Complete Works (179 page)
Let’s look at it this way. Are you saying that paying what is due and being justly disciplined for wrongdoing are the same thing?
P
OLUS
: Yes, I do.
[b] S
OCRATES
: Can you say, then, that all just things aren’t admirable, insofar as they are just? Think carefully and tell me.
P
OLUS
: Yes, I think they are.
S
OCRATES
: Consider this point, too. If somebody acts upon something, there also has to be something that has something done to it by the one acting upon it?
P
OLUS
: Yes, I think so.
S
OCRATES
: And that it has done to it what the thing acting upon it does, and in the sort of way the thing acting upon it does it? I mean, for example, that if somebody hits, there has to be something that’s being hit?
P
OLUS
: There has to be.
S
OCRATES
: And if the hitter hits hard or quickly, the thing being hit is [c] hit that way, too?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: So the thing being hit gets acted upon in whatever way the hitting thing acts upon it?
P
OLUS
: Yes, that’s right.
S
OCRATES
: So, too, if somebody performs surgical burning, then there has to be something that’s being burned?
P
OLUS
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: And if he burns severely or painfully, the thing that’s being burned is burned in whatever way the burning thing burns it?
P
OLUS
: That’s right.
S
OCRATES
: Doesn’t the same account also hold if a person makes a surgical cut? For something is being cut.
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: And if the cut is large or deep or painful, the thing being cut [d] is cut in whatever way the cutting thing cuts it?
P
OLUS
: So it appears.
S
OCRATES
: Summing it up, see if you agree with what I was saying just now, that in all cases, in whatever way the thing acting upon something acts upon it, the thing acted upon is acted upon in just that way.
P
OLUS
: Yes, I do agree.
S
OCRATES
: Taking this as agreed, is paying what is due a case of being acted upon or of acting upon something?
P
OLUS
: It must be a case of being acted upon, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: By someone who acts?
P
OLUS
: Of course. By the one administering discipline.
S
OCRATES
: Now one who disciplines correctly disciplines justly?
[e] P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Thereby acting justly, or not?
P
OLUS
: Yes, justly.
S
OCRATES
: So the one being disciplined is being acted upon justly when he pays what is due?
P
OLUS
: Apparently.
S
OCRATES
: And it was agreed, I take it, that just things are admirable?
P
OLUS
: That’s right.
S
OCRATES
: So one of these men does admirable things, and the other, the one being disciplined, has admirable things done to him.
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: If they’re admirable, then, aren’t they good? For they’re either
[477]
pleasant or beneficial.
P
OLUS
: Necessarily so.
S
OCRATES
: Hence, the one paying what is due has good things being done to him?
P
OLUS
: Evidently.
S
OCRATES
: Hence, he’s being benefited?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Is his benefit the one I take it to be? Does his soul undergo improvement if he’s justly disciplined?
P
OLUS
: Yes, that’s likely.
S
OCRATES
: Hence, one who pays what is due gets rid of something bad in his soul?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Now, is the bad thing he gets rid of the most serious one? Consider it this way: in the matter of a person’s financial condition, do [b] you detect any bad thing other than poverty?
P
OLUS
: No, just poverty.
S
OCRATES
: What about that of a person’s physical condition? Would you say that what is bad here consists of weakness, disease, ugliness, and the like?
P
OLUS
: Yes, I would.
S
OCRATES
: Do you believe that there’s also some corrupt condition of the soul?
P
OLUS
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: And don’t you call this condition injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and the like?
P
OLUS
: Yes, certainly.
S
OCRATES
: Of these three things, one’s finances, one’s body, and one’s [c] soul, you said there are three states of corruption, namely poverty, disease, and injustice?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Which of these states of corruption is the most shameful? Isn’t it injustice, and corruption of one’s soul in general?
P
OLUS
: Very much so.
S
OCRATES
: And if it’s the most shameful, it’s also the worst?
P
OLUS
: What do you mean, Socrates?
S
OCRATES
: I mean this: What we agreed on earlier implies that what’s most shameful is so always because it’s the source either of the greatest pain, or of harm, or of both.
P
OLUS
: Very much so.
S
OCRATES
: And now we’ve agreed that injustice, and corruption of soul [d] as a whole, is the most shameful thing.
P
OLUS
: So we have.
S
OCRATES
: So either it’s most painful and is most shameful because it surpasses the others in pain, or else in harm, or in both?
P
OLUS
: Necessarily so.
S
OCRATES
: Now is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly, and ignorant more painful than being poor or sick?
P
OLUS
: No, I don’t think so, Socrates, given what we’ve said, anyhow.
S
OCRATES
: So the reason that corruption of one’s soul is the most shameful [e] of them all is that it surpasses the others by some monstrously great harm and astounding badness, since it doesn’t surpass them in pain, according to your reasoning.
P
OLUS
: So it appears.
S
OCRATES
: But what is surpassing in greatest harm would, I take it, certainly be the worst thing there is.
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Injustice, then, lack of discipline and all other forms of corruption of soul are the worst thing there is.
P
OLUS
: Apparently so.
S
OCRATES
: Now, what is the craft that gets rid of poverty? Isn’t it that of financial management?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: What’s the one that gets rid of disease? Isn’t it that of medicine?
