Complete Works (174 page)

G
ORGIAS
: And you’d be quite right to say so, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Come, Gorgias, you take your turn. For oratory is in fact one [d] of those crafts that carry out and exercise their influence entirely by speech, isn’t it?

G
ORGIAS
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Tell us then: what are they crafts about? Of the things there are, which is the one that these speeches used by oratory are concerned with?

G
ORGIAS
: The greatest of human concerns, Socrates, and the best.

S
OCRATES
: But that statement, too, is debatable, Gorgias. It isn’t at all clear yet, either. I’m sure that you’ve heard people at drinking parties [e] singing that song in which they count out as they sing that “to enjoy good health is the best thing; second is to have turned out good looking; and third”—so the writer of the song puts it—“is to be honestly rich.”

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, I’ve heard it. Why do you mention it?

S
OCRATES
: Suppose that the producers of the things the songwriter
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praised were here with you right now: a doctor, a physical trainer, and a financial expert. Suppose that first the doctor said, “Socrates, Gorgias is telling you a lie. It isn’t his craft that is concerned with the greatest good for humankind, but mine.” If I then asked him, “What are you, to say that?” I suppose he’d say that he’s a doctor. “What’s this you’re saying? Is the product of your craft really the greatest good?” “Of course, Socrates,” I suppose he’d say, “seeing that its product is health. What greater good for humankind is there than health?” And suppose that next in his turn [b] the trainer said, “I too would be amazed, Socrates, if Gorgias could present you with a greater good derived from his craft than the one I could provide from mine.” I’d ask this man, too, “What are you, sir, and what’s your product?” “I’m a physical trainer,” he’d say, “and my product is making people physically good-looking and strong.” And following the trainer the financial expert would say, I’m sure with an air of considerable scorn for all, “Do consider, Socrates, whether you know of any good, Gorgias’ [c] or anyone else’s, that’s a greater good than wealth.” We’d say to him, “Really? Is that what you produce?” He’d say yes. “As what?” “As a financial expert.” “Well,” we’ll say, “is wealth in your judgment the greatest good for humankind?” “Of course,” he’ll say. “Ah, but Gorgias here disputes that. He claims that his craft is the source of a good that’s greater than yours,” we’d say. And it’s obvious what question he’d ask next. “And [d] what is this good, please? Let Gorgias answer me that!” So come on, Gorgias. Consider yourself questioned by both these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is the greatest good for humankind, a thing you claim to be a producer of?

G
ORGIAS
: The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s own city.

S
OCRATES
: And what is this thing you’re referring to?

[e] G
ORGIAS
: I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you’ll have the doctor for your slave, and the physical trainer, too. As for this financial expert of yours, he’ll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of himself; for you, in fact, if you’ve got the ability to speak and to persuade the crowds.

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S
OCRATES
:
Now
I think you’ve come closest to making clear what craft you take oratory to be, Gorgias. If I follow you at all, you’re saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that’s the long and short of it. Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience?

G
ORGIAS
: None at all, Socrates. I think you’re defining it quite adequately. That is indeed the long and short of it.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Listen then, Gorgias. You should know that I’m convinced I’m one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion’s about. And I consider you one of them, too.

G
ORGIAS
: Well, what’s the point, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: Let me tell you now. You can know for sure that I don’t know what this persuasion derived from oratory that you’re talking about is, or what subjects it’s persuasion about. Even though I do have my suspicions about which persuasion I think you mean and what it’s about, I’ll still ask [c] you just the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is, and what it’s about. And why, when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It’s not you I’m after, it’s our discussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we’re talking about most clear to us. Consider, then, whether you think I’m being fair in resuming my questions to you. Suppose I were to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is. If you told me that he’s the one who paints pictures, wouldn’t it be fair for me to ask, “Of what sort of pictures is he the painter, and where?”

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, it would.

[d] S
OCRATES
: And isn’t the reason for this the fact that there are other painters, too, who paint many other pictures?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been a good one?

G
ORGIAS
: Of course.

S
OCRATES
: Come then, and tell me about oratory. Do you think that oratory alone instills persuasion, or do other crafts do so too? This is the sort of thing I mean: Does a person who teaches some subject or other persuade people about what he’s teaching, or not?

G
ORGIAS
: He certainly does, Socrates. He persuades most of all.

S
OCRATES
: Let’s talk once more about the same crafts we were talking [e] about just now. Doesn’t arithmetic or the arithmetician teach us everything that pertains to number?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, he does.

S
OCRATES
: And he also persuades?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion.

G
ORGIAS
: Apparently.

S
OCRATES
: Now if someone asks us what sort of persuasion it produces and what it’s persuasion about, I suppose we’d answer him that it’s the persuasion through teaching about the extent of even and odd. And we’ll be able to show that all the other crafts we were just now talking about
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are producers of persuasion, as well as what the persuasion is and what it’s about. Isn’t that right?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So oratory isn’t the only producer of persuasion.

G
ORGIAS
: That’s true.

S
OCRATES
: In that case, since it’s not the only one to produce this product but other crafts do it too, we’d do right to repeat to our speaker the question we put next in the case of the painter: “Of what sort of persuasion is oratory a craft, and what is its persuasion about?” Or don’t you think it’s right to repeat that question? [b]

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, Gorgias, since you think so too, please answer.

G
ORGIAS
: The persuasion I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place in law courts and in those other large gatherings, as I was saying a moment ago. And it’s concerned with those matters that are just and unjust.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, and that these are the matters it’s persuasion about. But so you won’t be surprised if in a moment I ask you again another question like this, about what seems to be clear, and yet I go on with my questioning—[c] as I say, I’m asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It’s not you I’m after; it’s to prevent our getting in the habit of second-guessing and snatching each other’s statements away ahead of time. It’s to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you want to.

