The Fall of Carthage (5 page)
In the fifth century Carthagian power in Africa itself had steadily increased, perhaps in part encouraged by the failures in Sicily. The city had ceased to pay the subsidies levied by the local Libyan rulers and had come to control all the other Phoenician towns in the area, notably Hadrumen-tum and Utica. In the middle of the century Carthaginian fleets mounted great exploratory voyages along the North African coastline, passing the Straits of Gibraltar and pushing hundreds of miles along the western coastline. More permanently this led to the establishment of further trading posts in Africa, whilst the settlements in Spain continued to be developed. Control of all these outposts on the key coastal positions, for Carthaginian settlements were always based around good harbours, combined with the power of the Punic fleet, gave the city control of all the major trade routes in the western Mediterranean. Everywhere its merchants traded in the most favourable conditions, whilst those of other nationalities paid dues and tolls which further enriched the city's coffers. The enormous wealth of Carthage was reflected in the steady growth of the city and the splendour of its defences and buildings. Remains of the new areas of the city show evidence of having been laid out to a clearly organized plan, conforming to, although not as rigid as, the most advanced contemporary Hellenistic town-planning.
5
5
Trade was not the only source of the city's prosperity. It is important not to forget that Carthage's wealth was also derived from a highly organized and effective agricultural base. The Agricultural Manual produced by a Carthaginian nobleman, Mago, probably dating to the late fourth century, was later to have a massive influence on the rest of the world when it was translated into both Greek and Latin after 146. Mago wrote about the methods of running a large estate worked at least in part by servile labour, supplemented by Libyan peasants. By 300 the Carthaginians directly controlled about half of the territory of modern-day Tunisia and the greater part of this was owned by the nobility. The nobles of Carthage were just as much a landowning aristocracy as the ruling elites of other cities, including Rome. The land was fertile (far more so than today), the climate favourable and their productivity foreshadowed the time when the African provinces would be the great granaries of the Roman Empire. These estates produced vast quantities of grain and especially the tree crops for which Africa was famous, such as grapes, figs, olives, almonds, and pomegranates. Agathocles' army is supposed to have been amazed by the fertility of the Carthaginian farms when they landed in Africa. Not only did this supply the city's needs, but it also provided a great surplus for export.
6
6
In 300 the land controlled by Carthage was significantly greater than the
ager Romanus
y
the lands owned by the Roman people, and rivalled the sum of these and the territories of Rome's allies. Its yield was probably significantly greater, for much of the land in Italy had poorer soil. Yet the benefits from this agricultural richness were not evenly shared and were enjoyed largely by the Carthaginians themselves, and most of all by their nobility. Carthage proved reluctant to extend citizenship and political rights to the peoples within the areas she came to control. The citizens of Carthaginian and Phoenician communities enjoyed a privileged position, as did the people of mixed race known to the Greeks as the Liby-Phoenicians, but others remained clearly subordinate allies or subjects. Therefore the extension of Punic hegemony over Africa, Spain, Sicily and Sardinia did not result in a great expansion of the Carthaginian citizen body. The Libyan population on the great estates seem to have been tied to the land and had little freedom. Libyan communities allied to Carthage enjoyed some internal autonomy, but were clearly subject to Punic will. Whilst waging the First Punic War, other Carthaginian soldiers were engaged in bitter fighting to conquer more Libyan communities. When after the peace with Rome the mercenary soldiers of Carthage mutinied and turned against her, they were swiftly supported by many Libyan communities. Other allied peoples, such as the Numidian kingdoms in Africa, enjoyed greater or lesser autonomy, but derived few benefits from being part of the Carthaginian empire to which they paid subsidies and for which they were often obliged to fight as soldiers.
