The Real Chief - Liam Lynch (11 page)

Since the early months of 1922 IRB conferences had been held in Dublin in an effort to save the organisation from disruption on the issue of the treaty. These conferences, called by the supreme council, comprised members of that body, together with the division and county centres of the entire organisation. At these conferences, the first of which took place on 10 January 1922, a large majority of the members were in favour of the treaty, but both views of the issue were debated with restraint and com­mend­­­­able objectivity.

Liam Lynch and Michael Collins were the principal prota­gonists of the two opposing viewpoints at these conferences, each respecting the others' apparent immovable position. Be­cause of a sense of brotherhood, born out of their intimate asso­ciation dur­ing the great national struggle of the past years, words of bitter­ness and anger were held in check. They both wanted, above all, to work together; but they failed. It was a failure for two great men who loved Ireland: a failure, which brought about catas­trophe and sadness and led to the death of both men.

On 18 March the same IRB body met again, this time be­neath the shadow of the cabinet's prohibition on the holding of the army convention, and in the knowledge that the con­vention would be held despite the ban. Michael Collins bore a large share of the responsibility for the cabinet's decision, and Liam Lynch a great share of the responsibility for the action which caused the convention to be prohibited: despite this, the two men met again in an atmosphere which, although strained, was still dominated by the spirit of the organisation. Both men, to a large extent, wielded power but neither could arrest disaster.

Collins had decided to accept the treaty and all that it en­tailed. Lynch had decided that, whether or not the people ac­cepted the treaty, the army would not be committed to it, there­by holding a stance, under an Executive, until a constitution was drafted which would enable them to continue in allegiance to the Republic, when it could be truly called a Republic.

The second conference had adjourned without taking any de­cisions other than that the same body should meet again a month later. At the conference, which met on 19 April, the two chiefs-of-staff (of both divisions of the army) Lynch and Mul­cahy, sat together. The chairman asked each individual for his views as to whether the position had changed in any material way since the previous meeting. Because of the deteriorating situ­­ation, which existed throughout the country, heated ex­changes erupted between some of those present. The meeting was tense and explosive. Collins was extremely calm. According to him, the only suggestion the supreme council had to put be­fore the meet­ing was that a committee should be appointed by the meeting to consider the constitution which would be avail­able in three to four weeks. This committee, would in turn, report to the supreme council and summon a further meeting to discuss the constitu­tion. Liam Lynch immediately rejected this sug­ges­tion. ‘What was the point in waiting for three weeks for a Con­stitution which might not alter the position in any way?' He would have to take action, he said, unless there was a guarantee that the constitu­tion would be a Republican one. Florence O'Donoghue sug­gested the appointment of a committee of six, three from each side, pro-treaty and anti-treaty, and this com­mittee would try to find a basis of army reunification and report back to a further meeting. Agreement was reached on this point. (Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Florence O'Donoghue, Seán Ó Murthille, Martin Conlon, Liam Lynch and Joe McKelvey formed the com­mittee.)

When the committee met the following day at 41 Parnell Square a suggestion was put forward that a truce between the two sections in the army would help towards reunification. Lynch, however, expressed the view that unless an overall basis of agree­ment could be found, a truce would be of little service. He held the view that any basis for unity should embrace all the national organisations such as the IRB, the army, Sinn Féin. His belief was that an acceptable solution would require the bodies to re­unite in allegiance to the existing Republic and reject the treaty. Being a realist, he had little hope of such a solution, but he still sought a way of avoiding Civil War.

This committee held four subsequent meetings, and these were ineffectual. Neither the constitution nor an indication of draft proposals was submitted. The proposal of pro-treaty nomi­nees (Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Seán Ó Murthille, Liam Tobin, Mar­tin Conlon) was rejected by Liam Lynch on the basis that being a secret organisation (IRB) these pro-treaty nominees could not act on behalf of that army with any binding authority.

