The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (72 page)

482.
Email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 2:09:47 PM.

483.
Email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████, ████████, Jose Rodriguez; subject: Re: EYE ONLY - Legal and Political Quandary; date: MMarch 13, 2003, at 8:01:12 AM.

484.
Email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, ████████, ████████, ███████, ███████; subject: EYES ONLY - Use of Water Board; date: March 13, 2003, at 08:28 AM.

485.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: ████████; subject: Re: State cable; date: March 13, 2003, at 1:43:17 PM. The previous day, the medical officer had written that “I am going the extra mile to try to handle this in a non confrontational manner.” Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: ████████; subject: Re: MEDICAL SITREP 3/10; date: March 12, 2003, at 5:17:07 AM.

486.
██████ 10803 (131929Z MAR 03).

487.
Email from: ██████; to ████████; cc: █████; ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: re: Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 Mar 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 10:44:12 AM.

488.
Email from: ████████; to: ██████; cc: █████, █████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ███████; subject: re: Summary of KSM Waterboard Sessions - As of 1000 HRS 14 MAR 03; date: March 14, 2003, at 02:02:42 PM.

489.
See detailed review of these sessions in Volume III.

490.
██████ 10831 (151510Z MAR 03); ██████ 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ██████ 10849 (161058Z MAR 03); Interview of ██████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.

491.
The original reporting, that al-Qa’ida had purchased nuclear suitcases in Yemen, was later determined to be based on an effort by unknown Yemenis to sell “suitcase weapons” to al-Qa’ida. Al-Qa’ida operatives concluded that the offer was a scam. See ██████ 74492 (250843Z JUL 03), disseminated as ████████; and HEADQUARTERS ██████ (092349Z DEC 04).

492.
██████ 10841 (152007Z MAR 03); ██████ 10831 (151510Z MAR 03).

493.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: ████████; cc: █████████; subject: Re: Sitrep as of AM 3/15; date: March 15, 2003, at 3:52:54 A.M. Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.
See
also
interview of ███████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003. The descriptions of the use of the waterboard interrogation technique against KSM were provided by these two on-site medical officers.

494.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, May 15, 2003.

495.
Email to: [REDACTED]; from: ████████; subject: Re: Medical limitations of WB – draft thoughts; date: March 17, 2003, at 01:11:35 PM.

496.
Email from: ████████; to: [REDACTED]; cc: ████████; subject: Oct 18; date: March 18, 2003, at 10:52:03 AM.

497.
Majid Khan, who was arrested on March 5, 2003, provided extensive information prior to being rendered to CIA custody. This included information on Iyman Faris, Uzhair (Paracha) and his father, Aafia Sidiqqi, his transfer of al-Qa’ida funds to a Bangkok-based Zubair, and his discussions with KSM regarding various proposed plots. Majid Khan also provided assistance to the CIA in its efforts to locate Ammar al-Baluchi, including through Abu Talha al-Pakistani. (See ██████ 13697 (080730Z MAR 03); █████ 13713 ████████; █████ 13765 ████████; ███████ 44244 (161423Z APR 03); ██████ 44684 (250633Z APR 03); █████ 13678 (070724Z MAR 03); █████ 13785 ██████; ██████ 13908 (260251Z MAR 03); ██████ 13826 (190715Z MAR 03); ██████ 13833 (200454Z MAR 03); ██████ 13890 ████████████; ██████ 13686 (071322Z MAR 03); ██████ 13932 (271244Z MAR 03); ██████ 13710 (081218Z MAR 03).) After being rendered to CIA custody, Majid Khan was subjected by the CIA to sleep deprivation, nudity, and dietary manipulation, and may have been subjected to an ice water bath. (See █████████ 39077 (271719Z MAY 03); ████████ 39099 (281101Z MAY 03); ████████, Briefing for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 14, 2008; ██████████ 41772 (121230Z JUL 03); ████████ 42025 ██████; email from: ████████; to: ████████, [REDACTED], ██████, and ██████; subject, “Re: i hope the approvals for enhanced comes through quickly for this guy . . . this does not look good”; date: June 30, 2003.) A June 2006 CIA email stated that Majid Khan said he “fabricated a lot of his early [CIA] interrogation reporting to stop . . . what he called ‘torture.’” According to the email, Khan stated that he was “hung up” for approximately one day in a sleep deprived position and that he provided “everything they wanted to hear to get out of the situation.” (See email from: [REDACTED]; to: ███████, ███ COB, ████████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████; subject: █████: request for prozac; date: June 16, 2006.) As detailed in this summary and in more detail in Volume II, the CIA inaccurately attributed information provided by Majid Khan in foreign government custody to the CIA interrogations of KSM.