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, I think that you’re quite right to do this, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Come then, and let’s examine this point. Is there something you call “to have learned”?

G
ORGIAS
: There is.

S
OCRATES
: Very well. And also something you call “to be convinced”?

[d] G
ORGIAS
: Yes, there is.

S
OCRATES
: Now, do you think that to have learned, and learning, are the same as to be convinced and conviction, or different?

G
ORGIAS
: I certainly suppose that they’re different, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: You suppose rightly. This is how you can tell: If someone asked you, “Is there such a thing as true and false conviction, Gorgias?” you’d say yes, I’m sure.

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, is there such a thing as true and false knowledge?

G
ORGIAS
: Not at all.

S
OCRATES
: So it’s clear that they’re not the same.

G
ORGIAS
: That’s true.

[e] S
OCRATES
: But surely both those who have learned and those who are convinced have come to be persuaded?

G
ORGIAS
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Would you like us then to posit two types of persuasion, one providing conviction without knowledge, the other providing knowledge?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, I would.

S
OCRATES
: Now which type of persuasion does oratory produce in law courts and other gatherings concerning things that are just and unjust? The one that results in being convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing?

G
ORGIAS
: It’s obvious, surely, that it’s the one that results in conviction.

S
OCRATES
: So evidently oratory produces the persuasion that comes from being convinced, and not the persuasion that comes from teaching, concerning
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what’s just and unjust.

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And so an orator is not a teacher of law courts and other gatherings about things that are just and unjust, either, but merely a persuader, for I don’t suppose that he could teach such a large gathering about matters so important in a short time.

G
ORGIAS
: No, he certainly couldn’t.

S
OCRATES
: Well now, let’s see what we’re really saying about oratory. [b] For, mind you, even I myself can’t get clear yet about what I’m saying. When the city holds a meeting to appoint doctors or shipbuilders or some other variety of craftsmen, that’s surely not the time when the orator will give advice, is it? For obviously it’s the most accomplished craftsman who should be appointed in each case. Nor will the orator be the one to give advice at a meeting that concerns the building of walls or the equipping of harbors or dockyards, but the master builders will be the ones. And when there is a deliberation about the appointment of generals or an [c] arrangement of troops against the enemy or an occupation of territory, it’s not the orators but the generals who’ll give advice then. What do you say about such cases, Gorgias? Since you yourself claim both to be an orator and to make others orators, we’ll do well to find out from you the characteristics of your craft. You must think of me now as eager to serve your interests, too. Perhaps there’s actually someone inside who wants to become your pupil. I notice some, in fact a good many, and they may well be embarrassed to question you. So, while you’re being questioned by me, consider yourself being questioned by them as well: “What will we get if [d] we associate with you, Gorgias? What will we be able to advise the city on? Only about what’s just and unjust or also about the things Socrates was mentioning just now?” Try to answer them.

G
ORGIAS
: Well, Socrates, I’ll try to reveal to you clearly everything oratory can accomplish. You yourself led the way nicely, for you do know, don’t you, that these dockyards and walls of the Athenians and the equipping [e] of the harbor came about through the advice of Themistocles and in some cases through that of Pericles, but not through that of the craftsmen?
⁴

S
OCRATES
: That’s what they say about Themistocles, Gorgias. I myself heard Pericles when he advised us on the middle wall.

G
ORGIAS
: And whenever those craftsmen you were just now speaking
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of are appointed, Socrates, you see that the orators are the ones who give advice and whose views on these matters prevail.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, Gorgias, my amazement at that led me long ago to ask what it is that oratory can accomplish. For as I look at it, it seems to me to be something supernatural in scope.

G
ORGIAS
: Oh yes, Socrates, if only you knew all of it, that it encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be accomplished. [b] And I’ll give you ample proof. Many a time I’ve gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine or allow the doctor to perform surgery or cauterization on him. And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory. And I maintain too that if an orator and a doctor came to any city anywhere you like and had to compete in speaking in the assembly or some other gathering over which of them should be appointed doctor, the doctor wouldn’t make any showing at all, but the [c] one who had the ability to speak would be appointed, if he so wished. And if he were to compete with any other craftsman whatever, the orator more than anyone else would persuade them that they should appoint him, for there isn’t anything that the orator couldn’t speak more persuasively about to a gathering than could any other craftsman whatever. That’s how great the accomplishment of this craft is, and the sort of accomplishment it is! One should, however, use oratory like any other competitive skill, Socrates. In other cases, too, one ought not to use a competitive skill [d] against any and everybody, just because he has learned boxing, or boxing and wrestling combined, or fighting in armor, so as to make himself be superior to his friends as well as to his enemies. That’s no reason to strike, stab, or kill one’s own friends! Imagine someone who after attending wrestling school, getting his body into good shape and becoming a boxer, went on to strike his father and mother or any other family member or friend. By Zeus, that’s no reason to hate physical trainers and people who [e] teach fighting in armor, and to exile them from their cities! For while these people imparted their skills to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, and in defense, not aggression, their pupils pervert their
[457]
strength and skill and misuse them. So it’s not their teachers who are wicked, nor does that make the craft guilty or wicked; those who misuse it, surely, are the wicked ones. And the same is true for oratory as well. The orator has the ability to speak against everyone on every subject, so as in gatherings to be more persuasive, in short, about [b] anything he likes, but the fact that he has the ability to rob doctors or other craftsmen of their reputations doesn’t give him any more of a reason to do it. He should use oratory justly, as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn’t hate his teacher and exile him from our cities. For while the teacher [c] imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it. So it’s the misuser whom it’s just to hate and exile or put to death, not the teacher.