The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program (69 page)

278.
Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from █████, January 28, 2003, Subiect: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee ████ (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA debriefer indicated that, “[d]uring the two weeks of interrogation training, she heard stories of [COBALT] detainees being ‘hung for days on end,’ not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked.” The senior debriefer also informed the Office of Inspector General that, “[s]he heard that while at [COBALT] [█████, aka “CIA OFFICER 2”] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touching the ground.” (See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ████, April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a “rough takedown” following the death of Gul Rahman at COBALT. “According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of Rahman’s cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to ‘get down.’ They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman’s body after his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [█████ [CIA OFFICER 1]] [the CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what [████ [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner ‘to give them something to think about.’” (See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21–22.).

279.
See Notes of November, 2002, meeting D/IG [REDACTED].

280.
See Office of Inspector General Special Review of Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003), May 7, 2004, p. 52. According to an OIG interview with an analyst who conducted interrogations at DETENTION SITE COBALT, “indicative of the lack of interrogators was the fact that [████ [CIA OFFICER 1]] enlisted a [REDACTED] case officer friend . . . to conduct interrogations at [DETENTION SITE COBALT] after he completed his [REDACTED] business in ██████.” (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes ████, May 8, 2003.) Inspector General records of an interview with a senior CIA debriefer indicate that the debriefer, “heard prior to taking the [interrogator] training that people at [COBALT] had debriefed detainees on their own, sometimes going out to the site at night.” (See Interview Report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, ████, April 5, 2003.) As described elsewhere, DCI Tenet issued formal interrogation guidelines for the program on January 28, 2003. (See Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.).

281.
Interview of George Tenet, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, memorandum dated, September 8, 2003.

282.
Interview ████, Office of the Inspector General, September 9, 2003.

283.
Interview of Scott Muller, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003.

284.
Interview of John Rizzo, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 14, 2003.

285.
Interview of █████, Office of the Inspector General, February 11, 2003.

286.
Interview of Jose Rodriguez, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 12, 2003.

287.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running) at 4.
See also
email from: █████; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], █████; subject: Formation of a High Value Target Interrogation team (describing initial training plan and requirements); date: August 30, 2002, at 8:30 AM.

288.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running).

289.
December 4, 2002, Training Report, High Value Target Interrogation and Exploitation (HVTIE) Training Seminar 12-18 Nov 02 (pilot running), at 15.

290.
See, for example, email from: █████ to: █████, [REDACTED]; subject: HVT training; date: October 10, 2002; email from: [REDACTED]; to: █████; cc: █████, ████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: HVT traininhg; date: October 10, 2002; November 1, 2002, Memorandum for: Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center, from █████, Chief, Renditions Group, CTC, re: Request for use of Military Trainers in Support of Agency Interrogation Course, REFERENCE: Memo for D/CTC from C/RG/CTC, dtd 26 Aug 02, Same Subject.

291.
Email from: █████, █CTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED]; cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November █, 2002, at 03:13:01 PM. As described above, Gul Rahman likely froze to to death at DETENTION SITE COBALT sometime in the morning of November █, 2002. ██████’s email, however, appears to have been drafted before the guards had found Gul Rahman’s body and before that death was reported to CIA Headquarters. See [REDACTED] 30211 ██████ describing the guards observing Gul Rahman alive in the morning of November, 2002. Gul Rahman’s death appeared in cable traffic at least ███ after ████’s email. No records could be identified to provide the impetus for ████’s email.

292.
Email from: ██████, █CTC/LGL; to: [REDACTED], cc: Jose Rodriguez, [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November █, 2002, at 03:13:01 PM.

293.
Email from: Jose Rodriguez; to: ██████, █CTC/LGL; cc: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████; subject: EYES ONLY; date: November █, 2002, at 04:27 PM.

294.
Transcript of hearing, April 12, 2007 (DTS #2007-1563).

295.
The information ███████████ is described at length in the Committee Study in Volume III.

296.
██████ 31118 █████; DIRECTOR ██ █████.

297.
CIA detainee Gul Rahman died at DETENTION SITE COBALT at the end of the Federal Bureau of Prisons visit to the CIA detention site.

298.
[REDACTED] 30589 (271626Z NOV 02).

299.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.

300.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], ██████, [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 4, 2002.

301.
Email from: [REDACTED]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Meeting with SO & Federal Bureau of Prisons; date: December 5, 2002.

302.
CIA document entitled Renditions Group Interrogation Team (RGIT), Baseline assessment for MVT, Detainee/Prisoner management, December 30, 2002. The CIA does not appear to have taken action on this recommendation.

303.
Email from █████████ [CIA OFFICER 1]; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Thanks and Query re: List of ██████████ DETAINEES; date: March 14, 2003.

