The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (120 page)

2226.
██████████ 21753 ███████.

2227.
██████████ 21815 ███████; ███████ 21753 ██████; HEADQUARTERS ███ ████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1642 █████ JAN 04); DIRECTOR ███ █████ JAN 04).

2228.
For details on the reports,
See
███████████ 54194 █████ JAN 04); ███████████████ 1644 █████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ████ ██████ JAN 04); ████████ ██████ 1645 ████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS, ████ █████ JAN 04); ██████████ 1646 ██████ JAN 04), later released as HEADQUARTERS ████ █████ JAN 04); █████████ CIA ███ █████ FEB 04); ████████████ 1650 ████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1651 ████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1652 █████ JAN 04), later released as █████████ DIRECTOR ████ █████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1654 ████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1655 █████ JAN 04), later released as ██████████ CIA ███ ████ FEB 04); █████████ 1657 ███T JAN 04); ████████████ 1677 █████ JAN 04) █████████████ 1680 ████ JAN 04); █████████ 1681 ██████ JAN 04), later released as ██████████ CIA ███ █████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1685 █████ JAN 04), later released as ███████████ CIA ███ ██████; ███████████ 1687 ██████ JAN 04), later released as ██████████ CIA ████ █████ FEB 04); ███████████ 1688 ██████ JAN 04), later released as ██████████ CIA ███████ FEB 04); ██████████ 1690 ██████ JAN 04); ███████████ 1656 █████ JAN 04); ████████████ 1678 █████ JAN 04).

2229.
See December 2, 2004, CIA Office of Inspector General with [REDACTED], Chief, DO, CTC UBL Department, ██████████, in which a CIA officer involved with the interrogations of Hassan Ghul, states: “He sang like a tweetie bird. He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset.”

2230.
HEADQUARTERS ███ ████ JAN 04).

2231.
███████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04).

2232.
███████████ 1679 ████ JAN 04).

2233.
HEADQUARTERS ████ ████ JAN 04).

2234.
███████ 1283 ████ JAN 04 █. ██████████████████████████████████████████████████████████████ DETENTION SITE BLACK ██████████████████████████████████.

2235.
█████████ 1285 ██████ JAN 04).

2236.
█████████ 1285 ██████ JAN 04).

2237.
██████ 1285 █████ JAN 04).

2238.
HEADQUARTERS ████ (███ JAN 04).

2239.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume 11. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that “[a]fter undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques,” Hassan Ghul provided information that became “more concrete and less speculative, it also corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa’ida in 2002.” The assertion in the CIA’s June 2013 Response that information acquired from Hassan Ghul “[a]fter undergoing enhanced interrogation techniques” “corroborated information from Ammar that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) was lying when he claimed Abu Ahmad left al-Qa’ida in 2002” is incorrect. First, the referenced information from Hassan Ghul was acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. A CIA cable, HEADQUARTERS █████ (█████ JAN 04), explains that based on Hassan Ghul’s comments that it was “well known” that UBL was always with al-Kuwaiti (acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques), CIA Headquarters asked interrogators to reengage KSM on the relationship between al-Kuwaiti and UBL, noting the “serious disconnect” between Hassan Ghul’s comments and KSM’s “pithy” description of Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. The cable notes tliat KSM had made “no reference to a link between Abu Ahmed and al-Qa’ida’s two top leaders, nor has he hinted at all that Abu Ahmed was involved in the facilitation of Zawahiri in/around Peshawar in February 2003,” and that KSM “has some explaining to do about Abu Ahmed and his support to UBL and Zawahiri.” Second, as the intelligence chronology in Volume II details, there was a significant body of intelligence well before Hassan Ghul’s pre-enhanced interrogation techniques reporting in January 2004 indicating that KSM was providing inaccurate information on Abu Alimad al-Kuwaiti.
See
detailed information in Volume II intelligence chronology. Third, as detailed in CIA-provided documents (DTS #2011- 2004), the CIA described Hassan Ghul’s reporting as “speculat[ive]” both during and after the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Finally, as noted earlier, the CIA’s June 2013 Response ignores or minimizes a large body of intelligence reporting in CIA records—and documented in the Committee Study—that was acquired from sources and methods unrelated to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques. Nonetheless, the CIA’s June 2013 Response asserts: “It is impossible to know in hindsight whether we could have obtained from Ammar, Gul, and others the same information that helped us find Bin Ladin
without using enhanced techniques
, or whether we eventually would have acquired other intelligence that allowed us to successfully pursue the Abu Ahmad lead or some other lead without the information we acquired from detainees in CIA custody” (italics added). As detailed in this summary, the most accurate intelligence from a detainee on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was acquired prior to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, and CIA detainees subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided inaccurate and fabricated information on al-Kuwaiti.
See
detailed information in the Volume II intelligence chronology.

