The Real Chief - Liam Lynch (8 page)

Piaras Beaslaí, in his book
Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland
, stated that Liam Lynch and some of his officers went to GHQ some time before the truce and reported that owing to shortage of arms, ammunition and enemy pressure they were un­able to continue the fight.
8
This statement was inaccu­rate. Flor­ence O'Donoghue of No. 2 brigade confirmed that he had seen a letter from Liam Lynch in which he asked for ‘a few rifles' and said, ‘We will soon be in a very bad way for .303 as we had hard luck in captures recently.' Another letter from Cork No. 3 read that they were urgently in need of .303, adding ‘to a certain ex­tent we are held up by the want of this and harassed to a terrible extent by the enemy.' O'Donoghue was aware that Liam Lynch had not been directly consulted for an opinion, and believed it was untrue that they were ‘unable to continue the fight' as Beaslaí had stated. (O'Donoghue accepted Beaslaí's as­surance that his original statement was made in good faith and under a misapprehension of the facts.)
9

Tom Barry, in
Guerrilla Days in Ireland,
said, ‘No deputation of southern officers ever visited GHQ ... It is a fact that Lynch never left the First Southern Division area in all those months. Furthermore, no brigade or battalion officer from Kerry, Cork or Waterford brigades visited Dublin or GHQ between the end of March and the truce except myself towards the end of May and Seán Buckley in May ... Every Divisional and Brigade officer in the south rejects completely Beaslaí's statement about Liam Lynch.'
10

Shortage of arms was, of course, an acute problem. Complications had arisen with the shipment of arms which was being or­ganised by Donal Hales in Italy. Madge Hales, Donal's sister, went to Italy and personally returned to Collins with infor­ma­tion of the cancellation of the shipment.
11
As Madge Hales' dis­patch was by word of mouth, and, because of the usual secrecy in IRA circles, she did not inform anybody else, but it does seem extraordinary that Michael Collins did not pass the information on to either Tom Barry or to Liam Deasy who were organising the intake, transport and dumps, together with the scouts along the route, and also that he did not inform Liam Lynch who was the commander of the First Southern Division and to whom the receipt of the proposed shipment of arms was of vital importance.

There is no doubt that Collins was aware of the important role played by the flying columns in the Cork brigades and other southern regions. Nevertheless, these men in the south had not been consulted about their true positions and their true inten­tions for the future. Were there some seeds sown here which were to spring to life at a later stage during the Civil War when men like Deasy, Barry, Lynch and other officers decided to conti­nue the conflict?

It does appear as if Lynch, Barry, Deasy and other officers in the Southern Division, while they would have welcomed a truce, would only have welcomed a short truce. They were prepared to continue the fight, which they felt would bring success, as their intelligence service was now superior to that of the British. They had people inside the corridors of power transmitting infor­ma­tion to the IRA. Years later, Barry, Deasy and many men who were involved in the fight for independence, were convinced that had there been a shorter truce followed by a renewal of the armed conflict, the British might have been forced to enter into a more meaningful treaty which, with hindsight, could possibly have stopped the Civil War. The IRA was, by this time, tougher, more experienced and more immune to hardship. Extra men were coming on full-time active service: combat experience was more widespread, and with the majority of the civilian popu­lation be­hind them the columns were able to move more freely. Food and clothing for the men on active duty was provided by Cumann na mBan and houses throughout all brigade areas be­came safe bil­leting depots.

In 1920 and the first half of 1921 the British establishment gave the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries free reign in Ireland when they allowed them to terrorise the Irish people. They browbeat, insulted, murdered and maimed civilians as well as the IRA in order to create a climate of despair.

In
Ireland For Ever
Brigadier General Crozier said, ‘Never before had the RIC been used so ruthlessly and at times surreptitiously, to destroy and create a new note of anguish in the coun­try.'
1
Not alone did terror fail but public opinion in England dis­liked what was happening.

Early in April 1921 Lord French gave an interview to the
Daily Express
in which he admitted that the volunteers were an army ‘properly organised in regiment and brigade, led by dis­ci­plined officers.' Significant also was the fact that their volun­tary army had taken the initiative and was confronting the occu­pa­tion forces with many new, unexpected tactics. The British government discovered that the tactics adopted kept their forces under a perpetual strain. This type of guerrilla warfare was totally at variance with anything that they had previously experienced.

British foreign relations in America and elsewhere were be­ginning to incur disfavour, therefore their alternative was to use unlimited military force under a reign of martial law or to en­gage in some form of settlement. General Macready suggested to the British government that, if a solution was not reached by July, martial law would be imposed throughout the entire coun­try with the exception of the Ulster counties. This would mean reinforc­ing the garrison with an additional nineteen battalions and a strong force of marines. British army strength in Ireland would then be brought to 80,000 men, but he felt 150,000 would be essential if a military regime were to succeed.
2
Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the chief of the imperial general staff from 1918 to 1921 wrote:

18 May 1921. I said that directly England was safe, every available man should go to Ireland that even four battalions now serving on the Rhine ought also to go to Ireland. I said that the measures taken up to now had been quite inadequate, that I was terrified at the state of the country, and that in my opinion, unless we crushed out the murder gang this summer we shall lose Ireland and the Empire.
3

Winston Churchill, then secretary of state for the colonies, told the cabinet:

One hundred thousand new special troops must be raised, thou­sands of motorcars must be armed and equipped; the three south­ern provinces of Ireland must be closely laced with cordons of bloc­kades and barbed wire: a systematic rummaging and question­ing of every individual must be put in force.