At a further meeting it was agreed that it would serve no use­ful purpose to have prominent officers from both sides meet until a constitution was drawn up and the suggestion was made that hostilities on both sides be suspended. However, Lynch was ada­mant that, without guarantees, he could not wait a fortnight for a constitution: the wait had already been too long, he con­tend­ed, and it was now time for action. He said that events were gaining momentum in the south, which needed immediate at­ten­tion. Further, he asked for a guarantee from the other side that, within two days, they would maintain the independence of Ireland and produce a Republican constitution: the continuance of these meetings in the absence of a constitution was, he said, worthless. The maintenance of the Republic was of vital impor­tance, and the Free State should not be allowed come into exis­tence.

Throughout the country other groups sought some common ground in an effort to unite both sides. Officers who had taken an active part in the War of Independence and who were now on opposite sides held meetings in an effort to prevent a split. Dan Breen presided over many conferences. On the evening of 1 May, following a series of conferences on the last days of April, ten offi­cers, five from each side, met and agreed to sign a document which stated that in order to ‘avert this catastrophe we believe that a closing of the ranks all round is necessary.'
1
The document further suggested army unification on the basis ‘that the majority of the people of Ireland were willing to accept the treaty', consequently there should be ‘an agreed election' with a view to form­ing an acceptable government.
2
Liam Lynch was, at this stage, beginning to distrust all efforts for reunification of the army as his only concern was ‘the maintenance of the Republic'.

Subsequent to this agreed document, the army council issued a statement from the Four Courts, now Republican headquarters, expressing the opinion that:

Attempts to make ‘deals' with individual soldiers cannot result in unity; they can only intensify existing disunion ... The Executive elected by the army has the duty imposed on it ... it will deal with all efforts to reach unity, but it must be realised that unity cannot be bought at the expense of honour and principle.

On 3 May a deputation of five officers, representing the signa­tories of the appeal for unity, was admitted to Dáil Éireann. Seán O'Hegarty, on their behalf, addressed an assembly which, though divided on the treaty issue, was still strongly Republican in senti­ment. It was an appeal for a solution to avert a Civil War, which was now threatening the country. This led to the appointment by Dáil Éireann of a committee of ten in an effort to find a basis for unity.
3

At 1.25 on 4 May the following statement was issued: ‘A truce is declared on and from 4 p.m. today until 4 p.m. on Mon­day next with a view to giving both sections of the army an im­me­­diate opportunity of discovering a basis for army unification' [which were listed under three headings and signed by Liam Lynch and Owen O'Duffy].
4

On 8 May a joint statement, signed by Liam Lynch and Owen O'Duffy, ordered a continuation of the truce indefinitely ‘with a view to allow the army and Dáil committees to bring their work to completion'.
5

The joint committee which had been formed on 4 May (con­­­sisting of Liam Lynch, Liam Mellows, Seán Moylan, Rory O'Con­­nor, Séamus Robinson, Michael Collins, Richard Mul­cahy, Diarmuid O'Hegarty, Owen O'Duffy, Gearóid O'Sullivan and Seán Mac Eoin) reached an agreement that all prisoners held by both sides who had not been charged with civil offences should be released forthwith and that buildings in Dublin, other than the Four Courts, occupied by Republicans, should be evacu­ated. In allowing the Four Courts to continue to be held, Lynch felt that there was a consensus of agreement, therefore he hoped that an accepted settlement would be reached.

‘There can be unity if all forces will uphold the established Republic now as in the past,' he wrote in a letter to his god­mother, Hannah Cleary. He said that the sacrifices of the past few years would be in vain if the Free State was accepted. ‘At the moment I have hopes that the pro-treaty people have seen the error of their ways and that they will come to terms that will not let down the Republic. However, we cannot go back to a recur­rence of last week, as some other way than Civil War must be found.'

A joint signed statement by Lynch and O'Duffy ordered the continuation of the truce, ‘both sides to co-operate to maintain order to prevent acts of aggression against person or property'.

