Complete Works (177 page)

P
OLUS
: All right, I’m willing to answer, to get some idea of what you’re saying.

S
OCRATES
: Do you think that when people do something, they want the thing they’re doing at the time, or the thing for the sake of which they do what they’re doing? Do you think that people who take medicines prescribed by their doctors, for instance, want what they’re doing, the act of taking the medicine, with all its discomfort, or do they want to be healthy, the thing for the sake of which they’re taking it?

P
OLUS
: Obviously they want their being healthy.

S
OCRATES
: With seafarers, too, and those who make money in other ways, [d] the thing they’re doing at the time is not the thing they want—for who wants to make dangerous and troublesome sea voyages? What they want is their being wealthy, the thing for the sake of which, I suppose, they make their voyages. It’s for the sake of wealth that they make them.

P
OLUS
: Yes, that’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Isn’t it just the same in all cases, in fact? If a person does anything for the sake of something, he doesn’t want this thing that he’s doing, but the thing for the sake of which he’s doing it? [e]

P
OLUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now is there any thing that isn’t either
good
, or
bad
, or, what is between these,
neither good nor bad
?

P
OLUS
: There can’t be, Socrates.

S
OCRATES
: Do you say that wisdom, health, wealth and the like are good, and their opposites bad?

P
OLUS
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: And by things which are neither good nor bad you mean things which sometimes partake of what’s good, sometimes of what’s bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting or walking, running or making
[468]
sea voyages, or stones and sticks and the like? Aren’t these the ones you mean? Or are there any others that you call things neither good nor bad?

P
OLUS
: No, these are the ones.

S
OCRATES
: Now whenever people do things, do they do these intermediate things for the sake of good ones, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate ones?

[b] P
OLUS
: The intermediate things for the sake of the good ones, surely.

S
OCRATES
: So it’s because we pursue what’s good that we walk whenever we walk; we suppose that it’s better to walk. And conversely, whenever we stand still, we stand still for the sake of the same thing, what’s good. Isn’t that so?

P
OLUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And don’t we also put a person to death, if we do, or banish him and confiscate his property because we suppose that doing these things is better for us than not doing them?

P
OLUS
: That’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Hence, it’s for the sake of what’s good that those who do all these things do them.

P
OLUS
: I agree.

S
OCRATES
: Now didn’t we agree that we want, not those things that we [c] do for the sake of something, but that thing for the sake of which we do them?

P
OLUS
: Yes, very much so.

S
OCRATES
: Hence, we don’t simply want to slaughter people, or exile them from their cities and confiscate their property as such; we want to do these things if they are beneficial, but if they’re harmful we don’t. For we want the things that are good, as you agree, and we don’t want those that are neither good nor bad, nor those that are bad. Right? Do you think that what I’m saying is true, Polus, or don’t you? Why don’t you answer?

P
OLUS
: I think it’s true.

[d] S
OCRATES
: Since we’re in agreement about that then, if a person who’s a tyrant or an orator puts somebody to death or exiles him or confiscates his property because he supposes that doing so is better for himself when actually it’s worse, this person, I take it, is doing what he sees fit, isn’t he?

P
OLUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And is he also doing what he wants, if these things are actually bad? Why don’t you answer?

P
OLUS
: All right, I don’t think he’s doing what he wants.

[e] S
OCRATES
: Can such a man possibly have great power in that city, if in fact having great power is, as you agree, something good?

P
OLUS
: He cannot.

S
OCRATES
: So, what I was saying is true, when I said that it is possible for a man who does in his city what he sees fit not to have great power, nor to be doing what he wants.

P
OLUS
: Really, Socrates! As if
you
wouldn’t welcome being in a position to do what you see fit in the city, rather than not! As if
you
wouldn’t be envious whenever you’d see anyone putting to death some person he saw fit, or confiscating his property or tying him up!

S
OCRATES
: Justly, you mean, or unjustly?

P
OLUS
: Whichever way he does it, isn’t he to be envied either way?
[469]

S
OCRATES
: Hush, Polus.

P
OLUS
: What for?

S
OCRATES
: Because you’re not supposed to envy the unenviable or the miserable. You’re supposed to pity them.

P
OLUS
: Really? Is this how you think it is with the people I’m talking about?

S
OCRATES
: Of course.

P
OLUS
: So, you think that a person who puts to death anyone he sees fit, and does so justly, is miserable and to be pitied?

S
OCRATES
: No, I don’t, but I don’t think he’s to be envied either.

P
OLUS
: Weren’t you just now saying that he’s miserable?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, the one who puts someone to death unjustly is, my friend, [b] and he’s to be pitied besides. But the one who does so justly isn’t to be envied.

P
OLUS
: Surely the one who’s put to death unjustly is the one who’s both to be pitied and miserable.

S
OCRATES
: Less so than the one putting him to death, Polus, and less than the one who’s justly put to death.

P
OLUS
: How can that be, Socrates?

S
OCRATES
: It’s because doing what’s unjust is actually the worst thing there is.

P
OLUS
: Really? Is
that
the worst? Isn’t suffering what’s unjust still worse?

S
OCRATES
: No, not in the least.

P
OLUS
: So you’d rather want to suffer what’s unjust than do it?

S
OCRATES
: For my part, I wouldn’t want either, but if it had to be one [c] or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what’s unjust.

P
OLUS
: You wouldn’t welcome being a tyrant, then?

S
OCRATES
: No, if by being a tyrant you mean what I do.

