The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (49 page)

12. Information on the Facilitator that Led to the UBL Operation

Shortly after the raid on the Usama bin Ladin (UBL) compound on May 1, 2011, which resulted in UBL’s death, CIA officials described the role of reporting from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program in the operation—and in some cases connected the reporting to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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The vast majority of the documents, statements, and testimony highlighting information obtained from the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques, or from CIA detainees more generally, was inaccurate and incongruent with CIA records.

CIA records indicate that: (1) the CIA had extensive reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti (variant Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti),
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the UBL facilitator whose identification and tracking led to the identification of UBL’s compound and the operation that resulted in UBL’s death, prior to and independent of information from CIA detainees; (2) the most accurate information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti obtained from a CIA detainee was provided by a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques; and (3) CIA detainees who were subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques withheld and fabricated information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.

Within days of the raid on UBL’s compound, CIA officials represented that CIA detainees provided the “tip off”
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information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
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A review of CIA records found that the initial intelligence obtained, as well as the information the CIA identified as the most critical—or the most valuable—on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti,
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was not related to the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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The CIA did not receive any information from CIA detainees on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until 2003. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, the CIA was actively targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s close links to UBL. CIA records indicate that prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA had collected:

• Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Telephonic Activity:
  A phone number associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was under U.S. government intelligence collection as early as January 1, 2002.
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  In March 2002, this phone number would be found in Abu Zubaydah’s address book under the heading “Abu Ahmad K.”
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  In April 2002, the same phone number was found to be in contact with UBL family members.
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  In June 2002, a person using the identified phone number and believed at the time to be “al-Kuwaiti” called a number associated with KSM.
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  All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
  
• Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Email Communications:
  In July 2002, the CIA had obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti.
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  As early as August 24, 2002, the CIA was collecting and tracking al-Kuwaiti’s email activity. A cable from that day states that an email account associated with KSM “intermediary Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti” remained active in Karachi.
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  On September 17, 2002, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s email address from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government. The detainee reported that al-Kuwaiti shared an email address with Ammar al-Baluchi, and that al-Kuwaiti was “coordinating martyrdom operations.”
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  When KSM was captured on March 1, 2003, an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti was found on a laptop believed to be used by KSM.
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  All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
  
• A Body of Intelligence Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Involvement in Operational Attack Planning with KSM—Including Targeting of the United States:
  On June 10, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was engaged in operational attack planning with KSM.
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  On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government corroborating information that al-Kuwaiti was close with KSM, as well as reporting that al-Kuwaiti worked on “secret operations” with KSM prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
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  By August 9, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a third detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was supporting KSM’s operational attack planning targeting the United States.
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  By October 20, 2002, the CIA had received reporting from a fourth detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that a known terrorist—Hassan Ghul—“received funding and instructions primarily from Abu Ahmad, a close associate of KSM.”
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  All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
  
• Significant Corroborative Reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Age, Physical Description, and Family—Including Information the CIA Would Later Cite As Pivotal:
  In September 2001, the CIA received reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s family that the CIA would later cite as pivotal in identifying al-Kuwaiti’s true name.
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  From January 2002 through October 2002, the CIA received significant corroborative reporting on al-Kuwaiti’s age, physical appearance, and family from detainees held in the custody of foreign governments and the U.S. military.
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  All of this information was acquired prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
  
• Multiple Reports on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti’s Close Association with UBL and His Frequent Travel to See UBL:
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  As early as April 2002, CIA had signals intelligence linking a phone number associated with al-Kuwaiti with UBL’s family, specifically al-Qa’ida member Sa’ad Bin Ladin.
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  On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that “Abu Ahmad” was one of three al-Qa’ida associated individuals—to include Sa’ad bin Ladin and KSM—who visited him. The detainee—Ridha al-Najjar—was a former UBL caretaker.
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  On June 25, 2002, the CIA received reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government—Riyadh the Facilitator—suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for UBL. Riyadh the Facilitator highlighted that al-Kuwaiti was “actively working in secret locations in Karachi, but traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Ladin.”
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  Months earlier the CIA disseminated signals intelligence indicating that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and Riyadh the Facilitator were in phone contact with each other.
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  In August 2002, another detainee in the custody of a foreign government with known links to al-Kuwaiti
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  —Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili—reported that al-Kuwaiti “was one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”
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  All of this information was acquired in 2002, prior to any reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees.
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Within a day of the UBL operation, the CIA began providing classified briefings to Congress on the overall operation and the intelligence that led to the raid and UBL’s death.
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On May 2, 2011, CIA officials, including CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, briefed the Committee. A second briefing occurred on May 4, 2011, when CIA Director Leon Panetta and other CIA officials briefed both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of these briefings indicated that CIA detainee information—and the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques—played a substantial role in developing intelligence that led to the UBL operation. The testimony contained significant inaccurate information.

