (38 page)

6.
Machiavelli borrowed this formula from Cicero’s
On Friendship
(I, 3): “So that I may avoid always repeating ‘I say’ and ‘he says,’ I shall use the form of a dialogue.”

7.
Machiavelli is quoting Diogenes Laertius’s
Lives of Eminent Philosophers
, “Diogenes” (Book 6:2:23): “In summer he rolled in the hot sand and in winter embraced statues covered with snow, always practicing to endure anything.”

8.
A Roman commander and statesman (c. third century
BCE
), praised by Roman historians as a model of incorruptible Roman virtue. After King Pyrrhus of Epirus invaded Italy and defeated the Romans at Heraclea, he was so impressed by Gaius Fabricius Luscinus’s refusal to accept a bribe that he released all Roman prisoners without ransom.

9.
Polybius in
Histories
(I, 69) identifies Mathos as a regular Libyan soldier in the Carthaginian army and Spendius as a runaway Roman slave, who through violence and intimidation incited the Carthaginian army to rebellion and had themselves appointed sole commanders. Machiavelli also mentions the incident in
The Prince
, chapter 12: “As for mercenary armies in ancient times, we have the example of the Carthaginians, who were almost overwhelmed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, even though the Carthaginians had their own citizens as generals.”

10.
Francesco Sforza (1401–66) had been a condottiere in the service of Duke Filippo Maria Visconti of Milan. In 1450 he blockaded the city, causing a rebellion by the starving inhabitants, until he finally marched in with his army as the new Duke of Milan.

11.
Machiavelli uses almost the same words in
The Prince
, chapter 12: “Francesco Sforza’s father, a mercenary to Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her defenseless, and she was forced to throw herself on the mercy of the King of Aragon so as not to lose her realm.”

12.
Braccio da Montone (1368–1424), a rival of Muzio Attendolo Sforza, was one of the greatest condottieri of his time, becoming Prince of Capua.

13.
Machiavelli writes in
Discourses
, Book I, chapter 27: “Men often do not know how to be perfectly good or honorably evil, and when an evil deed has grandeur or is in some part generous, a man will often not know how to carry it off.”

14.
The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome.

15.
Augustus (63
BCE
-14
CE
), the first Roman emperor, and Tiberius (42
BCE
-37
CE
), the second Roman emperor.

16.
See
The Prince
, chapter 13: “Louis XI’s father, King Charles VII, who freed France from the English with the help of Fortune and his skill, recognized the importance of having his own army. He issued a decree in his kingdom to enlist an infantry and a cavalry. After him, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss mercenaries. This mistake, followed by others, has led, as we have seen, to the many dangers France has had to face.”

17.
Fabrizio Colonna, like many other Italian mercenary generals of the time, was also a feudal nobleman. He was Duke of Palliano and Marsi, and Count of Tagliacozzo and Celano.

18.
Ferdinand the Catholic.

BOOK II

[…]
COSIMO:
I would like you to tell me—if you have ever deliberated on the matter—what has caused the vileness, disorder, and laxity in the armies of our times?

FABRIZIO:
I will gladly tell you my thoughts on this. You know that many men in Europe have been considered excellent in war, but few in Africa, and even fewer in Asia. This is because Africa and Asia had one or two principalities and only a few republics. Europe, on the other hand, has had several kingdoms and an infinite number of republics. Men become excellent and show their skill according to how their prince, republic, or king makes use of them and gives them authority. Where there are many rulers, there are many valiant figures, and where there are few rulers, valiant figures are few. In Asia there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, and Mithradates,
¹⁹
but there were not many others in their league. The great warriors of Africa, if we leave aside those of ancient Egypt, were Massinissa, Jugurtha,
²⁰
and the generals of the Carthaginian Republic. Compared to European warriors, they too were few in number, for in Europe there was an infinite number of excellent men, and there would have been many more were one to add those whose names have been extinguished by the ravages of time, for there has been more skill in the world when there have been more states that favored it, either from necessity or from some particular interest. Consequently, Asia created few exceptional men because it was ruled by a single kingdom: Much indolence resulted from its size, which hampered men who excelled in their vocation. The same is true of Africa, though the Carthaginian Republic gave rise to valiant men. More excellent men come from republics than from kingdoms because skill is usually honored in republics, while in kingdoms it is feared. As a result, republics encourage men of skill, while kingdoms destroy them.

Whoever, therefore, considers Europe will find it to have been full of republics and principalities which out of fear of one another were compelled to keep their military institutions alive and to honor those who rose to eminence within them. In Greece, besides the kingdom of the Macedonians, there were many republics, each producing excellent men. In Italy there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Etruscans, and the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany had many republics and principalities, as did Spain. And if besides the great Roman figures we hear of only a few heroes of these other peoples, it is because of the baseness of the historians who, in pursuit of Fortune, usually found it more to their advantage to praise the victors.
²¹
Would it not be reasonable to surmise that the Samnites and the Etruscans, who fought the Romans for a hundred and fifty years before being defeated, would have had many excellent warriors too? The same is true of France and Spain. And yet the greatness that historians will not praise in individual men they praise in a people as a whole, exalting to the heavens the single-mindedness with which they defended their liberty.

As it is true that more valiant men arise where there are more states, it follows of necessity that when those states are destroyed, valor and skill are also destroyed little by little, there being fewer reasons for men to become valiant. The Roman Empire grew, extinguishing all the republics and principalities of Europe and Africa, and the greater part of those in Asia, and no other path to valor was left, except for Rome. The result was that valorous men began to be as few in Europe as they were in Asia, valor and skill ultimately falling into utter decline since it had all concentrated in Rome. But once Rome was corrupted, almost the whole world followed suit, and the Scythians were able to plunder Rome, which had extinguished the skill of others but did not know how to maintain its own. And even though the flood of barbarians caused the Roman Empire to split into several parts, the skill the empire had amassed did not resurge: first, because it is a long ordeal to rebuild institutions once they have been destroyed, and second because of the way of life today, where Christianity does not impose on man the necessity to fight and defend himself that existed in ancient times. In those times, men who were defeated in war either were slaughtered or remained slaves forever, living a life of misery
²²
Conquered states were either entirely devastated, or their inhabitants—their property seized—were driven out and scattered throughout the world. Those vanquished in war suffered extreme misery, and the ancients, terrified of this, kept their armies active, honoring those who excelled within them. But in our times this fear has for the most part been lost. Few of those defeated are slaughtered, and no one is kept prisoner for a long time, as prisoners can easily be freed. Cities might rebel a thousand times, but they are not destroyed, and their citizens are allowed to retain their property, so that the greatest evil they need fear is new levies. As a result, men do not want to subject themselves to military institutions and face continuous privation under them in order to escape dangers of which they have little fear. Furthermore, when compared to the past, the states of Europe exist under very few leaders, for all of France obeys a single king, all of Spain another, and Italy is divided into a few states. Hence weak cities defend themselves by allying themselves with victors, while the powerful states do not fear complete destruction, for the reasons I have just mentioned.

19.
Ninus was a legendary king of Assyria and the founder of the city of Nineveh; Cyrus the Great (d. c. 529
BCE
), founder of the Persian Empire, is also discussed in
Discourses
, Book II, chapter 13, and in
The Prince
, chapters 6, 14, and 26; Artaxerxes II (early fourth century) was King of Persia and described in Plutarch’s
Parallel Lives
; Mithradates the Great (d. 63
BCE
) was King of Pontus and a formidable enemy of Rome in Asia Minor.

20.
Massinissa (d. 148
BCE
) was an influential ruler of Numidia in North Africa and an ally of Rome in the Second Punic War (218–201
BCE
). Jugurtha (d. 104
BCE
) was the grandson of Massinissa and fought the Romans to end their rule in Numidia.

21.
See the preface to
Discourses
, Book II, in which Machiavelli develops this theme: “Most historians bow to the fortunes of conquerors.”

