The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush (30 page)

Read The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush Online

Authors: Judith E. Michaels

Tags: #test

BOOK: The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush
13.8Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
 
Page 90
Nixon created another problem for himself when, early in his first administration, he gave cabinet secretaries authority for subcabinet appointments and told them to fill positions "on the basis of ability first and loyalty second. This was a significant, if impulsive, delegation of personnel selection that members of the cabinet would not soon or easily surrender." Nixon recognized his error almost immediately. On leaving that fateful cabinet meeting at which he gave his secretaries carte blanche appointing authority, he told an aide, "I just made a big mistake;" but by then it was too late (ibid., 45).
It was soon apparent that this cabinet-style government would not work. In 1970 Nixon brought in Fred Malek to restructure the process, which he did, using techniques from the preceding administrations: centralization of the appointment process in the White House, clearer specification of selection criteria, a more explicit clearance process, and a much more aggressive recruitment effort, with a significantly heightened level of intensity.
Malek took tight control over all major appointments, including those of subcabinet officials and staff assistants to top PASs, as discussed in chapter 2. By the end of Nixon's first term the strong cabinet model was no more.
Pursuing Nixon's goal of controlling the government, the White House Personnel Office (WHPO) expanded in size and attempted to influence both noncareer and career positions further down in the bureaucracy. As discussed in chapter 3, it applied political criteria and found ways to skirt the merit system. It is from this era that the White House "enemies list," illegal controls over careers, and Watergate emanated. For all its efforts, however, it did not produce the desired effect of controlling the bureaucracy or producing better relations with the Congress (ibid., 54).
The political reaction to the White House Personnel Operation and the Watergate fiasco caused the fall of the presidential appointments system in the shambles of the Nixon administration. It would have to be reinvented in a different form by Gerald Ford (Macy et al. 1983, 35).
Ford, the first president to assume office without being elected to either that office or the vice presidency, did so at a unique and critical period in the nation's history. "A United States president had resigned in disgrace, the Watergate scandal had drawn the curtain on a seamy side of political life, and the public's confidence in its governing institutions had been severely shaken. The new president's paramount goal was to lead the country out of its 'long national nightmare' and restore public trust" (Bonafede 1987a, 42).
Initially, Ford moved cautiously, much as Johnson had, following
 
Page 91
JFK's assassination. Seeking to ensure stability and continuity, he did not purge his ranks of Nixon appointees. "He didn't want people to think all of Nixon's appointees were "bad guys" and he was throwing them to the wolves" (ibid., 42). And, given his lame duck status, with two years left in an office to which he had not been elected and for which he was not going to run, heading a public service tarnished by Watergate, Ford's administration was hardly attractive to potential appointee candidates.
Nonetheless, Ford was an active participant in the appointments process. His chief of staff, Donald Rumsfeld, exercised considerable control over appointments, but the final decision was the president's. Ford, without Rumsfeld's advice or sometimes despite his opposition,
personally selected David Mathews as HEW secretary, decided that Kissinger should hold the single job of secretary of state and thus relieved him of his other position as White House national security adviser, and installed Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller as operating director of the White House Domestic Council . .., [and] fired defense secretary James R. Schlesinger because of his "aloof, frequently arrogant manner" and combative attitude. He then appointed Rumsfeld as defense secretary, replaced him with Cheney, named George Bush as CIA director, and elevated General Brent Scowcroft to NSC director. (Ibid., 43)
In these actions Ford bypassed the newly renamed Presidential Personnel Office (PPO) that focused on subcabinet and other presidential appointments. The PPO, meanwhile, had taken the symbolic step of moving away from using the professional recruiters employed by Malek to using knowledgeable Washington generalists in an effort to shift the focus from pure politics to good government in the wake of Watergate. William Walker, the PPO director, had regular access to Ford, though, and a good working relationship with him (ibid., 43).
There was, however, a certain ambiguity in Ford's administrative style: "while endorsing cabinet government, he would express hostility toward the bureaucracy, claiming in a familiar litany, 'A government big enough to give you everything you want is a government big enough to take from you everything you have.' He further vowed to reduce the size of the permanent government and the White House staff, neither of which occurred during his term" (ibid., 44).
Early 1976 saw a shift in the political climate when Ford changed his mind and decided he would run for the office to which he had been elevated. Word soon went out that political considerations would be paramount in presidential appointments. The political nature of the appoint-
 
Page 92
ments process accelerated as appointees left to return to the private sector, as is customary near the end of a presidential term. The Democrat-controlled Senate began flexing its muscles in regard to PAS replacements, delaying or denying some appointments, such as that of Joseph Coors of beer manufacturing fame, an ideological conservative, slated, but not fated, to be a director of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (ibid., 44).
While Gerald Ford's personal interest in the appointment process helped restore some respect for public service and the executive personnel function, with the passage of the White House to Democratic control, Jimmy Carter's staff began again to reinvent the personnel wheel. He was the first president to begin planning for his administration before the general election. From the summer of 1976 onward his staff prepared for victory and transition and had TIP, the Talent Inventory Program, in place by election day. It was hailed as "the first step in a nationwide recruiting effort, which provided a comprehensive inventory of potential appointees and indicated the kinds of positions for which their qualifications recommended them" (Macy et al. 1983, 37).
However, infighting among the Carter staff over the nonpolitical nature of the program wasted the advance work done on it. Moreover, in Carter's administration, decisions were effectively decentralized, resulting in broad inconsistencies in the character and quality of his appointments; they ranged from "good old boy" hiring to stringent requirements for qualifications. As Carter's energies were diverted to other matters and the system was trying both to invent itself and to function at the same time, appointments soon bogged down (ibid., 37).
Carter allowed cabinet officers nearly free rein to choose their subordinates:
In manyperhaps mostrespects, this was an improvement. To the extent such discretion was granted, cabinet members were not saddled with incompatible associates thrust upon them by the White House. Nor did patronage considerations dictate the appointment of poorly-qualified persons, as had been know to happen in the past. Nevertheless, the results in terms of managerial capacity were bound to be spotty. [Cronyism often showed up in the choices secretaries made for their deputies.] . . . Scanning the list of deputy secretaries, one finds fewer than half with previous experience in federal government administrationand some of these for only two or three yearsbut several others had been managers in private industry or in state government. All of them brought important qualifications to the job, but managerial deputies were not recruited as a
 
Page 93
matter of course; if they were found at all, it was the product of the chance good judgement of the cabinet member. (Sundquist 1979, 6)
However, Carter largely created his own problems with his approach to the cabinet, giving his officers Nixonian carte blanche to choose their subordinates and likewise to manage their departments. Carter "proudly boasted, 'There will never be an instance while I am President where the members of the White House staff dominate or act in a superior position to the members of the cabinet"' (Bonafede 1987a, 46).
As happened to Nixon, this laissez-faire approach soon backfired. According to one White House aide, running battles between cabinet and White House staff over staff appointments, policy, media communication, etc., "ran the gamut from an unwillingness to cooperate to outright defiance. Carter was very supportive of the cabinet; he thought the White House staff was overreacting, and he'd give departmental appointees the benefit of the doubt" (ibid., 46). Carter only changed this position after intense pressure from the Congress.
Over time, fears of disloyalty eventually led to a White House directive to cabinet officers to institute
"[p]ersonal and professional evaluations" of all presidential appointees. . . . Inevitably, Carter's frustration in dealing with recalcitrant cabinet-level appointees led to a dramatic shake-up; in mid-July 1979, [he announced the departure of several key cabinet members]. The cabinet exorcism, widely criticized for the graceless way in which it was handled, was conducted without the involvement of the personnel office. (Ibid., 47)
A new personnel director, Arnie Miller, had reorganized the office in 1978 and helped restore White House control and professionalism to the appointments process. "But it came too latethe Iranian seizure of the American hostages had effectively sealed Carter's political fate" (ibid., 47).
Like Carter, Ronald Reagan began planning for his administration far in advance. He was more successful at embodying his policy focus in his appointments because his personnel staff maintained a consistent focus through the first eighteen months of his term and Reagan himself sustained a personal interest and the appearance of active participation in it (Macy et al. 1983, 39).
Reagan's investment in the appointment process was carried by his White House staff under Personnel Director E. Pendleton James who, having cut his political eye teeth under Fred Malek in Nixon's administra-

Other books

The One That Got Away by Carol Rosenfeld
Over Her Dead Body by Bradley Bigato
Unconditional surrender by Evelyn Waugh
Frozen Assets by Quentin Bates
Dark Woods by Steve Voake
Creators by Tiffany Truitt
The Gallant by William Stuart Long
Trigger Point Therapy for Myofascial Pain by Donna Finando, L.Ac., L.M.T.