ager Romanus
y
the lands owned by the Roman people, and rivalled the sum of these and the territories of Rome's allies. Its yield was probably significantly greater, for much of the land in Italy had poorer soil. Yet the benefits from this agricultural richness were not evenly shared and were enjoyed largely by the Carthaginians themselves, and most of all by their nobility. Carthage proved reluctant to extend citizenship and political rights to the peoples within the areas she came to control. The citizens of Carthaginian and Phoenician communities enjoyed a privileged position, as did the people of mixed race known to the Greeks as the Liby-Phoenicians, but others remained clearly subordinate allies or subjects. Therefore the extension of Punic hegemony over Africa, Spain, Sicily and Sardinia did not result in a great expansion of the Carthaginian citizen body. The Libyan population on the great estates seem to have been tied to the land and had little freedom. Libyan communities allied to Carthage enjoyed some internal autonomy, but were clearly subject to Punic will. Whilst waging the First Punic War, other Carthaginian soldiers were engaged in bitter fighting to conquer more Libyan communities. When after the peace with Rome the mercenary soldiers of Carthage mutinied and turned against her, they were swiftly supported by many Libyan communities. Other allied peoples, such as the Numidian kingdoms in Africa, enjoyed greater or lesser autonomy, but derived few benefits from being part of the Carthaginian empire to which they paid subsidies and for which they were often obliged to fight as soldiers.
Carthage had originally been a monarchy, its kingship possessing a strongly religious character, but by the third century the senior executive officers of the state were the two annually elected suffetes. It is unknown whether this office developed from or replaced the monarchy, but the Greek use of the word
basileus
(king) for this magistracy makes it possible that there was a connection. The nature of the Punic monarchy is fiercely debated by scholars, but it may be that it had been an elective office. Wealth as much as merit was important in the election of the suffetes, who held supreme civil and religious power but did not act as military commanders. A Council of Thirty Elders (or
g
erousia)
acted in an advisory capacity and was supervised by and probably drawn from another tribunal, the Council of 104. If the suffetes and the Elders agreed on a course of action then they had the power to implement it. If they were unable to reach agreement then the proposals were taken to the Assembly of the People to decide the matter. At these meetings any citizen was permitted to make a counter-proposal. It is clear that a relatively small number of noble families dominated the council and probably monopolized the office of
suffes
(suffete). The details of the internal politics of the city are far less clear, and whilst we gain hints of disputes and factionalism, it is impossible to describe these with any precision. Greek philosophers, most notably Aristode, praised Carthage for possessing a balanced constitution combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, which allowed it to avoid the chronic instability which was the weakness of most Greek states. Certainly Carthage appears to have been very stable, although it is difficult to say whether or not the Greeks had understood the true reason for this, and its regime was one from which the citizens, and most of all the wealthy, benefited greatly.
7
basileus
(king) for this magistracy makes it possible that there was a connection. The nature of the Punic monarchy is fiercely debated by scholars, but it may be that it had been an elective office. Wealth as much as merit was important in the election of the suffetes, who held supreme civil and religious power but did not act as military commanders. A Council of Thirty Elders (or
g
erousia)
acted in an advisory capacity and was supervised by and probably drawn from another tribunal, the Council of 104. If the suffetes and the Elders agreed on a course of action then they had the power to implement it. If they were unable to reach agreement then the proposals were taken to the Assembly of the People to decide the matter. At these meetings any citizen was permitted to make a counter-proposal. It is clear that a relatively small number of noble families dominated the council and probably monopolized the office of
suffes
(suffete). The details of the internal politics of the city are far less clear, and whilst we gain hints of disputes and factionalism, it is impossible to describe these with any precision. Greek philosophers, most notably Aristode, praised Carthage for possessing a balanced constitution combining elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, which allowed it to avoid the chronic instability which was the weakness of most Greek states. Certainly Carthage appears to have been very stable, although it is difficult to say whether or not the Greeks had understood the true reason for this, and its regime was one from which the citizens, and most of all the wealthy, benefited greatly.
7
The Carthaginian Military System
The Hellenistic kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean all fielded armies modelled closely on those of Philip and Alexander. They were composed of professional soldiers recruited from a relatively small pool of citizens settled in military colonies. The core of each army was the phalanx of highly drilled pikemen, supported by close-order shock cavalry, although few were able to field as many of the latter as Alexander had done. These well-trained and disciplined soldiers were very effective, but it was difficult for the kingdoms to replace heavy casualties quickly. The frequency with which the kingdoms fought each other ensured that more often than not the armies operated against enemy forces composed of the same basic elements and fighting in a similar manner. It was no coincidence that these armies began to experiment with such unusual elements as cataphract cavalry, war elephants and scythed chariots, seeking in some way to gain an advantage over their similar enemy. Works of military theory, which had begun to appear in the fourth century, were produced in great profusion in the third. Pyrrhus himself wrote a work on Generalship, although sadly this has not survived. This theoretical literature dealt firmly with the expectation of war between similar Hellenistic armies. However, neither of the armies involved in the Punic Wars conformed closely to this model.