498.
██████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03).

499.
██████ 10883 (182127Z MAR 03), disseminated as ████████; ████ 22939 (031541Z JUL 04). CIA records indicate that CIA officers believed that KSM’s recantations were credible. See KSM detainee review in Volume III.

500.
██████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03).

501.
Email from: [REDACTED], OFFICE: ██████; to: [REDACTED]; subject: JAFAR REQUEST; date: March 18, 2003, at 08:16:07 PM.

502.
██████ 10884 (182140Z MAR 03); ██████ 10888 (1908005Z MAR 03); ██████ 10999 (260835Z MAR 03); ██████ 10969 (240950Z MAR 03).

503.
██████ 10892 (191503Z MAR 03); ██████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03).

504.
██████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03).

505.
██████ 10894 (191513Z MAR 03); ██████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03).

506.
██████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03).

507.
Interview of ██████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003.

508.
██████ 10902 (201037Z MAR 03); ██████ 10900 (191907Z MAR 03); ██████ 10896 (191524Z MAR 03).

509.
██████ 10916 (210845Z MAR 03); ██████ 10921 (211046Z MAR 03).

510.
██████ 10916 (210845Z MAR 03).

511.
██████ 10909 (201918Z MAR 03).

512.
Interview of ██████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, October 22, 2003. ██████ 10917 (210907Z MAR 03).

513.
██████ 13839 (201434Z MAR 03).

514.
Email to: ██████████; from: [REDACTED] OFFICE: ██████/DETENTION SITE BLUE]; subject: Re: Majid Khan; date: March 20, 2003, at 03:40:17 PM. The █████ cable was formally sent to DETENTION SITE BLUE via ALEC █████ (210015Z MAR 03).

515.
██████ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03).

516.
██████ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03); ██████ 10922 (211256Z MAR 03).

517.
██████ 10932 (212132Z MAR 03).

518.
██████ 10941 (221506Z MAR 03); ██████ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03). One cable from DETENTION SITE BLUE hypothesized that KSM was lying in order to force the CIA interrogators to apply the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques: “[T]he enhanced measures resulting from his lying in [sic] details could be a resistance strategy to keep the interrogation from threatening issues . . . [KSM’s] apparent willingness to provoke and incur the use of enhanced measures may represent a calculated strategy to either: (A) redirect the course of the interrogation; or (B) to attempt to cultivate some doubt that he had knowledge of any current or future operations against the US.” See ██████ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03).

519.
██████ 10950 (222127Z MAR 03).

520.
██████ 10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████; ██████ 10948 (222101Z MAR 03), disseminated as █████████.

521.
██████ 10942 (221610Z MAR 03), disseminated as ███████.

522.
██████ 12095 (222049Z JUN 03).

523.
██████ 12558 (041938Z AUG 03).

524.
████ 31148 (171919Z DEC 05); ███ 31147 (171919Z DEC 05), disseminated as ███████.

525.
██████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03); ██████ 10972 (241122Z MAR 03).

526.
██████ 10974 (241834Z MAR 03); ██████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03).

527.
See the sections of this summary and Volume II on the Identification and Arrests of Uzhair and Saifullah Paracha.

528.
██████ 13890 ██████████; ██████ 10984 (242351Z MAR 03).

529.
WHDC ████ (242226Z MAR 03); ██████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03).

530.
██████ 10983 (242321Z MAR 03).

531.
██████ 10984 (242351Z MAR 03), disseminated as ███████.

