The Crusades: The Authoritative History of the War for the Holy Land (86 page)

Imad al-Din, p. 172; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 301–2.

Baha al-Din, p. 102–3;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 70, 72.

Baha al-Din, p. 104; Tyerman,
God’s War
, pp. 353–4.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 73; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 369.

Baha al-Din, pp. 107–8; Ambroise, p. 52.

Imad al-Din,
Arab Historians of the Crusades
, trans. F. Gabrieli, pp. 204–6; Baha al-Din, pp. 27, 100–101; Ambroise, pp. 55, 58; B. Z. Kedar, ‘A Western survey of Saladin’s forces at the siege of Acre’,
Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer
, ed. B.Z. Kedar, J. S. C. Riley-Smith and R. Hiestand (Aldershot, 2000), pp. 113–22.

Ambroise, pp. 52, 55;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 80, 82; Baha al-Din, pp. 124, 127.

Saladin was joined by his son al-Zahir of Aleppo and Keukburi of Harran on 4 May; by Imad al-Din Zanki, lord of Sinjar, on 29 May; by Sanjar Shah, lord of Jazirat, on 13 June; by Mosuli troops under ‘Ala al-Din, son of Izz al-Din Masud, on 15 June; and by Zayn al-Din of Irbil in late June or early July. Baha al-Din, pp. 109–12.

Baha al-Din, p. 106. Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 312–13, 316. Saladin dispatched troops to Manbij, Kafartab, Baalbek, Shaizar, Aleppo and Hama. Among those who left the environs of Acre was al-Zahir.

Baha al-Din, p. 124.

Baha al-Din, pp. 110–11; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 373; Ambroise, p. 55.

Baha al-Din, p. 123; Ambroise, p. 59.

La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, p. 105;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 74; Ambroise, p. 56.

La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, p. 98; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 375.

Ambroise, pp. 52, 61–3. Frederick of Swabia’s presence, as a ruler largely bereft of manpower, raised uncomfortable questions about leadership and King Guy’s status. Baha al-Din (pp. 128–31) believed that, soon after his arrival, Frederick spearheaded a new offensive against Acre, employing experimental military technology. This involved the medieval equivalent of a tank–a huge wheeled structure, clad with metal sheets, housing a massive iron-tipped battering ram. But Latin eyewitnesses gave all the credit for this initiative to the French and, in any case, once the ‘tank’ reached the foot of the walls it was quickly crushed and burned beneath a barrage of boulders and Greek fire.

Baha al-Din, pp. 130, 132; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 318–20. Around the same time, work to shore up the defences of Alexandria and Damietta was proceeding apace in Egypt, and instructions were broadcast through Syria to store grain from the recent harvest in case of invasion.

Baha al-Din, pp. 140, 143; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 323–4;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 127, 129–30; Ambroise, pp. 68–71, 73.

Baha al-Din, pp. 141–2; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 323–5.

Ambroise, p. 38; Baha al-Din, p. 150.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 204–5; P. W. Edbury,
The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374
(Cambridge, 1991), pp. 1–12.

Baha al-Din, pp. 145, 149–50;
La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, pp. 109, 111.

Baha al-Din, p. 146; R. Heiser, ‘The Royal
Familiares
of King Richard I’,
Medieval Prosopography
, vol. 10 (1989), pp. 25–50.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 206, 211; Baha al-Din, p. 155.

Baha al-Din, pp. 153, 156, 159.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 211; Ambroise, p. 74.

Codice Diplomatico della repubblica di Genova
, ed. C. Imperiale di Sant’ Angelo, 3 vols (Genoa, 1936–42), ii, n. 198, pp. 378–80; J. S. C. Riley-Smith,
The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1174–1277
(London, 1973), pp. 112–17.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 218–19. The precise details of these siege weapons–their origins and exact designs–are unclear, because the contemporary sources are frustratingly imprecise. It is possible that some use was made of counterweight technology in these stone-throwers (traction-powered devices being the established norm). It is also possible that the technology and materials for these engines were brought from Europe, or that captured engineers contributed to their development. The dating of Philip’s independent assault is problematic and it may have occurred at any point between 17 June and 1 July. Hugh of Burgundy, the Templars and Hospitallers all appear to have manned their own catapults. Richard does seem to have built a siege tower at Acre, protected by ‘leather, cords and wood’, but this structure does not appear to have played a major role in the assault.

Baha al-Din, pp. 155–7.

Baha al-Din, pp. 156–7;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 223–4.

Ambroise, p. 80;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 225.

Ambroise, pp. 82, 84; Baha al-Din, p. 161;
La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, p. 125.

Baha al-Din, p. 161; Imad al-Din, p. 318;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 233; Ambroise, p. 84.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 233–4.

Baha al-Din, p. 162; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, p. 331; Gillingham,
Richard I
, p. 162; Pryor,
Geography, Technology and War
, pp. 125–30.

Ambroise, p. 85; Rigord, ‘
Gesta Philippi Augusti
’,
Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton
, ed. H. F. Delaborde, vol. 1 (Paris, 1882), pp. 116–17; Howden,
Gesta
, vol. 2, pp. 181–3; Gillingham,
Richard I
, p. 166.

‘
Epistolae Cantuarienses
’,
Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I
, ed. W. Stubbs, vol. 2, Rolls Series 88 (London, 1865), p. 347.

Baha al-Din, pp. 164–5; Imad al-Din, p. 330; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 390; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 331–3.

Howden,
Chronica
, vol. 3, pp. 127, 130–31; Howden,
Gesta
, vol. 2, pp. 187, 189; Ambroise, pp. 87–9;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 240–43;
La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, pp. 127–9; ‘
Historia de expeditione Friderici Imperatoris
’, p. 99; R. Grousset,
Histoire des Croisades
, 3 vols (Paris, 1936), vol. 3, pp. 61–2; Gillingham,
Richard I
, pp. 166–71.

Richard also had the significant advantage of enjoying close relations with the leaders of the two main Military Orders. Robert of Sablé, who was appointed to the vacant post of master of the Templars in 1191, was one of the Lionheart’s leading vassals from the Sarthe valley and had served as one of five fleet commanders during the journey to the Levant. Garnier of Nablus, who was elected as Hospitaller master in late 1189 or early 1190, was the former prior of England and grand commander of France. He travelled to the Near East with Richard’s contingent.

Smail,
Crusading Warfare
, p. 163; Gillingham,
Richard I
, p. 174; J. F. Verbruggen,
The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages
(Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 232–9; Ambroise, pp. 91–2.

Ambroise, p. 92.

Baha al-Din, p. 170; Ambroise, p. 93.

Ambroise, p. 94; Baha al-Din, p. 170.

Ambroise, p. 96;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 253, 258–9; Baha al-Din, p. 171.

Ambroise, p. 97; Baha al-Din, pp. 171–2.

Baha al-Din, pp. 172–3; Ambroise, p. 98; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, p. 336.

Ambroise, pp. 99–107;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 260–80; Howden,
Chronica
, vol. 3, pp. 130–33; Baha al-Din, pp. 174–6; Imad al-Din, p. 344.

Ambroise, pp. 100–101, 103.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 264; Howden,
Chronica
, vol. 3, p. 131; Baha al-Din, p. 175.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 268–9; Ambroise, p. 104.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 270; Howden,
Chronica
, vol. 3, pp. 129–31. Richard authored another letter on that same day (this time addressed generally to the people of his realm) which had even less to say about the battle, commenting simply that ‘as we were nearing Arsuf Saladin came swooping down upon us’.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, pp. 274–7; Ambroise, pp. 107–9. Richard I described James of Avesnes as the ‘best of men whose merits had made him dear to the whole army’ and as the ‘pillar’ of the crusade (Howden,
Chronica
, vol. 3, pp. 129–31). Ambroise recalled the circumstances of James’ death, noting that ‘there were some who did not come to his rescue, which gave rise to much talk; this was one of the barons of France, they said, the count of Dreux, he and his men. I have heard so many speak ill of this that the history cannot deny it.’ Unfortunately, no further explanation was offered of Robert of Dreux’s failure to help James.

