Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (117 page)

This unique military system and the urban-oriented social structure caused the weight to shift from the fortresses to the field armies. A greater emphasis was laid on creating an independent and mobile army. It is important to keep in mind that the Mamluks had few military allies during this period.

Though Mamluk defense still relied on strong fortresses and the performance of their garrisons, the sultan’s field armies carried a greater share of responsibility. This had a direct influence on the development of military architecture. The investment in fortifications decreased; no new fortresses were built, few architectural innovations can be seen and the scale of building was limited. To this one may add the conclusions of
Chapter 2
, which show that although the Mongol threat constantly hovered above the sultanate, Mongol siege warfare capabilities were inferior to those known in the Eastern Mediterranean. The establishment of the Īlkhānid state did not change matters; as its siege abilities along the Mamluk frontier slowly declined there was no real call for new ideas within the field of Mamluk military architecture.

Was there a grand Mamluk defense strategy?

The question of frontier policy and the existence of a grand strategy in the Roman Empire is a controversial subject amongst scholars in the field of military history.
²⁴
The same question can be asked with regard to the early Mamluk period. Was there a planned defense strategy? Was the location of each and every fortress thought out?

The historical sources show that Baybars followed a well-thought-out strategy, which was maintained by his successors. It seems though that to a certain extent the numerous fortresses already scattered across the region, their location and size, greatly influenced and helped form this strategy, if not fully dictate it. On the whole the number of fortresses the Mamluks rebuilt and maintained was smaller than that held by the Franks. If a fortress was not a true necessity (administrative, military or economic), and might become a burden on the treasury and the field army, Baybars ordered its destruction. Fortresses along the coast and strongholds such as Mount Tabor,
,
, al-Tīna,
²⁵
(Montfort) and others were sacked and deserted. Ibn Shaddād lists 22 fortresses in the vicinity of Aleppo that were taken by Baybars and abandoned. Several accounts show the sultan weighing the pros and cons of a site before deciding whether to keep the fortress and restore it, or demolish it.
²⁶

Much emphasis was laid on setting a communication system between fortresses along the frontier and the centers of government. The
barīd
developed step by step with the Mamluk conquests. Key fortresses along the frontier, the main roads, and administrative centers were almost immediately connected to the postal route. Fortresses on the Euphrates had three means of sending messages in times of an emergency. Al-Bīra and
are the only fortresses that
mentions as having dovecotes, fire and smoke signals as well as the
barīd
services.
²⁷

The existence of a well-organized strategy is manifested in the selection of sites, the relatively modest scale of building, the establishment of the
barīd,
the organization of relief forces, the constant concern for frontier garrisons and fortress maintenance, the choice of governors and the composition of the garrisons. Although this grand strategy had its faults it served the Mamluks well. Mamluk amirs occasionally revolted and tried to form their own quasi-principalities, and the Īlkhānid armies managed to cross the Euphrates, for frontiers cannot be sealed, and yet the Mamluk sultanate outlived all three of its most prominent enemies: the Franks, the Īlkhānids, and the Armenians.

The Mamluks learnt from their predecessors’ mistakes and appear to have changed their priorities. Mamluk power was first and foremost displayed in its centralized regime and superior military organization. Military architecture came second. During this period architecture meant to display power was mostly constituted by the many monumental public and religious buildings in the large urban centers. Expenditure on grand and lavish projects such as mosques, madrasas, hospitals, bath-houses, markets, and caravansaries may well have surpassed the funds allocated to military architecture.

Epilogue

Though the thirteenth century defense system had proved itself, it was not maintained throughout the Mamluk period. During the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries Mamluk strategy changed considerably in response to geopolitical movements in the region with the fall of the Īlkhānid state, the Armenian kingdom in Cilicia and the rise of new Türkmen principalities. According to Har-El: “The Mamluks, who were no longer able to garrison those places, agreed to turn them over to the Türkmen chieftains, hoping in return to gain their assistance in the defence of the frontier.”
²⁸

Maqrīzī describes the Türkmens thus: “The Türkmens were the equivalent of fortifications protecting the country … And if the sultan delegated them to fight a war they acquiesced to his order and they went ahead in obeisance and prostration.”
²⁹

It seems, however, that the changes in defense can be partly attributed to changes in the nature of the Mamluk sultanate and the standing of the sultan. The internal chaos that struck the Sultanate soon after the death of
(741/1340) led to the gradual deterioration of fortifications along the eastern frontiers, and slackness among the garrisons who were no longer directly supervised by the sultans.

Towards the end of the fourteenth century a large Central Asian nomadic army was to invade the Middle East. The new defense strategy failed miserably, leaving much of northern and central Syria in ruins. News of Temür’s (Tamerlane) arrival at Tabrīz and the conquest of Baghdad reached Barqūq’s court as early as 795/1392–3.
³⁰
In addition, the sultan received a warning from the Jalayirid ruler of Iraq. Internal politics made it difficult to act, and the threat was probably not taken seriously. The latter would appear to have been the case. According to Ibn Khaldūn, Barqūq admitted that he feared the Ottoman sultan more than he feared Temür.
³¹
Reports of Temür’s conquests and atrocities must have been confirmed by the early 1390s. Barqūq set out for Syria in 797/1394–5 and personally saw to the appointment of new governors in three of the towns along the Euphrates frontier (
, Rūha (Edessa) and
).
³²
It is difficult to determine whether this move made by the sultan was directly connected with turbulent events that were to follow, or if it was a routine shuffle of governors intended to prevent powerful amirs from rebelling. The doubt concerning this act surfaces due to the fact that some of the towns (Tarsus, Safad, Tripoli and Karak) that had their governors replaced were not directly involved in the defense of the frontier. Whatever the case, no other preparations were made in anticipation of Temür’s invasion; neither fortresses nor garrisons were strengthened. Temür eventually invaded
Syria in 803/1400–1, a year after Barqūq’s death. Matters were left to a handful of powerful amirs, since Barqūq’s heir, al-Malik
Faraj b. Barqūq was only eleven years old (b. 791/1389; first reign 801/1399–808/1405). Temür’s armies marched from the north, taking a different route than Hülegü’s armies 140 years earlier.