The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran (110 page)

53.
U.S. Embassy Kuwait cable, “Recent Incidents Surrounding Kuwaiti Shias Trial,” May 3, 1987.

54.
The Silkworm is a relatively unsophisticated Chinese-made missile. It has a range of approximately ninety kilometers and carries a thousand-pound warhead. Launched along a programmed azimuth, it skims just above the water for a predetermined amount of time, at which point it turns on its radar and homes in on the first target it acquires. If the target moves or its position is off by more than three kilometers, there is no guarantee that the missile will hit the intended target. CIA, “Characteristics and Capabilities of the Silkworm,” April 16, 1987; “Threat Activity: Iran.”

55.
Richard Norton-Taylor and William Raynor, “Jailed ‘Go-Between’ on UK-Iran Arms Deals Is Freed to Keep MI6 Secrets Out of Court,”
Guardian
, February 6, 1999; Marie Colvin, “Secrets of the Silkworm Spy,”
Sunday Times
, June 15, 1997, p. 15.

56.
Weinberger interview.

57.
CIA, “Iran Persian Gulf: Increased Threat to Shipping,” February 27, 1987, and “Iran: Growing Threat to Persian Gulf Shipping,” May 30, 1987.

58.
CINCCENT, “Operation Private Jewels Commander’s Estimate,” March 1987; Bernsen interview; General Robert Herres message to Admiral William Crowe, “Private Jewels” (141845Z), March 1987.

C
HAPTER 12
T
HE
W
AKE
-U
P
C
ALL

1.
Michael Vlahos, “The Stark Report,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, May 1988, p. 36.

2.
Jeffrey L. Levinson and Randy L. Edwards,
Missile Inbound: The Attack on the
Stark
in the Persian Gulf
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 12.

3.
Crist interview; Bernsen interview.

4.
Bernsen interview.

5.
CINCCENT message, “Attack on USS
Stark
Chronology” (DTG 221500Z), May 1987, p. 2.

6.
Ibid.

7.
Rear Admiral Grant Sharp,
Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS
Stark
(FFG 31) on 17 May 1987
, Department of Defense, 1987 [hereafter referred to as Sharp Report], “Findings of Fact,” Item 1.

8.
Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Item 3.

9.
The rules of engagement were based on two documents: CMEF Operations Order 400-85 from October 1, 1985, and Commander, Middle East Force, message of August 21, 1986.

10.
Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact.”

11.
As the official investigation later stated: “The commanding officer failed fundamentally to appreciate the significance of the intelligence information provided to him regarding the recent trend in Iraqi ship attacks south of the 27˚30´ north parallel, into the central Gulf.” Sharp Report, “Opinions,” Item 27.

12.
Brindel believed they were in weapons “warning yellow,” which allowed for much greater freedom for the
Stark
’s weapons to be fired. This, however, did not translate down to his officers and the CIC believed they were still in the restrictive condition “white” and placed the systems in a mode that prohibited any quick response.

13.
Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Items 24, 25.

14.
The broadcast was made over the narrow-band secure voice radio telephone circuit, or NBSV.

15.
Greg McCannel, Lieutenant Commander, USN (Ret.), interview with author, March 22, 1995.

16.
Sharp Report, “Findings of Fact,” Item 51.

17.
Ibid., “Opinions,” Item 14.

18.
Following the attack, the AWACS tried to vector in two Saudi F-15s to the Iraqi jet, but the Saudi pilots refused without orders from their commanders.

19.
Interview with Ambassador Samuel Zachem, Oral History Collection, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., undated.

20.
COMIDEASTFOR message, “Attack on USS
Stark
” (DTG 180208Z), May 1987, p. 1; Chief of Naval Operations message, “Personal For” (DTG 230140Z), May 1987, p. 1.

21.
Levinson and Edwards,
Missile Inbound
, p. 33.

22.
Interview with CWO3 Howard L. Geiger, USN, by Paul Stillwell, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, January 29, 1988.

23.
Weinberger Diary, May 17, 1987;
Reagan Diaries
, p. 497.

24.
Crist interview; Schramm interview.

25.
Ten men were awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal of Heroism, including both Lieutenant Commander Gajan and Lieutenant Moncrief.

26.
Sharp Report, “Opinions,” Item 28.

27.
General Crist had been passed a report, not through normal intelligence channels, that the attack was deliberate, in an attempt to draw the United States into the war. But he did not think it had much validity.

28.
Lang interview.

29.
National Security Policy Implications of United States Operations in the Persian Gulf
, p. 81.

30.
As Senator Pressler said in a congressional hearing in June, “Prior to that [the
Stark
incident], nobody was really paying much attention to the situation in the Persian Gulf. It is good that our attention has been drawn to it. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, May 29, June 16, October 23 and 28, 1987
, p. 32; also Charles interview.

31.
Jacob Lamar, Steven Holmes, and Barrett Seaman, “Escort Service for the Gulf,”
Time
, June 24, 1987.

32.
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Personal For General Crist” (DTG 222350Z), May 1987, p. 1.

33.
“Admiral William Crowe Remarks to NSPG,” undated [May or June 1987].

34.
Weinberger Diary, May 22, 1987.

35.
General Crist message to Admiral Bernsen, “Plan for Protection of Kuwaiti Shipping” (230130Z), May 1987.

36.
Admiral Bernsen message to George Crist, “Increased Readiness in the Persian Gulf” (211510Z), May 1987. Bernsen believed the
Stark
tragedy was caused by errors made by the captain, not by inadequacies in the rules of engagement.

