The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (159 page)

⁹¹
Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, ‘Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure From Cheney Visits’,
Washington Post
, 5 June 2003, A01.

⁹²
United States Congress,
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against
Iraq, Public Law 107–243, 116 Stat. 1498, H.J. Res. 114, 16 Oct. 2002. The Resolution also passed more easily than its 1991 analogue, 296–133 in the House, and 77–23 in the Senate.

⁹³
SC Res. 1441 of 7 Nov. 2002.

⁹⁴
Correspondence with David Malone, 6 June 2005.

⁹⁵
Interview, 7 June 2005.

⁹⁶
Ibid.

⁹⁷
See Lawrence Freedman, ‘War In Iraq: Selling The Threat’,
Survival
46, no. 2 (2004), 29.

⁹⁸
Lopez and Cortright, ‘Containing Iraq’, 92.

⁹⁹
Quentin Peel et al., ‘How the US Set a Course for War with Iraq’,
Financial Times
, 26 May 2003.

¹⁰⁰
James Traub,
The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in an Era of American World Power
(New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2006).

¹⁰¹
See for example David Malone, ‘The UN will come around to the Bush-Blair view’,
International Herald Tribune
, 1 Feb. 2003, 4.

¹⁰²
Steven R. Weisman., ‘U.S. Set To Demand that Allies Agree Iraq is Defying U.N.’,
New York Times
, 23 Jan. 2003, 1.

¹⁰³
Peel et al., ‘How the US Set a Course for War’.

¹⁰⁴
‘No evidence yet to justify war on Iraq: Ivanov’,
Agence France-Presse
, 23 Jan. 2003; ‘China adds voice to Iraq war doubts’,
CNN.com
, 23 Jan. 2003,
edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/23/sprj.irq.china/index.html
.

¹⁰⁵
See Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro,
Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq
(New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2004); and Michael Clarke, ‘The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq’, in Paul Cornish (ed.),
The Conflict in Iraq 2003
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

¹⁰⁶
See ‘U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security Council’,
White House Office of the Press Secretary
, 5 Feb. 2003.

¹⁰⁷
Powell later called this episode a ‘blot’ on his record: Steven R. Weisman, ‘Powell Calls His U.N. Speech a Lasting Blot on His Record’,
New York Times
, 9 Sep. 2005, A10.

¹⁰⁸
Blix,
Disarming Iraq
, 157, 167.

¹⁰⁹
Ibid., 86.

¹¹⁰
Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis, and John Cavanagh, ‘Coalition of the Willing or Coalition of the Coerced?’, Institute for Policy Studies, 26 Feb. 2003,
www.ips-dc.org/COERCED.pdf

¹¹¹
United States Department of State, ‘Iraq: U.S./U.K./Spain Draft Resolution’, 24 Feb. 2003.

¹¹²
This argument is laid out most cogently in the secret legal advice provided by UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on 7 Mar. 2003 and released to the public on 28 Apr. 2005, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’. See also Adam Roberts, ‘The Use of Force’, in Malone,
The UN Security Council.

¹¹³
Blix,
Disarming Iraq
, 212.

¹¹⁴
Ibid., 212–13.

¹¹⁵
‘President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours’,
White House Office of the Press Secretary
, 17 Mar. 2003.

¹¹⁶
Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, ‘Errors Are Seen in Early Attacks on Iraqi Leaders’,
New York Times
, 13 June 2004, 1.

¹¹⁷
Thomas D. Grant, ‘The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice’,
American Journal of International Law
97, no. 4 (2003), 824.

¹¹⁸
See David Scheffer, ‘Beyond Occupation Law’,
American Journal of International Law
97, no. 4 (2003), 842–60. See also David Scheffer’s discussion of military occupation in
Chapter 26
.

¹¹⁹
UN doc. S/PV.4721 of 19 Mar. 2003, 22.

¹²⁰
SC Res. 1373 of 28 Sep. 2001; SC Res. 1540 of 28 Apr. 2004.

¹²¹
Paul C. Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’,
American Journal of International Law
96, no. 4 (2002), 901–5.

¹²²
Conversation with David Malone, 3 Mar. 2005.

¹
David M. Malone, ‘The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War World: 1987–97’,
Security Dialogue
28, no. 4 (1997), 393.

²
Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Collective Spinelessness: U.N. Actions in the Former Yugoslavia’, in Richard H. Ullman (ed.),
The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 59–96.