A letter dated 8 May to Lynch in the Four Courts from the Third Northern Division speaks ‘from our point of view' in the north ‘war conditions exist at GHQ. I consider it is up to you to issue orders to your following to fall in line with the majority and to fight under one command ... I would like the Chief-of-Staff and yourself to visit the Third Northern' as ‘the army split is hav­ing a detrimental effect in the North ...'
6
The ten-member com­mittee, following their approach to Dáil Éireann on 10 May, re­ported that there were two points on which they had reached agree­ment.

In summary:

(1) All legislators, Executive and judicial authority in Ireland, is and shall be, derived solely from the people of Ireland;

(2) That Dáil Éireann is a supreme governing authority in Ireland.

However, they did not find any basis of national unity, because according to Richard Mulcahy, ‘our document ignored cause of split in army which they allege is the Treaty ...'
7

The full reports on other points such as those dealing with elections were read to the Dáil. Dáil Éireann cabinet requested that the committees make a further effort towards unity. It was evident from the reports, which were debated in the Dáil on 17 May that an effort was being made to find some means of bridg­ing the gap, which had been created since the treaty debates. Dáil Éireann cabinet requested that De Valera and Collins should re-examine the proposal. The two men sat in conference on 18 and 19 May at University College, Dublin, and on the afternoon of 20 May, they reached agreement and signed the Pact. The nation greeted the news with profound relief.

There was now a new incentive for Lynch and the army negotiators to continue their task of building on a sound base. The Pact would provide for the creation of a coalition parli­ament and government in which both pro-treaty and anti-treaty ele­ments would be represented in proportion to their existing strength. During the weeks that followed, negotiations for army unity continued with Liam at the forefront of these negotiations. Proposals and counter-proposals were discussed, and various drafts and amendments drawn up until eventually in the first week of June documents were submitted by Liam Lynch and Seán Moy­lan.
8
Lynch, in his memorandum, called for the main­tenance of an Irish Republic under the auspices of the govern­ment of the Republic; the IRA as the army ‘under the control of an inde­pendent Executive'; both these bodies would maintain a working agreement. This broadly represented the negotiating position initiated by Lynch along army Executive lines.
9

Seán Moylan in his ten proposals, listed a number of proce­dures, among them the ‘re-organisation staff' to be appointed under Liam Lynch, as deputy chief-of-staff, to re-organise the army ‘with instructions that all inefficient officers be dispensed with.'

A third document of general army proposals and the per­sonnel of the proposed army council and GHQ staff was put for­ward by the pro-treaty representatives (Collins, Mulcahy and O'Duffy) which dealt with appointments and general duties and activities within the army. In the ‘Final Proposals for Agreement' members of an army council including Liam Lynch as deputy chief-of-staff were listed and were to be ‘specially charged with re-or­gani­sation'.
10

During these prolonged negotiations both sides had made considerable efforts to meet the others' viewpoint. Representa­tives of the pro-treaty view had conceded the right of the army to hold periodic conventions, with the freedom to elect an army council. Of the six principal members of the GHQ staff, three would have been pro-treaty and three anti-treaty. As Eoin O'Duffy had tendered his resignation on 22 May to become com­missioner of the garda síochána, Liam Lynch would then succeed him as chief-of-staff and Liam Deasy as deputy.
11
Indeed, this position was favoured by Collins according to Liam Deasy, who believed that Collins would have liked to see Lynch as chief-of-staff.

Of the five principal staff officers of the army council three were to be anti-treaty and two pro-treaty. After long and anxious consideration, Liam Lynch accepted this basis of settlement. In­deed negotiations had gone into deadlock previous to the sign­ing of the Pact, but the introduction of the Pact meant that parli­ament and government would derive their authority directly from the votes of the people, as happened in the first and second Dáil. This arrangement ultimately led to Lynch's acceptance of the final proposals for army council agreement.
12

He wrote to his brother: