cessful in eradicating every trace of Reagan. By the summer of the first year, approximately 35 percent of the subcabinet appointees were Reagan holdovers, though not necessarily holding the same position (Pfiffner 1990, 68). However, a year later only 22 percent remained (Aberbach 1991, 239).
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Another important source of patronage pressure is the other appointees themselves. Robert Mosbacher, secretary of commerce, for example, publicly complained that not enough fund raisers were getting jobs in the administration, even though as many as 50 percent of them did. There was also a "must list" of fifty major donors who wanted jobs for themselves or their relatives; more than a dozen significant donors were appointed to major ambassadorial posts early in the administration (Pfiffner 1990, 68).
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Conservative think tanks and the Far Right continued their importuning of the White Housethe Heritage Foundation sent over a ten-foot stack of 2,500 resumes. The flood of resumes to the White House from all sources eventually numbered 70,000 (45,000 after duplicates were culled). As one administration official said, choosing among them was like "trying to take a sip from a fire hydrant" (ibid., 68). The sheer numbers are enough to stagger any personnel office, let alone one not firmly established and well positioned within an administration.
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Models of Political Appointments: Political Pay-Offs, Shadow Governments, and Counter-Staffing
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In their study of noncareer SES executives in the Reagan administration, Ban and Ingraham discuss three models for political appointments and the relationships with careerists to which they lend themselves. Their analysis applies in large measure to PAS executives as well. One is the political payoff model, in which the appointment is made to please or appease a constituency group, party power base, large donor, or individual crucial to the success of the presidential campaign. Appointees occupying these positions are "particularly hard to control, since they are likely to define their role in terms of representing the interests to whom they owe their position, and to have strong ties to the 'iron triangle' [an agency, congressional oversight committee, and special interest groups] in their field." If they share similar values and priorities with their career staff their relationship is likely to be very good (Ban and Ingraham 1990, 109-10).
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The shadow government model involves what Heclo terms "political careerists," who may be congressional staff members, academics, career
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