The Enigma of Japanese Power (66 page)

For one example of this argument, see Park,
Bureaucrats
, op. cit. (n. 56), p. 134. A very knowledgeable and eloquent defender of this position is Muramatsu Michio; see, for example, Muramatsu Michio and Ellis S. Kraus, ‘The conservative policy line and the development of patterned pluralism’, in K. Yamamura and Y. Yasuba (eds.),
The Political Economy of Japan
, Stanford University Press, 1987, pp. 516–54.
↩

Hata,
Kanryo no kenkyu
, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 108.
↩

Ibid., pp. 109–10.
↩

Gordon Berger,
Parties out of Power in Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 75.
↩

Delmer M. Brown,
Nationalism in Japan
, University of California Press, 1955, pp. 219–20.
↩

Ibid., p. 220.
↩

Junichi Kyogoku,
The Political Dynamics of Japan
, University of Tokyo Press, 1987, p. 11.
↩

Jiyuminshu Henshubu, ‘1985 nen taisei e no tembo’ [Perspective for a 1985 system],
Jiyuminshu
, January 1982, pp. 224–9.
↩

For an example of this in Tanaka Kakuei’s stronghold, see Takabatake Michitoshi, ‘Etsuzankai no tsuyoki to yowaki’ [Strong and weak points of Etsuzankai],
Ushio
, December 1983, p. 96.
↩

Garon,
State and Labor
, op. cit. (n. 3).
↩

Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in
Four Essays on Liberty
, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 118.
↩

David A. Titus, ‘Political parties and nonissues in Taisho democracy’, in H. Wray and H. Conroy (eds.),
Japan Examined
, University of Hawaii Press, 1983, p. 185.
↩

Akira Iriye, ‘The failure of economic expansionism: 1918–1931’, in B. Silberman and H. D. Harootunian (eds),
Japan in Crisis
, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 238.
↩

Tsuchiya Takao, ‘Keizai seisakuka to shite no Okubo Toshimichi’ [Okubo Toshimichi as an economic policy-maker],
Chuo Koron
, April 1935, p 98. The mission was the famous Iwakura Mission to Europe and the United States that lasted eighteen months in 1871–3.
↩

Ibid., p. 109.
↩

Clyde Prestowitz,
Trading Places
, Basic Books, 1988, chapter 4.
↩

The authority on this subject, Nakamura Takafusa, makes this point, contradicting the widespread view of overall recession. Nakamura Takafusa,
Economic Growth in Prewar Japan
, Yale University Press, 1983, p. 156.
↩

Chalmers Johnson,
MITI and the Japanese Miracle
, Stanford University Press, 1982, pp. 102–3.
↩

Nakamura,
Economic Growth
, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 266.
↩

Mark R. Peattie,
Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West
, Princeton University Press, 1975, chapters 6, 7.
↩

Nakamura,
Economic Growth
, op. cit. (n. 6), pp. 268–70.
↩

Also known as Aikawa Yoshisuke, he had, of course, graduated from Todai, and was a protégé of Marquis Inoue Kaoru, who held many portfolios in Meiji-period governments and had very close ties with the biggest financiers. He started with a foundry, combined it with the Kuhara Mining Company of his brother-in-law, gave it the name Nissan and added subsidiaries, including the famous Hitachi works, to form a ‘new
zaibatsu
. The conglomerate prospered by producing munitions and armaments before being invited to participate in Manchuria. See Ayukawa’s own explanation of the deal made with the Kwantung Army, in his article ’Manshu keizai shihai no kii pointo’ [The key points of economic control in Manchuria],
Bessatsu Chisei
, December 1956, pp. 198–200.
↩

G. C. Allen, ‘Japanese industry: its organisation and development to 1937’, in E. B. Schumpeter,
The Industrialisation of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930–1940
, Macmillan, 1940, pp. 643–5. For Kishi’s introducing Ayukawa to Manchuria, see also Johnson,
MITI
, op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 131–2.
↩

For a part of the web of Ayukawa’s family ties with prominent figures, see Natori Giichi,
Seizaikaijin no meiun
[Destiny of People in the World of Politics, Business and Bureaucracy], Hokushindo, 1952, pp. 155–9.
↩

Ayukawa explained after the war that he had been misled by bureaucrats such as Shiina Etsusaburo about conditions in Manchuria. See Ando Yoshio,
Showa seiji keizaishi e no shogen
[Testimony on the Political and Economic History of Showa], vol. 1, Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1972, p. 280.
↩

T. A. Bisson,
Japan’s War Economy
, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945, p. 3.
↩

See, for instance, the remarks by Kaya Okinori, the most prominent Ministry of Finance official in the late 1930s. A number of Showa Kenkyukai (see Chapter 14) members thought the same. See Kaya Okinori,
Senzen sengo 80 nen
[Eighty Years before and after the War], Keizai Oraisha, 1976, pp. 95–6.
↩

Johnson,
MITI
, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 160.
↩

Ito Osamu, ‘Sengo Nihon kin’yu shisutemu no keisei’ [The formation of post-war Japan’s financial system], in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai (eds.),
Nempo Kindai Nihon Kenkyu
, vol. 8, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1986, p. 219.
↩

Johnson,
MITI
, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 136.
↩

Ito, ‘Sengo Nihon’, op. cit. (n. 18), p. 223.
↩

Ibid., pp. 224–5.
↩

Gunju Yushi Shitei Kinyu Kikan Seido.
↩

See Okurasho Showa Zaiseishi Henshushitsu (eds.),
Showa zaiseishi
[History of Public Finance in Showa], vol. 11,
Kin’yu 2
[Finance 2], Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1957, pp. 343–6. The law was the Gunju Kaisha Ho (Munition Corporation Law).
↩

The commercial banks were Teikoku, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo and Sanwa; the Industrial Bank of Japan belonged in the same category. They were backed by fifty-six banks designated as ‘banks to absorb funds from private sectors’. Ibid., p. 348.
↩

Ibid., pp. 349–52.
↩

Okurasho Showa Zaiseishi Henshushitsu (eds.),
Showa zaiseishi
, op. cit. (n. 23), vol. 2,
Zaisei kikan
[Financial Institutions], 1956, pp. 275–8. A law passed in April 1945 further endorsed the system (Gunjo Kinyuto Tokubetsu Sochi Ho, Special Law for Munitions Financing).
↩

Nakamura Takafusa,
The Postwar Japanese Economy
, University of Tokyo Press, 1981, pp. 16–17; Miyazaki Yoshikazu,
Sengo Nihon no keizai kiko
[Economic Structure of Post-War Japan], Shinhyoron, 1966, pp. 48–9; Ito, ‘Sengo Nihon’, op. cit. (n. 18); Yamazaki Hiroaki, ‘Senjika no sangyokozo to dokusen soshiki’ [Wartime industrial structure and monopolistic organisation], in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo (eds.),
Senji Nihon keizai
, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1979, pp. 286—9.
↩

Yoshio Suzuki,
Money and Banking in Contemporary Japan
, Yale University Press, 1980, p. 8.
↩

Ibid., p. 9.
↩

Tahara Soichiro,
Dentsu
, Asahi Shimbunsha, 1984, p. 69.
↩

Ibid., p. 61.
↩

Suetsugu Seiji, ‘Dentsu ni yoru masukomi sosa: sono haikei to konnichiteki yakuwari’ [Dentsu’s manoeuvring of the mass media: its background and present-day role],
Tsukuru
, November 1973, pp. 76–9.
↩

Kusayanagi Daizo, ‘Gendai okokuron: Dentsu’ [On a modern kingdom: Dentsu],
Bungei Shunju
, February 1967, p. 194.
↩

Tahara,
Dentsu
, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 79.
↩

Fujii Haruo, ‘Dentsu no heeru o hagu’ [Unveiling Dentsu], in Ino Kenji (ed.),
Dentsu kogairon
, Nisshin Hodo, 1971, pp. 165–7.
↩

Nakamura,
Postwar Japanese Economy
, op. cit. (n. 27), p. 15.
↩

See Okurasho Showa Zaiseishi Henshushitsu (eds.).
Showa zaiseishi
, op. cit. (n. 23), vol. 1,
Soron
[General Discussion], 1965, pp. 227–32.
↩

See Osawa Tadashi,
Chusho kigyo seisaku shiron
[On the History of Small and Medium-Sized Industry], Minato Shuppansha, 1970, p. 206.
↩

Ibid., p. 208.
↩

Tatsumi Nobuharu, ‘Chusho kigyo ni okeru soshikika no rekishi to mondaiten’ [History and problems of the systematisation of small and medium-sized companies], in Takeuchi Masami (ed.),
Korekara no chusho kigyo soshikika no tembo
, Nihon Seisansei Hombu, 1965, p. 72. For a history of early post-war organisation of small and medium-sized industry, see Higuchi Kenji, ‘Sengo chusho kigyo undo no tenkai’ [Post-war development of small and medium-sized industry movement],
Gendai Chusho kigyo kisokozo
, vol. 3, Doyukan, 1976, pp. 223–56.
↩

Aikawa Yoshisuke,
Watashi no rirekisho: keizaijin
[My Personal History: People in Business], vol. 9, Nikkei Shimbunsha, 1980, p. 77. Originally published by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1965.
↩

Ibid., p. 80.
↩

Higuchi, ‘Sengo chusho kigyo’, op. cit. (n. 40), p. 246.
↩

Ibid., p. 249.
↩

Ibid., p. 252.
↩

Whether or not a formal or informal ‘reverse course’ was ever part of the occupation’s conscious policies – a subject of some debate – is immaterial. The shift in emphasis was noticed, and in the view of Japanese intellectuals it has been a very real milestone in early post-war history.
↩

Yanaga Chitoshi,
Big Business in Japanese Politics
, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 38.
↩