P
OLUS
: I mean just what I said a while ago, to be in a position to do whatever you see fit in the city, whether it’s putting people to death or exiling them, or doing any and everything just as you see fit.

S
OCRATES
: Well, my wonderful fellow! I’ll put you a case, and you criticize [d] it. Imagine me in a crowded marketplace, with a dagger up my sleeve, saying to you, “Polus, I’ve just got myself some marvelous tyrannical power. So, if I see fit to have any one of these people you see here put to death right on the spot, to death he’ll be put. And if I see fit to have one of them have his head bashed in, bashed in it will be, right away. If I see fit to have his coat ripped apart, ripped it will be. That’s how great my power in this city is!” Suppose you didn’t believe me and I showed you [e] the dagger. On seeing it, you’d be likely to say, “But Socrates,
everybody
could have great power that way. For this way any house you see fit might be burned down, and so might the dockyards and triremes of the Athenians, and all their ships, both public and private.” But then
that’s
not what having great power is, doing what one sees fit. Or do you think it is?

P
OLUS
: No, at least not like that.

[470]
S
OCRATES
: Can you then tell me what your reason is for objecting to this sort of power?

P
OLUS
: Yes, I can.

S
OCRATES
: What is it? Tell me.

P
OLUS
: It’s that the person who acts this way is necessarily punished.

S
OCRATES
: And isn’t being punished a bad thing?

P
OLUS
: Yes, it really is.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, my surprising fellow, here again you take the view that as long as acting as one sees fit coincides with acting beneficially, it is good, and this, evidently, is having great power. Otherwise it is a bad [b] thing, and is having little power. Let’s consider this point, too. Do we agree that sometimes it’s better to do those things we were just now talking about, putting people to death and banishing them and confiscating their property, and at other times it isn’t?

P
OLUS
: Yes, we do.

S
OCRATES
: This point is evidently agreed upon by you and me both?

P
OLUS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: When do you say that it’s better to do these things then? Tell me where you draw the line.

P
OLUS
: Why don’t you answer that question yourself, Socrates.

[c] S
OCRATES
: Well then, Polus, if you find it more pleasing to listen to me, I say that when one does these things justly, it’s better, but when one does them unjustly, it’s worse.

P
OLUS
: How hard it is to refute you, Socrates! Why, even a child could refute you and show that what you’re saying isn’t true!

S
OCRATES
: In that case, I’ll be very grateful to the child, and just as grateful to you if you refute me and rid me of this nonsense. Please don’t falter now in doing a friend a good turn. Refute me.

P
OLUS
: Surely, Socrates, we don’t need to refer to ancient history to refute [d] you. Why, current events quite suffice to do that, and to prove that many people who behave unjustly are happy.

S
OCRATES
: What sorts of events are these?

P
OLUS
: You can picture this man Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia, I take it?

S
OCRATES
: Well, if I can’t picture him, I do hear things about him.

P
OLUS
: Do you think he’s happy or miserable?

S
OCRATES
: I don’t know, Polus. I haven’t met the man yet.

[e] P
OLUS
: Really? You’d know this if you had met him, but without that you don’t know straight off that he’s happy?

S
OCRATES
: No, I certainly don’t, by Zeus!

P
OLUS
: It’s obvious, Socrates, that you won’t even claim to know that the Great King
⁹
is happy.

S
OCRATES
: Yes, and that would be true, for I don’t know how he stands in regard to education and justice.

P
OLUS
: Really? Is happiness determined entirely by that?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, Polus, so I say anyway. I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy, but that the one who’s unjust and wicked is miserable.

P
OLUS
: So on your reasoning this man Archelaus is miserable?

S
OCRATES
: Yes, my friend, if he is in fact unjust.
[471]

P
OLUS
: Why of course he’s unjust! The sovereignty which he now holds doesn’t belong to him at all, given the fact that his mother was a slave of Alcetas, Perdiccas’ brother. By rights he was a slave of Alcetas, and if he wanted to do what’s just, he’d still be a slave to Alcetas, and on your reasoning would be happy. As it is, how marvelously “miserable” he’s turned out to be, now that he’s committed the most heinous crimes. First he sends for this man, his very own master and uncle, on the pretext of [b] restoring to him the sovereignty that Perdiccas had taken from him. He entertains him, gets him drunk, both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin and a boy about his own age. He then throws them into a wagon, drives it away at night, and slaughters and disposes of them both. And although he’s committed these crimes, he remains unaware of how “miserable” he’s become, and feels no remorse either. He refuses to become “happy” by justly bringing up his brother and conferring the sovereignty upon him, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven to whom [c] the sovereignty was by rights due to come. Instead, not long afterward, he throws him into a well and drowns him, telling the boy’s mother Cleopatra that he fell into the well chasing a goose and lost his life. For this very reason now, because he’s committed the most terrible of crimes of any in Macedonia, he’s the most “miserable” of all Macedonians instead of the happiest, and no doubt there are some in Athens, beginning with yourself, who’d prefer being any other Macedonian at all to being Archelaus. [d]

S
OCRATES
: Already at the start of our discussions, Polus, I praised you because I thought you were well educated in oratory. But I also thought that you had neglected the practice of discussion. And now is
this
all there is to the argument by which even a child could refute me, and do you suppose that when I say that a person who acts unjustly is not happy, I now stand refuted by you by means of
this
argument? Where did you get that idea, my good man? As a matter of fact, I disagree with every single thing you say!