The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (45 page)

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
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deed, if there is any single lesson that PAS appointees would pass on to the future, it is that the career servants should be accepted as competent professionals, and should be used wisely. (Light 1987, 158)
In the NAPA study, 80 percent of the Reagan PASs found their careerists to be both responsive and competent. Why, then, did 50 percent of them say that there should be more political appointees?
With limited political capital in Congress and the public, an administration must conserve its scarce internal resourcestime, energy, expertise, and information. Although careerists may have ample stocks of resources, which can certainly reduce the amounts a political appointee has to spend, the initial investments may be too large for most appointees. Again, there may be too little time, and too many layers, to make the connection between the two worlds. (Ibid., 160)
Another reason for the desire for more political appointees may be found in PASs' frustration with the slow pace of government. Respect for the civil service was lowest among the one-quarter of the Reagan PASs who named that pace as their greatest source of frustration. It could be that they blamed the individuals for the failures of the system. Or, "it may be that Reagan appointees simply do not know whom else to blame." While the Carter officials felt the same frustration, only half as many of them favored increasing the number of political appointments as a solution (ibid., 162).
It is often observed that appointees have been progressively more negative toward the career service since the Eisenhower administration. This is due to many factors, among them the rise of the short-term presidency, limited PAS tenure, the ongoing trauma of dealing with a deficit in the billions of dollars, the inability of the neophyte PASs to use the career resources of their department, and expansion of political appointments down into the bureaucracy.
This latter factor often leads to lack of leadership, especially when political vacancies leave departments leaderless and unable to fight budget cuts. "With unfilled slots at the assistant secretaryships and below, newly appointed secretaries have little access to the kinds of information and expertise they need to win budget battles." Leaving the lower-level positions vacant can then easily sever the political-career connection and seriously weaken an agency. This can be both the outcome and design of a deliberate administrative strategy, one Reagan was quick to exploit (ibid., 163).
 
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There are numerous problems with the PAS system: Short-termers tend to live for the moment because that may be all they have, given their tenure patterns and lack of job security. With great expectations imposed upon them by the White House and little time to meet them, PASs have an incentive to care more about the immediate and leave the problems that perspective creates to the careerists and their political successors.
Another problem is that agencies' programmatic lives face what Heclo calls "cycles within cycles of discontinuity." Because PASs' success is not based primarily on the health of the agency they administer, "their comings and goings in the executive branch are more likely to be based on calculations of personal benefit rather than the needs of government. . . One result is that they] have enough time to make mistakes but often not enough time to put the resulting lessons to use." (Heclo 1987, 208). Further, because there are so many appointees at the lower levels, political authority is diffused, making it harder for higher-level appointees to work in an agency rife with lower-level appointees (ibid., 209).
Another problem is "creeping appointeeism-the reproduction of pint-sized political executives throughout government." The more PASs there are and the farther down into the bureaucracy the administration plants them, the less desirable political positions become. More experienced persons will not take the lower-level jobs; they become filled by people of lesser ability and "young climbers . . . who are resume-building for the private sector or higher-level political appointments." As Elliot Richardson observed in 1985, "This administration is full of turkeys who have undercut the quality of public service in their areas" (Pfiffner 1987c, 63).
Another problem is the tendency toward bias in recruitment due to the costs imposed on the individual PASs. Beyond the obvious oversupply of middle-aged, white male PASs of means are other issues, such as the types of persons who are able to accept these positions. Those who are younger and have fewer financial obligations can accept political appointments without sacrificing much, particularly if they are single or have an easily employable spouse. Nonlocals with young children will be reluctant to move to the District of Columbia, given the realities of its public school system and expensive private schools. Those who are older and established in their careers (generally already in Washington, and whose spouse may be employed there as well) can afford to take a brief break for government service. Also, those whose professional lives will be enhanced by it, such as those in academia or think tanks, are more able to take the time for government service. Others, however, will find it a liability to have served in an agency that regulates an industry in which
 
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they hope to be employed in postgovernment service. Further, ethics regulations place restrictions of one year or more on the type of work they can perform, post-PAS service. Others cannot afford the break in their careers or the drop in salary such positions may carry (Heclo 1987, 210-11).
The increase and downward filtration of PASs lead to what one PAS termed a bureaucratic lobotomy, because with a change of administrations or even the departure of a lower-level appointee, "the people who could educate the assistant secretaries were gone too," thus seriously hampering an agency's effectiveness (ibid., 208). According to Fred Malek, Nixon's personnel chief, "In many cases, the effectiveness of an agency would be improved and political appointments would be reduced by roughly 25% if line positions beneath the assistant secretary level were reserved for career officials" (Pfiffner 1987c, 63).
Additionally, the overabundance of lower-level PASs and their claims to a political mandate lead to devaluation of "the coin of political executive leadership" in others' eyes. As one Reagan PAS put it, somewhat wistfully, "Washington is filled with people who used to be something, so that we're not really anybody anymore" (Heclo 1987, 209).
There are other factors that contribute to make political jobs less desirable:
Washington positions, even when avidly sought, are generally seen as short-term appointments. They are accepted to cap a political avocation, to take a career break, or more often, as a duty which must be rendered to the party, candidate or nation. Although this may be changing, an executive rarely receives a tangible reward from his law firm or company for serving his country. He may even lose his place on the promotion ladder. (Rehfuss 1973, 131)
These factors make for a lessened commitment that imposes an additional bureaucratic burden on the system in terms of energy and shortened tenure.
There are other pressures on the PASs. As they work at the pleasure of the president, there is no job security, legal recourse if fired, or severance provisions. The workload is intense, with work weeks of sixty to seventy hours the norm. PASs' actions are subject to second-guessing in Washington's fishbowl atmosphere, with press and professional peers watching every move. Rehfuss's evaluation of the situation in 1973 is no less relevant today: "A reputation can be made and unmade in a few short days, and the necessity of protecting one's positions from attack is always present" (ibid., 135).
The crucial asymmetry between PASs and careerists discussed in

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