The Imjin War (85 page)

Chapter 15: Suppression and Resistance

[344]
Letter dated 26/5/Bunroku 1 (July 5, 1592), in Park Yune-hee, 112.

[345]
Elisonas, “Trinity,” 275.

[346]
Imperial Japanese Commission,
History of the Empire of Japan
(Tokyo: Dai Nippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893), 281-282.

[347]
Kato Kiyomasa to Hideyoshi, 1/6/Bunroku 1 (July 9, 1592), in Park Yune-hee, 118.

[348]
Yu Song-nyong, 91.

[349]
Yu Song-nyong, 92; Hulbert, vol. 1, 389-390.

[350]
Elisonas, “Trinity,” 275.

[351]
Yi Sik, “Yasa chobon,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 126-128; Yu Song-nyong, 92-93;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 281-283 (7/Sonjo 25; Aug. 1592).

[352]
Shimokawa Heidayu, “Kiyomasa Korai no jin oboegaki,” in Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 79.

[353]
Kato Kiyomasa to Ki(noshita) Hanasuke, 20/9/Bunroku 1 (Oct. 25, 1592), in Elisonas, “Trinity,” 275-276.

[354]
Palais,
Confucian Statecraft
, 82.

[355]
Ha Tae-hung,
Behind the Scenes
, 173.

[356]
Yun Hyong-gi, “Choya chomjae,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 106.

[357]
Pak Dong-ryang, “Kijae sacho,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 108; Yu Song-nyong, 145-146.

[358]
Ha Tae-hung,
Behind the Scenes
, 173-174; Hulbert, vol. 1, 392.

[359]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 76 (7/8/Sonjo 25; Sept. 12, 1592); Hulbert, vol. 1, 393.

[360]
Yun Hyong-gi, “Choya chomjae,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 106; “Somyo chunghung-gi,” ibid., 106-107; Hanguk chongsin, vol. 1, 111-112.

[361]
“Sonmyo bugam,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 120.

[362]
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 283-285 (7/Sonjo 25; Aug. 1592); “Sonmyo bugam,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 121-122; Yi Myong-han, “Baekju-chip,” ibid., 123-125; Yi Hyong-sok,
 vol. 1, 402.

[363]
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 4, 32-33 (6/Sonjo 26; July 1593); Hulbert, vol. 1, 394.

[364]
Hankuk chongsin, vol. 1, 485-486; Yu Song-nyong, 145;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 276 (6/Sonjo 25; July 1592), and 286 (7/Sonjo 25; Aug. 1592); Hulbert, vol. 1, 395-396; Jones, 188.

[365]
Yi Su-kwang, “Chibongyusol,” in
Saryoro bonun
,110; Mun Yol-kong, “Cho Hon shindobi,” ibid., 111.

[366]
Samuel Dukhae Kim, 25-26.

[367]
  Ibid., 26-28.

[368]
Ibid., 81-82.

[369]
“Chungbong Choson saenghaengjang,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 113-114; Samuel Dukhae Kim, 80-84;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 288 (8/Sonjo 25; Sept. 1592); Yi Hyong-sok, vol. 1, 455.

[370]
Samuel Dukhae Kim, 86-89;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 294-295 (8/Sonjo 25; Sept. 1592).

[371]
Samuel Dukhae Kim, 86-90.

[372]
Shin Kyong, “Chaejo bonbangji,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 132-134;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 307 (9/Sonjo 25; Oct. 1592); Jones, 187-188.

[373]
William Griffis, quoted in Boots, 36-37.

[374]
Yu Song-nyong, 143; Yi Hyong-sok, vol. 1, 514.

[375]
Hulbert, vol. 1, 407.

[376]
Quoted in Yang Jae-suk,
Dashi ssunun
, vol. 1, 193.

[377]
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 305-306 (9/Sonjo 25; Oct. 1592).

[378]
Yang Jae-suk,
Dashi ssunun
, vol. 1, 192-193; Yu Song-nyong, 143-144;
Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 125; Hulbert, vol. 1, 407-408; Joseph Longford,
The Story of Korea
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1911), 164-165. Korean historian Choi Du-hwan successfully test fired a reconstructed pigyok chinchollae from a daewangu mortar for a television program on Korea’s KBS TV on January 12, 2002. The delayed fuse worked perfectly. The only problem was that the sphere, which was made from heavy cast iron based on archaeological finds, did not explode apart when the gunpowder ignited. The lid sealing the top of the device where the fuse was inserted simply blew off and the shrapnel packed inside blasted out of the hole. (The lid on the test-fired device was held in place by metal wedges tapped into the gaps around the edge.)

[379]
Hanguk chongsin, vol. 1, 344; Palais,
Confucian Statecraft
, 84-85.

[380]
Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 129. The Japanese
naginata
, comparable to the European glaive, was a polearm with a knife-like blade on the end. The Korean version featured a wider and heavier blade than the Japanese, and would have been a fearsome thing to have thrust in one’s face.

[381]
Heung Yang-ho, “Haedong myongjangchon,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 144-147;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 310-311 (10/Sonjo 25; Nov. 1592); Yi Hyong-sok, vol. 1, 556; Hulbert, vol. 1, 406-407; Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 129-130.