But towards the end of June it was obvious to the British that some form of compromise was necessary. The lord chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, speaking in the British House of Lords on 24 June 1921 said:

... if I must speak frankly, I think that the history of the last three months has been the history of the failure of our military method to keep pace with and overcome the military methods which have been taken by our opponents.

C. J. C. Street, imperial activist, intelligence officer and advisor to Lloyd George wrote later:

There were only two alternatives, to come to terms with Sinn Féin or exterminate its armed forces.
4

The British forces did not seem to be able to exterminate or to beat the Irish volunteers and a truce was declared.

Liam Lynch was at division HQ at Coolea when official notification of a truce reached him on 10 July 1921. Immediately he issued the necessary order for the cessation of hostilities in his brigade to come into force at 12 noon the next day.

Were it not for this order his former brigade might have pul­led off the greatest success in his region. Paddy O'Brien with eighty officers and men from five battalion columns had some days previously marched into West Limerick and, in co-opera­tion with West Limerick units, laid an ambush near Temple­glantine. For several days the column had lain in wait without finding a target. But they were prepared to wait.

Upon receipt of notification O'Brien called his section com­manders together and asked for their views regarding taking up positions on the morning of 11 July 1921. All were eager to do so, and the column went into position. At 11.35 the column com­mander instructed the section commanders to withdraw their sec­tions. The truce was to come into being at 12 o'clock. At 12.15 the British convoy arrived on the scene and passed some of the dispersing groups on the road; not a shot was fired. The struggle towards agreement was now in the hands of the dip­lo­mats.

During the previous years, many volunteers throughout Ire­land had displayed courage and determination, had fought and died for the Republic. But the south had earned a Republic more than any other part of Ireland. In Liam Lynch's division, 193 officers and men were killed, twice that number wounded and about 2,000 interned or sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In the face of those losses they had, under many other and varied dif­ficulties, continued to strike at the occupation forces so vigo­rously and persistently that responsible British military com­manders were convinced of the necessity for immense reinforce­ments if their defeat was to be achieved.

In the March 1921, issue of
An tÓglach
a tribute was paid to the men of the south. ‘The Cork brigades have proved them­selves to have reached a level of military efficiency which make them a match for the most highly trained soldiers in the world. An example has been set which every brigade in Ireland should strive to emulate.'
5

The first reaction to the truce was one of optimism. Officers and men in Lynch's division had for the previous eighteen months concentrated their attention and energy upon the fight to such an extent that all other considerations, personal and national, were excluded. In their optimism, the people of the south be­lieved that England had at last decided, in calling a truce, to eva­cuate her armed forces from the country, and that this would lead to the establishment of a freely functioning Republic.

Men close to Liam Lynch later expressed their opinion that in Lynch's view the truce came a little too soon; however Lynch expected that the respite would be short and that soon the con­flict would be renewed. It was his belief that England was not yet ready for a full settlement and as he continually said he would not contemplate the possibility of any settlement on terms which gave Ireland less than sovereign independence. ‘We are and must be prepared to fight to the last for that,' he wrote in a letter to his brother, Tom. ‘In justice to the yet unborn as well as to the dead past we have no other authority but to fight on a fight thank God which never for generations seemed more hopeful than now as the Empire is heaving with trouble ...'
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An air of relaxation and a general feeling of freedom and opti­mism permeated the countryside during the summer of 1921. With the termination of curfew and of the prohibition of fairs and markets, movement and a form of order was restored. Nor­mal trade and commerce created a sense of relief in the public mind. Men who had been out on active service over the past years were at last free to go about without being hampered in their activities. But as time progressed and negotiations in Lon­don between the Irish and British delegates proceeded, a dispassionate assessment of the situation was to become more difficult. As far as Liam Lynch was concerned the fight against the British government was not yet over. Quick to realise the danger of apathy, he started to combat any tendency towards relaxation in his division. Training camps were established and an expanded series of inspections were inaugurated. He discouraged men, as far as it was possible, from coming out into the open.

British tact showed itself in the establishment of liaison officers. These were appointed by both sides to supervise the ob­ser­vance of the terms of the truce. By doing so they recognised the IRA as an army and not as a group of rebellious civilians. During this truce period division HQ had been moved from its wartime location at Sweeneys, Coolea to O'Sullivans, Lombard­stown on 2 July.

Liam had had very little contact with home over the past year and he now returned home for his brother's ordination on 11 June and stayed for two days. He was again able to meet his girlfriend, Bridie Keyes and the pair had much to discuss, includ­ing the prospect of marriage. His hope was that future discussions between both governments would reach a final settlement, and that his days of guerilla warfare would be finally over, so that he could at last settle down and have a future with Bridie. He was thankful to have survived the War of Independence, but sensed an anti-climax.