Tsuchikawa Nobuo, ‘Seito naikaku to shoko kanryo’ [The commercial, industrial bureaucracy and party cabinets: the industrial state policy of the Tanaka cabinet], in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai (eds.),
Nempo Kindai Nihon kenkyu
, vol. 8, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1986, pp. 188, 199.
↩

Iwai Tomoaki, ‘Kokkai naikaku’ [Diet cabinet], in Nakano Minoru (ed.),
Nihongata seisaku kettei no hen’yo
, Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1986, p. 17; and Muramatsu Michio, ‘Rippo katei to seito, atsuryoku dantai, kanryo no kankei’ [Parties, bureaucrats and pressure groups in the Japanese legislative process: pre-Diet and Diet procedure],
Hokudai Hogaku Ronshu
, vol. 34, no. 1, 1983, pp. 149–50.
↩

William W. Lockwood, ‘Japan’s “new capitalism”’, in Lockwood (ed.),
The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan
, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 487.
↩

Uchino Tatsuro,
Japan’s Postwar Economy
, Kodansha International, 1983, p. 66.
↩

For the farcical hearings on this, see Yamamura Kozo,
Economic Policy in Postwar Japan
, University of California Press, 1967, chapter 5.
↩

Uchino,
Postwar Economy
, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 54.
↩

The balanced budget was maintained until long after Dodge’s other prescriptions were forgotten. The government was forced to drop it in the late 1960s under pressure to stimulate the economy by public works (see Chapter 5), though departure from it scares the Ministry of Finance bureaucrats up to this day.
↩

Suzuki,
Money
, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 14.
↩

Johnson,
MITI
, op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 255–60; Uchino,
Postwar Economy
, op. cit. (n. 51), pp. 119–20.
↩

As observed by Johnson,
MITI
, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 32.
↩

Uchino,
Postwar Economy
, op. cit. (n. 51), p. 120.
↩

Okumura Hiroshi,
Shin: Nihon no roku dai kigyo shudan
[Six Big Corporate Groups in Japan], Daiamondosha, 1983, p. 118.
↩

For an overview and analysis of the system, see Ishida Hideto, ‘Anticompetitive practices in the distribution of goods and services in Japan’,
Journal of Japanese Studies
, Summer 1983, pp. 319–34.
↩

Ibid., p. 325.
↩

Furuta Hisateru, ‘Foodo o meguru Kishi to Yoshida’ [Kishi, Yoshida and Ford Motor Co.],
Chuo Koron
, July 1986, p. 301.
↩

For the role of the
banto
, see John G. Roberts,
Mitsui
, Weatherhill, 1973.
↩

See, for example, Shibagaki Kazuo, ‘“Keizai shintaisei” to toseikai: sono rinen to genjitsu’ [‘Economic new order’ and the control associations: their ideal and reality], in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo (eds.),
Senji Nihon keizai
, op. cit. (n. 27), p. 302.
↩

Yanaga,
Big Business
, op. cit. (n. 47), p. 46.
↩

Sakaguchi Akira, ‘Zaikai “ipponka” koso no shujiku’ [Initiator of the ‘unification’ of the business world],
Zaikai
, 1 February 1965, p. 53.
↩

Miyazaki Yoshikazu,
Sengo Nihon no keizai kiko
[Economic Structure of Post-War Japan], Shinhyoron, 1966, p. 55.
↩

Prestowitz,
Trading Places
, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 144.
↩

For an excellent detailed account of the Japan–US ‘semiconductor wars’ as well as the machine-tool saga, see ibid., chapter 2 and pp. 217–29.
↩

The term derives from
zaimu
, which means financial management, and ‘hi-technology’.
↩

In the 1980s Japanese continued to save roughly one-fifth of their disposable income. The ‘bonus’ system, whereby salarymen receive between 20 and 35 per cent of their salary in negotiated sums twice a year, helps stimulate savings. The underdeveloped welfare system is another stimulus; 36 per cent of all personal savings is estimated to serve as insurance for illness or accidents, according to a central bank study. A further impetus for saving is the high cost of education and housing.
↩

Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi.
↩

According to the Economic Planning Agency. See also the remark by the president of Sohyo, Kurokawa Takeshi, quoted in
Asahi Evening News
, 19 February 1988.
↩

Over the calendar year of 1987. National Land Agency figures made public in March 1988.
↩

Nippon Life Insurance, Daiichi Mutual Life Insurance and Sumitomo Mutual Life Insurance.
↩

The bureaucrats do, of course, make mistakes. One of their greatest postwar failings was the yen-rate defence of 1971. The authorities supported the dollar by buying 6 billion dollars for eleven days, during which only Japan’s foreign exchange market did not close.
↩

IBM and Coca-Cola are often singled out as the great foreign success stories in the Japanese market. Both began at a very early stage after the war and had, as it were, historical rights. Nevertheless, they were placed under many restrictions, were initially forbidden to take their earnings out of Japan and through licensing stipulations practically had to help nurture the growth of their Japanese competitors.
↩