France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (49 page)

Italy was threatening to leave the League of Nations if sanctions were not lifted, and appeared less eager to oppose the Anschluss (as indicated by its support of a German-Austrian agreement signed on July 11). Two issues, therefore, faced the new minister Yvon Delbos: Should sanctions be lifted? Should France recognize the conquest of Ethiopia?

Regarding the first issue, being debated in Geneva and with the British since the end of April, France could only follow England. The latter indicated “it resigned itself to accepting the existing situation.”
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Delbos felt that France could not take the initiative but was “ready to approve any suggestion coming from the British government.” British leaders Eden and Vansittart wished to announce as of June 27 that they had the approval of the French government. Corbin felt “there was an advantage to affirming Franco-British cooperation so that it would progressively come to be accepted by that country.”
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Italy was to obtain what it wanted. Mussolini handed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he was running himself, to his son-in-law, Count Ciano, who was known to be pro-German. Countess Edda Ciano, visiting Germany, received a very warm welcome by Hitler and Goebbels. Ambassador Attolico “appeared to be completely dedicated to Italo-German rapprochement.”
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The League of Nations assembly decided to suspend sanctions against Italy on July 4. This was no reason for celebration
for Léon Blum and Yvon Delbos. On June 23, Blum at the Senate and Delbos at the Chamber of Deputies read the government’s foreign policy declaration affirming the principle of collective security and their faith in the League of Nations.

There was no immediate requirement for France to recognize the conquest of Ethiopia if not for the problem of the embassy in Rome. Léger disliked Charles de Chambrun and succeeded in getting Delbos to retire him as of October 31, 1936.
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His successor would have to be accredited to “the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.” The Popular Front government, using the pretense that this implied an indirect recognition, refused to send the designated successor, Count de Saint-Quentin, who was Deputy Director of Africa and Levant at the Quai d’Orsay. France would maintain this position for two years as it was represented by its chargé d’affaires at the embassy, Councilor Jules Blondel.

Relations with Germany did not fare any better. It was decided not to attempt to correct any of the negative consequences of the remilitarization of the Rhineland.

The military drew some conclusions. In a memorandum written by Gamelin after consulting the members of the Superior War Council, as well as Marshals Pétain and Franchet d’Esperey, Gamelin
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proved—which was easy enough—that “Germany’s military power had continued to increase.” But he added, “this increased power has not yet given the German army clear cut superiority.” Gamelin assumed that in case of a German aggression, British, Czechoslovak, and Belgian forces would certainly participate. On May 15 Franco-Belgian military talks were held in Gamelin’s office.
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It would all depend on the Belgians’ “call.” “The Belgians will have to call us as soon as possible. The French vanguard will immediately respond and other forces will follow. We will fight together on the Albert Canal; its defense is a common Franco-Belgian safeguard.” The issue is therefore to find out what the Belgians would do. In his June report Gamelin showed that beyond England, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium, France’s “fundamental interest” of “
from the single perspective of the equilibrium of the land forces
” implied “
keeping our military agreements with Italy and consolidating the Franco-Polish alliance
.” A few days later, on June 26 the new organization Blum had created (by a decree of June 6, 1936) known as Permanent Committee of National Defense met under the chairmanship of Edouard Daladier. Blum was present at the meeting.
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“The general plans of national defense,” said Daladier, “are a governmental matter.” The “main point” was that “France had a defensive policy.” All issues
were discussed, especially that of the considerable effort required to increase the air force.

Daladier appeared before the army commission of the Chamber on July 1 to speak very candidly about “the precise inventory of the situation.” He pointed out that Germany had an army of 500,000, men soon to become 650,000, and was making a huge effort to add new equipment. He said, “Germany was building its army on the idea of a war of movement.” France had 20 divisions. “Since we have a fortified barrier we have deployed our mechanized elements in the form of general reserves.” Daladier very judiciously deplored that linear form of defense. He would have preferred a scaled defense and far more armaments at every level, especially mechanized cannon. “I know that the French army is very much attached to tradition. It has nevertheless made a considerable effort at motorization.” If Italy remained neutral, Daladier felt confident: “We have the capability of preventing the invasion of the territory.”
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This was all rather optimistic. However, a note written on June 30 by the director of political affairs, Bargeton, was not. It showed that France did not really have an alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania; that the treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia were “unlimited as to providing assistance but limited on the contrary as to the countries against whom the assistance would be directed,” and that the treaty with the USSR was still unclear. There was a lack of coordination among those treaties. “Among the five countries having a treaty of “alliance” with France, few consider each other as allies. Weakness is not the only result of the current situation; it also concentrates any action taken against peace on France.”
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How could France get out of that bad situation? By detecting the signs of a German attack in Austria, Danzig, and elsewhere. That was the focus of the activity of François-Poncet, Léon Noël and Puaux, in particular.

Wouldn’t it be possible to take further steps and try for a “western agreement” with Germany? François-Poncet felt that the Germans would agree to it.
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The best way to make a favorable impression was to begin with fair play and take part in the Berlin Olympics scheduled for August.
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A law passed in June 1934 had appropriated just over 4 million francs in four installments to prepare for the games. Various anti-fascist movements, including the Communist Party, were against France’s participation in what appeared to be a coming glorification of Nazism. But sports
leaders and Count de Baillet-Latour, the president of the International Olympic Committee, which had secured the participation of non-Aryans, supported sending French athletes. France had taken part in the Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen but the coup of March 7, 1936, took place immediately after. What would the Popular Front do?