[478]
P
OLUS
: Necessarily.
S
OCRATES
: What’s the one that gets rid of corruption and injustice? If you’re stuck, look at it this way: where and to whom do we take people who are physically sick?
P
OLUS
: To doctors, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: Where do we take people who behave unjustly and without discipline?
P
OLUS
: To judges, you mean?
S
OCRATES
: Isn’t it so they’ll pay what’s due?
P
OLUS
: Yes, I agree.
S
OCRATES
: Now don’t those who administer discipline correctly employ a kind of justice in doing so?
P
OLUS
: That’s clear.
S
OCRATES
: It’s financial management, then, that gets rid of poverty, medicine that gets rid of disease, and justice that gets rid of injustice and indiscipline. [b]
P
OLUS
: Apparently.
S
OCRATES
: Which of these, now, is the most admirable?
P
OLUS
: Of which, do you mean?
S
OCRATES
: Of financial management, medicine, and justice.
P
OLUS
: Justice is by far, Socrates.
S
OCRATES
: Doesn’t it in that case provide either the most pleasure, or benefit, or both, if it really is the most admirable?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Now, is getting medical treatment something pleasant? Do people who get it enjoy getting it?
P
OLUS
: No, I don’t think so.
S
OCRATES
: But it
is
beneficial, isn’t it?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: Because they’re getting rid of something very bad, so that it’s [c] worth their while to endure the pain and so get well.
P
OLUS
: Of course.
S
OCRATES
: Now, would a man be happiest, as far as his body goes, if he’s under treatment, or if he weren’t even sick to begin with?
P
OLUS
: If he weren’t even sick, obviously.
S
OCRATES
: Because happiness evidently isn’t a matter of getting rid of something bad; it’s rather a matter of not even contracting it to begin with.
P
OLUS
: That’s so.
S
OCRATES
: Very well. Of two people, each of whom has something bad [d] in either body or soul, which is the more miserable one, the one who is treated and gets rid of the bad thing or the one who doesn’t but keeps it?
P
OLUS
: The one who isn’t treated, it seems to me.
S
OCRATES
: Now, wasn’t paying what’s due getting rid of the worst thing there is, corruption?
P
OLUS
: It was.
S
OCRATES
: Yes, because such justice makes people self-controlled, I take it, and more just. It proves to be a treatment against corruption.
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: The happiest man, then, is the one who doesn’t have any badness in his soul, now that this has been shown to be the most serious kind of badness.
P
OLUS
: That’s clear.
S
OCRATES
: And second, I suppose, is the man who gets rid of it. [e]
P
OLUS
: Evidently.
S
OCRATES
: This is the man who gets lectured and lashed, the one who pays what is due.
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: The man who keeps it, then, and who doesn’t get rid of it, is the one whose life is the worst.
P
OLUS
: Apparently.
S
OCRATES
: Isn’t this actually the man who, although he commits the most
[479]
serious crimes and uses methods that are most unjust, succeeds in avoiding being lectured and disciplined and paying his due, as Archelaus according to you, and the other tyrants, orators, and potentates have put themselves in a position to do?
P
OLUS
: Evidently.
S
OCRATES
: Yes, my good man, I take it that these people have managed to accomplish pretty much the same thing as a person who has contracted very serious illnesses, but, by avoiding treatment manages to avoid paying what’s due to the doctors for his bodily faults, fearing, as would a child, [b] cauterization or surgery because they’re painful. Don’t you think so, too?
P
OLUS
: Yes, I do.
S
OCRATES
: It’s because he evidently doesn’t know what health and bodily excellence are like. For on the basis of what we’re now agreed on, it looks as though those who avoid paying what is due also do the same sort of thing, Polus. They focus on its painfulness, but are blind to its benefit and are ignorant of how much more miserable it is to live with an unhealthy [c] soul than with an unhealthy body, a soul that’s rotten with injustice and impiety. This is also the reason they go to any length to avoid paying what is due and getting rid of the worst thing there is. They find themselves funds and friends, and ways to speak as persuasively as possible. Now if what we’re agreed on is true, Polus, are you aware of what things follow from our argument? Or would you like us to set them out?
P
OLUS
: Yes, if you think we should anyhow.
S
OCRATES
: Does it follow that injustice, and doing what is unjust, is the worst thing there is?
[d] P
OLUS
: Yes, apparently.
S
OCRATES
: And it has indeed been shown that paying what is due is what gets rid of this bad thing?
P
OLUS
: So it seems.
S
OCRATES
: And that if it isn’t paid, the bad thing is retained?
P
OLUS
: Yes.
S
OCRATES
: So, doing what’s unjust is the second worst thing. Not paying what’s due when one has done what’s unjust is by its nature the first worst thing, the very worst of all.
P
OLUS
: Evidently.
S
OCRATES
: Now wasn’t this the point in dispute between us, my friend? [e] You considered Archelaus happy, a man who committed the gravest crimes without paying what was due, whereas I took the opposite view, that whoever avoids paying his due for his wrongdoing, whether he’s Archelaus or any other man, is and deserves to be miserable beyond all other men, and that one who does what’s unjust is always more miserable than the one who suffers it, and the one who avoids paying what’s due always more miserable than the one who does pay it. Weren’t these the things I said?