The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (119 page)

2192.
Italics added. For a listing of the 12 detainees,
see
CIA’s six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” which lists 12 detainees, all of whom are listed as being in “CIA Custody” (DTS #2011-2004).

2193.
Italics added. CIA records indicate that none of the three CIA detainees known to have been subjected by the CIA to the waterboard interrogation technique provided unique intelligence on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. To the contrary, there is significant evidence that two of the three detainees—Abu Zubaydah and KSM—failed to provide accurate information likely known to them about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and/or fabricated information to protect al-Kuwaiti. The third CIA detainee known to have been subjected to the CIA’s waterboard interrogation technique, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, provided no information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.

2194.
Italics added. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “CIA has never represented that information acquired through its interrogations of detainees was either the first or the only information that we had on Abu Ahmad.”

2195.
Italics added. CIA testimony from CIA Director Panetta, and transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049).

2196.
CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for █████ phone number #█████ ALEC █████ (240057Z AUG 02).

2197.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including CIA record (“Call Details Incoming and Outgoing”) relating to calling activity for ████ phone number #█████; ALEC ████ (240057Z AUG 02); [REDACTED] 65902 (080950Z AUG 02); ALEC ████ (092204Z AUG 02); ████████ dated 17 September 2001; [REDACTED] 60077 (09/17/2001); DIRECTOR █████ (221240Z AUG 02); and DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02).

2198.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including DIRECTOR ████ (251833Z JUN 02). As described above, Riyadh the Facilitator was eventually rendered into the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in January 2004, but CIA records indicate he was not subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. The referenced information was provided in June 2002, while Riyadh the Facilitator was not in U.S. custody, but in the custody of a foreign government.

2199.
Senator McCain and other members requested information on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in the UBL operation at the previous day’s hearing and the CIA committed to provide additional information to the members. Senator McCain: “I’m also interested in this whole issue of the ‘enhanced interrogation,’ what role it played. Those who want to justify torture seem to have grabbed hold of this as some justification for our gross violation of the Geneva Conventions to which we are signatory. I’d be very interested in having that issue clarified. I think it’s really important.”
See
transcript of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee briefing on May 4, 2011 (DTS #2011-2049).

2200.
See
CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). See
also
a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.” The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence (
See
DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: “In sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information
after
being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), although of the 13 only two (KSM and Abu Zubaydah) had been waterboarded” (italics added). As described, the information in this CIA “lessons” report is inaccurate.

2201.
Italics added. “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).

2202.
The CIA document identified “Tier 1” intelligence as information that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” but inaccurately included CIA detainees under the “Tier 1” detainee reporting list who did not provide information linking “Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin.” For example, the CIA identified Abu Zubaydah and KSM as providing “Tier 1” intelligence that “linked Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin,” despite both detainees denying any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL.

2203.
Riyadh the Facilitator (information on June 25, 2002 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody January █, 2004), Ammar al-Baluchi (information on May 6, 2003 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody May █, 2003), Ahmed Ghailani (information on August 1, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September █, 2004), Sharif al-Masri (information on September 16, 2004 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody September ██, 2004), and Muhammad Rahim (information on July 2, 2007 [prior to CIA custody]; CIA custody July ██, 2007). There are reports that a sixth detainee, Hassan Ghul, also provided extensive information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional information.

2204.
DIRECTOR ████ (221240Z AUG 02).

2205.
Ammar al-Baluchi, Hassan Ghul, Ahmad Ghallani, Sharif al-Masri, and Muhammad Rahim.

2206.
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.

2207.
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: “. . . with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no role.” CIA records indicate Khallad bin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti serving as acourier for UBL.

2208.
DIRECTOR ████ (8/25/2005). On July 7, 2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” and denied knowing the name.

2209.
See
CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). See
also
a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.”
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II for additional details.

2210.
See
CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004).
See also
a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.” The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,”compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence (DTS #2012-3826), appears to utilize the same inaccurate information, stating: “In sum, 25 detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, his al-Qa’ida membership, and his historic role as a courier for Bin Ladin. Nine of the 25 were held by foreign governments. Of the 16 held in CIA custody, all but three had given information
after
being subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) . . .” (italics added). As described, the information in this CIA “Lessons Learned” report is inaccurate.

2211.
Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, who was detained in May 2002, first provided intelligence on al-Kuwaiti on June 4/5 2002, and was subsequently transferred to CIA custody on June █, 2002; and subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques in October 2002. Hambali, who was detained on August 11, 2003, first provided information on al-Kuwaiti on August 13, 2003. Later, Hambali was rendered to CIA custody on August █, 2003.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including 63211 (30 JAN 2002).

2212.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ███████ 63211 (30 JAN 2002).