22.
See also
Discourses
, Book II, chapter 2, in which Machiavelli discusses the weakening effect of Christianity from a different perspective: “Our religion glorifies men who are humble and contemplative rather than men of action. […] If our religion does demand that you be strong, it is so that you will be able to bear suffering rather than carry out feats of strength.”

BOOK VII

FABRIZIO:
[…] I know that I have spoken to you of many things that you could have understood yourselves. And yet I spoke of these matters, as I said earlier this afternoon, in order to demonstrate better what kind of military training is best, and also to satisfy those (should there be any) who do not understand these matters as readily as you do. It seems to me that there is nothing left for me to say, other than to give you some general rules which I am sure you will find familiar.
²³
They are:

What benefits the enemy will harm you, and what benefits you will harm the enemy.

He who in war is more vigilant in scrutinizing the enemy’s designs, and more tireless in training his army, will face fewer dangers and have greater hope for victory.

Never lead your soldiers into battle before you are certain of their courage, that they are without fear, and that they are well ordered. Do not engage your troops unless you can see that they hope for victory.

It is better to defeat the enemy with hunger than with steel, for in victory with steel you will see Fortune playing a greater role than skill.

The best strategy is that which remains concealed from the enemy until it has been carried out.

In war, knowing how to recognize and seize an opportunity is the most important ability.

Nature creates few brave men—diligence and training create many.

Discipline in war is more vital than fury.

Soldiers leaving the enemy’s side to come to yours are an optimal acquisition if they are loyal, because the forces of your enemy diminish more with the loss of those who desert than with those who are slain, even though the word “deserter” wakes suspicion in new friends and hatred in old.

It is better when arranging your formations to set up considerable support behind the front line than to spread out your soldiers so that you can make the front line more imposing.

He who knows his forces and those of the enemy will be hard to vanquish.

The soldiers’ skill is worth more than their number, and the site of a battle can sometimes be of greater benefit than skill.

What is new and unexpected will take an army aback, while the army looks down on what is customary and predictable. You will therefore give your army both practice and knowledge of a new enemy by engaging him in minor skirmishes before you face him in battle.

Whoever pursues a routed enemy in a disorderly manner is seeking to become a defeated victor.

Whoever does not prepare his provisions will be defeated without steel.

Whoever places more trust in cavalry than in infantry, or more in infantry than in cavalry, must accommodate himself to the site of battle.

If you want to ascertain whether a spy has entered your camp, have all men in the middle of the day return to their assigned quarters.

Change your battle plan when you see that your enemy has predicted it.

Seek the counsel of many on what you should do, but then confer with only a few on what you will do.

Soldiers are kept in their quarters by fear and punishment; when they are marched into battle, they are led by hope and reward.

Good generals never engage in battle unless necessity compels or opportunity beckons.

Make sure that your enemy does not know how you plan to order your ranks in battle, and in whatever way you order them, be certain that the first line can be absorbed by the second and third.

Never use a division in battle for another purpose than the one to which you assigned it, unless you want to cause disorder.

Sudden upsets are countered with difficulty, unless one can think on one’s feet.

Men, steel, money, and bread are the backbone of war; but of these four the first two are more necessary, because men and steel can find money and bread, but money and bread cannot find men and steel.

The unarmed rich man is the prize of the poor soldier.

Accustom your soldiers to despise comfortable living and luxurious attire.

All this is what has generally occurred to me, though I know I could have told you many more things in our discussion: for example, in how many different ways the ancients organized their ranks, how they dressed, how they trained, and many other things. I could have brought up many other particulars, which I did not, however, judge necessary because you can read about them quite readily, and also because my intention was not to show exactly how the ancient army was created, but how an army should be organized in our times so that it might have more skill and ability than it does. Hence I felt it unnecessary to discuss ancient matters in greater depth beyond what I felt necessary as an introduction.

23.
In the following, Machiavelli translates, adapts, and paraphrases maxims from
De re militari
by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (fourth century
CE
), a work that advocates and codifies the arrangement of armies according to a classical Roman ideal. Machiavelli expands and adapts Vegetius’s Latin maxims and adds a few of his own.