532.
According to one cable, KSM did not volunteer the purported smuggling plot, but rather was asked about it by interrogators. (See ALEC █████ (052230Z MAY 03). All parties to the purported plot – Paracha and Ammar al-Baluchi – denied any agreement had been reached. DIRECTOR █████ (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as ████████; ████████████ 39239 (301600Z MAY 03); █████ 13588 (171505Z JUL 03); DIRECTOR █████ (181929Z JUN 03), disseminated as ███████; ██████████ 39239 (301600Z MAY 03); ALEC █████ (0212248Z APR 03).) With regard to the explosives smuggling reporting, the former chief of the Bin Ladin Unit wrote in a March 2003 email: “again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable knuckleheads . . . why ‘smuggle’ in explosives when you can get them here? neither fertilizer for bombs or regular explosives are that hard to come by. ramzi yousef came to conus with a suitcase and hundred bucks and got everything he needed right here. this may be true, but it just seems damn odd to me.”
See
email from: █████████; to: ████████, ████████, ████████, ████████; subject: see highlight: again, another ksm op worthy of the lamentable; date: March 25, 2003, at 6:29:08 AM.

533.
██████ 10985 (242351Z MAR 03). “Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.

534.
Sleep deprivation was extended for an additional day, although it was interrupted by “catnapping.” See ██████ 10999 (260835Z MAR 03).

535.
For additional details, see KSM detainee review in Volume III.

536.
“Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting – Precious Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies,” IICT, April 3, 2003.

537.
Email from: ██████████; to: █████████; cc: James L. Pavitt; ██████████; John H. Moseman; Jose Rodriguez; ██████████; and ██████████; subject: Mueller’s Interest in FBI Access to KSM; date: April 24, 2003, at 10:59:53 AM.

538.
Memorandum for: James L. Pavitt; ██████████; Jose Rodriguez; ███████; ████████████; from: ██████████; subject: Update: Director Mueller – DCI Tenet Conversation on KSM; date: June 4, 2003, at 05:47:32 PM. Note for: James L. Pavitt; from: █████████; cc: █████████████, Jose Rodriguez, █████████; subject: Director Mueller Plans to Call DCI on KSM Issue; date: May 21, 2003, at 08:40:22 PM. In addition to the FBI, senior CIA officers, including CTC’s representatives to the FBI, complained about the limitations on the dissemination of intelligence derived from CIA interrogations and the impact those limitations had on counterterrorism analysis. The CTC’s representative to the FBI described this to the OIG as a “serious concern.” He stated that the compartmentation of interrogation information ███████████████ resulted in delays in dissemination that could result in information being “missed.” He also stated that the CIA’s compartmentation of information prevented him from providing to the FBI “some insight into the value/credibility of intelligence reports.” (See interview of ███████████, by █████████, Office of the Inspector General, August 18, 2003.) Among the other CIA officers expressing these concerns were the deputy chief of CTC’s Al-Qa’ida Department, who told the OIG that limited access to operational traffic “has had an impact on [analysts’] full knowledge of activities, and thus their analysis.” (See ███████████████ Memorandum for the Record; subject: Meeting with Deputy Chief, Counterterrorism Center Al-Qa’ida Department; July 28, 2003.) The Director of Analysis at CTC described analysts’ limited access to information as a “continuing problem.” (See August 18, 2003, Memorandum for the Record, meeting with Counterterrorism Center, Director of Analysis, Office of the Inspector General.) The CIA’s Deputy Director of Intelligence told the OIG that limitations on the dissemination of operational information prevented the “full cadre of analysts” from reviewing the intelligence and that, as a result, “we’re losing analytic ability to look at [foreign intelligence] in a timely manner.” See interview of ██████████████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, September 12, 2003.

539.
ALEC █████ (072002Z MAY 03).

540.
DIRECTOR ██████ (121550Z JUN 03).

541.
██████ 11454 (301710Z APR 03); ██████ 11448 (301141Z APR 03).

542.
ALEC █████ (022012Z MAY 03). See information in this summary and Volume II on the “Karachi Plot” for additional information.

543.
See detainee reviews for Ammar al-Baluchi and Khallad bin Attash in Volume III for additional information on the reporting the detainees provided.

544.
Memorandum for: ████████████; ███████████████; █████████████; from: ██████████; subject: Action detainee branch; date: June 12, 2003 (emphasis in the original).