2213.
DIRECTOR ████ (221240Z AUG 02).

2214.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting from Riyadh the Facilitator, Ammar al-Baluchi, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, and Hambali. As detailed, a former CIA officer stated publicly that Hassan Ghul provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to being transferred to CIA custody.

2215.
“Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).

2216.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including reporting from Ammar al-Baluchi, Ahmad Ghailani, Sharif al-Masri, Muhammad Rahim, Ridha al-Najjar/al-Tunisi, Hambali, and Hassan Ghul.

2217.
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Khalid bin Attash, Abu Yasir al-Jaza’iri, Samir al-Barq, and Abu Faraj al-Libi.

2218.
Khalid Shaykh Mohammad, Abu Faraj al-Libi, and Khalid bin Attash.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II and CIA testimony from May 4, 2011. CIA officer: “. . . with the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Khalid Shaykh Mohammed, these are key bin Ladin facilitators, gatekeepers if you will, and their description of Abu Ahmed, the sharp contrast between that and the earlier detainees. Abu Faraj denies even knowing him, a completely uncredible position for him to take but one that he has stuck with to this day. KSM initially downplays any role Abu Ahmed might play, and by the time he leaves our program claims that he married in 2002, retired and really was playing no role.” CIA records indicate Khallad bin Attash also downplayed the role of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, stating several times that Abu Ahmad was focused on family and was not close to UBL, and that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti serving as a courier for UBL.

2219.
Abu Yasir ai-Jaza’iri provided corroborative information in July 2003 that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was associated with KSM, was best known in Karachi, and appeared to be Pakistani. (
See
DIRECTOR ████ (111632Z JUL 03).) Samir al-Barq provided information in September 2003 that al-Kuwaiti had provided al-Barq with $1000 to obtain a house in Karachi that al-Qa’ida could use for a biological weapons lab. (
See
████47409 (191324Z NOV03), as well as the detainee review of Samir al-Barq in Volume III that details al-Barq’s various statements on al-Qa’ida’s ambition to establish a biological weapons program.) Neither of these reports is cited in CIA records as providing unique or new information. In October 2003, both detainees denied having any information on the use of Abbottabad as a safe haven for al-Qa’ida.
See
██████ 10172 (160821Z OCT 03); 48444 (240942Z OCT 03).

2220.
DIRECTOR (8/25/2005). On July 7, 2003, and April 27, 2004, Abu Zubaydah was asked about “Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” and denied knowing the name.

2221.
“Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” dated September 2012, compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, and provided on October 3, 2012 (DTS #2012-3826).

2222.
In addition to “Abu Ahmad K.” being included in Abu Zubaydah’s address book, there was additional reporting indicating that Abu Zubaydah had some knowledge of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. For example, on October 12, 2004, another CIA detainee explained how he met al-Kuwaiti at a guesthouse that was operated by Ibn Shaykh al-Libi and Abu Zubaydah in 1997.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.

2223.
See
DIRECTOR ████ (252024Z AUG 05) and the intelligence chronology in Volume II.

2224.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II, including ALEC ████ (102238Z MAR 03); HEADQUARTERS ████ (█████ JAN 04); ████ 29986 (171741Z AUG 05); ███████ 5594 (201039Z MAY 07).

2225.
As the dissemination of 21 intelligence reports suggests, information in CIA records indicates Hassan Ghul was cooperative with CIA personnel prior to being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. In an interview with the CIA Office of Inspector General, a CIA officer familiar with Ghul stated, “He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.” (
See
December 2, 2004, interview with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ███████████) The CIA’s September 2012 “Lessons from the Hunt for Bin Ladin,” compiled by the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence (DTS #2012-3826), states that: “Ghul’s tantalizing lead began a systematic but low profile effort to target and further identify Abu Ahmad.” On April 16, 2013, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a forum in relation to the screening of the film, “Manhunt.” The forum included former CIA officer Nada Bakos, who states in the film that Hassan Ghul provided the critical information on Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti to Kurdish officials prior to entering CIA custody. When asked about the interrogation techniques used by the Kurds, Bakos stated: “. . . honestly, Hassan Ghul . . . when he was being debriefed by the Kurdish government, he literally was sitting there having tea. He was in a safe house. He wasn’t locked up in a cell. He wasn’t handcuffed to anything. He was—he was having a free flowing conversation. And there’s—you know, there’s articles in Kurdish papers about sort of their interpretation of the story and how forthcoming he was.”
See
www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/film-screening-manhunt/p30560. When asked by the Committee to comment on this narrative, the CIA wrote on October 25, 2013: “We have not identified any information in our holdings suggesting that Hassan Gul first provided information on Abu Ahmad while in ████ [foreign] custody.”
See
DTS #2013-3152.