Chapter 16: Saving History

[382]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 146-147 (13/9/Sonjo 25; Oct. 17, 1592);
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 278 (7/Sonjo 25; Aug. 1592); Yu Song-nyong, 133.

[383]
Munhon pigo
, quoted in G. M. McCune, “The Yi Dynasty Annals of Korea,”
Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
29 (1939): 63, n. 7.

[384]
Kukcho pogam
, ibid., 58.

[385]
McCune, 74-76;
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 278 (7/Sonjo 25; Aug. 1592).

PART 4: STALEMATE

[386]
“Wu-tzu,” in Sawyer, 208.

Chapter 17: The Retreat from Pyongyang to the “River of Hell”

[387]
Hints of a general lack of enthusiasm for the Korean campaign were now beginning to appear in letters sent home from the front (Sansom, 357). In letters home dated August 17 and 20, 1593, Date Masamune attributes the deaths of many Japanese troops to the fact that “the water in this country is different.” They were likely contracting cholera or typhus. Date also speaks of an outbreak of beriberi in which eight of ten sufferers died (Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 155).

[388]
Ibid., 151. Turnbull concludes that by April 1593 the Japanese had 53,000 men left from their original 158,800-man invasion force. This loss, representing an overall decline of nearly sixty-seven percent, appears too high, for it exceeds the sixty-five percent loss sustained by Konishi’s first contingent, which Turnbull states “suffered the most.” (The figure of 53,000 more likely represents the number of troops in Seoul at that time.) A more accurate loss figure is provided by the Jesuit father Luis Frois, who was close to Konishi Yukinaga. Frois wrote that of the 150,000 Japanese soldiers and laborers who crossed to Korea in 1592, one third died, mostly the victims of disease, hunger, exhaustion, and cold (Luis Frois,
Historia de Japan
, ed. Josef Wicki (Lisbon: Bilioteca Nacional de Lisboa, 1976-1982), vol. 5, 599).

[389]
Elisonas, “Trinity,” 276.

[390]
Goodrich, vol. 1, 832; Huang, “Lung-ch’ing,” 568.

[391]
Huang,
1587
, 179-180; Chan, 55.

[392]
Chan, 205-207.

[393]
Stamigioli, 103;
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 295-297 (30/11/Sonjo 25; Jan. 2, 1593), and 304 (3/12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 5, 1593).

[394]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 305 (3/12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 5, 1593). Yun Gun-su was at this time the Minister of the Board of Rites.

[395]
Kuno, vol. 1, 162.

[396]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 368-369 (25/12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 27, 1593).

[397]
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 3, 322 (12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 1593).

[398]
Samuel Dukhae Kim, 90 and 92.

[399]
Yi Hyong-sok, vol. 1, 650-651. In a meeting with King Sonjo, Yi Dok-hyong estimated that between 12,000 and 20,000 Japanese troops were stationed at Pyongyang. (
Sonjo
sillok
, vol. 6, 371 [27/12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 29, 1593]).

[400]
Yu Song-nyong, 155.

[401]
Ibid.

[402]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 7, 26 (11/1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 11, 1593).

[403]
Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 140.

[404]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 6, 368-369 (25/12/Sonjo 25; Jan. 27, 1593).

[405]
Ibid., vol. 7, 26 (11/1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 11, 1593).

[406]
Samuel Dukhae Kim, 92-93; Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 139.

[407]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 7, 25-28 (11/1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 11, 1593); Yu Song-nyong, 156-157.

[408]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 7, 28 (11/1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 11, 1593); Sin Kyong, “Chaejo bonbangji,” in
Saryoro bonun
, 161; J. S. Gale,
James Scarth Gale and His History of the Korean People
, ed. Richard Rutt (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1972), 262-263.

[409]
Yoshino Jingozaemon oboegaki
, in Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 141.

[410]
Hulbert, vol. 2, 7.

[411]
Goodrich, vol. 1, 833.

[412]
Ibid.

[413]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 7, 28 (11/1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 11, 1593).

[414]
Yoshino Jingozaemon oboegaki
, in Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 142.

[415]
Yu Song-nyong, 161-162.

[416]
The Imjin River at this time of year was said to have posed a considerable obstacle, for with the warming of the weather the ice had broken into a welter of grinding blocks, making it difficult to take a boat across. The Koreans solved this problem by throwing a rope bridge made from arrowroot vines across the river, a feat that has been hailed as the world’s first suspension bridge (Hulbert, vol. 2, 8-9). With the ice preventing supporting piles from being driven into the riverbed at midstream, two thick cables were stretched across the river, suspended from a framework of heavy timbers on either bank, and were twisted and thus tightened until they hung well clear of the water and the ice. Willow branches were then laid between them and dirt packed on top to make a walkway. With this structure in place, the allied troops were able to cross the river in safety. (
Sonjo sujong sillok
, vol. 4, 8-9 [1/Sonjo 26; Feb. 1593]).

[417]
Griffis,
Corea
, 113-114; Turnbull,
Samurai Invasion
, 143.

[418]
Murdoch, 345.

[419]
According to Turnbull, the Japanese chose not to make their stand at the Imjin River because it “would provide but a small obstacle to the Korean army who were familiar with its layout.” (
Samurai Invasion
, 145.)

[420]
Sonjo sillok
, vol. 7, 113 (5/2/Sonjo 26; Mar. 7, 1593).