8
8
Carthage had a very small citizen body and early on in its history abandoned the practice of relying on citizen soldiers for the bulk of its armies, being unwilling to risk heavy casualties amongst this group. Citizens were only obliged to undergo military service to face a direct threat to the city itself. When they took the field they did so as close order infantrymen, fighting in a phalanx and armed with shields and long spears, but their military effectiveness was poor, probably as a result of their inexperience. Agathocles defeated a far larger army including a large contingent of these citizen spearmen in 309, and their record in the first two conflicts with Rome was undistinguished.
More Carthaginian citizens appear to have served in the navy, although admittedly our evidence for the recruitment of sailors is very slight. Unlike the armies, which tended to be raised for a particular conflict and were disbanded at its end, the Carthaginian navy had a more permanent status, since there was always the need to protect the trade routes which brought the city so much wealth. The famous circular naval harbour at Carthage provided ramps to act as berths for about 180 ships and all the facilities for their maintenance. Excavations at the harbour dated it at the earliest to the second century, although the evidence was not certain and it is possible that this was a period of rebuilding. Even if the earlier naval harbour was not located on this site, it is likely that it was constructed on a similarly grand scale. The entire fleet is unlikely to have been crewed and in service except in wartime. However, an efficient fleet could only have been maintained if crews were regularly exercised at sea, so it is likely that sizeable squadrons were permanently maintained. It is distinctly possible that many of the poorest citizens of Carthage derived their livelihood from service as rowers in the fleet. If this is so, then it may well have contributed to the city's political stability, since the unemployed, debt-ridden poor in other cities were frequently inclined to support revolutionary leaders in the hope of improving their own desperate lot.
9
9
The lack of citizen manpower ensured that Carthaginian armies were recruited from foreign soldiers. Libyans provided probably the steadiest and most disciplined element in most armies. Their close formation infantry were equipped with long spears and round or oval shields, and wore helmets and probably linen cuirasses. Libyan cavalry were also close order troops armed with thrusting spears, trained to deliver a controlled, shock charge. The Libyans may well also have provided some of the infantry skirmishers, the
lonchophoroi
of Polybius, each armed with a small shield and bundle of javelins. The Numidian kingdoms were renowned for their superb light cavalry, who rode their small mounts without either bridle or saddle and harassed the enemy with volleys of javelins, avoiding close combat unless conditions were absolutely in their favour. Numidian armies also included infantry skirmishers equipped with javelins and the same round shield borne by the cavalry and it is possible that contingents of these troops were also sent to Punic forces. From Spain came both light and heavy infantry, whose normal dress was a white tunic with a purple border. The heavy infantry
{scutati)
fought as a dense phalanx, carried a long body shield and were armed with a heavy throwing spear and a sword, either the short, thrusting weapon which provided the model for the Roman
gladius
or the curved, slashing
falcata.
The light infantry
(caetrati)
carried a small round shield and several javelins. Gallic infantry fought in massed formation and carried shields and javelins, but relied on their long, slashing swords. Both Spaniards and Gauls also provided contingents of well-mounted and brave, if undisciplined, cavalry, whose primary tactic was the all-out charge. Body armour was very unusual amongst the tribal peoples of Europe, helmets only a little less uncommon. The warriors of these nations were characterized by classical authors as ferocious in the first charge, but easily tired and inclined to lose heart if things did not quickly go their way. There was some truth in this statement, but on other occasions these troops proved far more stubborn than this stereotype would allow.