2240.
█████ 2441 ████████; HEADQUARTERS ████ ███████; ███████ 1635 ████████; ████████ 1712 ████████; HEADQUARTERS ███ ███████; ██████ 1775 ████████; ███████ 173426 ██████.

2241.
See
Committee Notification from the ClA dated █████████ (DTS #2012-3802).

2242.
See
CIA letter to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated May 5, 2011, which includes a document entitled, “Background Detainee Information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,” with an accompanying six-page chart entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” (DTS #2011-2004). See
also
a similar, but less detailed CIA document entitled, “Detainee Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Historic Links to Usama Bin Laden.”

2243.
Significant information was acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti independent of CIA detainees.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume II.

2244.
Italics added. CIA analysis entitled, “Overcoming Challenges To Capturing Usama Bin Ladin, 1 September 2005.” CIA records indicate that Abu Faraj al-Libi fabricated information relating to “’Abd al Khaliq Jan.”

2245.
Italics added. As detailed, the reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti “worked closely with KSM” and was “one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin,” who “traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Ladin,” was acquired in 2002, from sources unrelated to the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

2246.
Italics added. █████████ 5594 (201039Z MAY 07). Reporting from CIA detainees Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash—both subjected to the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques —included similar inaccurate information. Khallad bin Attash was arrested with Ammar al-Baluchi in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. On May ██, 2003, bin Attash was rendered to CIA custody and immediately subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 16, 2003, to May 18, 2003, and then again from July 18, 2003, to July 29, 2003. On June 30, 2003, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was admired among the men. On July 27, 2003, bin Attash corroborated intelligence reporting that al-Kuwaiti played a facilitation role in al-Qa’ida and that al-Kuwaiti departed Karachi to get married. In Januaiy 2004, bin Attash stated that al-Kuwaiti was not close to UBL and not involved in al-Qa’ida operations, and that al-Kuwaiti was settling down with his wife in the summer of 2003. In August 2005, bin Attash stated that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, that he had never heard of Abu Ahmad transporting letters for UBL, and that Abu Ahmad was instead focused on family after he married in 2002. In August 2006, bin Attash reiterated that al-Kuwaiti was not a courier, but rather focused on family life. Ammar al-Baluchi was arrested with Khallad bin Attash in a unilateral operation by Pakistani authorities resulting from criminal leads on April 29, 2003. Upon his arrest in Pakistan, Ammar al-Baluchi was cooperative and provided information on a number of topics to foreign government interrogators, including information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that the CIA disseminated prior to al-Baluchi being transferred to CIA custody on May ██, 2003. After Ammar al-Baluchi was transferred to CIA custody, the CIA subjected Ammar al-Baluchi to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques from May 17, 2003, to May 20, 2003. On May 19, 2003, al-Baluchi admitted to fabricating information while being subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques the previous day, and in response to questioning, stated that he believed UBL was on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border and that a brother of al-Kuwaiti was to take over courier duties for UBL. In June 2003, al-Baluchi stated that there were rumors that al-Kuwaiti was a courier. In early 2004, al-Baluchi acknowledged that al-Kuwaiti may have worked for Abu Faraj al-Libi, but stated that al-Kuwaiti was never a courier and would not have direct contact with UBL.
See
intelligence chronology in Volume 11 and detainee reviews of Khallad bin Attash and Ammar al-Baluchi for additional information.