It solved the problem on July 6, 1936, by approving funding for the Games of the General Sports Federation of Workers, scheduled to take place in Barcelona but interrupted by the Spanish civil war.

François-Poncet finally did attend the “grandiose” opening ceremony of the Games on August 1. It was to be a huge German propaganda success. In front of 120,000 spectators in the world’s largest stadium built for the occasion, the Führer “really looked like a victor at the peak of his glory.” The only saving grace was that the German audience warmly cheered the French team,
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a rather meager consolation. The Germans won the most medals, even ahead of the Americans, 38 to 24…and 7 for France. Pierre Gaxotte wrote: “The Berlin Olympics end in a triumph. But where are the French? Without bicycle racing and weight lifting no one would hear about us… We look very poor in international competitions.”
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And
L’Humanité
concluded: “Sports were used in Berlin but they were not well served.”
³³

The issue of the Olympics seemed unimportant only on the surface. In fact, they touched a much wider audience than the broadest and most visible diplomatic initiatives. Nevertheless, in its relations with Germany, the government had to explore every opportunity to reach an agreement. The first possibility was a renewal of Locarno with German participation. Despite initial misgivings, Anthony Eden accepted a meeting of the three western Locarno powers—France, Belgium, and Great Britain, but without Italy—on July 23 in London. This meeting came after that of March 19
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and the conversations were based on the British communiqués of July 17 and 20,
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outlining the task “to find the best way to ensure peace in Europe through a general agreement.” The goal was to negotiate a new agreement replacing Locarno. Italy and Germany would be asked to participate, once the scope of the discussions could be broadened.

Léon Blum took advantage of those discussions to voice his worries to Baldwin, Eden, and Halifax, representing the British cabinet, and to the Belgian ministers Van Zeeland and Spaak. “The deep conviction on the part of the Prime Minister was that a Franco-German agreement, even though it might be guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy, would not
be sufficient to avert any danger of war in Europe.” He therefore was hoping for “a general peace agreement.”
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The London meeting was useless. Despite many efforts, Germany rejected any such negotiations.
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Therefore, direct Franco-German negotiations would be attempted. The go-between was the famous economics minister and governor of the Reichsbank, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht. Much more than Hitler, Schacht showed an interest in German colonial demands. He was hoping in any case for Germany to return somehow to the free market, an issue about which he would be consistently disappointed. It was not certain that Schacht was in fact being a faithful interpreter of Hitler himself. On August 3 Schacht hosted a luncheon in honor of Emile Labeyrie, the governor of the Bank of France, and on August 25 he traveled to Paris.
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Was it a polite gesture or “the starting point of a long-term political initiative?” He wanted to meet with Blum, Delbos, Auriol, Chautemps, Daladier, and Bastid. François-Poncet recommended that talk with him “in depth and very openly.”
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In the meantime, on August 24 Germany decided to lengthen conscription, bringing the German army from 500,000 to 700,000 men.
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“The day will come,” commented François-Poncet, “when Germany will have to choose between war and bankruptcy.” This was a source of worry for Schacht.

The meeting between Blum and Schacht took place on the morning of August 28.
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Schacht had met with Hitler before leaving. “He approves of the general thrust of my statements…you should understand that Chancellor Hitler is a man of genius.” Blum explained his views to his guest regarding a “general agreement” and why he preferred naming it so rather than bilateral agreements (such as the German-Polish or German-Austrian agreements). Blum admitted that an anti-fascist ideology did exist in France: “I am not just French, I am a Marxist and I am Jewish.” He pointed out that the Germans were anti-Communist and opposed to the League of Nations. Why not get rid of ideologies? The Franco-Soviet alliance was tied to German rearmament, just as the Franco-Russian alliance of 1893. In order to reach an agreement, Blum did not reject out of hand a discussion about the colonies. Why not have an immediate three-way negotiation between Germany, France and Great Britain? Schacht agreed but said “I must report our conversation and be sure that the Chancellor approves…” Blum replied, “I ardently hope we can succeed.”
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There was not to be any such success. During a discussion between Blum and Eden in Paris on September 20, 1936, the French prime minister
described his conversation with Schacht to the British.
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Hitler’s position, clearly favoring autarchy as stated at the Nuremberg party rally in September,
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appeared to exclude Schacht’s attempts to reach a measure of economic liberalization.
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François-Poncet met with Schacht on October 3 and found him “disappointed and worried.” His personal credibility, wrote the ambassador, was undergoing “a new period of crisis.”
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Jean Aris, the financial attaché, also shared this view and reported that Hitler scolded Schacht about “the vanity of his Franco-German conversations.” He had not even predicted the devaluation of the French franc. Göring had just been granted powers as “economic dictator”
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by a decree dated October 18.
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Any idea of direct Franco-German negotiations vanished. At that time as well, the king of the Belgians announced that Belgium from now on would ensure its own defense—and France therefore should not expect it to open up its territory unless it were attacked. There was also the Rome-Berlin agreement, which Mussolini described as being not a diaphragm but an axis. François-Poncet concluded on November 10
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that it was best not to pursue the Locarno-type discussion.

2.

T
HE
B
EGINNING OF
N
ON
-I
NTERVENTION IN
S
PAIN

Léon Blum was unlucky. On July 17, six weeks after forming the Popular Front government, Spain was rocked by a military coup. The friendly regime of the “Frente Popular,” resulting from the February elections, was under attack from Morocco and inside Spain by a military revolt that, customarily, was seeking a rapid seizure of power. For many reasons that we shall not detail here, the coup led by Generals Sanjurjo and Franco became a long civil war lasting almost three years.