304.
The cables did not explain any legal basis for detaining individuals who did not meet the detention requirements of the September 17, 2001, MON. HEADQUARTERS ███ (████████) ████████████████████ 36682 (████████); ███████████████ 38836 (████████); HEADQUARTERS ███████████; ███████████████ 41204 (████████); ALEC ███ (████████).

305.
See Volume III for additional information.

306.
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

307.
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

308.
CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03–4/30/03, May 22, 2003.

309.
CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03–4/30/03, May 22, 2003.

310.
CIA document titled, Quarterly Review of Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, 1/28/03–4/30/03, May 22, 2003.

311.
████████████████ 3741 █████████.

312.
Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001, signed by George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 2003.

313.
For a description of the “rough takedown,” see Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from █████████, January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21–22.

314.
One cold water shower was described by a CIA linguist; “Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards at [█████ [CIA OFFICER l]]’s direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. According to [the on-site linguist], the entire process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower Rahman’s resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or over night with his hands chained over his head.” See CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee ██████ (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005.

315.
Water dousing was not designated by the CIA as a “standard” interrogation technique until June 2003. In January 2004 water dousing was recategorized by the CIA as an “enhanced” interrogation technique.

316.
See Volume III for additional information.

317.
DIRECTOR ███ (302126Z JAN 03); DIRECTOR ███ (311702Z JAN 03). Despite the formal record keeping requirement, the CIA’s June 2013 Response argues that detailed reporting on the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques at CIA detention sites was not necessary, stating: “First, the decline in reporting over time on the use of enhanced techniques, which the
Study
characterizes as poor or deceptive record keeping, actually reflects the maturation of the program. In early 2003, a process was put in place whereby interrogators requested permission in advance for interrogation plans. The use of these plans for each detainee obviated the need for reporting in extensive detail on the use of specific techniques, unless there were deviations from the approved plan.” As detailed in the Study, the process put in place by the CIA in early 2003 explicitly required record keeping, including “the nature and duration of each such technique employed, the identities of those present, and a citation to the required Headquarters approval cable.” That requirement was never revised.

318.
Subsequent to the January 2003 guidance, many cables reporting the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques listed the techniques used on a particular day, but did not describe the frequency with which those techniques were employed, nor did they integrate the specific techniques into narratives of the interrogations. As the CIA interrogation program continued, descriptions of the use of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were recorded in increasingly summarized form, providing little information how or when the techniques were applied during an interrogation. There are also few CIA records detailing the rendition process for detainees and their transportation to or between detention sites. CIA records do include detainee comments on their rendition experiences and photographs of detainees in the process of being transported. Based on a review of the photographs, detainees transported by the CIA by aircraft were typically hooded with their hands and feet shackled. The detainees wore large headsets to eliminate their ability to hear, and these headsets were typically affixed to a detainee’s head with duct tape that ran the circumference of the detainee’s head. CIA detainees were placed in diapers and not permitted to use the lavatory on the aircraft. Depending on the aircraft, detainees were either strapped into seats during the flights, or laid down and strapped to the floor of the plane horizontally like cargo. See CIA photographs of renditions among CIA materials provided to the Committee pursuant to the Committee’s document requests, as well as CIA detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information on the transport of CIA detainees.

319.
DIRECTOR ███ (032336Z DEC 03).

320.
Interview of ████████, by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, August 20, 2003. Interview of ██████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 14, 2003. CTC Chief of Operations told the Inspector General that the program was handled by the Abu Zubaydah Task Force. See February 11, 2003, interview report of Office of the Inspector General.

321.
As noted, the CIA’s Rendition Group is variably known as the “Renditions Group,” the “Renditions and Detainees Group,” the “Renditions, Detentions, and Interrogations Group,” and by the initials, “RDI” and “RDG.”

322.
Interview of [██████████], by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. February 21, 2003, interview report, ████████, Office of the Inspector General. Hammond DUNBAR told the Office of Inspector General that there was “intrigue” between the RDG and him and SWIGERT, and “there were emails coming to [DETENTION SITE BLUE] that questioned [his] and [SWIGERT]’s qualifications.” See Interview of Hammond DUNBAR, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 4, 2003.

323.
Email from: ████████; to: ███████; cc: ██████████, ███████, ███████, ████████, ██████; subject: Re: RDG Tasking for IC Psychologists [DUNBAR] and [SWIGERT]; date: June 20, 2003, at 5:23:29 PM. █████ OMS expressed concern that “no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR’s] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures.” (See email from: ██████; to: ████████; cc: ███████, ██████, ██████, ████████, ████████; subject: Re: ██ RDG Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.) The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that CIA “Headquarters established CTC’s Renditions and Detentions Group CTC/RDG as the responsible entity for all CIA detention and interrogation sites in December 2002, removing any latent institutional confusion.”