2247.
See
CIA CTC “Al-Qa’ida Watch,” dated November 23, 2007.

2248.
See
CIA CTC “Al-Qa’ida Watch,” dated November 23, 2007.

2249.
██████ 3808 (211420Z JAN 08); HEADQUARTERS ████ (232217Z JAN 08); ██████ 9044 (240740Z JAN 08); ██████ 5568 (081633Z FEB 08).

2250.
Italics added. ███████ 9044 (240740Z JAN 08).

2251.
HEADQUARTERS █████ (011334Z MAY 08).

2252.
█████████ 5594 (201039Z MAY 07).

2253.
█████████ 5594 (201039Z MAY 07).

2254.
See information in Volume II intelligence chronology for additional details.

2255.
On October 28, 2013, the CIA informed the Committee that “CIA policy is to conduct background briefings using unclassified or declassified information” (DTS #2013-3152).

2256.
Email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED], ███████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: █████████; subject: CIA at War; date: January 20, 2004, at 11:13 AM; email from: ███████████; to: █████████; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 21, 2004; at 02:11 PM; email from: ████████; to Scott W. Muller, John A. Rizzo, █████████; cc: █████████; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 21, 2004, at 02:27 PM.

2257.
Email from John A. Rizzo; to: █████████; cc: █████████, Scott W. Muller, █████████, [REDACTED]; subject: Re: CIA at War; date: January 22, 2004, at 09:28 AM.

2258.
“Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston,
The New York Times
, March 6, 2005; email from: ████████████; to: █████████; cc: █████████, ███████████; subject: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 22, 2005, at 1:38 PM; email from: ███████████; to: ███████████; cc: ███████████, ███ ███████, █████████, █████████; subject: Re: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 28, 2005, at 8:12:46 am.

2259.
Email from: █████████; to: █████████████; cc: █████████████, █████████████; subject: Re: Question on 06 March New York Times revelations; date: April 28, 2005, at 8:25:23 AM.

2260.
The CIA at War
, Ronald Kessler, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2003. As detailed elsewhere, Iyman Faris was already under investigation and Majid Khan, who was then in foreign government custody, had discussed Faris, prior to any mention of Faris by KSM. Likewise, the capture of Khallad bin Attash in April 2003 was unrelated to the reporting from KSM or any other CIA detainee. Kessler’s book also stated that Abu Zubaydah “soon began singing to the FBI and CIA about other planned plots,” and that “intercepts and information developed months earlier after the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh . . . allowed the CIA to trace [KSM].” (
See
Ronald Kessler,
The CIA at War
, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2003.) As detailed elsewhere, Abu Zubaydah did not provide intelligence on al-Qa’ida “planned plots,” and KSM’s capture was unrelated to information provided by Ramzi bin Al-Shibh. Finally, Kessler’s book stated that KSM “told the CIA about a range of planned attacks—on U.S. convoys in Afghanistan, nightclubs in Dubai, targets in Turkey, and an Israeli embassy in the Middle East. Within a few months the transcripts of his interrogations were four feet high.” These statements were incongruent with CIA records.

2261.
“Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad,” by Douglas Jehl and David Johnston,
The New York Times
, March 6, 2005.

2262.
Email from: █████████; to: [REDACTED], ███████, ███████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████, [REDACTED], ███████, [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; cc: ███████, ███████; subject: FOR IMMEDIATE COORDINATION: Summary of impact of detainee program; date: April 13, 2005, at 5:21:37 PM.

2263.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and █████████, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.

2264.
As detailed in this summary, this exchange occurred the day before an anticipated Committee vote on a proposed Committee investigation of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program.

2265.
Sametime communication, between John P. Mudd and ██████████, April 13, 2005, from 19:23:50 to 19:56:05.