Richard Mulcahy, chief-of-staff, visited him at division HQ in early August and during the following week the two men inspected units of the Cork and Kerry brigades. Later that month De Valera visited division HQ and, with Liam and a few more officers, over the following three days, made a tour of the scene of the principal actions in the division. At each place the columns, which had participated were mobilised under arms and congratu­lated by De Valera. Liam was proud and happy. There was no sign of a break in national unity. The future seemed hopeful. Even the
Irish Times
acknowledged a changed Ireland!

For good or evil the old Ireland is gone. Instead of this there is a young people with new qualities and also with new defects ... none of the efforts that have been made to divide the people have succeeded. On the contrary, they have vindicated the strength of the national ideal.

On the evening of 18 August 1921, Liam was driving back from Bandon when he was held up at Ballinhassig by three cars of mili­­tary personnel. The district inspector in charge demanded that he produce a British permit for use of the car (one of the restric­tions enforced under martial law). Liam demanded the right, as an Irish army officer, to use his own transport without an enemy permit just as British officers ‘do without our permits'. Neverthe­less, he was taken to Bandon barracks and detained there until 1.30 next day, when, following a phone message from Dub­lin Castle, he and his driver were released.

Afterwards, he wrote to his brother, ‘I enjoyed the time with the Tans and the D.I. as the truce feeling prevailed all round. We even discussed the possibility of again meeting them face to face in a clash with arms.'
1

But Liam still felt that the truce was only temporary. Plan­ning to go to a dance in Mitchelstown, to meet old friends, espe­cially Bridie Keyes, he wrote, ‘I believe that after a few weeks I may have a poor chance of seeing them again. It is also my in­ten­tion to run home if possible.'
2
His brother Tom came home shortly after the truce and Liam, excusing himself for not being home on that occasion, wrote, ‘somehow I would consider it a national sin when there is work to be done.'

With Seán Moylan, Liam was on his way to Dublin for Tom Barry's wedding when his car broke down. They arrived late, so they weren't present for the historic photograph on 22 August 1921. But it was a memorable, social occasion.

After a visit to Dublin in mid-September, he expressed a feel­­ing to his comrades that national unity was within sight ‘though there may be a resumption of the struggle in arms.'
3

To his brother Tom he wrote:

You may rest assured that our government as well as the army is out for the Republic and nothing less, and that without a rest on our oars either. We are and must be prepared to fight to the last for that ...
4

Subsequent to the assembly of the second Dáil in the Mansion House, Dublin, De Valera and Lloyd George entered into a series of communications. On 14 September Dáil Éireann sanctioned the appointment of delegates and negotiations commenced in London on 11 October 1921. (The Irish delegates were Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, George Gavan-Duffy, Robert Barton and Éamon Duggan.)
5

It was October before Liam was again able to visit home. On this occasion he went to Ballylanders Races. Congratulations were heaped on him by locals, but Liam viewed the newfound patriot­ism of many with a jaundiced eye:

I don't give a damn about these people when it comes to praise or notoriety, and they are making the hell of a mistake if they think I forget their actions during the war. I remember at one time in the best areas where it was next to impossible to find a bed to lie on.'
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Liam appeared happiest when he was among army men as within the movement he found warmth and friendship. He balanced the integrity of the men within the conflict with the insincerity of some of those who were outside.

He spent much of October and November in IRA organisational activities and conferences both in the Southern Division and at GHQ. His ability and integrity impressed the Dáil cabi­net so much, that at the end of November 1921, he was offered the position as commander-in-chief of the army. (This would mean Richard Mulcahy, chief-of-staff, would be sub-ordinate to him.)

As Michael Collins and his comrades wrestled in London with the culmination of the treaty debates, Liam apparently anti­cipating the resumption of war against Britain, wrote to Cathal Brugha:

Headquarters,

1st Southern Division,

6th December, 1921.

To the Minister for Defence

It is after serious consideration I acquaint you that I cannot under present circumstances accept the commission you offer me.

I feel that the Commander-in-Chief and his staff cannot do their duty when they are not placed in a position to do so. I may have wrong views of the duties of a Commander-in-Chief and Minister for Defence, if so I will put up with the result. I painfully realise the consequences of the present relations between Cabinet and GHQ Staff, therefore I cannot act blindly in the matter and be responsible for directing general operation policy. At the present moment when war may be resumed at short notice I have got no general directions.

When the situation is cleared up to the Brigade Comman­dants in this Division I shall be pleased to be relieved of my present responsibility.

Liam Lynch Commandant.
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This letter from Lynch seems to imply that tension existed be­tween the cabinet and GHQ, and that Lynch at this period and subsequently maintained that control of the army should be free from cabinet interference.

On 6 December 1921 the Articles of Agreement for a treaty – which required an oath of allegiance to a British monarch dis­established the Republic and partitioned Ireland – were signed. Where British arms had failed, British diplomacy had won. A chapter in Irish history was closed and another, more bitter was about to begin.