³
Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Conflict Prevention’, in David M. Malone (ed.),
The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century
(New York: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 103. To be fair, Sir David Hannay characterizes the UN role in Bosnia as ‘an unmitigated
public relations
disaster for the UN’, while ‘its actual performance on substance deserves to be treated less negatively’, in ‘The UN’s Role in Bosnia Assessed’,
The Oxford International Review
(Spring Issue 1996), 4.

⁴
Including the nearly identical Resolutions, SC Res. 733 of 23 Jan. 1992 on Somalia reproducing SC Res. 713 of 25 Sep. 1991 on Yugoslavia.

⁵
An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping
, UN doc. A/47/277S/24111 of 17 June 1992.

⁶
Report of the Panel of Experts on United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
, UN doc. A/55/305S/2000/809 of 21 Aug. 2000.

⁷
I argue, in ‘Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985–1991’, in Bruce W. Jentleson (ed.),
Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World
(Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 133–72, that there were many opportunities to prevent the violence, but they were between 1985 and March 1991, when EC crisis-management mechanisms only began.

⁸
The names of most of the regional organizations involved during 1990–1 changed after 1991, such as the EC to the European Union (EU), the CSCE to the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the G7 to the G8.

⁹
The Chinese vetoed extension of its mandate in the Security Council because the Macedonian government recognized Taiwan in exchange for aid (which never arrived), but the real cause of its removal, in fact, was preparations for Operation Allied Force.

¹⁰
It is perhaps ironic that the trigger, at least, for this violence was the (peaceful) agreement between Serbia and Macedonia to complete the definition of their border which, this argument goes, Albanian nationalists perceived as an obstacle to their national goals.

¹¹
For example, the Austrian foreign minister promoted the Slovene cause for independence in many European forums for more than two years and was joined by Switzerland in early 1991; Germany and Norway counselled Slovene and Croat strategists in 1990–1; and Hungary and Germany, at least, secretly sent infantry weapons and communications equipment (and assurances that the EC would not stop them if they chose secession) in May/June 1991 (on the latter, see Aleksandar Pavkovi
,
The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans
, 2nd edn. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 138).

¹²
More detail can be found in Susan L. Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War
(Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 1995), 158–60 and ch. 6.

¹³
The effect of these sanctions on the federal government and its ability to protect the survival of Yugoslavia compounded penalties that had been mounting for several years: in April 1990, the EC excluded Yugoslavia from PHARE; in July 1990, it stopped renegotiations of the 1982 EC association agreement at the behest of Greece, and in mid-May the initial offer by Delors and EC Chair Santer of a US $4.5 billion aid package was blocked by the UK. In Nov. 1990, the US Congress voted to end all US economic assistance and support with the international financial institutions by 5 May 1991, if human rights in Kosovo did not improve; although Secretary Baker was able to interrupt, temporarily, its implementation, Congress then embargoed its Aid to Democracies assistance to the federal government in early June but exempted the Slovene and Croatian republics.

¹⁴
The federal government had been without a functioning presidency since March, when the Croatian member (Stipe Mesi
) declared his goal upon assuming the rotating chair that spring to be the independence of Croatia, causing the Serbian-led bloc of 4 out of 9 to vote against him. When eventually elected as the EC required, he ordered the federal army to leave Slovene territory immediately.

¹⁵
A new mechanism, the Council of Senior Officers, was charged by the CSCE June summit to support Yugoslav unity, but its first chair was German foreign minister Genscher, who used the position in support of German policy, which was Slovene and Croatian independence.

¹⁶
David Owen,
Balkan Odyssey
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1995), 31.

¹⁷
The term ‘dissolution’ was proposed early by Slovene leaders, on the argument that the 1945 federal constitution was a voluntary pact among separate nations which could thus be dissolved by a voluntary act of one or more of its republics, even though the country’s constitutional court had issued repeated rulings in 1989–91 explicitly against this interpretation and any right to secession. Because the right to secession does not exist in international law either and is highly contentious internationally, Slovenes knew to avoid the term. The term dissolution allowed them to argue before the EC’s Arbitration (Badinter) Commission and the subsequent working group of ICFY that Slovenia should receive its share of Yugoslav assets and obligations in relation to its pre-‘dissolution’ contributions to GDP and the federal budget. The Commission adopted this legal formula on 7 October when the three-month moratorium concluded (Yugoslavia, it ruled, was ‘in the process of dissolution’).

¹⁸
By the second week of August, 300 had lost their lives and 79,000 had been internally displaced in the war in Croatia; between mid-August and mid-October 1991, 300,000 Serbs fled Croatia for Bosnia.

¹⁹
Now the Democratic Republic of Congo.

²⁰
By a strange twist of fate, both Stipe Mesi
and Budimir Lončar are from Croatia.