10
lonchophoroi
of Polybius, each armed with a small shield and bundle of javelins. The Numidian kingdoms were renowned for their superb light cavalry, who rode their small mounts without either bridle or saddle and harassed the enemy with volleys of javelins, avoiding close combat unless conditions were absolutely in their favour. Numidian armies also included infantry skirmishers equipped with javelins and the same round shield borne by the cavalry and it is possible that contingents of these troops were also sent to Punic forces. From Spain came both light and heavy infantry, whose normal dress was a white tunic with a purple border. The heavy infantry
{scutati)
fought as a dense phalanx, carried a long body shield and were armed with a heavy throwing spear and a sword, either the short, thrusting weapon which provided the model for the Roman
gladius
or the curved, slashing
falcata.
The light infantry
(caetrati)
carried a small round shield and several javelins. Gallic infantry fought in massed formation and carried shields and javelins, but relied on their long, slashing swords. Both Spaniards and Gauls also provided contingents of well-mounted and brave, if undisciplined, cavalry, whose primary tactic was the all-out charge. Body armour was very unusual amongst the tribal peoples of Europe, helmets only a little less uncommon. The warriors of these nations were characterized by classical authors as ferocious in the first charge, but easily tired and inclined to lose heart if things did not quickly go their way. There was some truth in this statement, but on other occasions these troops proved far more stubborn than this stereotype would allow.
10
Our sources primarily speak of the components of Carthaginian armies as national groups. Only a very small detachment from a field army was ever likely to be composed of a single nationality and some armies were very mixed. Usually an effort was made not to rely too heavily on the peoples indigenous to the theatre of operations for fear of defection or desertion. Before his Italian expedition Hannibal sent a large contingent of Spanish troops to Africa, replacing them with units raised there. The Carthaginian high command provided the sole unifying force in each army.
11
11
It is conventional to describe Punic armies as consisting of mercenaries, but this is a gross oversimplification, since these forces included soldiers raised in many different ways with a great variety of different motivations. Some contingents were not hired, but provided by allied kingdoms or states as part of their treaty obligations. This always seems to have been the case with the Numidian kingdoms, whose royal families enjoyed a fairly close relationship with the Carthaginian noble families, bonds that were sometimes strengthened by marriage alliances. Numidian contingents were usually led by their own princes. Similarly many of the tribes in Spain and Gaul were formally allied to Carthage and fielded contingents identical to their own tribal armies and commanded by their own chieftains. Again, there is some indication of Punic leaders forming strong connections with the native aristocracy, perhaps allowing them to exploit traditional patterns of loyalty. Hasdrubal certainly married a Spanish princess and it is possible that Hannibal also did so. It is clear that the Spanish tribes' loyalty focused on the Barcid family rather than the distant Carthage. Later, the tribes would similarly adhere to the Scipiones, rather than Rome, rebelling when it was rumoured that Scipio Africanus had left Spain.
12
12
We do not know precisely how the Libyan units were raised. Some troops were probably provided by allied cities in a similar manner to the Numidians. Others may well have been formed by peasants conscripted from the great Carthaginian estates. This area was later to prove a very fertile recruiting area in the Roman Empire. Even the troops clearly hired as mercenaries were not all recruited in the same manner. In some cases these men were hired as a group, a leader or chieftain offering his own and his warband's services for hire. The leader received payment for his services and then supported, and distributed rewards amongst, his followers much as any chieftain would do. In the tribal societies of Europe there was a strong tradition of warriors seeking service with the leaders who could support and give them wealth and glory, for a martial reputation was highly valued wherever it was attained. The bond between such a chieftain and his followers was intensely personal. They fought for him and would just as happily fight with or against Carthage as their leader chose. We hear of one group of Gauls led by a chieftain who served several masters in succession and proved of dubious loyalty to each of them. The loyalty of such soldiers must have been significantly different from that of men who had been directly recruited and were directly paid by their Carthaginian leaders. Presumably some units in the army, especially those which included Roman and Italian deserters and escaped slaves, were of mixed nationality.
13
13
Other books
The Wellspring by M. Frances Smith
Oblivion by Kelly Creagh
Shades of Black by Carmelo Massimo Tidona
Midnight Blues by Viehl, Lynn
Star Brigade: Resurgent (Star Brigade Book 1) by C.C. Ekeke
Rex Stout - Nero Wolfe 25 by Before Midnight
Keeper of the Realms: The Dark Army (Book 2) by Alexander, Marcus
Instant Love by Jami Attenberg
Golden by Jessi Kirby
Night by Elie Wiesel