Enemy on the Euphrates (42 page)

Three hours later, Haldane sends a much more detailed telegram whose content and wording graphically convey the commander-in-chief’s anxiety and his assessment of the rapidly deteriorating situation.

The rising of the Shamiyya Division before the relief of Rumaytha has caused a material change in the situation and adds to the difficulties by exposing my communications between Baghdad and the relief force to increased danger of attack. The rising has become general and may spread … External intrigue organized and synchronized with recent renewed Bolshevik activity is at the bottom of the disturbances. Tribes who have risen appear to be affected by a wave of fanaticism. Neither they nor their leaders have in any instance formulated any specific grievances and removal of all Government control appears to be their sole expressed object.
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Haldane then informs the War Office that he has committed his last reserves to the Rumaytha relief operation, that it is essential that he is able to form another reserve force at Baghdad and that he could withdraw troops from the Upper Euphrates, but ‘this action would inevitably lead before long to disturbances in these areas’; therefore ‘the only logical decision is to withdraw from Mosul Vilayet … I propose to order this, possibly within a very few days.’ As for the troops in northwest Persia, Haldane observes that their continued presence there ‘is … a matter for the consideration of His Majesty’s Government’, but suggests that they might be withdrawn to Hamadan, a position nearer Baghdad. The GOC-in-chief also envisages a scenario in which the full pacification and re-occupation of the country will not be possible until the following year.

While events in Shamiyya were coming to a head, the commander of the second relief column, Brigadier General F.E. Coningham, was concentrating all the available troops between Hilla and Diwaniyya at Imam Hamza, where the survivors of the first relief attempt remained. In practice this meant that he would have to command a force made up of units of four different brigades which did not even belong to the same division and was henceforth to be known as RUMCOL. In fact this would be the pattern throughout the campaign as Leslie complained to his wife: ‘Everything in this “War” is done in “Columns” – the 17th Division, as such, no longer exists in the minds of GHQ.’
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But his commander-in-chief had good reason for these unorthodox military formations: ‘This organization, though unsound, was unavoidable, not only because, to save time, the troops nearest at hand had to be used, but because … my reserve brigade, which would normally have been at Baghdad and available to proceed as a whole on any operation required, was, except for one battalion, still on the Upper Euphrates.’
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At least, this time, the relief column would be considerably stronger than in the earlier attempt. By 14 July Leslie and Coningham had assembled a force made up of four battalions of Indian infantry, an under-strength British battalion (the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Rifles), two field artillery batteries and one pack artillery battery. There was
also a squadron of the 37th (Indian) Cavalry, some machine-gunners and sappers and an armoured train on which the reserve ammunition, water, rations and medical requirements would be carried. Furthermore, an additional battalion from the 51st Infantry Brigade, the 1st Battalion 10th Gurkha Rifles, had been ordered to join the column and was currently making a forced march from the Upper Euphrates to Baghdad, from where it would be transported by rail to Diwaniyya.

However, in spite of the fact that RUMCOL was considerably larger and stronger than its predecessor, it faced three major problems. First, its line of communications could never be more than scantily defended. Major General Leslie ordered that double platoon posts should be placed every two to four miles from Imam Hamza, the most forward position manned by the 45th Sikhs, to Hilla, a distance of about seventy miles. But to man these posts required the equivalent of two of Coningham’s battalions. Even so it was difficult to prevent the rebels from cutting telegraph wires and ripping up railway track under cover of darkness. Second, while this larger column was strung out in marching order, it would be extremely vulnerable to attacks on its flanks or rear by Arab raiding parties. To reduce this risk the column was obliged to proceed south along the railway line in a square formation in which the train and transport wagons were in the middle with companies from the remaining infantry battalions covering the front, rear and sides of the square. Progress in this formation was slow, however, as the column had to make frequent stops to repair track or to transport guns and supplies across the numerous dried-up canals and gullies which criss-crossed their path.

