Complete Works (175 page)

S
OCRATES
: Gorgias, I take it that you, like me, have experienced many discussions and that you’ve observed this sort of thing about them: it’s not easy for the participants to define jointly what they’re undertaking to [d] discuss, and so, having learned from and taught each other, to conclude their session. Instead, if they’re disputing some point and one maintains that the other isn’t right or isn’t clear, they get irritated, each thinking the other is speaking out of spite. They become eager to win instead of investigating the subject under discussion. In fact, in the end some have a most shameful parting of the ways, abuse heaped upon them, having given and gotten to hear such things that make even the bystanders upset with themselves for having thought it worthwhile to come to listen to such [e] people. What’s my point in saying this? It’s that I think you’re now saying things that aren’t very consistent or compatible with what you were first saying about oratory. So, I’m afraid to pursue my examination of you, for fear that you should take me to be speaking with eagerness to win against
[458]
you, rather than to have our subject become clear. For my part, I’d be pleased to continue questioning you if you’re the same kind of man I am, otherwise I would drop it. And what kind of man am I? One of those who would be pleased to be refuted if I say anything untrue, and who would be pleased to refute anyone who says anything untrue; one who, however, wouldn’t be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I count being refuted a greater good, insofar as it is a greater good for oneself to be delivered from the worst thing there is than to deliver someone else from it. I don’t suppose there’s anything quite so bad for a person as having false belief about the things we’re discussing right now. So if you say [b] you’re this kind of man, too, let’s continue the discussion; but if you think we should drop it, let’s be done with it and break it off.

G
ORGIAS
: Oh yes, Socrates, I say that I myself, too, am the sort of person you describe. Still, perhaps we should keep in mind the people who are present here, too. For quite a while ago now, even before you came, I gave them a long presentation, and perhaps we’ll stretch things out too long if [c] we continue the discussion. We should think about them, too, so as not to keep any of them who want to do something else.

C
HAEREPHON
: You yourselves hear the commotion these men are making, Gorgias and Socrates. They want to hear anything you have to say. And as for myself, I hope I’ll never be so busy that I’d forego discussions such as this, conducted in the way this one is, because I find it more practical to do something else.

C
ALLICLES
: By the gods, Chaerephon, as a matter of fact I, too, though [d] I’ve been present at many a discussion before now, don’t know if I’ve ever been so pleased as I am at the moment. So if you’re willing to discuss, even if it’s all day long, you’ll be gratifying me.

S
OCRATES
: For my part there’s nothing stopping me, Callicles, as long as Gorgias is willing.

G
ORGIAS
: It’ll be to my shame ever after, Socrates, if I weren’t willing, when I myself have made the claim that anyone may ask me anything he wants. All right, if it suits these people, carry on with the discussion, and [e] ask what you want.

S
OCRATES
: Well then, Gorgias, let me tell you what surprises me in the things you’ve said. It may be that what you said was correct and that I’m not taking your meaning correctly. Do you say that you’re able to make an orator out of anyone who wants to study with you?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: So that he’ll be persuasive in a gathering about all subjects, not by teaching but by persuading?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, that’s right.
[459]

S
OCRATES
: You were saying just now, mind you, that the orator will be more persuasive even about health than a doctor is.

G
ORGIAS
: Yes I was, more persuasive in a gathering, anyhow.

S
OCRATES
: And doesn’t “in a gathering” just mean “among those who don’t have knowledge”? For, among those who do have it, I don’t suppose that he’ll be more persuasive than the doctor.

G
ORGIAS
: That’s true.

S
OCRATES
: Now if he’ll be more persuasive than a doctor, doesn’t he prove to be more persuasive than the one who has knowledge?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, that’s right.

S
OCRATES
: Even though he’s not a doctor, right? [b]

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And a non-doctor, I take it, isn’t knowledgeable in the thing in which a doctor is knowledgeable.

G
ORGIAS
: That’s obvious.

S
OCRATES
: So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non-knower will be more persuasive than a knower among non-knowers. Isn’t this exactly what follows?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes it is, at least in this case.

S
OCRATES
: The same is true about the orator and oratory relative to the other crafts, too, then. Oratory doesn’t need to have any knowledge of the [c] state of their subject matters; it only needs to have discovered some device to produce persuasion in order to make itself appear to those who don’t have knowledge that it knows more than those who actually do have it.

G
ORGIAS
: Well, Socrates, aren’t things made very easy when you come off no worse than the craftsmen even though you haven’t learned any other craft but this one?

S
OCRATES
: Whether the orator does or does not come off worse than the others because of this being so, we’ll examine in a moment if it has any [d] bearing on our argument. For now, let’s consider this point first. Is it the case that the orator is in the same position with respect to what’s just and unjust, what’s shameful and admirable, what’s good and bad, as he is about what’s healthy and about the subjects of the other crafts? Does he lack knowledge, that is, of what these are, of what is good or what is bad, of what is admirable or what is shameful, or just or unjust? Does he employ devices to produce persuasion about them, so that—even though he doesn’t know—he seems, among those who don’t know either, to know more than [e] someone who actually does know? Or is it necessary for him to know, and must the prospective student of oratory already be knowledgeable in these things before coming to you? And if he doesn’t, will you, the oratory teacher, not teach him any of these things when he comes to you—for that’s not your job—and will you make him seem among most people to have knowledge of such things when in fact he doesn’t have it, and to seem good when in fact he isn’t? Or won’t you be able to teach him oratory at all, unless he knows the truth about these things to begin with? How
[460]
do matters such as these stand, Gorgias? Yes, by Zeus, do give us your revelation and tell us what oratory can accomplish, just as you just now said you would.

G
ORGIAS
: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if he really doesn’t have this knowledge, he’ll learn these things from me as well.

S
OCRATES
: Hold it there. You’re right to say so. If you make someone an orator, it’s necessary for him to know what’s just and what’s unjust, either beforehand, or by learning it from you afterwards.

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, it is.

[b] S
OCRATES
: Well? A man who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, isn’t he?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And isn’t a man who has learned music a musician?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: And a man who has learned medicine a doctor? And isn’t this so too, by the same reasoning, with the other crafts? Isn’t a man who has learned a particular subject the sort of man his knowledge makes him?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, he is.

S
OCRATES
: And, by this line of reasoning, isn’t a man who has learned what’s just a just man too?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, absolutely.

S
OCRATES
: And a just man does just things, I take it?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Now isn’t an orator necessarily just, and doesn’t a just man [c] necessarily want to do just things?

G
ORGIAS
: Apparently so.

S
OCRATES
: Therefore an orator will never want to do what’s unjust.

G
ORGIAS
: No, apparently not.

S
OCRATES
: Do you remember saying a little earlier that we shouldn’t complain against physical trainers or exile them from our cities if the boxer [d] uses his boxing skill to do what’s unjust, and that, similarly, if an orator uses his oratorical skill unjustly we shouldn’t complain against his teacher or banish him from the city, but do so to the one who does what’s unjust, the one who doesn’t use his oratorical skill properly? Was that said or not?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, it was.

S
OCRATES
: But now it appears that this very man, the orator, would never [e] have done what’s unjust, doesn’t it?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes, it does.

S
OCRATES
: And at the beginning of our discussion, Gorgias, it was said that oratory would be concerned with speeches, not those about even and odd, but those about what’s just and unjust. Right?

G
ORGIAS
: Yes.

S
OCRATES
: Well, at the time you said that, I took it that oratory would never be an unjust thing, since it always makes its speeches about justice. But when a little later you were saying that the orator could also use
[461]
oratory unjustly, I was surprised and thought that your statements weren’t consistent, and so I made that speech in which I said that if you, like me, think that being refuted is a profitable thing, it would be worthwhile to continue the discussion, but if you don’t, to let it drop. But now, as we subsequently examine the question, you see for yourself too that it’s agreed that, quite to the contrary, the orator is incapable of using oratory unjustly and of being willing to do what’s unjust. By the Dog, Gorgias, it’ll take [b] more than a short session to go through an adequate examination of how these matters stand!

P
OLUS
: Really, Socrates? Is what you’re now saying about oratory what you actually think of it? Or do you really think, just because Gorgias was too ashamed not to concede your further claim that the orator also knows what’s just, what’s admirable, and what’s good, and that if he came to him without already having this knowledge to begin with, he said that he would teach him himself, and then from this admission maybe some [c] inconsistency crept into his statements—just the thing that gives you delight, you’re the one who leads him on to face such questions—who do you think would deny that he himself knows what’s just and would teach others? To lead your arguments to such an outcome is a sign of great rudeness.

S
OCRATES
: Most admirable Polus, it’s not for nothing that we get ourselves companions and sons. It’s so that, when we ourselves have grown older and stumble, you younger men might be on hand to straighten our lives up again, both in what we do and what we say. And if Gorgias and I are [d] stumbling now in what we say—well, you’re on hand, straighten us up again. That’s only right. And if you think we were wrong to agree on it, I’m certainly willing to retract any of our agreements you like, provided that you’re careful about just one thing.

P
OLUS
: What do you mean?

S
OCRATES
: That you curb your long style of speech, Polus, the style you tried using at first.

P
OLUS
: Really? Won’t I be free to say as much as I like?

[e] S
OCRATES
: You’d certainly be in a terrible way, my good friend, if upon coming to Athens, where there’s more freedom of speech than anywhere else in Greece, you alone should miss out on it here. But look at it the other way. If you spoke at length and were unwilling to answer what you’re asked, wouldn’t I be in a terrible way if I’m not to have the freedom
[462]
to stop listening to you and leave? But if you care at all about the discussion we’ve had and want to straighten it up, please retract whatever you think best, as I was saying just now. Take your turn in asking and being asked questions the way Gorgias and I did, and subject me and yourself to refutation. You say, I take it, that you know the same craft that Gorgias knows? Or don’t you?

P
OLUS
: Yes, I do.

S
OCRATES
: And don’t you also invite people to ask you each time whatever they like, because you believe you’ll answer as one who has knowledge?

P
OLUS
: Certainly.

[b] S
OCRATES
: So now please do whichever of these you like: either ask questions or answer them.

P
OLUS
: Very well, I shall. Tell me, Socrates, since you think Gorgias is confused about oratory, what do you say it is?

S
OCRATES
: Are you asking me what
craft
I say it is?

P
OLUS
: Yes, I am.

S
OCRATES
: To tell you the truth, Polus, I don’t think it’s a craft at all.

P
OLUS
: Well then, what do you think oratory is?

[c] S
OCRATES
: In the treatise that I read recently, it’s the thing that you say has produced craft.
⁵

P
OLUS
: What do you mean?

S
OCRATES
: I mean a knack.
⁶