324.
Interview of █████████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 21, 2003. The chief of interrogations, ██████, told the Inspector General that the waterboard was overused with Abu Zubaydah and KSM and was ineffective in the interrogations of KSM. (See Interview of ██████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Office of the Inspector General, March 27, 2003.) One doctor involved in CIA interrogations using the waterboard interrogation technique stated that ████ “has a huge bias against the waterboard b/c he’s not approved to use it. The reverse is the contract psy guys [SWIGERT and DUNBAR] who have a vested interest in favor of it.” See email from: ███████; to ███████; cc: [REDACTED]; subject: re: More; date: April 11, 2003, at 08:11:07 AM.

325.
March 10, 2003, interview report of ███████, Office of the Inspector General. Interview of ███████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, February 27, 2003. Interview of ███████, by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Office of the Inspector General, April 3, 2003. March 24, 2003, interview report of ██████, Office of the Inspector General.

326.
DIRECTOR ████ (301835Z JAN 03).

327.
████ 12168 (301822Z JUN 03).

328.
The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, stated that, “[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and responsibilities before their arrogance and narcissism evolve into unproductive conflict in the field.” See email from: █████████; to: ████████ cc: ██████, ██████, ██████; subject: ███ RDG Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.

329.
Email from: ████████ to: ████████; cc: ██████, ██████, ██████, ████████, ███████; subject: Re: Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGER; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.

330.
████ 12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA’s June 2013 Response states: “In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had
not
interrogated” (emphasis added). The CIA’s June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they
had
interrogated.

331.
Memorandum for Inspector General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from [REDACTED], M.D., ███ Medical Services ███ re: Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.

332.
For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.

333.
ALEC ████ █████; ███ 11357 (021242Z DEC 02); ███ 36710 █████.

334.
See ███ 36595 ████████; ███ 36726 ██████; ALEC ███ ██████. For disseminated intelligence, see ████████ CIA ██ ███████; ████████ CIA ████ ████████. For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see ██████ 70879 ████████; ██████ 70866 ███████; █████ 70868 ███████; █████ 70870 ████████. For disseminated intelligence, see █████████; ████; ████.

335.
██████████ 29768 (████ NOV 02); ████ 11243 (████ NOV 02).

336.
See, for example, ██████ 11246 █████ NOV 02); █████ 11258 ██████ NOV 02); █████████ 11263 █████ NOV02); ██████ 11270 ███████ NOV 02); █████ 11284 █████ NOV 02); 11294 ███████ NOV 02); ███████ 11293 ███████ NOV 02); ███████ 11322 ███████ NOV 02); ███████ 11352 ███████ DEC 02); ███████ 11359 ███████ DEC 02); ███████ 11322 ███████ NOV 02).

337.
███████78275 (███████ DEC 02).

338.
Al-Nashiri’s time at DETENTION SITE COBALT is not well documented in CIA records. As described elsewhere, standard operating procedure at COBALT at the time included total light deprivation, loud continuous music, isolation, and dietary manipulation. Based on CIA records, the other four “enhanced interrogation” periods of al-Nashiri took place at DETENTION SITE BLUE on December 5-8, 2002; December 27, 2002–January 1, 2003; January 9-10, 2003; and January 15-27, 2003. See ███████ 10030 (111541Z DEC 02); ███████ 10078 (211733Z DEC 02); ███████ 10140 (031727Z JAN 03); ALEC ███████ (191729Z JAN 03).

339.
Email from: █████████, to: ████████, [REDACTED]; cc: ██████████, ██████████, ██████, [REDACTED], [REDACTED]; subject: [DETENTION SITE BLUE] follow-up; date: December 15, 2002.

340.
See, for example, ALEC ███████ (072315Z DEC 02); ALEC (130352Z DEC 02); ALEC ██████████ (180247Z DEC 02); ALEC ███████ (191729Z JAN 03); CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques at [DETENTION SITE BLUE], (2003-7123-IG), October 29, 2003.
See also
CIA Office of Inspector General report, Counterterrorism Detention And Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), released on May 7, 2004.

341.
██████ 10030 (111541Z DEC 02).

342.
ALEC ████ (180247Z DEC 02).

343.
█████ 10085 (230906Z DEC 02).

344.
█████ 10085 (230906Z DEC 02).

345.
█████ 10040 (122122Z DEC02). Prior to ██████████ [CIA OFFICER 2’s] deployment, CIA records included numerous concerns about ███████████ [CIA OFFICER 2’s] anger management, ██████, and ████████. For more information on ████████ [CIA OFFICER 2] and other CIA personnel in the program with similar alarming issues in their background, see Volume III. The CIA’s June 2013 Response states that: “████████████████████████ some of the ██ officers mentioned in the Study—████████████████████████████ should have been excluded—much derogatory information was not in fact available to senior managers making assignments █████████████.” Notwithstanding the CIA’s June 2013 assertion, as detailed in Volume III, senior managers were aware of concerns related to ██████ [CIA OFFICER 2] prior to his deployment.