No remedy was available for the third problem: the shade temperature was now reaching 120°f. It was a heat the like of which the British troops in the column could never have imagined: a heat which bore not the remotest similarity to any hot English summer day – a horrible, frightening heat that pressed down upon them like a smothering blanket from which there was no escape. And in these conditions it was inevitable that the military effectiveness of the Royal Irish Rifles, the gunners of the Royal Field Artillery and some of the British officers –
even those who had previously served in Iraq – would soon be reduced by heatstroke casualties.
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By 16 July Coningham’s force had reached a position sixteen miles north of Rumaytha. Meanwhile, the APO at Rumaytha, Lieutenant Hyatt, had received intelligence that some of the sheikhs of the tribal sections besieging the town were willing to parley. He therefore sent a message – once again using the heliograph link with Samawa – informing Leslie of the Arabs’ willingness to negotiate, adding that if an aircraft could be sent to Rumaytha (he would put out a certain sign indicating it was safe to land) he should be flown out of the town to discuss the situation with his superior, Major Daly, who was accompanying Coningham’s relief force.

However, General Leslie was not impressed by this proposal and was of the opinion that APO Hyatt’s ‘tail’ was ‘between his legs all through’. According to Leslie, the APO ‘laid stress on the necessity for an immediate consultation with his boss at Diwaniyya’, but was insisting ‘that the plane should not bring Daly to him but take him to Daly’.
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Leslie’s response to this request was brutally sharp. He immediately telegraphed General Coningham – knowing that the latter would show the cable to the PO, Major Daly – stating that he considered that the insurgents would be better persuaded to cease hostilities ‘if the political officer Diwaniyya [Daly] comes … with you and your guns than if the political officer Rumaytha comes to Diwaniyya. Proceed with your advance!’

Meanwhile, in Baghdad, GHQ in the person of Brigadier General i/c Administration P.O. Hambro, recently arrived from the Persian hill station, had taken upon himself the task of arranging the transportation by rail of men and supplies to the ‘Rumaytha Front’. This was much to the annoyance of Major General Leslie, who was preparing to leave for Diwaniyya and who considered that it was he who should have been making the necessary arrangements. Leslie’s irritation rapidly turned to fury when he arrived at the railway station in the late afternoon of 17 July, as he later recorded.

The train to take me and the 10th Gurkhas – recently arrived by forced march from the Upper Euphrates – to Diwaniyya was to leave at 6.30 p.m. When I arrived at the station I found that GHQ [i.e. Hambro] had loaded the whole train with ‘comforts for troops’ and the 10th Gurkhas could not get on it, nor were there any other rolling stock in the station! I must confess that my temper was really put to the test now. But I might have expected something of the sort from a Staff which turned up to do its job at the last moment and insisted upon relieving me of that job though my staff were perfectly capable of doing it in addition to their own work.
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However, Leslie was not the man to be overawed by a GHQ staff officer and he immediately ordered the unloading of the 6.30 p.m. train and the embarkation of the Gurkhas. So by 4.20 p.m. the next day Leslie and the Gurkhas arrived at Diwaniyya and the Gurkhas began yet another forced march to try to catch up with the relief column.

By now it had become obvious to the War Office that recent events in Iraq would have to be fully reported to the cabinet and – in due course – to Parliament. Consequently, on 17 July Churchill informed his government colleagues that ‘the situation in Mesopotamia has come to a head.’
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Having presented a summary of military events in Iraq since 1 July – an account which did not minimise the difficulties the British were facing – Churchill explained that General Haldane had used his last reserves and that it was essential that a further reserve should be formed. In response to Haldane’s request for reinforcements made two days earlier, the general staff had already moved swiftly to commit a full division from India in spite of the fact that Haldane himself had only suggested that it was ‘probable’ that a full division would be needed. The financial implication of these developments was clear and the secretary of state for war did not hesitate to spell it out: the reinforcements would cost ‘millions … all prospect of reduction is at an end. A very large supplementary estimate is inevitable.’ All other objectives must now be subordinated to one single aim. ‘Whatever the future policy may be, the rising … should be stamped out with the utmost vigour.’
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However, it would be at least two weeks before any troops from India would begin to arrive in Iraq and a further four to five weeks
before the full division completed its disembarkation at Basra. In the meantime it was essential that forces already in the region were redeployed so that the maximum pressure could be brought to bear on the Euphrates rebels. But from which combat zone should these reinforcements be withdrawn?

The situation on the Upper Euphrates and Syrian border had quietened down over the last few months, largely because Haldane had deployed most of his reserves in that theatre. However, news from London suggested it was now inevitable that the French would attack Damascus and crush Syria’s nascent Arab government. Churchill thought that if that happened, Emir Faysal might join the Turks, foment trouble for Britain in Iraq and Palestine or even call for a jihad against all Europeans. In other words, withdrawing any more troops from the Syrian border areas would be extremely risky. To the north, Turkish nationalists continued to threaten the British position at Zakho and could even pose a threat to Mosul; it was also possible that Turkish troops would combine forces with the Kurds. It would be extremely unwise to withdraw troops from this frontier, given the continuing failure of the European powers and their postwar puppet government in Istanbul to subdue Mustapha Kemal and his men. Finally, on the eastern flank, Persia continued to be threatened by a combination of Bolshevik troops and local nationalist rebels. Haldane had the equivalent of two brigades in that enfeebled state, propping up a friendly government – should Britain abandon an ally and allow Persia to decline into chaos? The strategic choices were exceptionally difficult; as Churchill himself put it, ‘We find, therefore, that we are threatened with possible trouble from the west, the north and east. All the alternatives are disagreeable.’

However, the war secretary was not one to evade the making of difficult choices. ‘Persia’, he advised the cabinet, ‘remains the safest place from which troops can be withdrawn and it is considered that on military grounds the General Officer Commanding should be authorized to withdraw Noperforce.’ But would the cabinet agree?

While Churchill and his colleagues were considering these broad strategic issues, General Coningham was approaching the location where
the first attempt to relieve Rumaytha had failed. By now the insurgents’ position on the banks of the Hilla branch of the Euphrates, where the river curves round in a great loop, had been further strengthened, and now consisted of a series of trenches hidden by scrub in front of parallel lines of dried-up canal beds impassable to wheeled vehicles and lying directly across the column’s line of march. The position was a particularly strong one, given that the rebels on the left bank of the Hilla channel could enfilade the British troops as they moved forward to attack the insurgents’ main defences on the right bank. Moreover, the insurgent forces had increased to around 5,000 men spread out along a front of 3,500 yards.

By now so many men of the Royal Irish Rifles had gone down with heatstroke that the unit was effectively out of action. Nevertheless, at 1.10 p.m. on 19 July, Coningham’s six 18-pounder guns opened up and after the initial bombardment the two battalions leading the relief column, the 45th Sikhs and the 116th Mahrattas, were sent forward against the insurgents’ position. But the rebels, instructed by former Ottoman army officers and NCOs, had prepared their position extremely well and the sepoys failed to break through.

However, an hour later the 10th Gurkhas arrived, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel H.L. Scott, having marched towards the sound of Coningham’s guns.
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Coningham and Scott now scanned the battleground with their binoculars, searching for a point in the enemy’s defences which could be outflanked. Villages were visible along the line of the river, but from the British position and the flatness of the terrain it was not possible to determine which river bank they were on. Eventually, two objectives were chosen – Umm Nijiris, a small village surrounded by palm trees, and another group of mud-brick buildings a mile further upstream.

So, after a short rest, at 5.00 p.m. ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies of the Gurkhas were thrown into an attack on these two points. There followed a bitter struggle to try to occupy both sides of the river. ‘A’ Company, under its commander Captain Selby Moore, made for Umm Nijiris while ‘C’ Company provided covering fire supported by a section of British
machine-gunners. But after only a few bursts of machine-gun fire, the British gunners collapsed, half-dead with heatstroke. However, although deprived of effective covering fire, ‘A’ Company advanced grimly towards the river under heavy enemy fire and managed to establish themselves on the near bank.