For example, in the May 2, 2011, briefing, the CIA informed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that:

“However, there remained one primary line of investigation that was proving the most difficult to run to ground, and that was the case of a courier named Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. Abu Ahmed had totally dropped off our radar in about the 2002–2003 time frame
after several detainees in our custody
had highlighted him as a key facilitator for bin Ladin.”
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The information above is not fully congruent with CIA records. As described, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti prior to any reporting from CIA detainees. Al-Kuwaiti was identified as early as 2002 as an al-Qa’ida member engaged in operational planning who “traveled frequently” to see UBL.
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No CIA detainee provided reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. While CIA detainees eventually did provide some information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign partners.
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The most accurate CIA detainee-related intelligence was obtained in early 2004, from a CIA detainee who had not yet been subjected to the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.
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That detainee—Hassan Ghul—listed Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti as one of three individuals likely to be with UBL,
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stated that “it was well known that [UBL] was always with Abu Ahmed [al-Kuwaiti],”
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and described al-Kuwaiti as UBL’s “closest assistant,”
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who “likely handled all of UBL’s needs.”
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The detainee further relayed that he believed “UBL’s security apparatus would be minimal, and that the group likely lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan.”
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In the May 4, 2011, briefing, CIA Director Leon Panetta provided the following statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee (which mirrored similar statements by a “senior administration official” in a White House Press Briefing from May 2, 2011)
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:

‘‘
The detainees
in the post-9/11 period flagged for us that there were individuals that provided direct support to bin Ladin . . .
and one of those identified was a courier who had the nickname Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. That was back in 2002
.”
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As previously detailed, no CIA detainees provided information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002. As such, for the statement to be accurate, it can only be a reference to detainees in foreign government custody who provided information in 2002.
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As noted, prior to any reporting from CIA detainees, the CIA was targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti—to include al-Kuwaiti’s phone number and email address.
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Further, prior to 2003, the CIA possessed a body of intelligence reporting linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to KSM and UBL and to operational targeting of the United States, as well as reporting that Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was “one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin”
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and “traveled frequently” to “meet with Usama bin Ladin.”
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In the same May 4, 2011, briefing, a CIA officer elaborated on the previously provided statements and provided additional detail on how “a couple of early detainees” “identi[fied]” Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti as someone close to UBL:

“I think the clearest way to think about this is, in 2002
a couple of early detainees, Abu Zubaydah and an individual, Riyadh the Facilitator, talked about the activities of an Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti
. At this point we don’t have his true name.
And they identify him as somebody involved with AQ and facilitation and some potential ties to bin Ladin
.”
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This testimony is inaccurate. There are no CIA records of Abu Zubaydah discussing Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti in 2002.
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The first reference to Abu Zubaydah providing information related to al-Kuwaiti is on July 7, 2003, when Abu Zubaydah denied knowing the name.
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CIA records indicate that the information in 2002 that the CIA has represented as the initial lead information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not obtained from the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program, but was collected by the CIA from other intelligence sources, including from detainees in foreign government custody. Riyadh the Facilitator provided substantial information on Abu Ahmad alKuwaiti in 2002, including information suggesting al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier, as al-Kuwaiti reportedly “traveled frequently” to see UBL.
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Consistent with the testimony, CIA records indicate that the information provided by Riyadh the Facilitator was important information; however, Riyadh the Facilitator was not in CIA custody in 2002, but was in the custody of a foreign government.
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Riyadh the Facilitator was not transferred to CIA custody until January █, 2004.
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As noted, in 2002, the CIA received additional reporting from another detainee in the custody of a foreign government, Abu Zubair al-Ha’ili, that “Ahmad al-Kuwaiti” was “one of a few close associates of Usama bin Ladin.”
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At the May 4, 2011, briefing, a Senator asked, “I guess what we’re trying to get at here, or certainly I am, was any of this information obtained through [enhanced] interrogation measures?” A CIA officer replied: