France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (45 page)

did not succeed among the journalists either. Rémy Roure who wrote in
Le Temps
under the pseudonym of Pierre Fervacque, was one of his admirers. He met Raymond Cartier at
L’Écho de Paris
. Only
L’Époque
, a newspaper that continued
L’Écho de Paris
, edited by André Pironneau and Henry de Kérillis with Raymond, gave him full support and occasionally published his articles.
L’Action Française
, influenced by Weygand, criticized him politely while it waged an extremely violent campaign against Paul Reynaud.
⁷⁵
Pertinax introduced de Gaulle to Colonel de Lattre de Tassigny who disapproved of him, and the conversation between the two turned violent.
⁷⁶

In the end Gamelin was the main opponent to the ideas of Charles de Gaulle, who had the support of Lieutenant Colonel Perré, head of the tank section, and of infantry headquarters. Because of Gamelin, Daladier was convinced that de Gaulle’s ideas were bad and the new “Instruction on the deployment of large units,” issued in August 1936, made no mention of the creation of armored divisions in the future or as in the terminology used at the time—“armor-plated.”
⁷⁷

Admiral Castex failed to reach the pinnacle of history like de Gaulle. Born in 1878, he was twelve years older than the colonel. He was a remarkable strategic philosopher and a prolific writer at a young age, believing that ideas were “ageless, had no rank…and even fewer stars.”
⁷⁸

For a long time Admiral Castex was part of the navy’s historical service and a professor; in 1939 he was in command of one of the most important French naval areas (“Admiral Nord” in Dunkirk). But the navy, which had allowed him to publish what others viewed as pure abominations,
⁷⁹
transferred him into the reserves in October 1939.

We will simply give a short overview of what he proposed. Castex was convinced that there was necessarily “one” strategy. Therefore, all divisions among the various branches of the service and between the military and the political were absurd. He had no confidence in the French security system. He later wrote, “The French government’s war plans before 1940 looked like a long water snake, meaning that many people referred to it but few had ever actually seen it and no one was quite sure that it did, in fact, exist.” Admiral Castex’s pre-war ideas regarding the
preparation of the war of 1939 have been brilliantly summarized in a chapter of
Mélanges Stratégiques
.
⁸⁰
They clashed head on with the views of the High Command, as well as those of General de Gaulle. Castex felt that the only possible strategy for France and Great Britain against Italy and Germany was a
totally defensive
one. The enemy was, and would remain, stronger; therefore, a long war that could break his will was required. Just like Wellington at Torre Vedras, a powerful “western redoubt” prolonging the Maginot Line to the sea, extending it in depth, had to be created using naval superiority, as well as the vast African expanses, to the maximum. He wanted the same six armored divisions with heavy tanks not for the offensive but only for a defensive strategy and to “take and hold on to territory.”

Since only what is defensible can be defended, France would only keep the vast African lands of its Empire. To everyone’s amazement, Admiral Castex, at the time of the colonial exhibition in 1931, quietly wrote that Indochina would have to be abandoned: “Who will take Indochina off our hands?” he asked. “It is total wishful thinking to believe we can defend Indochina against the Japanese.” France should also, “as soon as possible,” get out of Syria and Lebanon by granting them the independence they demanded. “I can already hear the loud outcry berating the solutions I described about our centuries-old interests and our prestige, etc. Actually our interest and prestige are based on the strength of our geo-strategic position and our armed forces. By focusing on the Europe-Africa axis we shall improve both to everyone’s benefit.”

*
“La grande muette” referred to an army that did not take sides in internal politics. [NDT]

Chapter IX

T
HE
D
IPLOMATIC
M
ACHINE

1.

T
HE
Q
UAI D
’O
RSAY

D
uring the 1930s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
¹
was gloriously located at the Quai d’Orsay, near the Seine, one of the focal points of France’s prestige. The minister worked at the desk said to have belonged to Vergennes, but other eminent shadows were present as well, those of Théophile Delcassé and, most of all, of Aristide Briand. Not only was there a sculpture at the honor gate commemorating the “Apostle of Peace,” but many of his disciples and admirers were in key positions, with the Secretary General, Alexis Léger, overseeing everyone.

And yet this was a thin agency with a small budget that was of little interest to the members of Parliament.

Total personnel in 1935, excluding lower echelon employees and the “chancellery clerks,” was 686 for the most part in the two “careers,” the prestigious diplomatic career and the lesser consular service. Known as
The Career
par excellence, the diplomatic service shined in a kind of halo. It included only 191 persons, while the consular service reached 398. To these must be added a kind of hybrid group of thirty-three interpreter secretaries for the Middle East and thirty-six for the Far East, six code clerks and one archivist. About 120 out of the 686 employees worked “in the Department,” meaning in Paris—according to rather poorly organized
rotations. However, the department also used high level specialists who did not belong to either career: finance inspectors, attorneys from the
Conseil d’État
, jurists increasing the number of Paris-based employees—excluding lower level personnel—to about 230 persons. Diplomats were recruited through examinations since 1868 (“the consul students”). During the period we are examining, the “big exam” allowed only a small number of applicants: 12 in 1930, 11 in 1931, 6 in 1932, 5 in 1934, 4 in 1935, 2 in 1936, 7 in 1937, 7 in 1938, 8 in 1939. The numbers for the “little exam” for the consulates were slightly higher.

Examinations were prepared at the
École libre des sciences politiques
in so-called “stables” supervised by young diplomats. History, international law, both public and private, and economic geography played the most important role once the barrier of the language requirements (two foreign languages) was fulfilled. Political economy was virtually nonexistent. In practical terms, but nowhere written into the regulations, the career was in fact reserved for the families of the “notables” of the aristocracy or the high bourgeoisie with a slight advantage to the brothers, sons or nephews of diplomats. An “internship grade,” issued by a commission of four high-ranking diplomats grading the manners and appearance of the candidates, weighed greatly on the examination. Such a system could create intolerable favoritism. But that rarely happened. It obviously did favor a “class” recruitment but the exam was very difficult and those who passed had to be highly cultured and with a superior level of knowledge. They were, therefore, at the top of their social class. Because of the exam and the small number of officers, the career was very homogeneous with everyone knowing each other.
²

It should be said that it included only one woman prior to 1939.

Did such a social selection lead to a narrow policy based exclusively on relationships, avoiding the vital forces and the popular leaders in foreign countries? In many cases, actually, the diplomatic corps of those days became the stuff of caricature. Roger Peyrefitte, who had not yet been expelled from the career during the 1930s, collected a number of anecdotes, that were more or less authentic, in his novel
Les Ambassades
, in a mixture of scandal and ridicule. More critical but with an acid pen, Jacques Baeyens wrote
Au bout du Quai, souvenirs irrespectueux d’un diplomate
(1975). Paul Allard’s 1938 book,
Le Quai d’Orsay, son personnel ses rouages, ses dessous
, is very superficial.

The politicians didn’t always like the diplomats. Jean Zay was no doubt the harshest critic. While meeting the French minister to Belgrade, de
Dampierre, and hearing him say “there is no public opinion in Yugoslavia,” he reached a general conclusion: “What did most of our diplomatic agents abroad know? What was their insight during the fateful years? With a few exceptions these aristocratic individuals, brilliant graduates of the
École des sciences politiques
, were the prisoners of their personal opinions, their prejudices, their secret desires. They avoided any contacts with the people.” And he went on to accuse them of being biased, because they disapproved of the republic and even of preferring the local fascists.
³

What Jean Zay claimed was commonplace, actually appears to have been the exception. After reading thousands of documents, dispatches and telegrams, I am convinced, on the contrary, that French diplomats in those days made a huge effort to be informed about the real situation, including popular and labor reactions to events. In any case, as minister of national education, Jean Zay had few contacts with them. The Popular Front found it unnecessary to either purge anyone or even proceed with “diplomatic rotations” of any consequence. The only two known changes during the period we are covering were that of Paul-Boncour in March 1933 and of Georges Bonnet in October 1938. Both took place for either technical or personal reasons. There was never any trace of conspiracy and French diplomats even silently supporting
L’Action Française
must have been extremely rare.
⁴
French diplomats are seen working as hard as possible to forge a real alliance between France and the USSR, as well as with fascist Italy.

Those were not the characteristics of a limited and reactionary attitude. Many diplomats would refuse to serve Vichy, at least after November 1942. Many, like René Massigli, Stanislas Ostrorog, Louis de Guiringaud, Armand Bérard, and Jean Chauvel, went to London or Algiers. Many took part in the Resistance. In 1945–1947 few purges would become permanent.
⁵

The department’s organization chart was rather simple. Around the minister and his cabinet (which always included many diplomats) the secretary general was in charge and handled most matters. Only the
information and press service
, headed by an academic, Pierre Comert until October 1938, and the office of mail and pouches both reported directly to the minister. If we concentrate on the main functions the key department was the Directorate of Political and Commercial Affairs, divided into ten offices or divisions. Beyond the personnel office, headed for a long time by Louis de Robien and whose most famous member was Jean Giraudoux, the inspector general of diplomatic posts; the archives service;
the protocol service headed since 1920 by Pierre Becq de Fouquières, a permanent fixture; the office of chancelleries and legal affairs, the office of administrative affairs and international unions; the office of property and private interests.

The division of political and commercial affairs was by far the most interesting. It was divided into four geographic subdivisions: Europe; Asia and Oceania (Pacific); Africa-Levant (including Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Lebanon); and America. There were also two functional subdivisions: commercial affairs and the League of Nations, the office of French works overseas that was headed during the entire period by Jean Marx, in effect the original office of cultural relations. Finally, there were the code office, the legal section, headed by Jules Basdevant, a prominent professor of law, and the office of control of foreigners.

The European subdivision was the inner sanctum, handling general affairs and compiling all incoming information, including the incoming reports of the military attachés. There was, therefore, a pyramid of sorts

Secretary General

Director of Political and Economic Affairs

Adjunct Director

Deputy Director for Europe,

and we found an amazing continuity. Since we have already discussed Léger, we shall concentrate on the other officials.

Paul Bargeton was born in 1882, began his career in the Near East, fought in the war at Salonika and became one of the most important officials at the Quai d’Orsay. He was a Protestant and at the center of a “Protestant clan” of sorts with Massigli, Coulondre, Albert Kamerer, Victor de Lacroix, and, earlier, Jacques Seydoux de Clausonne, whose son François passed the big exam first in his class in 1928. Bargeton would replace Claudel as ambassador to Brussels in 1937.