Flori,
Richard the Lionheart
, pp. 137–8. Many historians have expressed similar views, suggesting that Richard actively sought battle at Arsuf. These include: Gillingham (
Richard I
, pp. 173–8) who acknowledged that his account of Arsuf was based on Ambroise’s testimony and described the battle as the ‘height of Richard’s fame’, characterising the king’s handling of the encounter as ‘masterful’ Verbruggen (
The Art of Warfare
, p. 232) who described Arsuf as ‘the last great triumph of the Christians in the Near East’ and S. Runciman (‘The kingdom of Acre and the later crusades’,
A History of the Crusades
, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1954), p. 57) who applauded the Lionheart’s ‘superb generalship’. Tyerman (
God’s War
, pp. 458–9) downplayed the importance of the battle, but nonetheless maintained that Richard wanted to engage Saladin in combat and launch a heavy cavalry charge. Others, like J. P. Phillips (
The Crusades 1095–1197
(London, 2002), pp. 146, 151), praised Richard’s ‘brilliant generalship at Arsuf’, while ignoring the question of whether or not the king deliberately sought battle. Smail (
Crusading Warfare
, p. 163) did describe Arsuf as a natural event that was merely part of the process of a fighting march, but still believed that Richard had planned the crusader charge (pp. 128–9).

Baha al-Din, pp. 175–7; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 338–9.

Baha al-Din, p. 178; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 338–42.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 284; Ambroise, p. 114. There can be little doubt that Richard was contemplating an Egyptian campaign from that autumn onwards, as letters to the Genoese dating from October 1191 refer to plans to ‘hasten with all our forces into Egypt’ the following summer ‘for the advantage’ of the Holy Land.
Codice Diplomatico della repubblica di Genova
, vol. 3, pp. 19–21. Richard showed a deft diplomatic touch in managing to curry the support of the Genoese, while still maintaining the backing of his established allies, the Pisans. Favreau-Lilie,
Die Italiener im Heiligen Land
, pp. 288–93.

Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 293; Ambroise, pp. 118–19; Gillingham, ‘Richard I and the Science of War’, pp. 89–90; D. Pringle, ‘Templar castles between Jaffa and Jerusalem’,
The Military Orders
, vol. 2, ed. H. Nicholson (Aldershot, 1998), pp. 89–109.

Baha al-Din, p. 179.

Baha al-Din, pp. 185–8; Imad al-Din, pp. 349–51. Gillingham,
Richard I
, pp. 183–5; Lyons and Jackson,
Saladin
, pp. 342–3. The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre (
La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr
, p. 151) mentioned the proposed union between al-Adil and Joanne, but this text (also known as the Lyon
Eracles
) originated in the mid-thirteenth century. The reason for Joanne’s refusal is unclear. Baha al-Din recorded that she flew into a rage when Richard finally presented his plan to her. Imad al-Din, however, believed that she had been willing to enter into such a union, but had been compelled to refuse by the Latin clergy.

Baha al-Din, pp. 193–5; Imad al-Din, pp. 353–4; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 392;
Itinerarium Peregrinorum
, p. 296; Ambroise, p. 120. Imad al-Din saw Richard’s approaches as duplicitous. Baha al-Din, meanwhile, argued that Saladin’s real ‘aim was to undermine the peace talks’. He recorded a personal conversation in which the sultan emphasised that peace would not end the danger to Islam. Predicting the collapse of Muslim unity after his death and a resurgence in Frankish power, Saladin apparently stated: ‘Our best course is to keep on with the
jihad
until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves.’ Baha al-Din concluded that ‘this was his own view and it was only against his will that he was persuaded to make peace’. However, this was probably propaganda designed to maintain Saladin’s image as an undefeated
mujahid
.