37.
The incorporating of hostile intent into the inherent right of self-defense is always a tricky issue. Only the United States and Israel recognize this and regularly incorporate it into their military forces’ rules of engagement. It defined a hostile act with the following examples: 1) Launching missiles or firing rockets at U.S. forces; 2) Conducting mine-laying operations to obstruct free navigation in international waters; 3) Attacking or interfering with friendly forces engaged in mine countermeasure operations; 4) An enemy aircraft, vessel, or land-based facility displayed hostile intent by threatening the imminent use of force against friendly forces. This would include electronically jamming U.S. forces or intending to lay mines in international waters.

38.
Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “Peacetime Rules of Engagement—Northern Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman/Strait of Hormuz/Persian Gulf” (3002035Z), June 1987.

39.
USCINCCENT message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Protection of U.S. Flagged Vessels” (270515Z), May 1987.

40.
CINCPACFLT memorandum for Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Status of TLAM/C Mission Planning,” May 24, 1987.

41.
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, “USS
Missouri
BG in Strait of Hormuz,” April 28, 1987, pp. 14–16; Commanders John Morgan and Harry Ulrich briefing, “
Missouri
Battleship Battle Group in Response to Provoked Anger,” June 9, 1987.

42.
U.S. warships would also monitor two additional frequencies that would not change monthly: a secondary UHF frequency of 243.0 MHz and an emergency VHF set at 121.5 MHz.

43.
CINCCENT message, “Personal For Admiral Crowe: Joint Iraqi and United States Proposal for Avoiding Incidents” (DTG 032200Z), June 1987, pp. 1–2.

44.
The Iraqi aircraft would respond by turning on its IFF transponder, change its course immediately by 90 degrees, and cease any radar emissions.

45.
Admiral William Crowe memorandum to Secretary of Defense, September 3, 1987.

46.
CENTCOM, “Weekly Update,” August 30, 1987.

47.
There were a few hiccups. In one case an Iraqi pilot’s radio broke and his wingman could not speak English. The American defense attaché did not always receive the American convoy and ship locations in a timely manner. The Iraqi pilots were not always the most attentive. On November 26, 1987, an AWACS picked up three Iraqi Mirages headed south but could not raise them on the radio. The cruiser
Richmond K. Turner
maneuvered to unmask her weapons, and at twenty-eight miles locked on to the Iraqis with her fire control radar. Apparently unaware that this was from a U.S. warship, the Iraqis tried unsuccessfully to jam the cruiser. The
Richmond K. Turner
fired off its chaff and prepared to engage with missiles. When the Iraqi planes were only twenty miles from the cruiser, they finally established voice communication and the Iraqi aircraft immediately altered course just seconds before its flight would have come to an abrupt end. General George Crist to Caspar Weinberger, “CENTCOM Update,” September and October 1987; Adam Siegel, “A Chronology of Events Related to Earnest Will Escort Operations,” Center for Naval Analyses, June 1991, p. 30. Iraqi attacks necessitated an additional meeting in February 1988. That month, Baghdad increased the use of the large Soviet-built TC-16 Badger bomber armed with the C-601, the air-launched variant of the Silkworm missile. The existing deconfliction rules centered around the shorter-range Exocet did not suffice, with its range of one hundred kilometers. On February 12, a Badger fired a C-601 that accidentally hit the Danish-flagged tanker
Kate Maersk
north of Rostam, killing one sailor. Following this attack was another Badger strike that came within nine miles of the USS
Chandler
(DDG-996), then escorting an inbound convoy. The new procedures negotiated forbade Badgers from crossing south of 28 degrees north without positive communications with U.S. forces. These refinements worked reasonably well, balancing the U.S. desire to safeguard its ships while still allowing the Iraqi air force maximum flexibility to attack Iranian targets and freedom to fly over international waters, both of which the United States wanted to preserve.

48.
Admiral Crowe memorandum to Secretary of Defense, “Fourth Endorsement on RADM Sharp Investigation of 12 June 87,” September 3, 1987, p. 1.

49.
Crowe interview; Admiral William Crowe, Oral History Interview with Colonel Charles Gross, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, July 16, 1991, pp. 16–18.

50.
USCINCCENT message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Escort Regime” (27051Z), May 5, 1987, p. 3; USCENTCOM J-2, “Iranian Reactions to U.S. Escort Operations,” May 1987, p. 1; Crist interview.

51.
Ibid.

52.
Pat Lang did not agree with the prevailing assessment by his organization. He contributed to a national intelligence estimate that was more circumspect about the Iranian mine threat, and the CIA was generally more concerned than other intelligence agencies. Lang interview.

C
HAPTER 13
T
HE
I
NVISIBLE
H
AND OF
G
OD

1.
Five ships were damaged near the Suez Canal, including the American-owned (Panamanian-registered)
Big Orange XII
, while two more were attacked down near the Bab el Mandeb.

2.
Juan Carlos Gumucio, “Iran Threatens to Block Persian Gulf Entrance,”
Washington Post
, August 18, 1984, p. A1.

3.
By far the most comprehensive account of this operation is Dr. Scott C. Truver, “Mines of August: An International Whodunit,”
U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
, May 1985.

4.
Ibid., p. 102; comments by Major Rich Barry, USMC, “The Gulf of Suez Mining Crisis: Terrorism at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Seminar, May 30, 1985, transcribed, p. 21.

5.
The operation was code-named Operation Intense Look. Six other nations answered the Saudi and Egyptian request for assistance. The United Kingdom sent five mine-clearing vessels plus a support ship, arriving at the Egyptian port of Adabiyah on August 15. The French sent two mine-clearing vessels to Jeddah in response to Saudi Arabian requests. Later, in September, both the Italians and the Dutch sent two vessels. Ironically, one of the first countries to respond to the crisis was the Soviet Union, which had supplied Libya with the mines in the first place. Three mine-hunter vessels plus the helicopter cruiser
Leningrad
based in the port of Aden began looking for additional mines around the Bab el Mandeb.